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Gefunden 
Ich ging im Walde 
So für mich hin, 
Und nichts zu suchen, 
Das war mein Sinn. 
Im Schatten sah ich 
Ein Blümchen stehn, 
Wie Sterne leuchtend, 
Wie Äuglein schön. 
Ich wollt es brechen, 
Da sagt es fein: 
Soll ich zum Welken 
Gebrochen sein? 
Ich grub's mit allen 
Den Würzlein aus. 
Zum Garten trug ich's 
Am hübschen Haus. 
Und pflanzt es wieder 
Am stillen Ort; 
Nun zweigt es immer 
Und blüht so fort. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe  
 
Found 
Once through the forest 
Alone I went; 
To seek for nothing 
My thoughts were bent. 
I saw i' the shadow 
A flower stand there 
As stars it glisten'd, 
As eyes 'twas fair. 
I sought to pluck it, 
It gently said: 
“Shall I be gather'd 
Only to fade?” 
With all its roots 
I dug it with care, 
And took it home 
To my garden fair. 
In silent corner 
Soon it was set; 
There grows it ever, 
There blooms it yet. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe  
(translated by Edgar Alfred Bowring, 1815) 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
Effectiveness and Perspectives of Access and Benefit-sharing Regimes in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity - A Comparative Analysis of Costa Rica, the 
Philippines, Ethiopia and the European Union 
The decline of biodiversity has reached an alarming rate and all the approaches that have 
been undertaken in the past were not sufficient to stop the on-going process. One of these 
approaches is Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS), a market-based approach, which has 
been established with the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992. 
The underlying idea of ABS is that it turns biodiversity and genetic resources from an open 
access good to a private or club good and creates a market for genetic resources. It 
internalizes the resources’ positive externalities by pricing the commercial values for 
research and development and makes users pay for it. Users’ benefits are shared with the 
resource holders and set incentives for the sustainable use and the conservation of 
biodiversity. So far the theory. However, in practice the question arises how the concept has 
to be designed to be an effective approach to contribute to the protection of biodiversity and 
to the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the commercialization. 
In this study, the effectiveness of the ABS concept with regard to biodiversity conservation is 
defined as “the capability of the ABS regime i) to set incentives for the sustainable use and 
the conservation of biodiversity, ii) to facilitate access to plant genetic material and iii) to 
enhance a fair and equitable benefit-sharing”. To measure the realization of these objectives, 
their determinants, the so-called critical factors, they have to be identified. In this study they 
are derived from the application of economic theory to the loss of biodiversity and the ABS 
concept, and from the empirical findings of three case studies of biodiversity-providing 
countries Costa Rica, the Philippines and Ethiopia and one case study of a community of 
user countries, the European Union (EU). The identified critical factors are property rights, 
information asymmetries, time lags, good governance, administrative complexity, and market 
structure. Depending on how they are addressed through the implementation of ABS on the 
national level the effectiveness can be assessed. This study discusses user and provider 
measures that have the potential to address the critical factors. Finally, the study formulates 
policy recommendations for an international ABS regime based on the results of the study. 
 
 Kurzfassung 
Effektivität und Perspektiven von Zugangs- und Vorteilsausgleichsregimen im 
Rahmen des Übereinkommens über die Biologische Vielfalt – Eine vergleichende 
Analyse von Costa Rica, den Philippinen, Äthiopien und der Europäischen Union 
Der fortschreitende Verlust von Biodiversität ist alarmierend. Alle Versuche und Initiativen 
diesen Prozess aufzuhalten, sind bisher gescheitert. Der marktbasierte Ansatz Access and 
Benefit-sharing (ABS) (dt.: Zugang und Vorteilsausgleich) ist ein solcher Versuch. Er wurde 
1992 im Rahmen des Übereinkommens über die Biologische Vielfalt (engl.: CBD) entwickelt 
und beschlossen. Dem Konzept liegt folgende, aus der Theorie abgeleitete Idee, zugrunde. 
Die Anwendung des ABS Konzeptes wandelt Biodiversität und genetische Ressourcen von 
open access Ressourcen in private Güter. Positive Externalitäten der Ressourcen werden 
durch die Monetarisierung der privaten Nutzen für Forschung und Entwicklung internalisiert. 
Die Nutzer genetischer Ressourcen teilen die Vorteile und Gewinne, die sie durch eine 
vorwiegend kommerzielle Nutzung erzielen, mit den Bereitstellern der Ressourcen. Die 
Erzielung von Einkommen durch die Bereitstellung von Biodiversität setzt Anreize zur 
Erhaltung und nachhaltigen Nutzung, sofern das alternative Einkommen der Bereitsteller die 
Opportunitätskosten deckt. Die Praxis hinkt der Theorie aber immer noch hinterher. Der 
Biodiversitätsverlust konnte bisher nicht aufgehalten werden und nur wenige ABS-Verträge 
haben zu einem sichtbaren Erfolg geführt. Die Frage, wie das ABS Konzept ausgestaltet 
werden muss, um tatsächlich ein effektiver Ansatz zur Erhaltung und nachhaltigen Nutzung 
genetischer Ressourcen, zur Schaffung eines leichteren Zugangs zu genetischen 
Ressourcen und zur Unterstützung des fairen und gerechten Vorteilsausgleichs zu sein, so 
wie die Konvention es verspricht, ist somit berechtigt.  
Um die Effektivität messen zu können, müssen so genannte kritische Faktoren definiert 
werden. Sie werden in dieser Studie durch die Anwendung der ökonomischen Theorie auf 
den Verlust biologischer Vielfalt und das ABS Konzept, sowie auf Grundlage vier 
verschiedener Fallstudien hergeleitet. Die Daten der Fallstudien wurden in drei 
biodiversitätsreichen Bereitstellerländern: Costa Rica, Philippinen und Äthiopien, sowie in der 
EU als einer Nutzergemeinschaft, mit besonderem Fokus auf Deutschland, erhoben. Die 
abgeleiteten kritischen Faktoren sind Eigentumsrechte, Informationsasymmetrien, zeitliche 
Verzögerungen, gute Regierungsführung, administrative Komplexität und Marktstruktur. Der 
Effektivitätsgrad des Konzeptes kann in Abhängigkeit davon bestimmt werden, inwieweit die 
einzelnen kritischen Faktoren ausgeprägt sind und beachtet werden. Hierzu analysiert die 
Studie potentielle Bereitsteller- und Nutzermaßnahmen. Zuletzt formuliert die Studie, 
basierend auf der vergleichenden Analyse und den abgeleiteten Ergebnissen, 
Handlungsempfehlungen für ein zukünftiges internationales ABS Regime. 
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1 Introduction 1
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
During the past twenty years the enormous global loss of biodiversity has received growing 
attention not only by biologists because it is one of the world’s most important resources. 
Biodiversity serves many important purposes as life-support systems, ecosystem services, 
and cultural objects but also as production inputs and goods.  
Today, genetic resources are regarded highly potential inputs of research and development. 
Due to the latest enormous technical progress, especially in the area of biotechnology, 
genetic resources have become more important for commercial sectors including the 
agribusiness, the pharmaceutical as well as cosmetics and natural products industries.1 
Genetic resources and the technology used for their exploitation are not equally distributed in 
the world. Biodiversity hotspots, being centers of highly diverse but threatened genetic 
resources, occur mainly in tropical forests located in developing countries. Industries using 
genetic material for research and development are settled in industrial countries. Due to this 
unequal geographical distribution of resources and technology, the international trade in 
genetic resources has significantly increased in recent centuries. But already in the past, 
trade in genetic resources has played an essential role. Plant collections and informal and 
commercial trade in biodiversity and genetic resources have been at all times an integral part 
of the socio-economic and cultural evolution. 
In the 1990s, the increased demand and the promising potential of the future use of genetic 
resources have thus been recommended as a source of funds for habitat preservation. For 
the first time in 1991, the idea was applied when Costa Rica’s National Biodiversity Institute 
(INBio) and the pharmaceutical company Merck & Co., Inc. announced an access-for-fee-
agreement. The concept expanded into the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
adopted in 1992, aiming to promote both biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
development. In the past, genetic resources were treated as open access resources in the 
                                               
1
 One well-known example is rosy periwinkle (Catharanthus roseus), a tropical dry-forest plant from Madagascar. 
Two drugs derived from the rosy periwinkle, vinblastine and vincristine, are successfully used in the treatment 
of Hodgkins' disease and leukemia. 
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sense of common heritage of humankind. Consequently, the resources could be acquired 
free of charge and without any approval. The adoption of the CBD implicated enormous 
changes. The Convention seeks to increase biodiversity’s use and access to it, but also to 
conserve biodiversity by recognizing the states’ sovereignty over their biological resources 
and claiming the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources. Since then, potential users have been required to seek consent of 
providers of biological diversity or their representatives and to negotiate mutually agreed 
terms on access and benefit-sharing (ABS) before they can bioprospect. Bioprospecting is 
understood as the specific search and exploration of biological material or information of 
social and economic value. The underlying idea is that through bilateral market-like contracts 
genetic resources are exchanged for shares of the generated benefits, which incentives 
resource conservation and promote economic development in the provider countries. The 
CBD is only a framework agreement and needs to be implemented by national or regional 
regulations. Today, 28 countries have already adopted measures to regulate ABS with 
regard to their own biological resources and many more are in the stage of developing such 
measures (CBD 2007c). 
Despite of the extended implementation of ABS regulations in provider countries and the 
improvements through gained experiences and higher scientific interest, many parties of the 
CBD, mainly developing countries, express their discontent with the existing situation. Plant 
genetic resources have been collected, used for research and development and protected by 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), but the provider countries have not approved the use and 
have not received any share. Natural products of neem and basmati rice are prominent 
examples where patents have been awarded for products not meeting the conditions of 
patents (e.g., novelty and invention). Besides these, many cases of misappropriation have 
been reported (McGown 2006). Such incidents have raised concern over the limitations of 
the present ABS regulation with regard to the effective protection of provider countries’ 
interests. 
In the recent years, demands on user countries have been expressed more explicitly, urging 
them to stand up for the implementation of the CBD regulations on ABS. The group of 
megadiverse countries emphasized the fact, that they do not consider themselves capable of 
enforcing ABS without the support of user countries. Therefore, they call for the creation of 
an international regime, which induces user countries to also undertake adequate measures 
for the realization of ABS according to the CBD. The idea to develop an international regime 
was accepted at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in 2002 in 
Johannesburg, and subsequently included as an objective in the final report. The CBD 
members are requested to negotiate an international regime to promote and safeguard the 
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fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources (UN 
2002, 44o). This means that today’s users of genetic resources have to be considered and 
involved even more as important actors in the development of comprehensive international 
conservation concepts. 
1.2 Objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to analyze how the CBD’s approach of ABS has to be 
designed to be an effective concept to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity, to facilitate access to biodiversity and to ascertain the fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising out of the commercialization of genetic resources. In short, what are 
the determinants of the effectiveness? 
The analysis is led by three assumptions. Firstly, the ABS concept, which is based on 
bilateral agreements, sets incentives to conserve biodiversity, but it has side-effects (e.g., 
economical, social), which have to be taken into account. Secondly, critical factors have a 
significant influence on the ABS concept and its goals. The effectiveness of the ABS concept 
depends on how these factors are shaped. Thirdly, the ABS concept can only be realized 
through an international regime, i.e., provider and user measures have to be in place. 
The study aims to establish an analytic framework to measure the effectiveness of the ABS 
concept on the national and regional level. In this study the effectiveness is defined as the 
capability of the ABS regime i) to set incentives for the sustainable use and the conservation 
of biodiversity, ii) to facilitate access to plant genetic material and iii) to enhance a fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing, which also implies the prevention of the misappropriation and the 
unapproved use of genetic resources. To measure the realization of these objectives, their 
determinants, so-called critical factors, they have to be defined. They are derived from the 
application of economic theory to the loss of biodiversity and the ABS concept, and from the 
empirical findings of four ABS country case studies. These ABS case studies are to provide a 
comprehensive and a comparative analysis of national and regional experiences in 
developing and implementing ABS policies, laws, institutions and regulatory regimes. Three 
provider countries, Costa Rica, the Philippines and Ethiopia, are taken as case studies in 
order to derive the critical factors and to test their feasibility by analyzing how the critical 
factors are shaped in a country-specific context, whether they are already addressed and/or 
gaps still exist. On the user side, the European Union (EU) serves as an example of a group 
of user countries to identify and analyze potential user measures with regard to their 
feasibility, efficiency and their potential to address the critical factors. Since many EU 
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measures are implemented on the national level, at some points a country perspective 
(Germany) is chosen to illustrate user country’s action and possibilities. 
Furthermore, the study aims to explore the perspectives for ABS regimes. The study 
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of current ABS regimes in provider countries and 
user countries with a view to the critical factors. It ascertains options for developing 
measures that can be undertaken by countries in their capacity as providers and users of 
genetic resources to strengthen ABS governance and form an international regime. 
The analysis of the effectiveness and the perspectives of the ABS concept allow deriving 
recommendations to improve and develop an international ABS regime. Measures that 
address the essential critical factors are identified and assessed. Furthermore, strategies are 
proposed how to implement such measures. The findings and results are not only limited to 
the investigated case studies. The analytic framework, consisting of the objectives and the 
critical factors, can be applied to a range of countries faced with the implementation of the 
ABS concept. Only with such an analytic framework, that this study intends to develop, a 
comparative analysis of different case studies is possible. The case studies provide insightful 
experiences for other provider and user countries. Since the underlying questions of this 
study are coherent with the questions international policy-makers are faced with, the results 
of the study support the political discussions and negotiations and propose options for further 
proceedings.  
1.3 Methodological approach 
The effectiveness of the ABS concept can be measured through the three objectives: 
conservation of biodiversity, facilitation of access and enhancement of a fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing. By analyzing the occurrence of the critical factors in a country-specific 
context the realization of the objectives are measured and the effectiveness of the ABS 
concept is assessed. Besides, the strengths and weaknesses of the approach are disclosed. 
The analysis integrates a multilevel approach by examining the implementation of the ABS 
concept on the national and international level. The analytical framework of this study is 
derived through the application of new institutional economics theory’s major aspects (i.e., 
property rights, bargaining solutions, transaction costs, and information asymmetries) to the 
ABS concept, and through the collection and analysis of empirical qualitative data of national 
and regional ABS regimes.  
The main source of information of this study is qualitative data collected by the case studies, 
primary and secondary literature with focus on environmental and new institutional 
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economics and biodiversity and biodiversity related topics, as well as information collected 
through the author’s observation and participation in several political negotiations and 
international conferences related to ABS. The chronological order of the study does not 
reflect the research process. The empirical findings already contribute to the development of 
the analytical framework in chapter 5.  
The empirical data of the four case studies (Costa Rica, the Philippines, Ethiopia and the EU) 
are the core of the study. They provide the practical insight to the problem of biodiversity loss 
and the ABS concept and they are the empirical bedding and completion for the development 
of the critical factors, which are derived from economic theory and the empirical case studies. 
Since the countries’ geographical location (i.e., different continents) and their approaches to 
implement ABS differ extremely, the selected case studies appear to be very useful. Users 
are an indispensable part of an international ABS regime. Therefore, this study considers 
and integrates them through the EU case study. This case study is mainly a desktop study, 
but enriched with information gathered in workshops and conferences. The provider case 
studies are accomplished by field trips to the three developing countries. A qualitative 
approach with fieldwork data collection was chosen, since qualitative methods for data 
collection are regarded as an adequate method. They provide information useful to 
understand the processes behind the observed results and assess peoples’ perception 
(Creswell 1994; Denzin / Lincoln 2000). 
Silverman (1997) characterizes qualitative research as a method to collect and interpret “in-
depth” material, which is more meaningful than quantitative survey research data. In 
qualitative research the reality is subjective of the analysis and differently seen by the 
interview partners. Therefore, it relies on the report of the different voices and the 
interpretation of the informants. The researcher usually interacts with those she/he studies 
and admits values and biases. The methodology allows inductive approaches. Categories 
emerge from the informants rather than being identified a priori by the researcher. This 
emergence provides “context-bound” information and can lead to patterns or theories that 
explain a certain phenomenon (Creswell 1994, 5-7). Therefore, qualitative research methods 
are usually applied when the research subject is new and theories need to be developed.  
As a research topic ABS is not new. It has been analyzed from many different angles. 
However, it lacks an adequate theoretical framework for the analysis of the effectiveness of 
the concept. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a new analytical framework based on 
insights of new institutional economic theory, but also based on the findings from the case 
studies. Therefore, the approach applied in this study combines deductive and inductive 
reasoning processes to establish a new analytic framework. The new institutional economic 
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theory was chosen because it appears as the most appropriate theory. It provides suitable 
approaches to analyze the problems that occur during the implementation of ABS and offers 
adequate solutions to these problems. 
In order to analyze the country-specific context of ABS in the three countries, including the 
resource itself as well as the resource providers and users, the majority of relevant 
stakeholders or their representatives were identified and interviewed. The first field trip was 
undertaken in the Philippines between March and May 2002 and 27 stakeholders were 
interviewed. The second field trip took place in Costa Rica in November and December 
2002, and 23 key informants agreed to provide information. The last field trip was conducted 
in Ethiopia in October 2003. 15 persons could be identified and interviewed.  
The qualitative collection method varies depending on the research subject. The major 
methods are observation, textual analysis, interviews and transcripts (Silverman 1997, 9). 
The data collection procedure was the same in all three case studies. The applied method of 
gathering and analyzing the qualitative data in the respective countries are semi-structured 
interviews. They were conducted with a fairly open framework, which allow for focused, 
conversational, two-way communication. According to Creswell (1994), interviews provide 
indirect information filtered through the views of the interviewee and are useful when 
informants can provide some kind of historical information and share their experiences. 
Stakeholders’ information and experiences are essential to analyze how ABS issues are 
perceived. 
The semi-structured interviews were prepared by an interview guide, which lists a pre-
determined set of questions or issues that were to be explored during the interview (cf. 
Appendix). The questions and issues are based on the pre-analysis of economic literature 
regarding to the loss of biodiversity and the ABS concept. The majority of questions were 
derived from the three general assumptions and further country-specific assumptions. 
Therefore, for each country the guide was adapted to the specific country situation and 
expanded by particular questions. For example, in the Costa Rican case the outsourcing of 
the application process to a non-state actor (INBio) was explicitly considered. 
The interviews were conducted with great flexibility because the majority of questions was 
created during the interviews. The guide covered the following problem areas: biodiversity 
conservation, property rights, win-win solution, potential benefits, bureaucratic procedure, 
stakeholder interest, information distribution, political and legal situation, control and sanction 
mechanisms. The given structure of the interviews made the interviewing of a number of 
different persons more systematic and comprehensive, but did not delimit the issues to be 
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taken up in the interview, since the majority of the questions were created during the 
interviews. 
The interview partners were identified and chosen as stakeholders, key informant, or experts. 
A key informant is an individual, who has access to information valuable for the evaluator 
because of her/his knowledge, previous experience or social status in a community. This 
information is, e.g., insights about the functioning of society, their problems and needs. Key 
informants are a source of information, which can assist in understanding the context of a 
program or project, or clarifying particular issues or problems. The main stakeholders, who 
are involved in ABS issues in their countries or on the international level, were identified as 
key informants. They can be assigned to different groups, as for example government actors 
(civil servants), civil society groups, scientists, industry, local communities, farmers, and 
indigenous people. 
The selection of key informants is not at random. At first, a set of people belonging to the 
identified groups was interviewed. They had been identified before the field research took 
place. Once the field research had started, the interviewed person recommended more 
interview partners. The author was aware that this principle might cause a bias. Therefore, 
interviewees were carefully selected and attention was made to integrate all important 
stakeholder groups. 
All interviews were documented through minutes. The qualitative data in this study is used 
and transformed according to Wolcott’s (1994) approach: “description”, “analysis” and 
“interpretation”. “Description” deals with the processing of the information in a descriptive 
way by sorting and filtering it. Once the empirical data had been collected, the information 
was allocated into different categories that had been derived from economic theory. Useless 
information was sorted out. The “analysis” uses this information and addresses the 
identification of essential features and the systematic description of interrelationships among 
them. In this phase the critical factors were defined and characterized. Apart from the factors 
that have been identified through theory, new categories could be identified by the 
consolidation of theoretical and empirical findings. Furthermore, the existing categories could 
be extended. Besides, the interlinkages between these factors were analyzed. The last step 
“interpretation” addresses processual questions of meanings and contexts. However, since 
the collected information was direct and significant, this is rarely used. In this study the 
analysis based on prior description is the main approach to transform the data. 
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1.4 Contribution and outlook 
Since the CBD was adopted and the ABS concept was established, controversial 
discussions have been started, whether the approach is the most adequate to protect 
biodiversity, ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing and support sustainable development. 
In the first years after the Rio conference, optimism was spread and the hope was raised to 
protect the world’s biodiversity by commercializing the “green gold” of the tropical forests. But 
very soon it became obvious that the expectations were not fulfilled and benefits failed to 
appear. It seemed that the concept had not worked and the international negotiations during 
the political debate heated up. 
At the same time the research on ABS issues has also increased, since the international 
policy-makers realized that they lacked the knowledge on important governmental and non-
governmental actors, institutions, national regulatory and political frameworks, biodiversity 
economic values, the market for genetic resources (including users and providers) etc. 
Different from the Climate Convention, which has established the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPPC) being a scientific advising committee, the CBD does not have 
such a body. Therefore, the research communities were called on to provide scientific, 
technical and especially socio-economic information. The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MEA), initiated by the U.N. Secretary- General Kofi Annan in June 2001 and 
completed in March 2005, is such a contribution. But until now, this report has received only 
modest attention, although it delivers some appalling results on the future of ecosystems and 
biodiversity. 
In the ABS context the scientific environment has increasingly focused on the analysis of 
national or regional ABS regimes in provider countries mainly from the legal and policy 
perspective, concerning the development of national ABS laws in the past (cf. for example 
Reid et al. 1993; Columbia University 1999, Day-Rubenstein / Frisvold 2001). All these 
contributions have provided a useful catalogue of case studies and insights, but they lack the 
development of an analysis framework, which allows comparisons among different cases 
and drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of the CBD’s promoted ABS approach. 
Their analyses are more descriptive and lack an evaluation of the socio-economic and 
ecological effects of ABS. Dávalos et al. (2003) attempt to evaluate ABS regimes on a 
comparative basis and come up with some interesting results. However, despite the 
examination of case studies, the conclusions and recommendations only partly encompass 
the whole ABS concept. They remain either very general or very specific and are not related 
to the impacts of ABS on biodiversity conservation and economic development. The report of 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) mentions many very 
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interesting aspects and attempts to draw a general economic picture of ABS, but 
unfortunately it is not based on empirical insights and remains very sketchily (OECD 2003a). 
Barrett and Lybbert (2000) provide an interesting commentary on bioprospecting, but it 
covers only some of the essential aspects, e.g. the lack of distributional equity for the 
benefits, and does not provide a general analytical framework. Some studies focus only on 
one aspect, which this study reflects in the critical factors, and analyze it isolated from the 
others. For example, Mulholland and Wilman (2003) only investigate the information problem 
in ABS contracts. 
Other documents published (Simpson / Sedjo / Reid 1996; Rausser / Small 2000; ten Kate / 
A Laird 1999) estimate the private value of biodiversity as input into development and 
research or discuss the commercial use of biodiversity from the point of view of the demand 
side. It shows the industry’s point of view, but does not attempt any evaluation from a 
societal point of view. Besides, the existing work focuses on either the provider or the user 
side. A comprehensive approach has not been applied so far. For example, Artuso (2002) 
investigates the relationship between national ABS programs and biotechnology capacity of 
provider countries, but the user side is totally excluded. Only little research has been 
undertaken with regard to user countries and user measures (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 
2003; Dross / Wolff 2005; Sarnoff / Correa 2006), and most of these studies focus on single 
user measures or are very theoretical and not applied to an existing user country. All in all, 
the effectiveness of the ABS approach of the CBD related to its objectives and under an 
international regime is still not clarified.  
With this study, a new focus is entered into the discussion. The effectiveness of the ABS 
concept is measured by its capability to reach the three objectives: conservation, access and 
benefit-sharing and operationalized by the identification of the critical factors. In the light of 
these factors and by applying a comparative approach the four case studies are analyzed. 
Through the perspective of an international regime, both sides, providers and users of 
biodiversity, are integrated. 
Nevertheless, this study cannot give answers to all the questions and fill in all the gaps on 
ABS. This study can be seen as point of departure. Further research should be undertaken in 
several areas, e.g. the broadening the empirical basis, investigation of a multilateral system, 
and the assessment of the costs of user measures. 
Three provider country case studies were conducted and examined within the study. To test 
and improve the developed analysis framework it should be applied to more case studies. A 
range of other countries are suitable for applying this approach. It would then stand on a 
broader empirical basis. 
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In this study the main focus of research is the bilateral system as suggested by the CBD. 
Further research could step back and evaluate the concept of ABS in a broader multilateral 
framework as suggested by the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA). Furthermore, to determine the effectiveness of the ABS concept, 
it would be useful to evaluate the approach in comparison with other conservation concepts. 
The payment for environmental services appears to provide interesting results. 
In this study the analysis on user measures still remains quite theoretical, but the 
investigation of user measures is very essential if the international community wants to 
establish an international regime. The knowledge on the practicality, feasibility and the costs 
of user measures is very limited. Even if the EU serves as example, only little information on 
the implementation of user measures is available. Pilot projects that aim to implement a 
certain measure in a specific sector (e.g., certificates of origin in microbial collections) could 
provide needed information. Moreover, assessments of the economic impacts and 
implications would provide fruitful information for the debates. 
1.5 Study overview 
Chapter 1 introduces the subject and the objectives of the study. The methodological 
approach including the analytical framework, the method of gathering information, and the 
use of the collected data, as well as the structure of the study are outlined. Chapter 2 
presents the basic principles of genetic resources. It defines the terms “biodiversity” and 
“agrobiodiversity”, which are essential for this study. It describes the present state of genetic 
resources and the locations where genetic resources originate, where they are distributed, 
and where they are used. Furthermore, the chapter looks at the supply side of genetic 
resources, which is characterized by enormous decline and the demand side by assessing 
the importance of genetic resources and identifying the users of genetic resources as well as 
the users’ experience and awareness. Finally, the chapter investigates different biodiversity 
conservation concepts in order to identify the role of bioprospecting within these concepts. 
Chapter 3 sets out the institutional and political framework for international biodiversity 
conservation. On the one hand, conservation conventions as the CBD, the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and further protection agreements are 
illustrated. On the other hand, the international regulations regarding IPRs are examined. 
Chapter 4 applies economic theory to the global problem of biodiversity loss and discusses 
the economic framework of the ABS concept. Approaches and problems of valuation, the 
relationship between biodiversity degradation and economic development, and the analysis 
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of the market and policy failure as an explanation for the decline of biodiversity are analyzed. 
Moreover, the ABS concept is examined as a promising approach to conserve biodiversity 
conservation through biodiversity commercialization with a focus on its market-based 
character. The concept is integrated in the notion of sustainable development. The chapter 
discusses how the sovereignty principle and the bilateral system of benefit-sharing can 
contribute to the internalization of externalities. Chapter 5 builds the analytic framework for 
this study based on economic theory and the empirical information gathered through the 
case studies to measure the effectiveness of the concept. In accordance to the objectives, it 
derives and defines the critical factors (property rights, time lags, good governance, 
information asymmetries, administrative complexity, and market structure) of an effective 
ABS regime. Furthermore, it identifies possibilities how these factors can be addressed in 
biodiversity providing and using countries. Chapter 6 consists of the four case studies: Costa 
Rica, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and the EU with a focus on Germany. In each case study an 
overview over the general situation is given, including the legal and institutional setting, and 
the case study methodology is explained. The case study analysis investigates how the 
critical factors occur in the respective countries. It applies the derived analytic framework and 
analyzes how the factors are addressed. The major results from the case studies are 
summarized. Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the comparative analysis and formulates 
recommendations for ABS regimes on the national and international level as an instrument to 
protect biodiversity. 
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2 The basic principles of genetic resources regarding ABS 
The term of biodiversity has become very prominent, since it was coined in the 1980s2. At 
this time, the observed rapid extinction rates raised concerns and it became obvious that 
human activities are the main threat to the diversity of life. Biologists, ecologists, 
environmentalists, political leaders, and concerned citizens started to broach out the issue of 
biodiversity loss as a major environmental problem of the 20th century worldwide. The 
discussion on biodiversity has raised awareness about the environmental problem among 
the society, its causes and has helped to understand in which ways biological organisms and 
processes are endangered. In the course of development and industrialization, humans 
interfered with the natural environment, in which important biological processes are 
embedded. Biodiversity is the base for life and for the functioning of the ecosystem. No 
environmental system is considered to be that complex, dynamic and varied than the 
diversity of living organism and no system is considered to experience such dramatic 
changes caused by humans. These changes do not only influence biodiversity, they also 
have tremendous impacts on human-well being (MEA 2005c, 18). Conserving biodiversity 
and using it in a sustainable way are the strategies developed to address this problem. 
In order to fully understand the ABS concept and to estimate its opportunities and its limits 
regarding the objectives, it is necessary to understand the basic principles of the diversity of 
genetic resources. In the following, an overview over the basic principles of the diversity of 
genetic resources with regard to ABS is given. The central terms of this study as biodiversity 
and agrobiodiversity are defined and the major characteristics of genetic resources and their 
diversity are identified and illustrated. The present state of the world’s genetic resources is 
highlighted. The distribution and origin of genetic resources are elucidated and the provision 
and utilization of genetic are characterized. Based on this information, the supply and 
demand situation – the potential market for genetic resources – is evaluated. The supply side 
is characterized by the increasing decline of biodiversity caused by various direct (e.g., 
habitat destruction, invasive species, climate change) and indirect factors (e.g., population 
growth, economic factors). The demand side consists of a very heterogeneous group of user 
                                               
2
 Thomas Lovejoy coined the term “biological diversity” in 1980. The term “biodiversity” was used at 
the American Forum on Biological Diversity organized by the National Research Council (NRC) and it 
first appeared in print in 1988 when entomologist E.O.Wilson used it in the title of the forum’s 
proceedings (Dybas 2006, 792). 
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sectors. The composition of this group and the awareness and perceptions are illustrated. At 
last, the chapter introduces different conservation concepts including bioprospecting.  
2.1 Biodiversity and agrobiodiversity 
Biological diversity, which is more commonly known as biodiversity, is a collective term 
aiming to describe the totality and variety of life on Earth (Samper 2006). The CBD defines it 
as the ‘variability among living individual organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems’ (CBD 
1992, Article 2). Biological resources form this biodiversity. According to the CBD, it includes 
genetic resources, which are organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic 
component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity. Consequently, 
genetic material is any material of plants, animal, microbial material or other material from 
another origin containing functional units of heredity. Therefore, genetic resources are 
genetic material of actual or potential value (CBD 1992, Article 2). These definitions are 
widely used and rooted in the CBD. The study follows this framework and uses the terms as 
defined there. 
Agrobiodiversity differs from biodiversity. It is understood to be part of the biodiversity, which 
provides a base to nutrition, livelihoods and the maintenance of habitats, and is of great 
importance to peoples’ life in the form of agricultural crops, productive livestock, raw 
materials, and medical plants (Wolff 2004, 338). Agrobiodiversity is not only used as whole 
systematic units contributing to people’s livelihoods by providing food, medicine, feed for 
domestic animals, fiber, clothing, shelter or energy (Shand 1997, 5). Genetic resources are 
also used because of their genetic properties. Especially plant genetic resources with distinct 
characteristics play a major role for food security. Their genetic material is used in the 
production of new cultivars and breeds or as a reservoir of genetic adaptability buffering 
against potentially harmful environmental and economic changes (FAO 1996, 19). 
The FAO defines plant genetic resources used for food and agriculture (PGRFA) “as any 
genetic material of plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative propagating material, 
containing functional units of heredity” (ITPGRFA, Article 2). The utilization of PGRFA is very 
broad. They comprise the diversity of genetic material contained in traditional varieties (land 
races) and modern breeds, as well as crop wild relatives and other wild plant species that 
can be used directly or are stored in collections and gene banks, and will be used in the 
future for food and agriculture or even other uses (FAO 2007). 
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This study focuses on biodiversity including agrobiodiversity in form of wild plant material 
(species level) and wild plant genetic resources (genetic level), which are of greater interest 
for research and development (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 44-45). Animal genetic resources are 
also of great importance. Breeds of domesticated farm animal species are the primary 
biological capital for livestock development, food security, and sustainable rural 
development. However, the nature of animal genetic resources and the actual and potential 
measures to conserve them significantly differ from the approaches for plant genetic 
resources. The analysis of animal genetic resources is beyond the scope of this research 
and therefore animal genetic resources are excluded in this study. 3 
The same applies to traditional knowledge (TK) related to plant genetic resources. It is also 
used as input for research and development. TK and biodiversity are jointly negotiated on the 
international level. It is assumed that the same instrument, namely ABS, can protect TK and 
biodiversity. However, the analysis of TK, which is not a global environmental problem, but 
the loss of an essential cultural asset, differs distinctly from the analysis of the loss and 
protection of biodiversity. Therefore, the issue of TK is excluded in this study. 
2.2 The present state of the world’s genetic resources 
How many species actually live on the planet? Today’s estimates of the number of species 
on the Earth range from three to 100 million, indicating the difficulties in assessing the total 
amount of species. However, generally accepted estimates are between five and 20 million. 
The Secretariat of the CBD (SCBD) assumes that about 13 million species exist today of 
which 1.75 million have been described so far (SCBD 2000, 2). The estimates of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) with 14 million unknown species are very close to 
this estimation. Out of the 1.75 million known species 270,000 plant species are already 
described (cf. Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 See Ecological Economics 2003, Volume 45, Issue 3, pp. 315 – 517, Special Issue on “Valuing Animal Genetic 
Resources” and Drucker 2004 for an overview over the issue. 
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Table 1: Number of described species 
Species Number 
Bacteria 4,000 
Protoctists (algae, protozoa) 80,000 
Animals – invertebrates 1,272,000 
Fungi 72,000 
Plants 270,000 
Total described species 1,750,000 
Possible total including unknown species 14,000,000 
Source: UNEP 2002, 120 
The World Conservation Union (IUCN) regularly publishes statistics on globally threatened 
species and the Red List of Threatened Species. They come to the conclusion that 1.9 
million species out of the five to 30 million species have been described (Baillie / Hilton-
Taylor / Stuart 2004, 34). Most taxonomic work is concentrated away from the most species-
rich taxa and regions and is declining in general. This explains the uncertainty related to the 
knowledge about the existence of species (MEA 2005a, 88). 
According to FAO (1997) it is assumed that between 300,000 and 500,000 species of higher 
plants (i.e., flowering and cone-bearing plants) exist, of which approximately 270,000 have 
been described. Out of these about 30,000 are edible and about 7,000 have been cultivated 
or collected by humans for food and play a major role for food security. Despite that great 
number and vast diversity of PGRFA, only 30 crops provide 95 percent of dietary energy. 
Three crops, wheat, rice and maize, account for more than 50 percent of the world 
population plant-derived energy intake. Sorghum, millet, potatoes, sweet potatoes, soybeans 
and sugar account for additional 25 percent (FAO 1997, 14). Today, only 150 crops are 
commercialized on a significant global scale. The other species have fallen victim to 
agricultural simplification, a process that favored few crops instead of others because of their 
comparative advantages, as for example for the ability to grow in a wider range of habitats, 
their simple cultivation requirements, their easier processing, their storability, and their taste. 
These developments lead to enormous genetic erosion through a reduction of intra- and 
inter-specific diversity of crops. Therefore, the level of vulnerability among users, particularly 
the poorer societies depending on diversity in crops, has increased. Besides, the quality of 
food has decreased by narrowing the variety of nutrients (Padulosi et al. 2002, 1).  
Local communities in developing countries use a wider range of the existing diversity. For 
example, in the Uxpanapa region in Mexico peasant farmers use 435 wild plants and animals 
and eat 229 of them, and people in a community in a Thai village eat 295 different local 
plants (Harrison / Pearce 2001, 159). Many minor species still exist, e.g., underutilized crops 
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as leafy vegetables in Sub-Sahara Africa, and play a vital role in local farming systems and in 
human well-being at sub-national levels, but they disappear in statistical aggregations on the 
national level (Williams / Haq 2002, 2). In the recent years awareness about the neglected 
genetic treasures has risen and researchers, policy-makers and even the industry have 
recognized the need to maintain and improve the utilization of these underutilized or 
neglected crops, which are left aside by research, technology, marketing systems as well as 
conservation efforts (Padulosi et al. 2002, 1). As food security products in local and regional 
markets and as niche products in international markets underutilized crops have promising 
economic potential. 
Underutilized crops are not emphasized in this research, since coffee was chosen as an 
example as to how crops and ABS can be reconciled. However, since the economic potential 
of these crops is not utilized, it seems that there is a strong demand for research in this area 
of underutilized crop and their role for benefit-sharing. 
2.3 The supply side 
This section characterizes the supply side. With regard to ABS, the supply side plays a key 
role. The countries that hold biodiversity are so-called “provider countries”. Countries where 
certain genetic resources originate are “countries of origin”. Both provider and user countries 
can be identified by analyzing the origin and the distribution of material. Generally spoken, 
genetic resources’ diversity and origin are the greatest in the southern hemisphere in 
developing countries, and they are mainly used and processed in the northern hemisphere in 
industrialized countries. Even if this simplification applies to many cases, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at the actual distribution, since the natural distribution is not always in 
harmony with the CBD’s understanding on ABS. The distribution of genetic resources is not 
bound to territorial borders but the CBD defines states as the responsible actors.  
Furthermore, the subchapter investigates the loss of biodiversity and its drivers. The greatest 
threat of biodiversity is the human-induced habitat destruction for converting forest to 
agricultural land. This indicates that the decline of biodiversity is above all a question of 
opportunity costs. Other land uses are economically more attractive than biodiversity 
conservation. This shows that the ABS concept can be an adequate concept to counteract 
the on-going loss of biodiversity by providing economic incentives for conservation. 
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2.3.1 Origin and distribution 
Species have been migrated on Earth for ages. Migration is one important aspect of 
evolution and the development of biodiversity. Especially crops have spread around the 
world through human interventions and activities. Also wild plant genetic resources have 
migrated in the course of time. Therefore, questions regarding the species’ origin and today’s 
distribution of genetic resources are legitimate. 
The CBD relies on the concept of origin. In the CBD states agreed that the “country of origin 
of genetic resources” is the country, which possesses these genetic resources in in-situ 
conditions (CBD 1992, Art. 2). Whereas “country providing genetic resources" is the country, 
which supplies genetic resources collected from in-situ sources. These include populations of 
both wild and domesticated species, or populations taken from ex-situ sources, which may or 
may not have originated in that country (CBD 1992, Art. 2). This differentiation addresses the 
difficulties in determining the actual country of origin of a plant. When it comes to the ABS 
concept, the determination of origin and source is very essential. Countries of origin should 
be the recipients of the benefits (CBD 1992, Art. 15). Even if the CBD definition of “country of 
origin” leaves room for interpretation, its understanding is that only countries of real origin are 
concerned. This concept is very narrow because many species have left their countries of 
origin due to evolutionary process a long time ago. In many cases diversity was created and 
enriched in secondary countries and not in the countries of origin. In terms of the CBD, these 
secondary countries are only source countries. 
The first noteworthy comprehensive attempt to identify the origin of major crops was in the 
1900s. After many collection missions, the Russian scientist Vavilov identified centers of 
plants’ origin. In 1926 he published his work "Studies on the Origin of Cultivated Plants", 
documenting his theories on the origin of crops. The main result of his research was that 
each crop has a characteristic primary center of diversity, which is also its center of origin. 
He argued that the degree of diversity was indicative of how long the crop had been grown in 
that area. Therefore, species vary genetically the most at or near the center of origin. 
According to his theory, from these centers all major crops were domesticated. Vavilov 
identified eight areas: China, India, with a related center in Indo-Malaya, Central Asia, the 
Near East, the Mediterranean, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), southern Mexico and Central America, 
and South America (Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia), with two lesser centers - the island of 
Chiloe off the coast of southern Chile, and an eastern secondary center in Brazil and 
Paraguay (Hawkes 1997). Vavilov’s centers have similarities, since they can be found at 20-
45 degrees latitude in mountainous regions with temperate climate (Fowler / Mooney 1990). 
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Later Vavilov’s theory was enlarged and modified. Today scientists agree that there are one 
or even more centers of origin where a crop is domesticated and that these are usually the 
primary centers of in-situ diversity for that crop (cf. Figure 1). The continued geneflow 
between crops and their wild relatives in these areas can contribute to new variability. Center 
of origin is not a synonym for center of diversity, and these centers are not necessarily the 
starting point of domestication. Certain varieties of crops have even originated outside of 
both centers of origin and diversity (FAO 1997, 20). 
Figure 1: Regions of diversity for major cultivated plants 
 
Source: FAO 1997, 21 
In many cases it is difficult to determine the origin of plant genetic resources and assign them 
to regions or even countries. However, through technical advances in the field of molecular 
biology the identification of origin is more and more possible (Hardon / Vosman / van Hintum 
1994, 13). 
Territorial borders do not bind the existence of plants. In many cases plants exist in three or 
even more neighboring countries and plants have migrated and distributed through people 
and animals. For example, the origin of Guava (Psidium guajava L.) is assumed to be an 
area extending from southern Mexico into or through Central America. Traditionally it is used 
for diarrhea, gastroenteritis and other digestive complaints. Tamarindus indica, used as 
refrigerants in fevers and as laxatives, is native to tropical Africa, which consists of more than 
40 countries (Morton 1987, 115ff/356ff). 
The evolution, which Vavilov has already described for crops, also applies to biodiversity in 
general. Biodiversity is not evenly distributed in the world. In the context of biodiversity 
conservation, tropical forests are the areas specific for their rich diversity, whereas drier 
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ecosystems are far more important for crop resources (FAO 1997, 20). As already 
mentioned, generally species density is greatest in the southern hemisphere. According to 
UNEP, 70 percent of the world's species is found in just 12 countries: Australia, Brazil, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mexico, Peru and 
Democratic Republic of Congo (UNEP 2002). 
More than 25,000 plant species can be found in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan belt, which 
correlates with 10 percent of the world's flora (UNEP 2002, 131). Tropical forest ecosystems 
are the most species-rich environments. Although they cover less than 10 percent of the 
world’s surface, they contain 90 percent of the world’s species. Coral reefs and 
Mediterranean heathland are also highly species-rich. In some countries endemism is high. 
98 percent of Madagascar's land mammals, 92 percent of its reptiles, 68 percent of its plants 
and 41 percent of its breeding bird species are endemic (Harrison / Pearce 2001, 167). The 
Amazonian flora has the highest tree diversity on earth: in 1000 km2 of Terra Firme-forest 
near Manaus (Brazil) 1300 tree species were identified. The world record was discovered in 
the Peruvian lowland forest near Iquitos with 300 tree species on one hectare (Parolin 2002). 
These numbers indicate that biodiversity is distributed widely but not equally. 
Different concepts have been developed to assess the existence and distribution of 
biodiversity. Mutke and Barthlott (2005) have developed a world map of the species numbers 
of vascular plants as an indicator of plant biodiversity (cf. Figure 2). 
Figure 2: World map of the species numbers of vascular plants 
Source: Mutke / Barthlott 2005, 525 
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The concept of “biodiversity hotspots” is another approach to identify biodiversity-rich areas. 
Originally, it was developed by Norman Myers in order to identify priority areas for 
biodiversity conservation. First published in 1988, biodiversity hotspots were characterized 
both by exceptional levels of plant endemism and by serious levels of habitat loss. Later the 
concept was revised and the definition redefined. Today a hotspot is defined by at least 
1,500 endemic species of vascular plants (> 0.5 percent of the world’s total), and by its loss 
of at least 70 percent of its original habitat. 25 hotspots were identified (Myers et al. 2000). 
Figure 3: Biodiversity hotspots 
 
Source: Conservation International 2005 
The hotspot identification concept is evolutionary due to the changes in nature and the 
advances in science. In 2005, Conservation International published new figures. The number 
of biodiversity hotspots was extended to 34, showing the on-going loss of biodiversity. The 
key findings are: 
• Over 50 percent of the world’s plant species are endemic to the 34 biodiversity 
hotspots, the 34 hotspots once covered 15.7 percent of the Earth’s land surface; 
• 86 percent of the hotspots’ habitat have already been destroyed; intact remnants of 
the hotspots now cover only 2.3 percent of the Earth’s land surface; 
• Hotspots hold at least 150,000 plant species as endemics, 50 percent of the world’s 
total; 
• The overall number of species occurring in the hotspots is much greater - 
approaching four-fifths (Mittermeier et al. 2005). 
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Both concepts depend on the conventional measure to count species and the results are 
obvious. Most of the world’s biodiversity is concentrated in a very small area within the 
tropics. Different reasons lead to species concentration. Stronger solar energy and higher 
variety of habitats and micro-climate in the tropics are good examples. Isolation as in the 
case of islands (e.g., Galapagos, Madagascar) promotes endemism. However, endemism 
also weakens species and makes them vulnerable to outside interference due to the limited 
spread and their weak resistance to diseases (Harrison / Pearce 2001, 167). 
It has been questioned that the hotspot concept sets the right priority to conserve 
biodiversity, since species-richness hotspots do not necessary overlap with hotspots of 
endemic-species richness or of a high number of threatened species. Besides, the concept 
totally excludes social and economic factors, e.g., the cost of conservation action 
(Possingham / Wilson 2005, 920). 
2.3.2 Decline of biodiversity 
In the past, the extinction of certain species and the decline of biodiversity are caused by 
natural incidents as climate change or tectonic movements leading to continental 
interchange. Today, most of the world’s supply of genetic resources is primarily affected by 
human activities. IUCN estimates that 99 percent of the threatened species are at risk due to 
human activities (IUCN 2006b). 
What have we lost so far and at what pace have we lost it? To investigate the instrument 
ABS it is necessary to identify the problem of loss. The concerned genetic resources have to 
coincide with the resources ABS can affect. ABS focuses on the part of biodiversity that is 
relevant for the commercial use and research and development. Therefore, it has to be 
analyzed if these are the resources that are declining. 
The decline in biodiversity is enormous. The current rate of species extinction is 
approximately 1,000 times higher than the natural rate (also called background rate), which 
has prevailed over Earth’s history. Even if globally the net rate of conversion of some 
ecosystems has begun to slow (one reason is that there is only little habitat left for further 
conversion), it can be observed that across a range of taxonomic groups, the population size 
or range of the majority of species is declining (MEA 2005c, 3). 
Information on extinction rates and the existence of species is provided by the IUCN ‘Red 
Lists of Threatened Species’. It lists the species that are threatened with extinction. The 
actual 2006 Red List of Threatened Species indicates that about 16,119 species, of which 
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plants and lichens are 8,394, are threatened with extinction.4 In the major species groups, the 
percentage of threatened species ranges between 12 percent (birds) and 52 percent 
(cycads). Mainly concerned are species in the tropics, especially on mountains and on 
islands (IUCN 2006b). The described species are very relevant for ABS. All wild plants, 
especially those in the tropics, are of high interest for research and development. 
In addition to species diversity, genetic diversity has declined globally, especially among 
domesticated species. The decline lowers the resilience and adaptability of domesticated 
species. Genetic erosion is the consequence of the replacement of local varieties by 
improved or exotic varieties and species. If old diverse varieties are substituted by newer 
homogenous varieties and if the total number of cultivated varieties is reduced by the 
introduction of commercial varieties in traditional farming systems, genetic erosion will occur. 
For example in Ethiopia, traditional barley and durum wheat varieties are suffering serious 
genetic erosion due to displacement by introduced varieties (FAO 1997, 33-35). With the 
“Green Revolution” the intensification of agricultural systems has significantly increased and 
led to a fundamental shift of intra-species diversity in farmers’ fields. Furthermore, 
specialization by plant breeders and the harmonizing effects of globalization have also led to 
a substantial reduction in the genetic diversity of domesticated plants in agricultural systems 
(MEA 2005c, 5). 
Not only the amount of the total loss of biodiversity is alarming. The distribution of species 
has become more homogenous, meaning that species at very different locations resemble. 
This is caused by the facts that unique species experience higher extinction rates and extinct 
earlier and that invasions of alien species disperse at accelerating pace and swamp out other 
species (MEA 2005c, 4). For the use of genetic resources as input for research and 
development this development is very dramatic, since the amount and the quality of diversity 
increases the probability of finding new active substances or breeding material. 
What are the drivers of biodiversity loss? Drivers are considered as natural or human-
induced factors that directly or indirectly cause a change in an ecosystem. Direct drivers 
unequivocally influence ecosystem processes and the interrelationship is proofed. Indirect 
drivers operate more diffusely, by altering one or more direct drivers (MEA 2005b, 175). The 
identification of the drivers is crucial for the selection of adequate countermeasures. 
Instruments that increase the economic value of the resource are effective measures to 
respond to the decline of biodiversity if the drivers of biodiversity loss are reasoned in the 
                                               
4
 IUCN considers this number as a gross underestimate because the Red List has assessed fewer than three 
percent of the world’s 1.9 million described species. 
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economic inferiority of the resource conservation towards other activities, e.g., land-use 
change due to agricultural production. 
According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005a), the most important direct 
negative impacts on biodiversity are habitat destruction, the introduction of alien species, 
overexploitation, disease, nutrient pollution, and climate change. Habitat change, loss and 
degradation are seen as the most affecting drivers of biodiversity loss but it is assumed that 
disease, nutrient pollution and climate change will play a more important role in the future. 
Furthermore, climate change and invasive species are considered as threats, which initiate 
irreversible processes (MEA 2005a, 96). These direct drivers heavily influence the state of 
biodiversity and will even more in future. The relative importance of these drivers differs 
between ecosystems. Land conversion is most intensive in tropical forests and less intensive 
in temperate, boreal and Arctic regions. Atmospheric nitrogen deposition is largest in 
northern temperate areas close to cities. The introduction of exotic species is related to 
human activity. Areas remote from human intervention generally have fewer introduced 
species (UNEP 2002, 121).  
Habitat change through clearing or degradation (fragmentation) has been the major threat 
for terrestrial ecosystem and their biodiversity. The problem is the most apparent in areas 
where humans and species compete for space. We can observe two developments. Firstly, 
agricultural land is expanding. In the coming 30 years, developing countries will need an 
extra 120 million ha for crops, which is an overall increase of 12.5 percent. The rate varies 
from region to region, but Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and South-East Asia 
are mostly concerned. However, less new agricultural land will be opened up than in the past 
(FAO 2002, 3). Secondly, the world’s forests are diminishing. The FAO reports on the state 
of the forests (FAO 2003) and estimates that 0.38 percent of the world's forests were 
converted to other land uses (i.e. deforested) every year in the 1990s and that at the same 
time, large areas were being reverted to forest, thus leaving a net annual loss of 0.22 
percent. Fragmentation is a visible consequence of habitat change. In the case of agricultural 
crops, intensification of agriculture by the utilization of agricultural chemicals, the building of 
large-scale irrigations, clearing of hedgerows etc., cause habitat destruction (FAO 1997, 36). 
The fact that human-induced habitat destruction and the intensification of agriculture are the 
major causes of biodiversity decline shows that the economic incentives for conservation are 
too low. ABS, which has an impact on the economic value, is a promising instrument. 
In recent years, the introduction of alien species and diseases has increased enormously. 
Globalization of markets and population growth, visible through increased international trade 
and travel, supports the introduction of invasive species and pathogens. Alien species are 
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non-native species that are introduced deliberately or unintentionally outside their natural 
habitats where they become established, proliferate and spread. Existing native population 
can be negatively effected. The same applies to the introduction of pathogens. Once a 
disease has attacked a population, a decline will follow that can result to a depopulation and 
even extinction. Invasive species and pathogens are recognized as one of the greatest 
biological threats to biodiversity - second only to that of habitat loss (MEA 2005c, 8; 
Reinhardt et al. 2003). Pimentel et al. (2001) estimated the annual economic and 
environmental costs caused by introduced pests in crops, pastures, and forests. Economic 
costs amount to nearly US$ 230 billion and environmental costs amount to US$ 100 billion in 
the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Australia, South Africa, India, and Brazil. ABS 
is not related to this problem. 
Overexploitation of resources or unsustainable harvesting of, for example, wild plants for 
food, medicine and the ornamental flower trade and timber is another important cause of 
genetic erosion. Many of these wildlife products and derivates can be found in international 
markets and are in great demand. The pressure on resources has increased with growing 
population. Even if the trade in wild plants and animals and their derivatives are poorly 
documented, the costs are estimated to exceed US$ 160 billion (Traffic 2002). In the case of 
PGRFA, overexploitation appears as overgrazing (FAO 1997, 36). ABS can be relevant for 
this problem, since in some cases users of genetic resources, e.g., in the sector botanical 
medicine, depend on a large and continuous supply of genetic resources. In this case, ABS 
would reinforce the problem. 
Climate change is likely to have considerable impacts on most or all ecosystems. The 
natural distribution limits for species can be affected due to changes of temperature (global 
warming), rise of sea levels, changes in precipitation patterns, and increased frequencies of 
extreme weather events. As a consequence, species may migrate in response to changing 
conditions, but in many cases natural or human-induced barriers will hinder the movement of 
species and consequently lead to the extinction of species. For example, most national parks 
and protected areas are surrounded by urban and agricultural landscapes, which prevent the 
migration of species beyond their boundaries. Scientists believe that the golden toad is 
extinct because of climate change (Pounds / Fogden / Campbell 1999, 611-615). Climate 
change does not affect all species in the same way. Some species are more vulnerable than 
others because they have different attributes (e.g., reduced mobility, isolated or small 
populations) and experience different barriers (e.g., restricted habitat requirements). It is 
assumed that the climate change trend will continue and the impacts on biodiversity will 
increase. Some scenarios indicate that as many as 30 percent of species will be lost as a 
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consequence of such change (Thomas et al. 2004). ABS is not related to this problem. 
However, the problem of climate change indicates that there is urgent need for action.  
Indirect factors that influence the state of biodiversity are of demographic, economic, 
sociopolitical, scientific and technological, and cultural and religious nature (MEA 2005b, 
175). All these factors are related to ABS. 
50 years after World War II, the world’s population has grown immensely and multiplied more 
rapidly than ever before. The population growth is not evenly distributed in the world. High 
growth rates can be observed mostly in less developed countries, but also in the United 
States population growth will continue. Today more than 6.5 billion live on earth, twenty 
years ago there were only 4.2 billion. Estimations predict that by 2050 more than 9 billion 
people will live on the planet (Population Reference Bureau 2005). More people need more 
living space and resources to meet their demands and will increase the pressure on the 
environment. Increased land use changes are the consequence. More people will make the 
ABS issue more complex, since resource holders play an important role for the concept. 
Economic aspects play a key role for the loss of biodiversity. Besides population also the 
world economy and per capita incomes have grown. Between 1950 and 2000, the world’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 3.85 percent per year on average, resulting in an 
average per capita income growth rate of 2.09 percent (MEA 2005b, 175). Economic growth 
is not equally distributed over the world and inequities in the distribution of wealth and 
resources continue. A rise of income implies increased consume and changes in 
consumption patterns. Economic growth depends on resources as, e.g., land and fossil fuels. 
Another consequence is an increased production of waste and pollutants. International trade 
will increase and economies will be more linked and aggravate the problem. The loss of 
biodiversity is also a problem due to the lack of economic incentives, which ensure the 
provision of biodiversity, or due to the existence of adverse incentives, which lead to 
depletion (Myers 1995, 111ff and chapters 4.1.3 and 4.1.4). Economic distractions caused by 
taxes and subsidies (e.g., to clear forests) may have negative impacts on the environment 
where they are produced, but also abroad. All these developments have a decisive impact on 
resources and the environment. ABS and the market for genetic resources is closely linked 
to other markets and compromised by distortions. ABS needs to ensure compensations that 
can reimburse the abandonment of other destructive activities. 
The importance that is attached to biodiversity in a country also depends on how political 
leaders consider environmental issues. Sociopolitical factors have developed positively in 
many countries in the last decades (UNDP 2005, 19ff). Elected democracies have displaced 
authoritarian governments, local communities and indigenous people have gained rights and 
2 The basic principles of genetic resources regarding ABS 26
recognition, non-governmental organizations play an increasingly role in the decision-making 
progress and many environmental issues are discussed in multilateral fora, as for example 
the CBD (MEA 2005a, 74f). These developments put biodiversity on the agenda of the 
politics of many governments, but also made societies more familiar with the issue, even if 
the awareness is still on a very low level. International conflicts often imply the destruction of 
the natural environments in the area of conflict. In some countries, war and civil strife have 
contributed significantly to genetic erosion. In Angola and Cambodia they contributed to the 
loss of many traditional varieties as people moved from one area to another in search of 
safety. Farmers were unable to preserve their local varieties (FAO 1997, 38). Sociopolitical 
factors play also an important role for the ABS system and its critical factors. Only where the 
sociopolitical factors support such a system and it can function. 
Besides the sociopolitical conditions, cultural and religious aspects can influence the 
perception of biodiversity, mainly positively. Cultural and religious drivers influence peoples’ 
values, beliefs and norms and hence their behavior and consumption patterns. The loss of 
certain cultural and ethnic attributes in societies can be a negative impact on the status of 
genetic diversity (FAO 1997, 38) 
2.4 The demand: utilization of genetic resources 
In this chapter the demand of genetic resources is characterized by the importance of 
genetic resources for the demand side and by the actors (users) that operate in the market. 
Besides the providers, users are the most relevant actors in ABS. The scope and size of their 
demand is exemplarily shown for the pharmaceutical sector relying on natural inputs in order 
to illustrate, which role genetic resources play for research and development. The market is 
also shaped by the heterogeneity of users who are the relevant consumers. The main 
commercial user sectors of biodiversity are illustrated in this subchapter. They are the health 
care sector with pharmacy, botanical medicine, cosmetics and personal care, the agricultural 
sector with plant breeding and pest control as well as the sector horticulture and the sector 
biotechnology. They point up the different areas and possibilities of commercial utilization. 
These sectors differ regarding many aspects, as for example, market value, market structure, 
material acquisition, and benefit-sharing practices. 
2.4.1 Importance of genetic resources for industry 
Biodiversity is a treasured good. At a conference of the International Society of Chemical 
Ecology in Sweden 1990, it was recognized that “Natural products constitute a treasury of 
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immense value to humankind. The current alarming rate of species extinction is rapidly 
depleting this treasury, with potentially disastrous consequences” (MEA 2005c, 273f). 
However, not all potential users of genetic resources acknowledge the importance of genetic 
resources. Especially today, users from private sectors stress that their need of genetic 
resources as input for research and development has significantly decreased.  
The user industry of genetic resources can be generally described as research and 
development intensive industries, with over 10 percent of their gross revenues invested in 
the development of new approaches (Swanson / Goeschl 2000, 78). The pharmaceutical 
sector is the biggest and most promising user industry of genetic resources regarding its 
potential in monetary terms. To introduce all relevant sectors, which use genetic resources 
as input for research and development, would be beyond the scope of the study. Therefore, 
a short overview over one selected market, the market for drugs based on natural inputs, is 
given to show exemplarily the role of genetic resources for the devolvement of commercial 
products. 
In the past ten years, companies de-emphasized natural product drug discovery arguing that 
the share of drugs that rely on natural inputs is relatively small and decreasing. Industries’ 
interest in natural products drug discovery diminished because other technologies as 
combinatorial chemistry promised to be successful future solutions (Sittenfeld / Cabrera / 
Mora 2003). According to Newman et al. (2003), the trend began in the early 1990s and was 
led by primarily practical reasons. Advances in the drug discovery process (automation, 
robotics, fast personal computers, high-throughput screening) have required huge numbers 
of compounds for screening. Natural products drug discovery has not satisfied this demand, 
since the approach is slow and labor intensive. Besides, combinatorial chemistry libraries are 
more successful than natural product drug discovery in further developing or optimizing from 
hits of screens to leads and to approved drugs. But this is not the case for pure discovery 
and the development of de novo combinatorial compounds leading to an approved drug. 
Here, natural products drug discovery is still the main applied method. Moreover, it has 
become less difficult to apply through technological advances (e.g., separation technologies, 
speed and sensitivity of structure elucidation) (Newman / Cragg / Snader 2003). 
The statistics prove these developments and the importance of natural products and genetic 
resources as input and sources for new drugs and lead compounds useful for further drug 
development. Butler et al. (2004) found out that natural products or related substances 
accounted for 40 percent in 2000, 24 percent in 2001, and 26 percent in 2002 of the top 35 
worldwide prescription drug sales. A further indicator of the importance of certain groups of 
drugs is the number and economic value of prescriptions. According to Grifo et al. (1997) 84 
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of a representative 150 prescription drugs in the US fell into the category of natural products 
and related drugs. 
2.4.2 Users of genetic resources 
The use of genetic resources for research and development depends on a wide variety of 
species, but it also involves a wide variety of users and users groups. Related to the 
utilization of biodiversity and especially ABS, the term “user” or “user country” is widely used. 
On the country level and compared to “provider countries”, it describes the amount of 
biodiversity in the country and the occurrence and development of biotechnological, 
pharmaceutical, and agricultural industry. Due to the unequal distribution of resources and 
research and development capacities in the world, biodiversity-rich developing countries are 
classified as provider countries and most of the industrialized countries, which have distinct 
biotechnology capacity, as user countries. However, the distinction and the generalization 
cannot be held in all cases. For example, Australia and Brazil are important providers and 
users of genetic resources (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 18). In this study, user countries 
are considered as countries that have high demand for genetic resources and capacity to 
use them in research, development and for commercialization, disregarding if they also 
provide biodiversity. On the individual level, it characterizes the agents on the demand side 
of genetic resources. Users are those agents that import or use genetic resources for 
commercial or scientific purpose. User countries reflect the competent legal and political 
authorities under which jurisdiction the user of genetic resources act and operate (Barber / 
Johnston / Tobin 2003, 18). Even if it is widely used, the term “user” seems to be too broad, 
since intermediaries or other agents also demand genetic resources. These are recipients of 
the material, but they are not necessarily the final users. However, in the international debate 
recipients are classified as users. To speak in the same language the term “user” is 
synonymously used with the term “recipient” within this study. 
2.4.2.1 The user sectors 
The health care sector, including pharmacy, botanical medicine, cosmetics and personal 
care, agriculture with plant breeding and pest control, horticulture and biotechnology, is the 
most relevant user sectors of plant genetic resources (cf. Figure 4). Research institutions 
(e.g., universities and research institutes) and ex-situ collections often act as intermediaries 
and forward genetic resources, derivatives or intermediary products to these sectors. They 
are more research- than development-orientated and can be assigned to the identified 
sectors. However, since more and more patents are based on innovations, which occur in 
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universities, in future these users have to be considered as an important user group. The 
number of US academic patents quadrupled from approximately 800 in 1988 to more than 
3,200 in 2003. The increase in patents was highly concentrated in life sciences applications 
(National Science Board 2006, 5-51). In 2005, the University of California received more than 
390 and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 136 patents for innovations (USOPT 
2007). 
Figure 4: User sectors 
Source: Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 2005, 18 
2.4.2.1.1 Pharmacy 
Pharmaceutical companies invest a higher share of their profits in research and development 
than other innovative sectors. In general, these expenditures have significantly grown, but 
the companies are always looking for ways to decrease cost prices. Most pharmacy-related 
research and development take place in the US, followed by the UK and Switzerland. 
Estimations assume that the development of a new medicine costs about US$ 500 million 
and takes on average 15 years until the product reaches the market (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 
47).  
The main technologies used for drug development are screening of libraries of synthetic 
compounds and natural products and rationale drug design through genomics. Both 
technologies are very elaborate and the probability of success is quite low. In case of 
screening, out of 5,000 to 10,000 synthetic compounds only one becomes an approved drug. 
The rate of natural products is only one in 30,000 or 40,000 (Onaga 2001, 264). However, 
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the potential profits are remarkable. In 1997 more than 71 drugs earned more than US$ 500 
million and 27 blockbuster drugs earned more than US$ one billion per year. Estimations for 
the pharmaceutical sector indicate an increasingly significant role of genetic resources for the 
development of pharmaceuticals. Today, more than half the drugs in the market are natural 
products or derived from natural products. It has been estimated that the pharmaceutical 
industry gains about US$ 32 billion in profits a year from products derived from traditional 
remedies (Harrison / Pearce 2001, 162). 
According to a recent survey by Newman et al. (2003), 61 percent of the 877 small-molecule 
new chemical entities introduced as drugs worldwide during 1981–2002 can be traced to 
natural products. Natural products amount six percent, natural product derivatives 27 
percent, synthetic compounds with natural-product-derived pharmacophores five percent, 
and synthetic compounds designed on the basis of knowledge gained from a natural product 
(natural product mimic) 23 percent. In therapeutic categories the share is even much higher. 
78 percent of antibacterials and 74 percent of anticancer compounds are natural products or 
have been derived from or inspired by a natural product. Other important categories are anti-
ulster, cholesterol-lowering, hypertension, antidepressant, hematologic, and antihistamine. 
The most popular example of a natural-based drug is Taxol (paclitaxel), which was 
introduced by Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) in 1993, in order to treat ovarian cancer. The 
company earns about US$ 1.6 billion a year from Taxol. Its development is based on the 
bark of the Pacific yew tree (Firn 2003, 212). Other examples are vinblastine and vincristine 
from Catharanthiis roseus, the rosy periwinkle from Madagascar. In the 1950s, Eli Lilly and 
Company discovered that a leaf extract from C. roseus could affect the progress of leukemia. 
As a result, the pharmaceutical company introduced anticancer drugs known as vinca 
alkaloids in the 1960s. Vinblastine is used to treat Hodgkin disease, a cancer of the 
lymphatic system, and vincristine is used to treat pediatric leukemia, which is cancer of the 
bone marrow and other blood-cell-producing organs. The annual revenue exceeded US$ 200 
million (Wilson 1992, 283). 
In 2004 the pharmaceutical market topped US$ 500 billion (Wynberg / A Laird 2005, 7). This 
is a seven percent increase over 2003 and a 28 percent increase compared to 2001. The 
industry is concentrated in the US and Europe, followed by Japan. The already large and 
profitable pharmaceutical industry has been rapidly consolidating over the past few years. 
The top ten companies (by sale) cover 45 percent of the market (cf. Table 2). 
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Table 2: The top ten pharmaceutical companies, ranked by sales, 2004 
Company Revenues US$ 
billion 
Market share 
(percent) 
R&D spend US$ 
billion 
Pfizer 50.9 9.25 7.5 
GlaxoSmithKline 32.7 5.96 5.2 
Sanofi-Aventis 27.1 4.93 3.9 
Johnson & Johnson 24.6 4.47 5.2 
Merck 23.9 4,35 4.0 
Novartis 22.7 4.13 3.5 
AstraZeneca 21.6 3.93 3.8 
Hoffmann-La Roche 17.7 3.22 5.1 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 15.5 2.82 2.5 
Wyeth 14.2 2.58 2.5 
Source: Diller / Satlas 2005 
The greatest rate of growth can be observed in generic and biotechnology companies. 
However, the consolidation of the market had also some negative impacts on research and 
development and many companies have lower market shares in 2003 than the sum of their 
components in 1998 (Wynberg / A Laird 2005, 8). 
The acquisition of genetic material in the pharmaceutical sector is mainly carried out via 
intermediaries. Few companies, mostly larger ones, collect raw material (i.e., wild plants or 
microorganisms) themselves in the countries of origin. Collections can be random and blind 
in a determined geographical area, ecology-driven and led by observations, chemotaxonomic 
based on knowledge on taxa or ethnobotanical using local people’s knowledge about plant 
properties. Many companies own libraries of compounds, extracts and dried plant material. 
The amount of obtained material depends on the company’s size and their research and 
development strategy. It is assumed that the users of this sector are relatively familiar with 
the CBD and adopt progressive procedures of ABS (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 57-77). 
2.4.2.1.2 Botanical Medicine 
The Botanical Medicine industry is growing worldwide, and especially in Germany. In 1997 
the German population accounted for approximately 30 percent of their consumption of non-
prescription pharmaceuticals with botanical medicine. Besides Germany, the largest markets 
can also be found in China, Japan, the US, France, Italy, the UK, and Spain (ten Kate / A 
Laird 1999, 79). 
In botanical medicines mainly whole plant-material is used. Prominent examples are Ginko, 
enchinacae, and Saint John’s wort. The botanical medicine industry imports mainly the whole 
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body of the plant. The botanical market in the US is estimated at approximately US$1.6 
billion per year. It is estimated that Europe, annually, imports about 400,000 tons of 
medicinal plants with an average market value of US$ 1 billion from Africa and Asia. After 
Hong Kong, Japan and the USA, Germany ranks forth in the list of international importers. 
However, most of the used material is native to the region where it is sold. According to 
estimations, the global trade in medical plants is US$ 800 million per year (Horaeau / Da 
Silva 1999). 
The plant material is collected from the wild or cultivation. Since the market is growing by 
more than ten percent per year, wild collections can have a negative impact on the 
environment and biodiversity. Products are sold as dried and fresh raw material, tinctures, 
extracts, and phytomedicines. China is so far the largest exporter of plant material, followed 
by India. The acquisition of the material is done through supply companies (i.e., cultivators, 
wholesalers, processing companies). On the way to the consumer it passes many hands as 
manufacturing companies and consumer sales. Traditional knowledge is widely used for the 
identification of promising material, whereas intensive research in the field of botanical 
medicine is limited due to the multi-compound characteristics of botanical medicine. The 
applications for patents seem to be unrealistic in these cases. Two-thirds of the 50,000 
medicinal plants used worldwide come from the wild (wildcrafting) and provide the majority of 
plant material used in this sector. But now the trend is towards cultivated material, since 
continuation and quality are important criteria of supply (Schippman / Leaman / Cunningham 
2002, 4f). ABS is not very common in this sector. Monetary benefit-sharing is mainly 
practiced by payments per weight unit of raw material, and only in few cases by advance 
payments and royalties (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 78-116). 
Devil’s claw is a good example. In 1972 it was discovered that its extract derived from the 
roots has anti-inflammatory properties. From then on, the product boomed. In 1999 in 
Germany the sales amounted to €8 million, rising 113 percent the next year and again 59 
percent to €27 million by 2001. All sales are based on collections from the wild, but it has 
become clear that these collections cannot maintain the supply in the long-term. The global 
market currently uses between 600 and 700 metric tons of raw materials each year, and the 
plant needs to grow for four years or more before ready for harvesting. Company-based 
cultivation projects were initiated to substitute wild collection and to teach collectors how to 
harvest the rhizome in a sustainable manner in order to preserve the populations. As a side 
effect it was discovered that the cultivated material is of a better quality to the wild plant in 
terms of purity, identity and active constituent content (Nutraingredients 2004). The amount 
of trade supposes that revenues are quite large in this sector. According to estimations, in 
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Germany the annual revenue of phytopharmaceuticals amounts to about € 900 million (BPI 
2005, 37). 
2.4.2.1.3 Cosmetics and personal care 
With an eight to 25 percent growth rate per year the natural cosmetics and personal care 
industry grows disproportionately high within the whole cosmetics and personal care sector 
(three to ten percent). The natural segment anticipated up to ten percent of the whole sector. 
The industry uses wild or cultivated plant genetic material in a wide range of products, as for 
example, baby and skin care, cosmetics and hair products. The European and the US 
market for personal care was estimated to be worth US$ 86 billion in 2004 (Datamonitor 
2006). 
As in the sector botanical medicine active agents can be grouped into supply companies, 
manufacturers and marketers. Companies only seldom undertake their own collecting 
activities. Similarities between these two sectors are due to the identical raw material input, 
which are dried plants and oils from a wide variety of species. The users of this sector show 
a rather small demand for new genetic resources. One reason can be found in the large 
variety of plants already used, another one in the highly cost-intensive and time-consuming 
introduction of new ingredients. Yet, companies of this sector also include the use of new 
genetic material in their research and development strategy. If ABS agreements are 
concluded, providers will usually be compensated by prices per kilogram or samples (ten 
Kate / A Laird 1999, 276-292; Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 2005, 20). 
2.4.2.1.4 Agriculture: seed industry 
The seed industry has experienced structural changes in the last 30 years. Mergers and 
acquisition have created a new structure dominated by large companies. Already in the mid-
1970s when the seed market was growing, many multinational companies, which earlier 
focused on pharmaceuticals and chemicals, entered the seed market. With the development 
of genetic engineering in the 1980s, many companies developed to “life science groups” 
using the strong potential for complementarity between crop protection and seeds. One 
prominent example of this complementarity is the product Roundup Ready from Monsanto5 
(UNCTAD 2006, 7). 
                                               
5
 Roundup Ready corn is designed to be tolerant to the Monsanto broad-spectrum herbicide Roundup. It allows 
farmers to drench both their crops and crop land with the herbicide so as to be able to kill nearby weeds 
without killing the crops. The company can use economies of scope by using this specific trait for many crops 
(e.g., soybeans, canola, and cotton) and offer a bundled package of products tied to each other. 
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The global commercial seed market is estimated to vary between US$ 21 and US$ 25.2 
billion. As in the pharmaceutical industry, the domination of few companies with 
concentration strategies in the market can be observed (cf. Table 3). Ten companies control 
49 percent of the market and four companies control about 30 percent (UNCTAD 2006, 8; 
ETC 2005, 2).  
Table 3: The top four seed companies, ranked by sales and market share, 2004 
Company Seed sales (million US$) Market share (in percent) 
DuPont/Pioneer 2,624 10 
Monsanto 2,277 9 
Syngenta 1,239 5 
Limagrain 1,239 5 
Others 17,821 71 
World 25,200 100 
Source: UNCTAD 2006, 9 
It is difficult to separate the sectors seeds and pest control because the same companies 
dominate the market. However, in addition to the large companies many small seed 
companies (about 1,500) also exist in the market, 600 of which are based in the US and 400 
in Europe. In many countries the government still controls the provision and distribution of 
seeds. The public sector covers about 20 percent of the global seed market (James 1996, 
18). Besides, international research organizations as the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) support agricultural research for food security. 
The main actors in this sector are breeders of agricultural crops. Although most material 
used for breeding was taken from the wild, today most material is obtained from seed banks 
held by corporations, universities, botanical gardens, and regional, national, or international 
gene banks. Therefore, intermediaries are important actors in this sector. However, wild 
species are also essential for this sector. The existence of a wide gene pool is important for 
the breeding to adapt to future challenges of a changing environment. If certain wild plants 
had been extinct in the past, it would have been not possible to domesticate rice and wheat 
(Devlin / Grafton 1999, 95). The development of a wheat variety can involve thousands of 
plant breeding crosses and many different individual lines from many countries and over 
many centuries (MEA 2005c, 281). Other actors in the market are operating in the seed 
production, seed condition, and seed marketing and distribution. 
The development of new varieties takes about eight to 15 years and costs in the range of 
US$ 1.0 to 2.5 million for a traditionally bred variety, and US$ 35 to 75 million for a 
transgene. 
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Wynberg and Laird (2005) assume that in this sector the CBD and ABS play an important 
role. Benefit-sharing by private companies is generally arranged through payments of license 
fees for the use of germplasm. Monetary benefit-sharing is not common among public 
institutions. They generally arrange the access to genetic resources on a mutual basis and 
often promote capacity building through the transfer of knowledge and technology to the 
countries of origin (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 131-157). 
Since the entry into force of the ITPGRFA, benefit-sharing arrangements are covered by this 
multilateral agreement. Bilateral contracts will only play a role when the crops used for plant 
breeding are not included in the treaty (cf. chapter 3.1.2). 
2.4.2.1.5 Agriculture: crop protection 
After long-time stagnation, the market for agrochemicals (i.e., herbicides, insecticides, 
fungicides and other agrochemicals) has been growing since 2002. The recent market value 
is estimated at US$ 32 million (UNCTAD 2006, 3). The concentration in this market is 
obvious. In 2004 six companies accounted for about 77 percent of the market, and three of 
them accounted for about 50 percent. 
Table 4: The top six agrochemical companies, ranked by sales and market share, 2004 
Company Agrochem sales (million US$) Market share (percent) 
Bayer 6,155 19 
Syngenta 6,030 18 
BASF 4,165 13 
Dow 3,368 10 
Monsanto 3,180 10 
DuPont 2,249 7 
Others 7,519 23 
World 32,665 100 
Source: UNCTAD 2006, 3 
Major concentrations of agrochemical industry are in North America, Europe and Japan. 
Production is left to the small group of companies, but other small companies, government 
agencies, universities and research institutions are involved in the research. In 1997 
herbicides accounted for 48 percent of the market, insecticides for 27 percent and fungicides 
20 percent (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 189). 
Costs to discover a new commercial chemical pesticide may be between US$ 40 and US$ 
100 million and it takes up to 14 years to develop it. Out of 100,000 tested chemicals about 
two will result in a product. It is estimated that crop protection products, which are derived 
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from genetic resources, comprise about 10 percent of annual global sales (ten Kate / A Laird 
1999, 194-195). 
It is most likely that the demand for access to genetic resources in the sector agrochemicals 
will increase in the future. All companies and institutions that work in this sector depend on 
the access to new genetic resources. The users obtain material by their own collecting 
activities in the countries of origin and via intermediaries but also by ex-situ collections. Many 
companies maintain libraries of genetic material. A genetic resource is often needed for a 
single screening, thus the extraction takes place only once. However, some methods of pest 
control require a regular large supply of genetic material because it constitutes a direct 
component of the product. Public institutions, universities, and research institutions ensure 
the traditional mutual exchange of genetic material, implementing research in co-operation 
with the countries of origin. Private companies mainly practice monetary benefit-sharing in 
form of single access fees or up-front payments (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 210-227). 
As agrochemicals, biological control aims at crop protection but relies much more on 
biodiversity and is seen as an alternative to chemicals because it uses predators, parasites 
or pathogens or their products to protect crops. No data is available to estimate the share of 
biological control in the crop protection sector. Pimentel (1992) suggests using the cost of 
pesticide use for food production (e.g., health costs, veterinary costs, surface and 
groundwater contamination, and pollinator losses) in the US as reference. They were 
estimated to amount US$ 8 billion per year, which could be avoided by substituting 
agrochemicals with biological control agents (MEA 2005d, 279). 
Crop protection is also performed in the sector of horticulture and thus could be assigned to 
this sector. Since its application in the field of agriculture takes place at a significantly higher 
level and in order to simplify matters, here crop protection is assigned to the agricultural 
sector. 
2.4.2.1.6 Horticulture 
Horticulture is a very broad field and includes intensive, large-scale and commercial 
production of vegetables but also gardening as a hobby. In this study only the part of 
horticulture is considered that uses genetic resources to develop new horticultural products. 
However, it is difficult to define its scope with regard to agriculture and the accuracy of 
available data is questionable. The horticultural market for vegetables is greater than the 
market for ornamental horticultural products. Annual sales of horticultural seeds, including 
flower and vegetable seed, amount to US$ 1.80 billion (A Laird / ten Kate 2002, 256). The 
issues regarding the access to genetic resources for vegetables are very similar to the issues 
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discussed for agricultural seeds. In the case of ornamental horticultural (i.e., potted plants, 
bedding plants, cut flowers) things are slightly different and hence shortly illustrated here.  
The major producing countries are the Netherlands, Japan and the US. Market concentration 
is also an important attribute of this sector. Ten multinational seed companies (e.g., 
Norvatis/Switzerland, PanAmerican/USA, Sakata/Japan, Goldsmiths Seeds/USA) account 
for 90 percent of the global sales of seed of ornamental varieties. The costs and the time to 
develop a new ornamental variety from scratch can range from almost nothing to US$ 5 
million (average US$ 2 to 4 million) and from one or two years for up to ten years (ten Kate / 
A Laird 1999, 165). 
Regarding the use of genetic resources, the sector of horticulture is divided into two groups. 
One group mainly uses breeding material that is already being used commercially. The use 
of wild plants as source of new genetic material is of rather minor interest for these breeders. 
The second group consists of those breeders who depend on the access to new genetic 
resources. Their sources include botanical gardens, national collections, or commercial 
providers. It is difficult to access the size of each group. 
So far, this sector is characterized by ignorance of the CBD (Wynberg / A Laird 2005, 26). 
Benefit-sharing is relatively uncommon. Traditionally, plant material was exchanged free of 
charge between breeders. The mutual guarantee of access to plant material still constitutes 
an essential form of non-monetary benefit-sharing. There remain some cases where so-
called royalty fees are paid for benefit-sharing (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 172-187). 
2.4.2.1.7 Biotechnology 
Biotechnology is understood as the application of science and technology to living 
organisms, as well as parts, products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living 
materials for the production of knowledge, goods and services (OECD 2005, 9). The sector 
of biotechnology includes, e.g., activities in the fields of health and agriculture but also in 
energy, material, bio catalysis, functional food (novel food), and diagnostics. Its most 
important genetic resource inputs are microorganisms. In 2004 the revenues of the 
biotechnology industry amounted to US$ 54.6 billion. The US dominates the sector with 78 
percent of global public company revenues. Biotechnology products had a 17 percent 
increase in market share. Here the consolidation is also obvious. 80 percent of the 
biotechnology market is held by ten companies (Wynberg / A Laird 2005, 8/13). Since the 
sector is diversified, it is not possible to assess time and cost of a new product. In the case of 
a novel enzyme product, it may take from two to five years and cost between US$ two and 
20 million until it is sold on the market (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 239). 
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The sector biotechnology also comprises both users who collect their genetic material 
themselves in the respective countries of origin and companies and research institutions that 
obtain their genetic resources mainly from intermediaries, as for example collections 
(Wynberg / A Laird 2005, 16). 
In the sector of biotechnology various monetary and non-monetary benefits are provided in 
exchange for rights to use genetic resources. These measures can be described as benefit-
sharing, even though the users rather consider them as expenditures for important input 
factors (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 242-261). 
2.4.2.1.8 Other minor sectors 
Biomimetics describe biologically inspired technologies developed by industry. Prominent 
examples are shells of various mollusks, which have inspired the ceramic industry, or the 
lotus leave, which repels water droplets and particles of dirt. Biomonitoring is an industry that 
is needed to track down sources of pollution. This would require a vast amount of 
instrumentation, but monitoring of the status of the environment can also be conducted by 
using organism that sample the environment. Freshwater can be monitored by, e.g., fishes 
and mussels, soil by earthworms and air by bees (MEA 2005d, 279-281). These two sectors 
are examples for minor relevant sectors compared to the others and it is difficult to assess 
annual sales and market potential. But these emerging markets are growing and may play a 
more important role in future. 
2.4.3 Experiences, awareness and participation of users 
In 1999 ten Kate and Laird (1999) analyzed basic trends and differences within European 
user sectors. An important result of the study is that the majority of users among all sectors is 
insufficiently informed about the CBD and its associated legal framework regarding the use 
of genetic resources. Positive attitudes towards the CBD are most common among those 
companies, which are already participating in the political process. Among other things, the 
following expectations from the CBD are being expressed: the improvement of legal security 
for issues of access and use of genetic resources, and more clearness in questions of 
property rights to genetic resources. According to some users’ point of view, the CBD can 
assist in developing guidelines for best practice in the use of genetic resources, thereby 
tackling image problems of the user sector (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 296). The users’ 
experiences with the impact of the CBD have led to a more critical attitude towards the CBD. 
The problems and disadvantages users mention are the insufficient level of information, 
inconsistent implementation of access regulations by the different countries of origin, 
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excessive bureaucratic expenses, unrealistic expectations on part of the countries of origin 
regarding the sharing of benefits, negative incentives for research and development and in 
general the disadvantage of high transaction costs due to complicated regulations (ten Kate / 
A Laird 1999, 296-300).  
As to the CBD regulations on benefit-sharing, the users tend to hold the opinion that the 
actual value of a genetic resource arises only from the users’ capital expenditure in the 
context of research and development. Therefore, users are inclined to offer transfer of 
knowledge and technology in exchange for access rights, rather than consider themselves 
capable of and willing to practice monetary benefit-sharing. Besides, the industry always 
argues that they have alternative approaches to product discovery other than using genetic 
resources and that the demand for access will decrease in the future (ten Kate / A Laird 
1999, 6-7).  
Until recently, the comprehensive study on the EU undertaken by ten Kate and Laird was the 
only work that attempted to identify the structure of the user sector, users’ awareness and 
their perceptions. This information is essential for undertaking any user-orientated measures 
and formulating any policies with regard to genetic resources. Now, some user countries’ 
governments (e.g., Germany in 2004, UK in 2004, and Belgium in 2006)6 have initiated 
studies in order to assess the user structure in their countries, the users’ attitude, as well as 
the level of awareness and participation. The survey on users of genetic resources in 
Germany was the first that was published in this series and its major findings are illustrated 
here. Its results confirm many of the results formulated by ten Kate and Laird in 1999, but 
they also brought some new insights on users of genetic resources. 
In Germany the majority of users receives their material from trade partners rather than 
collect or reproduce it themselves. The same applies to the UK (Latorre 2005, 6). Providers 
from the countries of origin and from other countries constitute the most important supply 
sources for all sectors. Above all users at universities and other research institutions, as well 
as ex-situ collections and users from the field of biotechnology carry out „own collecting“ 
activities. 
                                               
6
 The UK study is published as Latorre 2005, Review of the Experience of Implementation by UK Stakeholders of 
Access and Benefit-sharing Arrangements under the Convention on Biological Diversity, Department for the 
Environment (Defra), the German study is published as Holm-Mueller, Richerzhagen, Taeuber 2005, Users of 
Genetic Resources in Germany, Awareness, Participation and Positions regarding the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, BfN-Skripten 126, Bonn, and a summary of the major findings is published as 
Richerzhagen, Holm-Müller, Täuber (2006): Users of genetic resources in Germany – Awareness, 
Participation and Positions regarding the Convention on Biological Diversity, in: Ute Feit et al. (2006), Access 
and Benefit-Sharing of Genetic Resources, 19-29. 
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Most users directly approach providers in the countries of origin, establish co-operation in the 
countries of origin and/or contact ex-situ collections. Only a few users obtain prior informed 
consent from authorities in the country of origin before using genetic resources or concluding 
material transfer agreements with the countries of origin.  
The main reason for German researchers and companies not to work with genetic resources 
is the difficulty to find an appropriate responsible contact person for the arrangement of 
access modalities in the country of origin and the image problem arising from the use of 
genetic material.7 The problem of excessive costs resulting from benefit-sharing is not 
identified as a major problem. This seems rather unexpected, since especially commercial 
users often complain about disproportionate expectations of monetary benefit-sharing. 
The most relevant result of the study is that many German users do not know the CBD and 
the obligations arising from the agreement. They consider themselves to be insufficiently 
informed about the international regulations on ABS. Users are apparently aware of the lack 
of information. The study cannot confirm the assumption that larger companies and 
institutions tend to be better informed as stated by ten Kate and Laird. Groups of users that 
have a similar size and structure do not automatically have the same level of information. In 
all sectors the majority of users is not informed about the CBD. Ex- situ collections are most 
familiar with the CBD, followed by universities and other research institutions. The 
awareness of survey participants from the private sector turns out to be considerably lower 
than the awareness of users from the public sector. Regarding the question whether the 
users consider their interests to be represented in the international CBD negotiations, the 
statements differ and do not give a clear picture. The most important sources of information 
about the CBD include, in descending order, the internet, associations and scientific journals. 
Firsthand information from German authorities (e.g., National Focal Point, delegation 
members) can only be consulted by few users. 
In the UK, the picture is slightly different. The level of awareness of the CBD and ABS 
provisions is higher, even if the majority of users appears to lack detailed understanding. 
Large organizations seemed generally more knowledgeable and experienced on ABS. 
However, they also rely mainly on intermediaries to obtain material (Latorre 2005, 6). 
More than 50 percent of the interviewed users believe that it has become more difficult for 
German users to gain access to genetic resources, since the CBD entered into force. The 
same is experienced in UK (Latorre 2005, 5). However, the majority of the users reports an 
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 In the past, incidents where genetic resources were illegally obtained have led to a negative impact on the 
image of using such material, as well as on the image of the users themselves. 
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approximately constant use of genetic resources. In future, the importance of genetic 
resources for users will increase. This result is surprising, since many private sector users 
stress the decreasing importance of “wild” plant genetic material for research and 
development. 
2.5 Conservation concepts 
How can we bridge the gap between the immense decline of biodiversity and the increasing 
demand and importance, and which role plays ABS among other conservation concepts?  
At the World Summit in Johannesburg in 2002 the international community realized that the 
on-going loss of biodiversity has not been halted and put biodiversity protection and the 2010 
target on the priority list. This target formulated by the CBD’s Conference of the Parties in 
2002 is now an essential component of the Convention’s implementation, and it implies that 
the Parties aim to achieve a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss at 
global, regional and national level by 2010 (CBD 1998, Decision VI/26). A series of global 
and outcome-orientated targets are adopted in order to facilitate the monitoring of the 
progress towards 2010. They cover the focal areas: understanding and documenting plant 
diversity, conserving plant diversity, using plant diversity sustainably, promoting education 
and awareness about plant diversity, building capacity for the conservation of plant diversity. 
The targets are very ambitious. They include, for example, conservation of 10 percent of 
each of the world's ecological regions, 50 percent of the most important areas for plant 
diversity, 60 percent of the world's threatened species conserved in-situ, and 70 percent of 
the genetic diversity of crops and other major socio-economically valuable plant species and 
associated indigenous and local knowledge maintained. 30 percent of plant-based products 
should be derived from sources that are sustainably managed, no species of wild flora 
should be endangered by international trade, and the importance of plant diversity and the 
need for its conservation should be incorporated into communication, educational and public-
awareness programs (CBD 2004, Decision VII/30). 
Different conservation concepts exist and are applied to stop the on-going loss. ABS is only 
one of them. The main conservation concepts can be categorized in two groups: in-situ and 
ex-situ conservation. In-situ conservation is “the conservation of ecosystems and natural 
habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural 
surroundings and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings 
where they have developed their distinctive properties”, whereas ex-situ conservation means 
“the conservation of components of biological diversity outside their natural habitats” (CBD 
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1992, Art. 2). Ex-situ approaches are seen as complementary approaches to in-situ 
approaches rather than as rivals because it is recognized that both methods address 
different aspects of genetic resources. None alone is sufficient and adequate to conserve the 
total range of genetic resources that exist. In-situ conservation is essential for several 
reasons. Not all elements of crops, e.g., wild and weedy relatives of crops, as well as 
perennials and species with recalcitrant seeds, can be contained in ex-situ facilities. Ex-situ 
institutions can store certain genetic material of a plant and maintain the material in the state 
in which it was collected but not the surrounding ecosystem, which influences the generation 
of it. In-situ conservation can support the maintenance of a changing system, which also 
allows the loss of certain species (Brush 2000, 7f). 
In order to understand the role of ABS among other conservation concepts, the different 
approaches and possibilities are categorized in this subchapter. Especially the 
characteristics of in-situ conservation compared to these of ex-situ is of high importance for 
the later analysis of ABS, since ex-situ collections appear as competition for provider 
countries. 
2.5.1 In-situ conservation 
Protected areas are the strongest instrument for the in-situ protection of biodiversity. These 
areas are like a genetic reserve, in which genetic diversity of natural wild populations is 
conserved within defined areas. Since the late 19th century the establishment of protected 
areas has been the leading response to these threats. The increased technical capacity to 
design protected areas as well as the insight that protected areas have the potential to 
effectively contribute to the protection of forests have led to the consolidation and expansion 
of the network of protected areas (Adams et al. 2004, 1146). The 2003 United Nations List of 
Protected Areas lists8 102,102 protected areas, which cover 18.8 million km2. This figure is 
equivalent to 12.65 percent of the Earth’s land surface. In 1962, protected areas only 
amounted to 9,214 sites and 2.4 million km2. In 1992 there were 48,388 sites and 12.3 million 
km protected. 4,116 protected areas of these areas contain marine and coastal elements, 
covering 4.3 million km2. The largest marine protected area is the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park in Australia (345,400km2) (Chape et al. 2003, 21/26/27).  
The CBD sees the establishment and the effective management of a global series of 
protected areas as a key instrument to protect biodiversity. The CBD defines a protected 
                                               
8
 The UN List is prepared jointly by the IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas (IUCN-WCPA) and UNEP-
World Conservation Monitoring Center (WCMC). 
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area as: "a geographically defined area which is designated or regulated and managed to 
achieve specific conservation objectives." IUCN has formulated a broader definition in order 
to include cultural aspects. It views protected areas as “areas of land and/or sea especially 
dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and 
associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means." (IUCN 
1994, 7). 
Protected areas play a key role for reaching the CBD’s objectives. The seventh Conference 
of the Parties (COP) of the CBD ended with a major advance on protected areas when it 
adopted a programme of work on protected areas. The overall purpose of the programme of 
work on protected areas is to support the establishment by 2010 for terrestrial and by 2012 
for marine areas of an effective global network of protected areas. The programme of work 
on protected areas recognizes that the least-developed countries and those with economies 
in transition need help to strengthen their own skills to implement the adopted objectives and 
measures (CBD 2004, Decision VII/28). 
Protected areas serve the purpose to support in-situ conservation, but also to provide the 
sources for bioprospecting (A Laird / Lisinge 2002, 127). In some countries, as for example 
Costa Rica, bioprospecting material is only collected in protected areas and with the growing 
implementation of the ABS concept, the demand for samples from protected areas will grow 
in future. In the past, protected areas have yielded valuable inputs for research and 
development. In 1969, US scientists reported a new species of bacteria, which they named 
Thermus aquaticus. This thermophilic organism was isolated from hot springs in Yellowstone 
National Park and contributed to the significant developments in biotechnology. The 
bacterium is the source of the enzyme Taq DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid) Polymerase, which 
is one of the most important enzymes in molecular biology and widely applied for industrial 
and scientific research. Yellowstone’s thermophilic bacteria attract many researchers and 
many research projects are undertaken in the National Park. In 2001, 49 microbiology 
research projects were undertaken in Yellowstone (YCR 2002). Another example is 
cyclosporine, which is derived from a soil sample taken from Hardangervidda National Park 
in Norway in 1969. As an immunosuppressive agent it is used to reduce the body's natural 
immunity in patients who receive organ transplants. It was the 33rd top-selling drug 
worldwide in 2000, with sales of US$ 1.2 billion (Mulongoy / Chape 2004, 45). 
In-situ conservation can be directly or indirectly financed and promoted. Since it became 
clear that developing countries, which have the most diverse biological resources, do not 
have sufficient resources to maintain them, industrialized countries have assumed some 
responsibility and contributed to conservation activities in these countries to alter the 
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behavior. While in industrialized countries conservation initiatives emphasize more direct 
investments (e.g., performance payments, tax relief, land purchases and easements), 
conservation in developing countries has emphasized more indirect approaches as 
integrated conservation, development projects and community-based natural resource 
management. These projects aim to encourage rural communities to maintain biodiversity 
but using it sustainably. They seem to achieve both conservation and development 
objectives. Although many of such conservation projects have been conducted, biodiversity 
is still declining (Ferraro / Kiss 2002, 1718f). The indirect approach has been criticized, since 
in most developing countries the political, social and economic conditions to establish indirect 
incentives are not given. Therefore, it has been suggested to switch from indirect to more 
direct investment forms and pay people directly for conserving biodiversity because they 
have less institutional demands, stimulate local markets and are more cost-efficient (Ferraro / 
Simpson 2001, 17f). 
Bioprospecting is characterized as a more indirect investment like eco-tourism, sport hunting 
and wild coffee production because markets are supportively established to commercialize 
biodiversity goods and it is hoped that the commercialization sets incentives for conservation. 
Biodiversity conservation is only a by-product (cf. chapter 4.2). 
Payments of environmental services such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, 
watershed protection and landscape values, is another indirect approach. Here, private land 
users are compensated for the environmental services they contribute to. By selling the 
services provided by, e.g., carbon sequestration by forests, funds are generated to increase 
the private benefits of forest conservation to individual land users and change their incentives 
or to generate resources that can be used by the government or public (Landell-Mills / Porras 
2002, 193; Pagiola / Bishop / Landell-Mills 2002, 4). Especially for biodiversity, the concept is 
promising. Much of the world’s biodiversity is not represented in protected areas, but in 
surrounding and neighboring areas. Therefore, it is necessary to find solutions for 
biodiversity outside of the protection zones. Costa Rica is not only a prominent example for 
pioneering efforts regarding ABS but also for payments for environmental services. 
Dept-for-nature swaps are a financial instrument, which may be used for funding either direct 
or indirect approaches (Ferraro / Simpson 2001, 20). It is an instrument to channel financial 
support from industrialized countries or NGOs to developing, poor but biodiversity-rich 
countries. These initiatives reduce debt obligations and generate funds for the environment. 
They typically involve restructuring, reducing, or buying a portion of a developing country’s 
outstanding debt, with a percentage of proceeds being used to support conservation 
programs within the debtor country (Sheikh 2004, 1). Recent examples are dept-for-nature 
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swaps that aim at the protection of forest areas. They have been pursued by the US with El 
Salvador (US$ 14 million), Belize (US$ 9 million), and Thailand (US$ 9.5 million) (Grafton et 
al. 2004, 445). 
On-farm conservation, being understood as the sustainable management of the genetic 
diversity of locally developed traditional crop varieties along with associated wild and weedy 
species or forms within traditional agricultural, horticultural or agri-silvicultural cultivation 
system, is a direct approach (Dhillon et al. 2004, 558). On farm-conservation can be realized 
automatically when farmers maintain genetic resources in form of local, diverse crop varieties 
(landraces) in their natural environment by their daily farming practices. If farmers choose to 
cultivate modern, broadly adapted, or higher yielding varieties instead, on-farm conservation 
has to be financially supported by specific projects and programs. National governments, 
international programs, and private organizations directly finance these programs and 
projects. These measures are an attempt to encourage farmers to continue to select and 
manage local crop populations (Brush 2000, 4). However, also indirect approaches have 
been established, e.g., the development of markets for niche products. One example of a 
successful green marketing program for promoting in-situ conservation has been established 
in the US to maintain and utilize ancestral maize by Cherokee farmers in North Carolina. 
Another market approach would be the sale of landraces’ genetic resources under ABS 
agreements.  
However, from an conservationist’s point of view direct payments for conservation might be 
the most effective instrument in the short-term but in the long-term others factors are also 
relevant. Direct payments will depend on ongoing financial commitments. They might also 
just shift the pressure from one site to another that was not previously being exploited. 
Another aspect are property rights. In developing countries land tenure is often ambiguous. 
For funding agencies these conditions are quite unattractive because they want to know how 
their investment is used (Nicholls 2004). 
2.5.2 Ex-situ conservation 
Biological resource centers (BRCs) are the heart of ex-situ conservation but also for the use 
of genetic resources for research and development. They contain collections of culturable 
organisms (e.g., microorganisms, plant, animal, and human cells), replicable parts of these 
(e.g., genomes, plasmids, viruses, cDNAs), viable but not yet culturable organisms, cells and 
tissues, as well as databases containing molecular, physiological and structural information 
relevant to these collections and related bioinformatics.” BRCs can be microbial culture 
collections, viral repositories, herbaria, botanical gardens, zoos and ex-situ plant and animal 
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genetic resource collections (OECD 2001b, 11/14). However, with a view to the analysis of 
the ABS concept ex-situ plant collections, botanical gardens and microbial collections are of 
highest importance, as will be illustrated in the following. 
In the past, the ex-situ conservation of plant genetic resources was the main instrument for 
conservation. Material was mostly stored in botanical gardens and seed banks. In the early 
1960s, the FAO strongly promoted ex-situ conservation of crop genetic resources and in the 
1970s and 1980s germplasm collecting was intensively executed. It is estimated that today 
the existing global ex-situ collections contain approximately six million accessions of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture. About 600,000 of these accessions are 
maintained within the CGIAR system, while the remainders are stored in regional or national 
gene banks (SCBD 2001, 205). CGIAR is a group of countries, international and regional 
organizations, and private foundations supporting 15 international agricultural centers (e.g., 
the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute and the International Rice Research 
Institute). 
Ex-situ collections are not equally distributed in the world. Twelve countries hold more than 
45 percent of the germplasm accessions held in national collections. Most genebanks are in 
Europe and Asia. Ex-situ collections can be seed gene banks, in vitro collections and field 
gene banks. The storage of seeds is the most common and most cost-effective way of plant 
conservation for orthodox seeds. Seed storage accounts for about 90 percent of total 
accessions held ex-situ (Dhillon et al. 2004, 557). Over 40 percent of all accessions in 
genebanks are cereals, whereas minor crops, e.g., yams, are poorly represented (FAO 1997, 
90f). 
The ex-situ collections differ regarding the type of material they preserve. Botanical gardens 
conserve living plant material, seed banks preserve seeds and microbial collections store 
microorganisms. There are more than 2000 botanical gardens in 153 countries with more 
than 6 million accessions (BGCI 2001, 5/28). Many of them also maintain germplasm 
collections for the conservation of ornamental species, indigenous crop relatives and 
medicinal and forest species and some of them conserve germplasm of cultivated species, 
including landraces and wild food plants, and other non-cultivated species for local use. Such 
species frequently lack in other ex-situ germplasm collections and therefore, botanical 
gardens play an important complementary role in ex-situ collection systems (SCBD 2001, 
206). Due to their task to conserve a broad spectrum and conserve as many species as 
possible, botanical gardens conserve considerable amounts of inter-species diversity, but 
only little intra-species genetic diversity (FAO 1997, 84). 
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The majority of botanic gardens is in developed countries in Europe and North America. 
According to estimations, 90 percent of all living plant collections in botanical gardens was 
collected and stored prior CBD. Therefore, the ABS regulations do not apply to these 
collections (BGCI 2001, 5f). 
Most developed countries and a few developing countries maintain national collections of 
microorganisms as an essential resource for science and industry. There are 483 culture 
collections in 65 countries registered in the World Data Centre for Microorganisms (WDCM). 
Together these collections maintain over 1.1 million microbial cultures including around 
11,000 species or sub-species of bacteria (445,000 cultures), 20,000 species or sub-species 
of fungi (375,000 cultures), 10,000 virus collections, 10,000 cell lines and 277,000 other 
microbes. Microbial collections handle thousands of transactions per year. For example, the 
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) Culture Collection in Illinois distributes 4,000 
subcultures per year and acquires 1,000 to 2,000 new accessions per year to its collection of 
around 85,000 cultures. The Institute for Fermentation (IFO) in Japan maintains around 
18,000 strains and distributes around 8,000 samples per year (Cunningham et al. 2006). 
BRCs can be hold publicly or privately. Public collections usually depend on public funding. It 
has been reported that many of the BRCs, especially in developing countries, have problems 
to obtain adequate funding to maintain and develop the collections (Day-Rubenstein et al. 
2005, 21). Public collections are publicly accessible whereas private industrial collections are 
withheld from public access to protect financial investments and industrial secrets. In many 
cases, private industrial biological resources are made accessible to the wider scientific 
community only when patents protect them or when they are no longer deemed to be of 
specific economic value (OECD 2001a, 37). 
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3 Institutional and political framework of international 
biodiversity conservation 
The institutional and political framework of international biodiversity conservation is 
influenced by two regimes: the regime for the conservation of biodiversity and the regime for 
the protection of IPRs. The major international agreements, which are the pillars of the two 
regimes, are on the one hand, the CBD and the ITPGRFA and on the other hand, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention). It 
has been debated that these two regimes are counterproductive and undermine each other. 
The two regimes are not contradictory, but they pursue totally different goals and take effect 
in totally different policy fields. Hence, there is a possibility that conflicts arise. When 
formulating ABS policies, the existences of the IPRs regime and the reciprocal influences 
have to be considered. Then, synergies can be used and the ABS concept of the CBD can 
even benefit from and make use of the IPRs regime. 
3.1 Conservation, sustainable use and benefit-sharing 
Several multilateral agreements aim at biodiversity conservation. The first to name is the 
CBD. It is a pure biodiversity convention, which attempts to conserve biodiversity not only 
through protection, but also through sustainable use and the sharing of benefits arising from 
the resource’s utilization. The ITPGRFA has similar objectives, but it only applies to a 
specific group of crops that are highly relevant for food security. This study takes a closer 
look at these agreements. Further conventions that have protection objectives are the 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the World Heritage Convention (WHC), the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS). 
3.1.1 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
Between the 1970s and 1980s, it became obvious that neither the public nor the private 
sector in biodiversity-rich countries - mostly developing countries - could provide sufficient 
funds for nature and especially biodiversity conservation. The concern and general 
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willingness within the international community to conserve biodiversity was not sufficient to 
counterbalance these deficiencies. In 1987 a discussion was started within the scope of the 
United Nations Environment Programme on the elaboration of an international agreement on 
the conservation of biodiversity (Henne 1998, 114). After long-lasting negotiations, the CBD 
was adopted during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The essential objectives of 
the CBD are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, 
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources (CBD 1992, Article 3). This includes facilitated access to genetic resources and 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies. Today (as of April 2007) the CBD has 190 
parties (CBD 2007e). Due to the fact that the majority of all countries are members, the 
protection of biodiversity is considered as one of the biggest environmental priorities in the 
world. However, the US have signed, but not ratified the CBD.  
The agreement covers all fields of biodiversity: ecosystems, species, and genetic resources. 
It includes in-situ biodiversity and biological material that has been stored in ex-situ 
collections after the adoption of the CBD (CBD 1992, Article 2). It links traditional 
conservation efforts to the economic goal of using biological resources sustainably. Contrary 
to the classical protection concepts claiming for not using the resources at all, the CBD 
recognizes that biological resources can be simultaneously conserved and used while 
ensuring its protection (SCBD 2000, 8). According to its objectives, the agreement sets 
principles for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic 
resources. To reach this goal the CBD is based on a bilateral system of exchange of genetic 
resources and compensation. This concept is illustrated and analyzed in chapter 4.2. It also 
covers the rapidly expanding field of biotechnology addressing technology development and 
transfer, benefit-sharing and biosafety. 
The CBD’s governing body is the Conference of the Parties (COP), consisting of all 
governments and regional economic integration organizations having ratified the Convention. 
The COP can make amendments to the Convention, create expert advisory bodies, review 
progress reports by member nations, and collaborate with other international organizations 
and agreements. Non-parties can also be admitted to attend the COPs as observers. The 
CBD is not a static entity but rather an agreement that constantly advances through the 
regular general meetings (COPs) and expert meetings (e.g., Subsidiary Body on Scientific, 
Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) and Working Groups). Table 5 gives an 
overview about the COPs that have taken place so far. 
SBSTTA is a committee composed of experts from member governments and a subsidiary 
body of the COP. It provides scientific advice and information to the COP on scientific and 
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technical issues related to the CBD, as for instance scientific and technical assessments of 
the status of biological diversity or innovative, efficient and state-of-the-art technologies. 
Table 5: The Conferences of the Parties since the adoption of the CBD 
Conference of the 
Parties to the CBD 
Location Major themes and outcomes 
COP VIII Brazil (8 – 19/05/2006) Island biodiversity, Dry and sub-humid lands 
biodiversity. Global Taxonomy Initiative, ABS, 
Education and public awareness, Article 8(j) and 
related provisions (planned) 
COP VII Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia  
(9 – 20/02/2004) 
Mountain ecosystems; Protected areas; Transfer 
of technology and technology co-operation 
COP VI The Hague, 
Netherlands  
(7 – 19/04/2002) 
Forest ecosystems; Alien species; Benefit-sharing; 
Strategic plan 2002-2010 
Adoption of the Bonn guidelines on access to 
genetic resources and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from their utilization 
COP V Nairobi, Kenya  
(15 – 26/05/2000) 
Dryland, mediterranean, arid, semi-arid, grassland 
and savannah ecosystems; Sustainable use, 
including tourism; Access to genetic resources 
Reconvention the Panel of Experts on ABS 
Decision to establish an Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Working Group with the mandate to develop 
guidelines and other approaches 
Decision to establish an open-ended Expert 
Workshop on Capacity-building for ABS 
ExCOP I  
(First Extraordinary 
Meeting of the 
Conference of the 
Parties to the CBD) 
Cartagena, Colombia 
& Montreal, Canada 
(22 – 23/02/1999 &  
24 – 28/01/2000) 
Adoption of a protocol on biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
COP IV Bratislava, Slovakia  
(4 – 15/05/1998) 
Inland water ecosystems; Review of the 
operations of the Convention; Article 8(j) and 
related issues (traditional knowledge); Benefit-
sharing 
Decision to establish a regionally balanced panel 
of experts appointed by Governments, composed 
of representatives from the private and the public 
sectors as well as representatives of indigenous 
and local communities 
COP III Buenos Aires, 
Argentina  
(4 – 15/11/1996) 
Agricultural biodiversity; Financial resources and 
mechanism; Identification, monitoring and 
assessment; IPRs;  
COP II Jakarta, Indonesia  
(6 – 17/11/1995) 
Marine and coastal biological diversity; Access to 
genetic resources; Conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity; Biosafety 
COP I Nassau, Bahamas 
(28/11 – 9/12/1994) 
Guidance to the financial mechanism; Medium-
term program of work 
Source: CBD 2007a 
The Secretariat of the CBD (SCBD), based in Montreal, organizes meetings, drafts 
documents, assists member governments in the implementation of the program of work, 
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coordinates with other international organizations, and collects and disseminates information. 
A recent paper on the Secretariat’s work attests that it is well organized and managed, but it 
also shows that it has only modest effects on external stakeholders and other actors as 
national governments, industry, and NGOs (Siebenhuener 2007, 271).  
The COP also establishes working groups, as for instance the Working Group on Article 8(j)9 
and the Working Group on ABS, to address more specifically the implementation of the 
CBD’s traditional knowledge and ABS articles. This shows that TK and ABS are the central 
issues of the CBD that are too complex to be handled by the COP alone. 
COP 4 established a regionally balanced panel of experts appointed by governments and 
composed of representatives from the private and public sectors, as well as representatives 
of indigenous and local communities to "draw upon all relevant sources, including legislative, 
policy and administrative measures, best practices and case-studies on access to genetic 
resources and benefit-sharing arising from the use of those genetic resources, including the 
whole range of biotechnology, in the development of a common understanding of basic 
concepts and to explore all options for access and benefit-sharing on mutually agreed terms 
including principles, guidelines, and codes of conduct of best practices for access and 
benefit-sharing arrangements." (CBD 1998, Decision IV/8, 3). 
The Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on ABS was established by COP 5 to develop 
guidelines and other approaches for submission to the COP and to assist Parties and 
stakeholders in addressing for instance, the clarification and definition of terms. The major 
result of the first meeting was the development of the Bonn Guidelines on access to genetic 
resources and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their utilization, 
which were adopted by COP VI. They give guidance to providers and users when 
implementing the CBD’s ABS specifications. Table 6 gives an overview about the CBD 
meetings related to ABS. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9
 CBD 1992, Article 8j: Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations 
and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval 
and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices. 
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Table 6: CBD meetings related to ABS 
Meeting Location Major themes 
Fourth meeting of 
the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Working 
Group on ABS (WG-
ABS-4) 
Granada, 
Spain (30 
January - 03 
February 
2006) 
Continuation of discussions in WG-ABS-3 
Third meeting of the 
Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Working Group on 
ABS (WG-ABS-3) 
Bangkok, 
Thailand (14 - 
18 February 
2005) 
International regime on ABS: nature, scope, potential 
objectives and elements to be considered for inclusion in 
the regime 
Other approaches, including consideration of an 
international certificate of origin/source/legal provenance 
Measures, including consideration of their practicability, 
feasibility and costs, to support compliance with prior 
informed consent of the contracting party providing genetic 
resources and mutually agreed terms on which access 
was granted 
Use of terms, definitions and/or glossary, as appropriate. 
Strategic Plan: future evaluation of progress – the need 
and possible options, for indicators for ABS 
Second meeting of 
the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Working 
Group on ABS (WG-
ABS-2) 
Montreal, 
Canada (1 - 5 
December 
2003) 
Use of terms, definitions and/or glossary, as appropriate 
Measures, including consideration of their feasibility, 
practicality and costs, to support compliance with prior 
informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such 
resources and mutually agreed terms on which access 
was granted in Contracting Parties with users of genetic 
resources under their jurisdiction 
Its consideration of any available reports or progress 
reports arising from the present decision 
Needs for capacity-building identified by countries to 
implement the Guidelines 
Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Working Group on 
ABS (WG-ABS-1) 
Germany, 
Bonn (22 - 26 
October 2001) 
Terms for prior informed consent and mutually agreed 
terms 
Roles, responsibilities and participation of stakeholders 
Relevant aspects relating to in-situ and ex-situ 
conservation and sustainable use 
Mechanisms for benefit-sharing, for example through 
technology transfer and joint research and development; 
and means to ensure the respect, preservation and 
maintenance of knowledge, innovations and practices of 
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional 
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, taking into account work by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization on IPRs issues  
Second Meeting of 
the Panel of Experts 
on ABS 
Montreal, 
Canada (19 - 
22 March 
2001) 
Assessment of user and provider experience in access to 
genetic resources and benefit-sharing and study of 
complementary options 
Identification of approaches to involvement of stakeholders 
in access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing 
processes 
First Meeting of the 
Panel of Experts on 
ABS 
San Jose, 
Costa Rica (4 - 
8 October 
1999) 
ABS for scientific and commercial purposes, review of 
legislative, administrative and policy measures at national 
and regional levels, review of regulatory procedures and 
incentive measures, capacity building 
Source: CBD 2007d 
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Besides the Working Groups and the SBSTTA, the work of the COP is also supported from 
the CBD’s Clearing House Mechanism (CBD-CHM), an internet-based network. The CBD-
CHM aims to ensure universal access to the Convention's official records, but also to 
additional information as case studies, national reports etc. It increases public awareness of 
Convention programs and issues. Furthermore, it supports providers and users to establish 
contacts to start co-operation and to facilitate the dissemination of information (SCBD 2005, 
222ff). 
The CBD is based on some major principles that are elucidated here. The Convention 
recognizes every state’s sovereignty over its own biological resources and assigns the 
responsibility for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity to the provider 
countries (CBD 1992, Article 3). The CBD states that governments have the accountability to 
establish national regulations on dealing with their biological resources and regulating ABS 
and that users have to recognize the sovereign rights of states over their natural resources 
(CBD 1992, Article 15.1). The definition and the consequences associated with the principle 
of state sovereignty are still not very clear though. It is the government’s decision to establish 
and design national ABS regulations, as well as to define and to assign property rights over 
biological resources, but the conditions have to ensure facilitated access to genetic 
resources (CBD 1992, Article 15.2). The difficulties arising from this principle are brought 
forward in chapter 5.1.2. Access to valuable biological resources must be carried out on 
"mutually agreed terms" (MAT) and be subject to the "prior informed consent" (PIC) of the 
country providing the genetic resources (CBD 1992, Article 15.1/4/5). These important 
criteria are not regulated in more detail in the CBD. The determination of rules and 
regulations concerning the “prior informed consent” is the responsibility and burden of the 
national governments. Furthermore, the CBD stresses that scientific research should be 
conducted to the greatest extent possible in the country of origin of the genetic resource and 
with the participation of the Contracting Party. The benefits resulting from any use of genetic 
resources should be shared with the country providing the material under mutually agreed 
terms and in a fair and equitable way (CBD 1992, Article 15). 
The PIC and benefit-sharing provisions of the CBD are established with respect to the 
“country providing genetic resources" and not the “country of origin”. “Access to genetic 
resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such 
resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party” (CBD 1992, Article 15.5). “Each 
Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, 
[…] with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and 
development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic 
resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources. Such sharing shall be upon 
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mutually agreed terms” (CBD 1992, Article 15.7). This clarification is important for the 
implementation of any ABS regulation in provider and user countries. The CBD demands 
benefit-sharing with the provider countries of in-situ material and necessarily with the 
countries of origin. 
Since the adoption of the CBD, its implementation has focused more on the establishment of 
ABS regulations in biodiversity-rich provider countries addressing the agents’ behavior in the 
provider countries. That has led to an imbalance regarding the efforts of the provider and 
user countries in order to realize the Convention’s objectives. However, when the CBD 
determines that access to valuable biological resources must be carried out on MAT and be 
subject to PIC of the providing country, it addresses the users’ behavior in provider countries 
(CBD 1992, Article 3, 15). The agreement also places responsibility on the user countries to 
contribute to its implementation. The realization of the third objective, the fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing by the transfer of monetary or non-monetary benefits, as for example, 
technology, requires measures that are carried out in user countries. Especially, the transfer 
of technology and biotechnology to the providers of the resources has to be promoted and 
carried out by users (CBD 1992, Article 15(7), 16, 19). 
The CBD places emphasis on the recognition of and consistency with IPRs, especially 
patents in the area of biotechnology (CBD 1992, Article 16). The Convention confirms the 
existence and extension of IPRs as a precondition for bioprospecting as sustainable form of 
exploitation. IPRs play a major role in the biotechnology industry and have a high impact on 
the developments in these knowledge-intensive sectors. In 2002 biotechnology patents 
already accounted for about seven percent of all US patents (OECD 2006b, 45). The 
possibility to protect inventions with high research and development costs by IPRs is 
considered to be a guarantee for on-going developments (Lele / Lesser / Horstkotte-
Wesseler 2000, 7). The relationship between ABS and IPRs is analyzed in chapter 4.2.2. 
However, although the CBD is in place for fifteen years now, the decline of biodiversity could 
not be stopped and the effectiveness of the Convention can be challenged. During COP VI 
the Parties decided to adopt the Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity to 
guide its further implementation at the national, regional and global level. The main objective 
is to effectively stop the loss of biodiversity so as to secure the continuity of its beneficial 
uses through the conservation and sustainable use of its components and the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources (CBD 2002, Decision 
VI/26). The Parties aim to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of 
biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level as a contribution to poverty 
alleviation and to benefit the whole society. 
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The financial system of the CBD is based on a multilateral system, providing support for 
capacity building and for investing in projects and programs in biodiversity-rich, developing 
countries. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), established 1991, finances projects in 
developing countries which forge international co-operation and finance actions to address 
four critical threats to the global environment: biodiversity loss, climate change, depletion of 
the ozone layer and degradation of international waters. The projects are managed by the 
Implementing Agencies, which are the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. GEF has financed 
752 projects in 155 countries worth $2.2 billion through fiscal year 2006. A total of $5.17 
billion has been leveraged in cofinancing. All together, the total contribution of GEF’s 
initiatives in biodiversity conservation is about US$7.3 billion (GEF 2006, 4). 
The recent discussions within the COPs and the Working Groups urge for more responsibility 
on the user side. The group of megadiverse countries claimed for an international regime, 
arguing that provider countries are not capable of enforcing ABS without the support of user 
countries. This claim was adopted by the WSSD in Johannesburg in 2002. The 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation calls upon the parties of the CBD to negotiate an 
international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising from the utilization of genetic resources (UN 2002, 44o). The Bonn Guidelines, which 
were adopted in 2002, also address providers’ and users’ roles and responsibilities according 
to ABS. They propose a range of measures that user and provider countries should consider 
when implementing the CBD’s ABS specifications. At COP7 the parties decided to mandate 
the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on ABS to elaborate and negotiate an international 
regime on ABS with the aim of adopting instruments to effectively implement the provisions 
of Article 15 and Article 8(j) of the Convention and the three objectives of the Convention. At 
COP8 it was decided to continue the elaboration and negotiations of the international regime 
and the ABS Working Group was instructed to complete its work at the earliest possible time 
before the COP10 in 2010. 
These developments indicate that demands on user countries have been expressed more 
explicitly, urging them to stand up for the implementation of the CBD regulations on ABS. 
This means that today users of genetic resources have to be considered and involved even 
more as important actors in the development of comprehensive international conservation 
concepts. 
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3.1.2 The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
Even before, but especially since the adoption of the CBD, the international community has 
been looking for a structured way to regulate the conservation, and ABS for PGRFA. But 
why? The CBD alone is not sufficient to regulate ABS of PGRFA. The rationale behind a 
separate regulatory framework for PGRFA lies in their distinct characteristics, especially the 
attribution of the country of origin and the need for an unrestricted access to a wide genetic 
base for future crop improvements against the background of sustainable agriculture and 
food security. 
This study only deals with the ABS concept of the CBD. However, in order to give 
recommendations for the future design and improvements other approaches have to be 
taken into account. The ITPGRFA is an excellent example, since it follows another approach 
(i.e., a multilateral approach) as the CBD. The acquisition of genetic resources on a case-by-
case and bilateral basis as stipulated by the CBD often involves high transaction costs. 
Besides, the CBD leaves the issue of ex-situ collections conserving material that was 
collected before the adoption of the Convention unsettled (Moore / Tymowski 2005, 11-12). 
By addressing ex-situ collections the ITPGRFA fills this gap. Therefore, the consideration of 
the new international ABS framework for PGRFA is indispensable for the analysis of the 
CBD’s ABS concept. 
The ITPGRFA is the result of a long-lasting process. Following the Earth Summit and the 
adoption of the CBD, already in 1993 the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) decided to revise the International Undertaking (IU) on Plant Genetic 
Resources, which had been adopted by the FAO Conference in 1983. It was the first 
comprehensive international agreement dealing with PGRFA and aimed to promote 
international harmony in matters regarding access to, use and conservation of PGRFA 
(Cooper 2002, 1). Based on the principle that plant genetic resources are considered as a 
heritage of mankind the IU aimed to ensure that plant genetic resources of economic and 
social interest, particularly for agriculture, will be explored, preserved, evaluated and made 
available for plant breeding and scientific purposes (IU 1983, Article 1). In June 2002, 113 
countries had adhered to the Undertaking. The secretariat of the IU was the FAO 
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (CGRFA), an intergovernmental 
forum that was also created in 1983 to facilitate the policy dialogue and technical discussions 
on genetic resources of relevance to food and agriculture. Initially, its mandate was limited to 
plant genetic resources, but it was broadened in 1995 to cover all components of agro-
biodiversity of relevance to food and agriculture. 
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In 1993 following the Rio Earth Summit and the adoption of the CBD, the FAO decided to 
revise the IU to harmonize it with this new international agreement on biodiversity 
conservation. The negotiation process was set up in the CGRFA and took more than seven 
years to be completed. This negotiation process reflects the complexity in ensuring facilitated 
access to PGRFA and a fair and equitable benefit-sharing while balancing the interests of the 
different stakeholders reaching from farmers and public- and private-sector breeders to life 
science and biotechnology companies (Cooper 2002, 1). 
In November 2001 the FAO Conference approved the ITPGRFA. It was opened for 
signature, ratification, acceptance or approval and accession by all members of the FAO and 
any states that are not members of the FAO, but that are members of the United Nations, or 
any of its specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency (ITPGRFA, 
Article 25, 26, 27). The treaty could only enter into force after the deposit of the fortieth 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by FAO members. With the 
ratification of twelve European countries and the European Community this obligation has 
been reached and the ITPGRFA finally entered into force 29 June 2004. 
The ITPGRFA is a legally binding instrument, which aims at the conservation and 
sustainable management of PGRFA, as well as at the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from their use (ITPGRFA, Article 1.1). As the CBD, the ITPGRFA recognizes 
the sovereign rights of states over their own PGRFA and the rights of the national 
governments to determine access to those resources resting with national governments 
(ITPGRFA, Article 10.1). However, the ITPGRFA establishes a different system as the CBD.  
The key component of the treaty is the multilateral system of ABS, which includes all plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in the annex of the treaty that are under the 
management and control of the Contracting Parties and in the public domain, but it is aimed 
to enlarge the pool of genetic resources covered by the treaty by including plant genetic 
resources of other holders (ITPGRFA, Article 11.2-3). PGRFA held in the ex-situ collections 
of the CGIAR and in other international institutions are also included. The list comprises 35 
crops including most major food crops (e.g., cereals and grain legumes) and some 80 
forages. The selection of crops is based on criteria of food security and interdependence. 
However, a number of crops that might be covered by the criteria are not included, as for 
example soybeans and sugar cane. The list is the result of the specific interests of the 
negotiated parties (Moore / Tymowski 2005, 15). 
The treaty consists of general provisions (ITPGRFA, Article 4 to Article 8) regarding the 
conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA, which apply to all crops and not just the listed 
ones, and specific regulations and procedures regarding the multilateral system. Within the 
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multilateral system Parties of the international treaty give up their individual sovereign rights 
to negotiate ABS terms under MAT and PIC, instead, the exchange of genetic resources is 
based on standard terms. 
The inclusion of farmers’ rights is an essential component of the international treaty. They 
recognize the continuous contribution of local and indigenous communities and farmers of all 
regions of the world, particularly those in the centers of origin and crop diversity, for the 
conservation and development of plant genetic resources, which constitute the basis of food 
and agriculture production throughout the world (ITPGRFA, Article 9). The treaty mandates 
the responsibility of realizing, protecting and promoting these rights to national governments. 
Regarding the issue of saving, using, exchanging and selling farm-saved seed the treaty is 
neutral but supports national regulations which assign these rights (ITPGRFA, Article 9.2). 
In the multilateral system access should be provided to legal and natural persons under the 
jurisdiction of any Contracting Party and solely for the purpose of utilization and conservation 
for research, breeding and training for food and agriculture, provided that such purpose does 
not include chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-food/feed industrial uses (ITPGRFA, 
Article 12.3). In these cases, the bilateral system of the CBD is applied. 
Access to PGRFA is provided in accordance with national ABS legislation, or, in the absence 
of such legislation, in accordance with such standards as may be set by the Governing Body 
of the treaty (ITPGRFA, Article 12.3). The Governing Body is composed of all Contracting 
Parties and its responsibilities range from advancing the implementation of the treaty, 
administering its budget and establishing co-operation and maintaining exchange with other 
relevant organizations. The CGRFA acts as an Interim Committee for the international treaty. 
Until now, the Interim Committee has met in October 2002 and November 2004. 
Benefits accruing from accessing PGRFA in the multilateral system are shared fairly and 
equitably. The main emphasis is placed on non-monetary benefits. Following mechanisms of 
benefit-sharing are considered: 
• Exchange of information; 
• Access to and transfer of technology; 
• Capacity-building; 
• Sharing of the benefits arising from commercialization, which addresses monetary 
benefits (ITPGRFA, Article 13.2). 
3 Institutional and political framework of international biodiversity conservation 59
Exchange of information concerns the availability of catalogues and inventories and the 
provision of information on technologies, results of technical, scientific and socio-economic 
research, including characterization, evaluation and utilization of PGRFA.  
Access to technologies for the conservation, characterization, evaluation and use of PGRFA 
and to improved genetic material should be realized through different measures, such as the 
establishment and maintenance of, and participation in, crop-based thematic groups on 
utilization of PGRFA, all types of partnership in research and development and in commercial 
joint ventures relating to the material received, human resource development, and effective 
access to research facilities. 
Capacity-building is probably the main category of non-monetary benefits and can be 
reached through scientific research and stronger facilities and programmes for scientific and 
technical education and training in conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA in 
biodiversity-rich countries, especially developing countries and economies in transition 
(ITPGRFA, Article 13.2 c). 
Access has been realized and formalized through standard material transfer agreements 
(SMTAs), containing the main provisions on ABS in the treaty. The SMTA conditions persist 
even if the material is transferred (ITPGRFA, Article 12.4). With a view to IPRs, the treaty 
demands that recipients of genetic resources shall not claim any intellectual property or other 
rights that limit the facilitated access to the PGRFA, or their genetic parts or components 
(ITPGRFA, Article 12.3 d). 
Benefits from commercialization are shared through the deposit in a trust account, which is 
managed by the Governing Body. Commercialization activities should be increased by 
stronger involvement of private and public sectors through partnerships and in research and 
technology development (ITPGRFA, Article 13.2 d). 
Since 2004, negotiations on the implementation instruments of the treaty went on. In June 
2006 the First Session of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture took place in Madrid. Important decisions for the final 
departure of the treaty were taken. The parties could agree on a SMTA, which is the 
cornerstone of the ITPGRFA. It lays out the conditions for access to genetic materials within 
the multilateral system and specifies the modalities and levels of payment for benefit-sharing 
(ENB 2006, 12). 
According to the newly adopted SMTA, the recipient has the possibility to choose between 
two types of payment. The first is based on a broad definition of products and requires 
benefit-sharing payments of 1.1 percent of sales of all PGRFA products that incorporate 
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material obtained from the multilateral system and to which access is restricted by IPRs. 
Alternatively, recipients can choose to make payments of 0.5 percent on all commercial 
products of a certain Annex I crop, regardless of whether access to these is restricted and 
whether they incorporate material from the multilateral system. This latter option enables the 
multilateral system to generate income right away, because it applies to products that are 
already on the market, while the first option applies only to new products that will not be 
ready for commercialization for another seven to 15 years. Besides, the Parties agreed on a 
funding strategy, on the rules of procedure and on compliance. The establishment of a 
compliance committee operating with provisional compliance procedures and mechanisms 
was decided (ICTSD 2006; ENB 2006, 12). 
3.2 Intellectual property rights protection10 
After identifying the international framework of biodiversity conservation, which characterizes 
and strengthens the provider side, it is necessary to take a closer look at the IPR protection 
regime, which characterizes and strengthen the user side. The protection of IPRs is not a 
new concept. According to Greek records dated already 200 B.C. inventors could apply for 
monopoly privileges. In Europe more systematic protection forms for intellectual property 
were developed in the medieval times. With the advance of free trade, industrialization, the 
development of natural sciences and technologies in the 18th and 19th century, patents were 
used more frequently as instruments for the protection of IPRs. Different forms of patent laws 
were developed in many countries. In Germany the first comprehensive patent law and the 
first patent office were created in 1877. At this time, nutritional, pharmaceutical or similar 
products were excluded. 
A first attempt to harmonize the protection of IPRs on the international level was the adoption 
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1833. This Convention was 
of great importance because it contains the principle of “national treatment” in Article 2.1 
(OECD 1998, 12). According to this principle, if a country grants a particular right, benefit or 
privilege to its own citizens, it must also grant those advantages to the citizens of other 
countries, which are members of the Convention. Later, more international agreements 
related to IPRs were concluded, for example the Budapest Treaty on the International 
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure 
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 The following chapter is mainly based on Richerzhagen, C., Virchow, D. (2007): Sustainable Utilization of Crop 
Genetic Diversity through Property Rights Mechanisms? The Case of Coffee Genetic Resources in Ethiopia, 
in: International Journal of Biotechnology 9 (1), 60–86. 
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(Budapest Treaty), the European Patent Convention (EPC), and the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT). 
The protection of IPRs with regard to plant genetic resources and plant varieties developed 
independently and not consistently with the described evolutions of general intellectual 
property law. This can be explained by the complexity and difficulties of protecting living 
materials. The introduction of high-yielding hybrid varieties in the 1930s in the US was an 
important step towards the protection of IPRs. The re-use of these high yielding hybrid 
varieties results in an enormous decline of yields. 
After the Paris Convention had been adopted and plant breeding had been improved, plant 
breeders asked for the equal treatment of their products and products of industrial inventors. 
Central aspects of their claims were the allocation and protection of IPRs. Consequently, 
between 1920 and 1940 in some European countries and the US regulations about the 
protection of new plant varieties were introduced, as for example, the patent law of 1930, 
which provides the possibility to patent asexual reproductive plants (Overwalle 1999, 159). 
The first endeavors to extend and harmonize plant breeder rights were reflected in the 
congress of the “International Association of Plant Breeders for the Protection of Plant 
Varieties”, which took place in Austria 1956. The congress led to the adoption of the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention) 
1961 in Paris (cf. chapter 3.2.2). 
Although the frameworks of IPR protection of industrial and agricultural technologies have 
differently developed, it is obvious that the overall level of protection has increased in the 
course of time. This development can be explained by the identical concern about the 
economic losses of inventors or breeders, caused by the increasing disregard of IPRs. Until 
1988, 115 countries provided some kind of patent protection, but more than 50 percent 
excluded biological inventions as plants and animals (Lesser 1991). However, with a view to 
the increasing importance of biotechnology, the different forms of protection of industrial and 
agricultural technologies are compatible through the application of patents to plants and 
other living organisms in developed countries, or through revisions of the UPOV Convention. 
Striking influence had the Chakrabarty versus Diamond case in 1980. The US Supreme 
Court decided that a live, human-made microorganism is patentable. The first patent for a 
plant variety was granted in the USA in 1985 and in Europe in 1988 for a transgenic plant 
(Joly / de Looze 1996). 
According to the growing importance, the institutional level of IPR protection has been 
extended. In 1967 the World Intellectual Property Right Organization (WIPO) was founded. 
Later in 1974, WIPO became a specialized agency of the United Nations system of 
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organizations. Her mandate is to administer intellectual property matters recognized by the 
member States of the UN. Today (as of April 2007), the organization has 184 members and 
administers 23 international treaties dealing with different aspects of intellectual property 
protection (15 on industrial property and seven on copyright, plus the Convention creating 
WIPO), including the Budapest Treaty, Paris Convention etc. (WIPO 2007). WIPO aims at 
promoting the worldwide protection of IPRs by administering the international treaties on the 
protection of intellectual property, supporting members in implementing the agreements und 
harmonizing national regulation regarding the protection of intellectual property (Centre for 
European Agricultural Studies 2000, 7). 
During the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, the US supported by the EU and other 
developed countries persisted on their opinion that the lack of protection of IPRs have to be 
considered as non-tariff barriers. For the first time the IPRs were linked with international 
trade (Bhat 1996, 208). Hence, the protection of IPRs were extended and strengthened by 
the adoption of the TRIPs agreement in 1994. The competence to generally regulate the 
protection of IPRs has been moved from WIPO to the newly created World Trade 
Organization (WTO). However, WIPO remains as an implementing agency that develops and 
administers international intellectual property law.  
3.2.1 The WTO Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
With establishing the WTO and adopting the TRIPs agreement in 1995, the national 
regulation and competence of IPR protection has been harmonized, complemented and 
covered by an international agreement. It was negotiated under strong pressure by 
industrialized countries for several reasons. Knowledge and technology have become of 
growing importance in the trade and international competition. The reduction of trade 
barriers, which promoted exports, and the increasing losses of the US and other 
industrialized countries through piracy and counterfeiting activities, were the main reasons to 
push the reforms (Correa 2000, 3f). 
Since its adoption, the TRIPs Agreement has received a growing level of criticism from 
developing countries, academics and NGOs. The main controversies concern the impact of 
TRIPs on the provision of AIDS drugs in Africa and the Article 27, which deals with the 
patenting of life forms, which also very relevant for ABS issues.11 
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 The concerns had been growing that patent rules might restrict access to affordable medicines for populations 
in developing countries in their efforts to control diseases of public health importance, including HIV, 
tuberculosis and malaria. In the Doha declaration on TRIPs and public health, the minister tried to address 
these concerns. It stressed that TRIPs should support public health and promote access to existing medicines 
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TRIPs is only one of three major agreements of the WTO. The General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are the other 
two. Today (as of April 2007), the WTO has 150 members (WTO 2007a). Every member of 
the WTO has to implement IPR protection according to TRIPs to comply with its obligations 
instituted by the agreement. However, developing countries and countries in transition were 
allowed to implement the requirements in a broader timeframe. They could implement the 
agreement within a five-year-period (until 2000), and least developed countries within eleven 
years (until 2006). This time limit was extended through the Doha declaration to 2016 for 
pharmaceutical patents. 
TRIPs sets minimum standards for national IPR laws. It co-ordinates and integrates already 
existing provisions on the protection of IPRs, and adjusts and restructures applicable 
measures to the demands of an ever increasing interdependency in the field of international 
trade (Senti / Conlan 1998, 99). The agreement also specifies enforcement procedures, 
remedies, and dispute resolution procedures. However, it leaves scope for the member 
countries to develop their IPR laws to promote their national interests but staying within the 
spirit of the agreement (Ganguli 2000, 168). The agreement’s objectives are to contribute to 
the protection and enforcement of IPRs, to the promotion of technical innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technical knowledge, as well as to social and economic welfare and to a balance of rights 
and obligations (TRIPs, Article 7). Unlike other international agreements on intellectual 
property or environmental protection, TRIPs has a powerful enforcement mechanism. Non-
enforcement of the TRIPs obligations can be prosecuted by the trade sanctions, which are 
determined through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (Benedeck 1998, 31f). 
TRIPs covers all forms of IPRs: copyrights, geographical indications, industrial designs, 
integrated circuit layout-designs, patents (including the protection of new varieties of plants), 
trademarks, and undisclosed or confidential information. In the case of plant genetic 
resources, patents are the most relevant IPRs. Patents are regarded as the political and 
economic most significant part of the TRIPs agreement and explicitly regulated (Pacon 1995, 
878).  
The WTO’s agreements are not directly related to environmental issues. However, GATT 
Article XX(b) provides an exception for measures "necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health”. Nevertheless, TRIPs contains an article, which relates the agreement to 
                                                                                                                                                   
and the creation of new medicines. To fulfill this purpose countries receive more flexibility to implement TRIPs. 
If necessary they can allow compulsory licenses and parallel imports to reduce drug prices. Furthermore, the 
transition period for the LDCs for implementation of the TRIPs obligations from 2006 to 2016 was extended 
(WTO 2001a). 
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biodiversity. Article 27.3(b) is one of the most controversial parts of the agreement, because 
it deals with the patenting of life forms and the protection of plant varieties (Tappeser / Baier 
2000). It defines the inventions governments are obliged to make eligible for patenting, and 
the exceptions. Inventions that can be patented include both products and processes, and 
should generally cover all fields of technology. Already during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations it was agreed that a review of the provision should take place in 1999. The 
article 27.3(b) states that 
“Members may also exclude from patentability [...] 
(b) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for 
the production of plants and animals other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes. However, members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by 
patents or an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.” 
Therefore, countries have the possibility to exclude plants, animals and essentially biological 
processes from patenting, but they are obliged to patent microorganisms, microbiological and 
non-biological processes. Additionally, they also have to grant plant variety protection 
through the patent system, through an effective sui generis system or any combination of the 
two. The Convention of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV) is such a sui generis system and is described in the following subchapter 3.2.2. 
The review of TRIPs started in 1999. In 2001 the Doha declaration made clear that the 
review should focus on the relationship between TRIPs and the CBD, the protection of 
traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments that member 
governments raise in the review of the TRIPs Agreement (WTO 2001b).  
Therefore, the Council12 deals with the questions whether there is conflict between the TRIPs 
Agreement and the CBD and whether something needs to be done on the TRIPs side to 
ensure that the two instruments are applied in a non-conflicting and mutually supportive way. 
The opinion of the WTO members regarding these issues is not uniform. A certain group of 
countries, including Australia, Japan, Canada, Korea, US, Switzerland, sees no conflict 
between TRIPs and CBD and stresses that they can be implemented in a mutually 
supportive way through national measures. They even regard the implementation of the 
TRIPs Agreement as a supportive instrument that can implement the obligations of the CBD 
most effectively. In their view patents are critical for ABS, because the requirements of the 
patent system can prevent bad patents. They give the control over production and 
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 The Council for TRIPs is the body, open to all members of the WTO that is responsible for administering the 
TRIPs Agreement, in particular monitoring the operation of the Agreement. 
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distribution to patent owners and their licensees and therefore facilitate the sharing of 
technology (WTO 2006, 4f). 
Another group of countries (e.g., Andean Community, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines) shares this view, but puts forward that further study is required to determine 
whether any international action in relation to the patent system is called for in order to 
ensure or enhance the implementation and the mutual supportiveness of both agreements. 
One instrument that is intensively discussed is the disclosure of the origin and source of 
biological material and associated traditional knowledge. Several countries made proposals 
regarding disclosure. They range from a TRIPs or WIPO obligation to obligations outside of 
the patent law. These suggestions are discussed in more detail in chapter 5.2.2.2. 
The last view (e.g., shared by the African group) sees an inherent conflict between the two 
instruments. This group insists that the TRIPs agreement will be amended to remove such 
conflict. The main argument is that TRIPs establishes a framework for the appropriation and 
the use of genetic resources that is inconsistent with the sovereign rights of countries over 
their genetic resources as provided for in the CBD by requiring that certain genetic material 
be patentable or protected by sui generis plant variety rights. Besides, it is stressed that 
TRIPs does not ensure that the provisions of the CBD are respected (WTO 2006, 8). 
3.2.2 The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV13) is an 
intergovernmental organization whose mission is to provide and promote an effective system 
of plant variety protection in order to encourage the development of new varieties of plants. 
Established by the Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 
Convention), the Union coordinates and implements plant breeders’ rights. Plant breeders’ 
rights protect new varieties of plants by granting exclusive commercial rights to market a new 
variety or its reproductive material (Swanson 1998, 10). 
The UPOV Convention provides a sui generis form of intellectual property protection in terms 
of TRIPs Article 27.3 (b). It has been specifically developed for the process of plant breeding 
long before TRIPs was negotiated. Developing countries that are a member of the WTO 
have the choice of either adopting the existing regime proposed by the UPOV Convention or 
to develop their own plant variety protection system. Since 1994, few countries have joined 
UPOV. The majority has decided to adopt their own plant variety protection laws. However, 
in a number of cases, these laws draw directly and significantly from the UPOV regime 
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(Cullet 2003). The application for variety rights through the UPOV Convention is more simple 
and at a lower cost than the one for patents. Besides, it guarantees to fulfill the TRIPS 
obligation to be an effective sui generis system. 
In 1961 the UPOV Convention was signed in order to address the problems arising from the 
protection of IPRs of plant breeders. The existing patent system could not be applied to 
innovative achievements in the field of crop breeding because it did not take into account the 
special needs of the breeding sector, explained later in this subchapter (Dutfield 2000, 27). 
Since then, the agreement regulates the international protection of IPRs for plant varieties. 
Initially, only developed countries were members of UPOV (Centre for European Agricultural 
Studies 2000, 24). With the accession of, for example, Kenya, Bolivia, and China the 
unbalanced participation has changed. However, most of the members are countries in 
Europe, North America, Latin America and Australasia. As of April 2007, UPOV has 63 
members who have ratified different versions of the Convention (UPOV 2006). The UPOV 
Convention has been revised three times, 1972, 1978 and 1991. The UPOV Convention 
1961 entered into force in 1968, UPOV 1972 in 1977, UPOV 1978 in 1981, and the UPOV 
Convention 1991 on 24 April 1998.  
Most countries are Parties to the 1978 Act and to the 1991 Act of the Convention. According 
to UPOV 1991 Article 3(1)-(2), new members and members who already signed an earlier 
version are encouraged to ratify the revised version of 1991. Pursuant to Article 37(3) UPOV 
1978 became closed to further accessions with the entry into force of UPOV 1991. However, 
even after the coming into force of the 1991 Convention, countries were able to access 
UPOV 1978 under certain requirements for one year (FAO 2000). 
In general, the UPOV Convention 1991 provides a more defined but extended scope of 
protection than the UPOV Convention 1978. The requirements for protecting plant varieties 
differ from the ones in patent law. Plant breeders’ rights can only be granted if the varieties 
are new, distinct, homogeneous, and stable (UPOV Convention 1991, Article 5). The 
protection of plant breeders’ rights covers production and reproduction, propagation, sale 
and marketing, import and export, and stocking (UPOV Convention 1991, Article 14). While 
the UPOV Convention 1978 limits these conditions to propagating material, the UPOV 
Convention 1991 extends them to the commercial use of all material of the variety, e.g., 
harvested material (including entire plants and parts of plants) and products made directly 
from harvested material of the protected variety (FAO 2000). 
Regarding the nature of the protected material the UPOV Convention 1978 is much broader. 
As long as a variety is distinguishable, homogeneous, and stable, it can be protected 
independently of the origin and of the initial variation from which the concerned variety is 
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derived. This includes the mere discovery of a new plant variety. The UPOV Convention 
1991 considers a “breeder” as a person who bred, or discovered and developed a variety. 
The breeder must also have developed and not only discovered the variety in order to be 
entitled to the protection.  
The main two elements of the UPOV Convention regarding more flexibility in IPR protection 
are the breeder’s exemption and the farmer’s privilege. The breeder’s exemption 
acknowledges the importance of the use of existing varieties for development and breeding 
of new, improved varieties. It guarantees the unrestricted utilization of protected varieties as 
an initial source of variation for the purpose of generating other varieties and for the 
marketing of such varieties. The UPOV Convention 1991 like the UPOV Convention 1978 
contains the breeder’s exemption, but in a more defined and weaker form. Here the 
protection plant breeder right is extended and transferred on varieties that are derived from 
protected varieties. 
Contrary to the UPOV Convention 1991, earlier versions of the UPOV Convention limited the 
scope of plant breeder’s right to the commercial use of propagating material (OECD 1996, 
22). Consequently, farmers are allowed to use harvested material of protected varieties 
(farm-saved seeds) for subsequent sowing on their own farms and to produce subsequent 
crops. However, this “farmer’s privilege” is only implicitly recognized under the UPOV 
Convention 1978 and allows a broad interpretation and implementation. UPOV directs the 
responsibility to national governments to decide whether they should permit farmers to use 
protected varieties for propagation purposes within reasonable limits and to safeguarding the 
legitimate interest of the breeder (UPOV Convention, Article 15.2). Therefore, it narrows the 
privilege and transforms it to an optional exception (FAO 2000). Farmers’ Rights recognizing 
“the … contribution that the local and indigenous communities and farmers of all regions of 
the world, particularly those in the centers of origin and crop diversity, have made and will 
continue to make for the conservation and development of plant genetic resources which 
constitute the basis of food and agriculture production throughout the world” (ITPGRFA, 
Article 9.1) were keenly discussed in the process of the negotiations of the ITPGRFA and 
finally included. 
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The major differences between UPOV 1978, 1991 and TRIPs as already explained are listed 
in Table 7. 
Table 7: Main provisions of Plant Breeder Rights under UPOV 1978, 1991 and TRIPs 
 UPOV 1978 UPOV 1991 TRIPs 
Protection coverage Plant varieties of 
nationally defined 
species 
Plant varieties of all 
genera and species 
Inventions 
Requirements Novelty 
Distinctness 
Uniformity 
Stability 
Variety denomination 
Novelty 
Distinctness 
Uniformity 
Stability 
Variety denomination 
Novelty 
Inventive step 
Industrial application 
Enabling disclosure 
Protection term Min 15 years Min 20 years 20 years 
Protection scope Minimum scope 
Commercial marketing 
Offering for sale 
Marketing of propagating 
material 
Minimum scope 
Producing, conditioning 
Offering for sale 
Export, import 
Product/ process 
Making 
Offering for sale 
Using 
Import 
Breeders’ exemption Yes, but restrictions for 
hybrids 
Yes, but restrictions for 
hybrids and derived 
varieties 
No 
Farmers’ privilege Yes Up to national law No 
Prohibition of double 
protection 
Yes No Up to national law 
Source: adopted from Dutfield 2000, 30 
The UPOV Convention 1991 is taking a strong position in the breeders’ exemption, while 
weakening the farmers’ privilege. The free availability of plant germplasm for further research 
and development is a prerequisite for future successful breeding. This existing UPOV 
principle is doubly contradictory: it demands free access to PGRFA in-situ and ex-situ as well 
as the free and unrestricted availability of protected varieties for further research and 
development. Consequently, UPOV’s principle offends the Farmers’ Rights of the ITPGRFA 
as well as CBD’s country’s sovereignty over genetic resources. On the other hand, UPOV’s 
objective of free access to protected varieties for research and development conflicts with 
TRIPs’ patent system.  
Another potential conflict arises between the UPOV Convention and TRIPs for countries, 
which are members in both institutions. A double protection for different varieties of one crop 
species may occur due to different protection systems for different varieties of one crop, 
conflicting the breeder and farmer with respect to why the breeders’ exemption and farmers’ 
privilege exist for one variety but not for the other. The new concept of ‘essentially derived 
variety’ is the first attempt to solve a problem arising through technological change. 
Essentially derived varieties are varieties with single gene changes introduced by 
backcrossing or genetic transformation as defined by the 1991 UPOV Convention 
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(Semon 1995). The breeders’ exemption is coming to its limit if modern biotechnology is 
utilized in plant breeding, provoking an inequality in competition. If a breeder inserts a 
patented gene into a protected variety, she/he may protect and commercially exploit the 
modified variety, whereas if a breeder inserts a foreign, patented gene into his own variety, 
she/he either has to pay royalties to the owner of the patent or could be prevented from 
exploiting the modified variety. Due to the concept of ‘essentially derived variety’ both 
breeders must seek to reach agreement with the other involved breeder. 
The TRIPs agreement sets only minimum standards for the crop plant protection for all 
member countries of the WTO. Every member country must evolve an IPR protection 
system. However, this can be adjusted to a specific situation in a specific country. In contrast 
to the UPOV Convention, TRIPs is not an institution solely aimed at the breeders and 
representing their interests of protecting newly bred varieties. Hence, the sui generis 
legislation is the protection system, which might incorporate the compensation idea from the 
concept of Farmers’ Rights and enabling the partially realization of benefit-sharing (Leskien / 
Flitner 1997). For instance, in 2001 India developed its own sui generis legislation with the 
Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers´ Rights Act, hailed as progressive, pro-developing 
country legislation. The law recognizes the necessity of protecting the rights of farmers in 
respect of their contribution made in conserving, improving and making available PGRFA for 
the development of new plant varieties (Sahai 2003). 
The potential of plant protection to support conservation of landraces is very limited. It seems 
unlikely that existing plant protection can be successfully used to define and enforce rights 
over traditional varieties because of the high variability and segregation of landraces that 
point towards a fundamental difference from protected varieties under the distinct, uniform, 
and stable criteria of the UPOV Convention (Lesser 1994). Additionally, the patenting of 
landraces is not possible, because a patent must meet the criteria of (at least commercial) 
novelty, which is difficult to certify for these genetic resources. A more feasible way is the 
definition of remuneration rights, based on collective administration organizations. 
Remuneration rights are established and applied in many countries in the area of copyrights 
because of difficulties in exercising exclusive rights. Exclusiveness cannot be achieved but a 
compensation for contributions made by communities. One example are royalties for blank 
audio tapes, which ensure compensation of title-holders of works published on audio tapes 
for copying and counter the impossibility of controlling private copying (FAO 1994). 
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3.2.3 Coherence between the two regimes 
On international level, it has been heavily debated if the international regimes and 
agreements on biodiversity and IPRs are coherent or conflicting. It is important for 
biodiversity policy to consider both the positive and negative effects of the establishment of 
IPR systems and try to overcome potential conflicts between them by finding an adequate 
degree for the protection of these rights. The relationship between IPRs and biodiversity is 
investigated in depth in chapter 5.1.2, but a short outline should be given here. 
At first sight, IPRs are positive for the ABS regime. They provide exclusive rights for 
inventions and products derived from the use of genetic resources. Usually they are 
combined with the liability for disclosing the knowledge on the invention. From the users’ 
point of view, the exclusivity is a prerequisite and incentive to conclude a bilateral ABS 
agreement. Exclusive rights mitigate the risk of investment for the potential user of genetic 
resources. An increase in research and development activities in the area of plant breeding 
and biotechnology creates new possibilities for using and commercializing genetic resources. 
A successful commercialization raises the value for the biological material and gives 
incentives for both the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity if a fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising of the utilization of genetic resources is applicable. Besides, 
TRIPs offers exceptions to address the concerns related to biodiversity (Anuradha 2001, 28). 
However, it can be said that both TRIPs and the UPOV Convention generally support the 
demand side for genetic resources, whereas CBD and the ITPGRFA advocate the suppliers 
of genetic resources in their objective of benefit-sharing (cf. Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Emerging conflicts between international agreements 
Source: based on Virchow 1999 
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This is reasoned in their divergent policy objectives. IPRs regimes aim to protect new 
knowledge through exclusive rights, whereas biodiversity regimes aim to protect genetic 
resources through market-based mechanisms. On the provider side, IPRs may have 
negative effects. IPR protection can result in restricted access to genetic resources, e.g., if 
the resources are subject to a patent that threats food security. IPR protection may also 
distort the benefit-sharing if the resource holder cannot participate in these rights (Rosendal 
2006, 90). Furthermore, the protected product may have intellectual similarity with traditional 
products and IPRs may limit or prevent traditional consumers from continuing using the 
biological resources. It is also possible that the new commercial product is a substitute for a 
traditional product, because it is cheaper and drives the traditional producers out of the 
market. If the IPR protection entails greater marginal loss to a local provider, she/he will have 
fewer incentives to conserve the resource (Bhat 1999, 392/402). 
Furthermore, there are concerns that IPR protection encourages biopiracy (Anuradha 2001, 
27). Many cases have occurred where nations had to challenge natural product patents on 
the basis of traditional knowledge, motivated by principles of justice rather than the economic 
forces usually underlying patent disputes. For example, a 1995 patent, "Use of Turmeric in 
Wound Healing," was cancelled in 1998 after an investigation established that use of 
turmeric to promote wound healing had been known for generations in India (Gollin 2001). 
IPRs have been widely criticized because of ethical concerns. Throughout history biological 
resources, related technologies and knowledge have been exchanged freely and still millions 
of people depend on these inputs in their daily life. Therefore, the patenting of life forms is 
regarded as unethical and sometimes entitled as “intellectual colonialism” (Bhat 1996, 207). 
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4 The economic framework of the ABS concept 
ABS has been mainly discussed from a legal or political perspective. The aim of the study is 
to contribute to the international debate by shading light on the approach by choosing an 
economic point of view. The ABS concept has been developed as an instrument to stop inter 
alia the decline of biodiversity. To analyze ABS from an economic point of view and assess 
the effectiveness it is necessary to step back and put the loss of biodiversity in an economic 
framework. Therefore, this chapter firstly explores the economic issues of biodiversity loss. 
The relevant economic issues are valuation, economic development and poverty, market and 
policy/institutional failures. The first subchapter describes the problems and the results of 
attempts of economic valuations of biodiversity. Different studies have been undertaken to 
assess the pharmaceutical value of biodiversity; only few studies assess agricultural values 
of genetic resources. However, these studies come to the conclusion that certain economic 
values for genetic resources exist. Besides, the chapter explores the link between 
biodiversity conservation, ABS and poverty. ABS is an instrument that has the potential to 
contribute to poverty alleviation. Finally, the subchapter identifies market and 
policy/institutional failures as being responsible for the loss of biodiversity. By investigating 
the promise of ABS to contribute to biodiversity conservation and economic development, the 
second subchapter establishes the economic framework of the ABS concept. The 
characterization of this framework follows the first assumption of this study, which states that 
the ABS concept, based on bilateral agreements, sets incentives to conserve biodiversity. 
However, the concept has side effects (e.g., economical, social) that have to be taken into 
consideration (cf. chapter 1.2). 
4.1 Economic issues of biodiversity loss 
This subchapter starts with an outline of the economic issues of biodiversity loss. The 
assessment of the economic value of biodiversity as resource or as input for research and 
development is the basis for decision-making regarding conservation activities. The chapter 
outlines the important approaches and results of biodiversity valuation studies and shows the 
difficulties of assessing biodiversity’s value. Having discussed the economic value, the link 
between biodiversity conservation and economic development or rather poverty is 
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elaborated. Finally, the subchapter discusses market failure and policy failures as underlying 
causes of the loss of biodiversity. 
4.1.1 The difficulties of valuing biodiversity 
“The value of biodiversity is the value of everything there is. It is the summed value of all the 
GNPs of all countries from now until the end of the world. We know that, because our very 
lives and our economies are dependent upon biodiversity. If biodiversity is reduced 
sufficiently, and we do not know the disaster point, there will no longer be any conscious 
beings. With them will go all value--economic and otherwise.” (Norton 1988). 
Today, the future relevance of biological diversity for the global economy and the social 
welfare cannot be estimated. Biodiversity has many benefits, which are still undiscovered, 
and the conservation of this resource can thus be justified by the precautionary principle. But 
even today many values of biodiversity can be identified. Biodiversity has values in itself, 
spiritual and intrinsic as well as existence and bequest values, but it also contains values 
generated by its use as inputs. The resource plays an important role within the planet's life-
support system and maintains at the same time many ecosystem services: mitigation of 
greenhouse gases, watershed protection, and the protection of scenic beauty (Sedjo 2000, 
110). Beyond, biodiversity and especially wild plant genetic resources are used as production 
inputs in research institutions and in “life science” companies, combining pharmaceutical, 
food, seed, and chemical divisions. Important markets for genetic resources are established 
by the pharmaceutical, the crop protection, the agricultural seed, the horticulture, the 
botanical medicine, and the cosmetic and personal care sector (A Laird / ten Kate 2002, 
246). Through the enormous technical progress, biotechnology has become ubiquitous in 
industry, and its wide use raises the expectations that in the near future the potential of 
biodiversity will be tapped more efficiently. The economic value of biodiversity for 
commercialization has increased. 
But why should we identify the economic values of biodiversity? Biodiversity protection 
generates costs or the non-use of the resource prevents the capturing of benefits (e.g., 
logging prohibitions). Biodiversity conservation activities often compete with other human-
induced activities that harm the environment. The identification of the values of the 
competing activities is necessary in order to decide whether some values and benefits of 
resource use are more important than others. Economic valuation of biodiversity can support, 
for example, decisions on land-use options for conservation or other uses, the raising of 
awareness, the setting of priorities for biodiversity conservation, the assessment of 
biodiversity losses, and the choice of instruments to conserve biodiversity (OECD 2002, 23f). 
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After identifying and disclosing biodiversity’s commercial value, the idea came up to develop 
the ABS concept. The assessment of this commercial value is essential for the ABS concept 
and the negotiations between users and providers regarding the fair and equitable benefit-
sharing. Only valuation can put negotiation on a solid basis. 
However, the commercial research and development value of biodiversity and genetic 
resources determines only a small share of the total economic value (TEV) of biodiversity, 
which comprehends all the values of biodiversity including plants and plant genetic 
resources. The ABS concept aims to internalize this value (cf. chapter 4.2). As Figure 6 
shows the TEV consists of the use value (UV) and non-use value (NUV). The use value 
arises from the actual use of the resource. According to Pearce and Moran (1994), use 
values can be divided into direct use values (DUV), which refer to actual uses of biodiversity 
for food, clothes etc., indirect use values (IUV), which refer to the benefits deriving from 
ecosystem functions, option values (OV) and quasi option values (QOV), which are like an 
insurance value and approximate an individual's willingness to pay to safeguard the option of 
using it in future. 
Figure 6: The Total Economic Value 
Source: OECD 2002, 83 
The direct use value describes the value that reflects elements of biodiversity, which can be 
directly consumed, traded or used as an input to commercial activities. Direct use values can 
generally be estimated by the identification of the market prices of a specific product or close 
substitutes. In case of biological diverse resources, it can be, for instance, the use of a forest 
for timber or recreation, or the use of plant genetic resources for biotechnological research 
and development. Use values are usually realized on the individual level if property and use 
rights are clearly assigned and tradable (OECD 1999, 29). The commercial use of genetic 
resources is also carried out on the individual level by economic agents that benefit by the 
use. 
Existence value
Total Economic value (TEV)
Non-use valueUse value
Direct use value Indirect use value Option value
Quasi-Option
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Indirect use values are delivered to humans on the local, regional, or global level by 
ecosystem services, as for instance, flood control, the purification of water supplies or carbon 
sequestration. There are not recognized on an individual level. Therefore, their provision 
requires the action on a broader level. Measuring indirect use values is more difficult than 
measuring use values, because it is difficult to measure the quantities of services, such as 
carbon sequestration, and to differentiate between several ecosystem inputs of produced 
goods. Indirect values can be assessed by calculating the amount that is necessary to invest 
in technologies to substitute for them (Brown et al. 1993, 13; OECD 1999, 29). 
The option and the quasi-option value describe the values contained in having the ability to 
make choices in an uncertain future. The option value addresses the possibilities of options if 
preferences change in the future, whereas the quasi-option value concerns maintaining the 
ability to react to future information, independently of preferences. Both option and quasi-
option values reflect all direct and indirect use values of biodiversity. Benefit-sharing 
contracts for genetic resources try to capture the option value of these resources (OECD 
1999, 31). 
The definition and estimation of NUV are more problematic. NUV are differentiated in the 
bequest value (BV) and the existence value (XV) (Pearce / Moran 1994, 12). The bequest 
value concerns the possibility to maintain the concerned resource for future generations, and 
the existence value concerns the value of a resource due its existence (OECD 1999, 31). In 
environmental policy the existence value of biodiversity is addressed by bilateral and 
multilateral transfers from industrial, biodiversity-poor countries to developing, biodiversity-
rich countries through international organizations and funds such as the GEF. 
The single values add up to the total economic value of an environmental resource such as 
biodiversity: TEV = UV + NUV = (DUV + IUV + OV + QOV) + (XV + BV) 
It has been realized that the application of the TEV is problematic, because the single 
categories cannot be separated in any case and are partly overlapping each other. This can 
cause double counting. Besides, one has to be careful, since some values cannot be added 
because they are mutually exclusive (Baumgaertner 2002, 11). Some argue that the 
existence value is not relevant for economic valuation, because it might represent counter 
preferential values based on moral concern, obligation, duty etc. (Brown et al. 1993, 13). 
However, the concept has been widely accepted to illustrate the different benefits that an 
environmental good has and that have to be considered for its valuation. 
To point up the share of the commercial value of biodiversity of the TEV, two prominent 
studies are illustrated that attempt to estimate the TEV. Costanza et al. (1997) published a 
paper in Nature, estimating the value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital, 
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based on few original calculations and the analysis and synthesis of more than 100 studies, 
which estimated the monetary value of ecosystem goods and services. They estimate the 
current economic value of 17 ecosystem services for 16 biomes. They concluded that the 
value of the entire biosphere is in the range of US$ 16–54 trillion per year, with an average of 
US$ 33 trillion per year, whereas the global Gross National Product (GNP) total is around 
US$ 18 trillion per year. 
Another approach was published by Balmford et al. (2002) in Science that compares the 
economical gains and losses of sustainable and converted ecosystems of five case studies. 
Based on the five case studies they come to the conclusion that the TEV of sustainably used 
ecosystems is higher than the TEV of converted ecosystems, because the loss of ecosystem 
services, such as flood protection, carbon sinks, and tourism, outweighed the marketed 
private benefits that came with conversion. In the beginning, conversions may have some 
benefit to local society, but on the global level costs exceed the benefits of conservation. 
According to the estimations, the TEV of the intact ecosystems ranged from 14 percent to 
nearly 75 percent higher than the converted ecosystem values. 
Looking at the value of plant genetic material for research and development, the debate is 
very lively and mainly characterized by two distinct views. The first stating from a social point 
of view, which is mainly put forth by conservationists, that the economic value of plant 
genetic resources with pharmaceutical potential is huge, and the second suggesting from a 
private point of view that the value is very marginal when converting it to economic values 
per hectare. This argument is often supported by the industry (ICC 2004; Finston Kling 
2004). 
Pearce and Moran (1994) have roughly calculated the economic value of tropical forests. 
Their results suggest that a tropical forest area on the local level can yield anything from US$ 
300 – 9000 per ha in present value terms per ha (cf. Table 8). Minor forest products (e.g., 
honey, nuts, rattan, rubber) and medical plants play the greatest role for the economic value. 
However, the results are quite imprecise and the authors regard the upper range of the 
results as unrepresentative. 
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Table 8: Economic values of biodiversity - tropical forest (values US$/ha 1992) 
Benefit Local Global Local and Global 
Use value: direct    
Medical Plants 250-750 12-250 262-1000 
Tourism 20-1250  20-1250 
Minor products >0-7000  >0-7000 
Use value: indirect    
Carbon fixing 0? 500-1500 500-1500 
Flood control 23  23 
Non-use value + 5 +5 
Total >293-9023 1017-4255 1310-13278 
Source: Pearce / Moran 1994, 90 
In their study Costanza et al. (1997, 256) estimated the economic value of genetic resources 
as inputs for medicine, products for material science, genes for resistance to plant pathogens 
and crop pests to amount US$ 79 per hectare per year. 
Three distinct studies have estimated the value of plant species as a source of leads in new 
product research by questioning what companies may be willing to pay to preserve 
threatened genetic resources. A paper by Simpson et al. (1996) argues that the commercial 
value of the "marginal species" is likely to be extremely small, thus leaving little incentive for 
companies to invest in habitat conservation. Their result is based on a static model that 
assumes that the probability that any given species contains commercially valuable 
information is independent and identical across species. The used model calculates the 
value of a species by deriving its incremental contribution to the probability that a particular 
product of commercial value will be discovered. A restriction is that it is assumed that the 
different products derived from different species are either perfect substitutes or absolutely 
unrelated. 
Simpson and Craft (1996) try to avoid this weakness by using a different approach assuming 
that different products derived from different species can be imperfect substitutes for each 
other. Furthermore, they attempt not only to capture the value of genetic resources for the 
pharmaceutical companies, they also try to estimate the social welfare, i.e., both consumer 
surplus and profit of bioprospecting. Though, they come to the conclusion that social values 
of biodiversity prospecting might motivate habitat conservation in some areas. These values 
are likely to be small relative to land value in other uses in even some of the more 
biologically rich regions of the world. 
Rausser and Small (2000) challenge these findings by noting that firms focus their research 
efforts on the most promising species, and that auspicious leads command an information 
rent because of their role in lowering search costs. For the most promising ecosystems, they 
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find that the value of preservation may be much more promising than suggested in the 
previous study by Simpson et al. (1996) and can be large enough to support market-based 
conservation of biodiversity. As Table 9 shows the undertaken studies suggest that plant 
genetic material with pharmaceutical potential can raise the values of certain land areas up 
to several hundreds or even thousands US dollars per hectare. 
Table 9: Pharmaceutical values of marginal hectares of land (US$/ha) 
“Hot spot” Simpson et al. 
1996 
Social value 
(Simpson and 
Craft 1996) 
Rausser and 
Small 2000 
    
Western Ecuador 20.6 2,888 9,177 
Southwestern Sri Lanka 16.8 2,357 7,463 
New Caledonia 12.4 1,739 5,473 
Madagascar 6.9 961 2,961 
Western Ghats of India 4.8 668 2,026 
Philippines 4.7 652 1,973 
Atlantic Coast Brazil 4.4 619 1,867 
Uplands of western Amazonia 2.6 363 1,043 
Tanzania 2.1 290 811 
Cape Floristic Province of South 
Africa 
1.7 233 632 
Peninsular Malaysia 1.5 206 539 
Southwestern Australia 1.2 171 435 
Ivory Coast 1.1 160 394 
Northern Borneo 1.0 138 332 
Eastern Himalayas 1.0 137 332 
Colombian Choco 0.8 106 231 
Central Chile 0.7 104 231 
California Floristic Province 0.2 29 0 
Source: Simpson / Sedjo / Reid 1996; Simpson / Craft 1996; Rausser / Small 2000 
Among practitioners these results have started an intense debate on values. For example, 
Barrett and Lybbert (2000, 295) state that in order to analyze whether the calculated rents 
are sufficient to provide an incentive for conservation, it has to be regarded that the 
estimations are very context-specific and can only be answered by empirical research. Firn 
(2003) provides food for thought from an empirical side of the natural sciences. He argues 
that the current biotechnological developments will further erode the value of bioprospecting, 
since they will loosen the dependence on biological resources. 
Costello and Ward (2006) assert that the studies of Simpson et al. and Rausser and Small 
only differ because different parameter and not because different search methods were 
assumed. They recalculate the marginal values of land for bioprospecting from 34 hotspots 
based on a new and updated set of parameters. They conclude that marginal land values are 
too small to provide conservation incentives. Assuming homogenous leads (all species are 
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homogenous) they estimate the values to amount US$3.18/ha (mean estimate) and 
US$5.70/ha (upper 5% quantile). Under ordered search of heterogeneous leads (i.e., some 
species are known to be more likely than others to yield a success) their estimates climb up 
to US$14/ha (mean estimate) and US$65/ha (upper 5% quantile). However, they expect that 
in future, with an increasing extinction rate, values will rise, too. 
But not only for the pharmaceutical sector plant genetic material has played an important 
role. Swanson (1997) indicates that wild and unknown species amount to six percent as a 
source of germplasm in the plant-breeding sector and definitely contribute to genetic 
enhancement of crops. A study by Hein and Gatzweiler (2006) estimate the value for 
Ethiopian coffee genetic resources for breeding programs in terms of disease resistance, low 
caffeine content and increased yield to amount US$ 1,459 million at a five percent discount 
rate and US$ 420 million at a ten percent discount rate. Successful examples of the use of 
wild relatives in crop improvement are the introduction of resistance to potato late blight, the 
increased soluble solid content in tomatoes (a trait worth US$240 million per year), and the 
development of a rice variety being resistant to a virus, which highly threatened the Asian 
rice crop in the 1970s (IPGRI 2005, 28; Heal 2000, p. 11). 
The value of wild species for plant breeding is estimated much higher than this percentage 
indicates, because wild species have a maintenance function for the whole breeding system. 
Wild relatives and early landrace varieties have been recognized as the essential pool of 
genetic variation that will be critical for future plant improvement (McCouch 2004, 1508).  
4.1.2 Biodiversity conservation, ABS and poverty 
Does ABS have the potential to alleviate poverty? When the CBD and the ABS concept were 
adopted, poverty alleviation was not the policy-makers' primary concern. It was developed to 
conserve biodiversity, but conservation measure should not comprise poverty. A good deal 
more, it should have a positive impact on poverty and it is still seen as such an instrument. 
Both the direct conservation of biodiversity and ABS have positive effects on poverty. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between ABS and poverty in a broader 
framework, including biodiversity loss and conservation.  
ABS is a new income opportunity for poor countries. If local resource providers are partners 
in ABS activities, the concept can alleviate poverty. Monetarizing of biological resources 
offers new income opportunities for developing countries and the transfer of benefits in form 
of technologies, money, or capacity from resource users to providers will bring them in a 
better position to elude from poverty (Barrett / Lybbert 2000, 293; Henne et al. 2003, 58). If 
bioprospectors establish research institutions, train local staff, and produce drugs or new 
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breeds in provider countries, ABS has the potential to promote economic development. 
However, development may threat biodiversity as examples from the past show. Biodiversity 
has been suppressed and decreased because countries’ development objectives have 
attempted to be realized through intensification of, e.g., land use, urbanization, infrastructure 
development, or food production. Habitat destruction has been identified as the major threat 
of biodiversity (cf. chapter 2.3.2). 
Looking at biodiversity decline and conservation the relationship with poverty is clear. 
Biodiversity loss exacerbates poverty and since poverty is a major threat to biodiversity, it’s a 
vicious circle. Biodiversity provides the basis for the life for many people, especially for poor 
people. According to the Human Development Report 2005, one in five people in the world, 
which are more than one billion people, still survive on less than US$ 1 a day. This is a level 
of poverty that threatens survival. Another 1.5 billion people live on US$ 1 to US$ 2 a day. 
This means that more than 40 percent of the world’s population is faced with poverty. Income 
poverty is closely linked to hunger. More than 850 million people, including one in three 
preschool children, are still trapped in a vicious cycle of malnutrition and its effects (UNDP 
2005, 24). 
Biodiversity plays an important role for poor people related to food security and health, 
income generation and livelihoods, reduced vulnerability to shocks, as well as cultural and 
spiritual values. Poor people’s life depends directly on the availability of a wide range of 
natural resources and ecosystem services and therefore, they are most affected by their 
degradation. The conservation of biodiversity, but also access to the resource is a condition 
for the survival of many people. In low-income countries, environment-based wealth 
accounts for 25 percent total wealth compared to less than four percent in OECD countries 
(OECD 2006a, 9). Biological resources are still the basis for consumption and production in 
many developing countries and a major source of economic income. Twenty-two percent of 
the world’s population works in the agricultural sector, relying heavily on biodiversity and 
ecosystem services. An estimated 1.6 billion poor people rely heavily on forests for their 
livelihoods, including food security (i.e., fruits and vegetables), health (i.e., medicinal plants), 
shelter (i.e., building materials) and energy (i.e., fuel wood and charcoal). Harvesting and 
trading in fisheries, fuel wood, wild fruits, and nuts, bush meat and other natural resources 
provide informal and formal employment, trading opportunities and jobs. As already 
mentioned, other sectors, such as tourism, medicinal plants, and herbs, generate billion of 
dollars per year. Bioprospecting has a substantial share of these activities. For many 
indigenous and traditional people, nature and biodiversity is directly linked with identity, 
culture and spirituality (IUCN 2006a, 33).  
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Besides, biodiversity protection supports and secures ecosystem resilience. It alleviates 
vulnerability towards changes such as climate changes or pests. Mangroves and coral reefs 
can slow down coastal storms and cyclones and reduce the vulnerability of the local people 
to extreme weather events (IUCN 2006a, 33). For example, in Bangladesh Hoar swamp 
forests have been cleared in favor of agricultural lands and human settlements. This has led 
to the disappearance and depletion of biodiversity and natural barriers. The forests have 
protected the population against the unavoidable wave action during the monsoon. As a 
consequence, people have been compelled to increase spending every year to protect their 
tiny homesteads (Steele / Oviedo / McCauley 2006, 224). 
Poor people are most affected by biodiversity loss. They do not have the resources, the 
ability and the choice to substitute or offset local losses of biodiversity and its services by 
shifting their production and harvest to other regions or switching to other income 
possibilities. Another important fact is that developing countries are most vulnerable to 
environmental degradation, but they are also the riches in biodiversity, i.e., there is a 
geographical overlap between biodiversity and poverty. Mapping global development and 
biodiversity shows that some of the world's least developed countries (LDCs) are located in 
hotspot areas of high importance for biodiversity. Figure 7 displays the Human Development 
Index (HDI)14 as a development indicator and hotspot regions. It is obvious that the HDI is 
very low in most of the important biodiversity hotspots and wilderness areas. 
Figure 7: Global development and biodiversity 
 
 
Sources: UNEP/GRID-Arendal 2004 
                                               
14
 The HDI, published annually by the UN, ranks nations according to their citizens' quality of life. The criteria for 
calculating rankings include life expectancy, educational attainment, and adjusted real income. 
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Although the benefits of biodiversity conservation are high for the local population, 
Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau (2004) remark that the impacts of conservations measures 
(e.g., protected areas) on the poor are often negative due to the loss of income opportunities 
and living space. The creation of protected areas denies farmers future land use options and 
causes potentially significant economic opportunity costs. Conservationists are conscious 
about the problem. In 2003 at the World Parks Congress it was stressed “that many of the 
costs of protected areas are borne locally – particularly by the poor communities – while the 
benefits accrue globally” (WPC 2003). However, there is still a strong body of opinion that 
poverty elimination and conservation can be combined under the concept of “pro-poor 
conservation”, but that in reality the realization of such win-win solutions is difficult (Adams et 
al. 2004, 1147). 
Adams et al. (2004) identify four models how poverty alleviation and conservation can jointly 
be implemented. ABS reflects the third model. Firstly, poverty and conservation can be 
regarded as separate policy realms. Focusing only on the preservation of biodiversity, this 
conception leads to conservation strategies aiming at the establishment of protected areas or 
of approaches such as direct payments for conservation carried out by the state or private 
owners. Secondly, poverty can be viewed as a critical constraint on conservation. In this 
case, poverty reduction is only undertaken to achieve more conservation. Conservation 
measures can be park outreach strategies (e.g., employment of local people) and income-
generating projects (e.g., sharing the revenue from tourism in protected areas) in order to 
address poverty of critical protected-area neighbors. Thirdly, it can be argued that 
conservation should not compromise poverty reduction. Compensation of the opportunity 
costs arising from conservation measures and social impact assessment of protected areas 
are measures in line with this concept. Another possibility is the generation of income 
through non-extractive use (e.g., ecotourism, sustainable harvest, and bioprospecting). 
Fourthly, poverty is the center of attention when it is assumed that poverty depends on living 
resource conservation. In this case conservation is a tool for achieving poverty reduction and 
might lead to the rejection of protected areas and the priority of sustainable use concepts to 
optimize economic return for poor people. Not the preservation of species but the sustainable 
harvest would be aimed for. Projects would, for example, promote the local management of 
common-pool resources. 
4.1.3 Biodiversity loss through market failure 
The current extent of biodiversity decline is a consequence of market failure. Market failure is 
a situation in which existing markets do not efficiently allocate resources because their full 
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costs and/or benefits are not reflected in the prices. The costs to conserve biodiversity are 
borne by the entity being in charge of the resource management. This can be a landowner, a 
local community or a governmental agency depending on the distribution of property and use 
rights regarding biological resources. The benefits of biodiversity and its conservation accrue 
on the same level but also beyond. On the global level the world population benefits from 
biodiversity’s contribution through non-use and use values, as for example aesthetical 
importance and ecosystem stability. The market failure is caused by 
• Externalities and 
• Public goods characteristics. 
These two causes and their impacts are explained in the following subchapters. 
4.1.3.1 Externalities 
The market for biological diversity fails because of the existence of externalities. Externalities 
occur when a decision causes costs or benefits to individuals or groups other than to the 
person making the decision. In this case the decision-maker does not bear all of the costs or 
reap all of the benefits from his action. In other words, externalities arise from the disparity 
between the private and social costs and benefits of biodiversity use and conservation (Dixon 
/ Sherman 1990). Biodiversity conservation has positive externalities in forms of benefits and 
biodiversity decline has negative externalities in form of costs, which are only separated by a 
baseline. On the private level, the direct user or provider of biodiversity perceives the private 
benefits of conservation or costs of loss, whereas on the social level the whole society 
perceives the social benefits or cost.  
The individual decision of a private landowner or a governmental agency may be rational and 
optimal from her/his point of view, but sub-optimal from the societal point of view. The private 
costs of exploiting species and converting habitats do not include the opportunity costs of 
foregone global biodiversity benefits. In the case of biodiversity, externalities are spill-over 
effects arising from the “production” and conservation of biodiversity. Biodiversity is locally 
maintained, but it causes global positive externalities (Barbier 2000, 80). These externalities 
are achieved especially by the indirect use-values and non-use values of biodiversity. If 
biodiversity is conserved in a tropical forest, not only the local population benefits, but also 
the population in other countries benefits because of its existence values or because it 
contributes to important ecosystem services.  
Since the individual’s benefits and the private value of producing the good are less than the 
benefits gained by society (i.e. the social value) in a competitive market, an insufficient 
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amount of biodiversity will be provided from the society’s point of view. The outcome is not 
socially optimal. The private value of biodiversity and its components varies from individual to 
individual. This private value is critical for biodiversity conservation because it determines 
decisions and economic behavior regarding the handling of biodiversity (Simpson 1999). 
People convert biodiversity-rich forests to cultivated land if this allows them to increase their 
income. Conservation of biodiversity can only be obtained if the private benefit of conserving 
biodiversity exceeds the private benefits of cultivating land or of any other biodiversity 
damaging activity (e.g., commercial logging). 
[Bc-Cc] > [Ba-Ca]  Bc: benefits of conservation  Cc: costs of conservation
    Ba: benefits of activity   Ca: costs of activity 
The difference Ba-Ca reflects the opportunity costs of conservation. The provider of 
biodiversity needs to receive a compensation for conserving biodiversity, which equals at 
least these opportunity costs, otherwise she/he will convert the concerned areas for 
alternative land-uses and not conserve the species.  
Pearce and Moran (1994) distinguish between local market failure and global market failure. 
Local market failure characterizes the inability of markets to capture local, regional, national 
benefits of biodiversity conservation, or in other words local market failure refers to the failure 
of markets to take into account the external costs of biodiversity loss because of, e.g., land 
conversion. They consider global market failure as a result from the fact that biodiversity 
conservation yields external benefits, which are received on the global level by other than the 
decision-makers. 
Figure 8 illustrates the market failure. The horizontal axis shows the amount of land 
converted to, e.g., agricultural land. The vertical axis shows the price. MPBi are the marginal 
private benefits of land conversion, which are the extra revenue a farmer receives by 
converting the land from forest to agriculture. MCi are the marginal cost accruing to the 
farmer by converting the land. The “rational” farmer will equate MCi and MPBi in order to 
maximize profits and the amount of land conversion that actually takes place is LP. If the 
farmer is subsidized to convert the land, the private costs are lowered and the marginal cost 
curve will be shifted from MCi to MCi - SUB where SUB refers to the subsidy. The amount of 
land conversion will be expanded to LP+S. The distance LP - LP+S is a measure of 
government failure (GF). The issue of government failure is explained in chapter 4.1.4. 
However, the LP and LP+S are not the optimal decisions on land use, since they are based 
on the private costs and benefits of the farmer. If the social costs of land conversion, 
including the externalities that are accrued to the local area, are known, a better result of 
land use can be achieved. By internalizing the externalities and making the farmer to account 
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for them by taxation or by paying fees because the land is zoned for conservation a higher 
level of conservation Ln is realized, since the cost curve is shifted from MCi to MCi+MECl. 
The distance Ln - LP is a measure of the local market failure (LMF). Less land is converted. 
By internalizing even the social costs of the whole society the cost curve is even more shifted 
to Mci+MECl+MECg and the global market (GMF) failure can be prevented. Internalizing the 
externality of land use involves less land conversion and, hence, more biodiversity 
conservation. 
Figure 8: Measuring the economic failure 
Source: Pearce / Moran 1994 
In reality, the externalities of land conversion are only internalized in very rare cases and 
biodiversity decreases as a consequence of incomplete and missing markets, which fully 
reflect the full cost and benefits of biodiversity. 
4.1.3.2 Publicness of biodiversity 
In the economic literature biodiversity is often characterized as public good, but is this true? 
In order to answer this question, the following subchapter identifies the characteristics of 
biodiversity and compares it with the classification of goods. 
Public goods are characterized by a particular kind of externalities. The benefits of public 
goods are available for everyone. A pure public good can be characterized by non-
excludability and non-rivalry, meaning that no one can be excluded from the good’s 
consumption and the good can be consumed by one person without affecting its 
simultaneous consumption by another. Public goods can yield benefits on all levels. They are 
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differentiated in local public goods (LPGs), national public goods (NPGs), regional public 
goods (RPGs), transnational public goods (TPGs), and global public goods (GPGs). In 
contrast to NPGs, TPGs provide nonrival and non-excludable benefits to people in two or 
more countries. If they provide global spillovers, they are called GPGs. If the benefits are 
confined to a well-defined location in two or more countries, the good is called RPG. For 
example, cleansing a local ecosystem is such a RPG (Sandler 2006).  
Private goods are excludable and rival in consumption, meaning a person who does not pay 
for a good or does not fulfill certain access criteria can be excluded from its consumption, 
and a good consumed by one person cannot be consumed by another person. Impure public 
goods represent in-between cases. They possess benefits that are either partially non-rival 
and partially excludable or partially rival and non-excludable (Sandler 2001, 10). Club goods 
are one category of impure public goods. If a good is excludable but non-rival it is a club 
good. Difficulties arise from setting the right price for accession, from determining the group 
of users who can share the good, and from balancing the gain from additional users to the 
potential loss from increased use. 
Another group are common property resources. These are goods that are subject to rivalry, 
but nobody can be excluded from its use. Common property is usually shared in an 
uncontrolled manner amongst its owners, but others can be excluded; or it may take the form 
of an open access regime where it is difficult to put any restriction at all on use (OECD 
2003b, 14). Hardin (1968) already described in his article “Tragedy of the Commons”, 
published in Science, the consequences of an open access resource. In his opinion only two 
institutional arrangements - centralized government and private property - could sustain 
common-pool resources, such as air, water, and forests, in the long run. To illustrate his 
point, he used an example about the use of public lands by herdsmen. The pasture is open 
to all. This arrangement works for a while, even for centuries, until each herdsman realizes 
he can make a profit by adding more and more cattle to his herd. Hardin concludes that in a 
world in which resources are scarce and individuals pursue their own best interest, the 
freedom of commons brings ruin to all. 
Hardin’s theory can also be applied to the problem of biodiversity loss. If biodiversity appears 
as a common-pool resource, e.g., in form of a common access forest, it will be exploited and 
biodiversity will decline. In 1999 Ostrom et al. (1999) revisited the commons and challenged 
Hardin’s theory. The authors think that Hardin’s assumption is not correct to view users as 
being pictured as trapped in a situation, they cannot change and the external authorities 
need to address the problem. They argued that many social groups have been successful to 
manage common-pool resources and have often devised long-term, sustainable institutions 
4 The economic framework of the ABS concept 87
for governing these resources. Furthermore, they indicate that private and state managed 
resources have also been subject to failures and define the conditions for durable and 
successful institutions managing common-pool resources. 
Figure 9: Characterization of goods 
Biodiversity can appear in the four categories: pure public good, common good, club good 
and private good. Looking at ABS, especially the problems of the commons as well as that of 
club goods are relevant. Biodiversity and its components have characteristics of public and 
private goods. While many of the benefits of biological diversity accrue to the public as a 
whole, some benefits have a private character and can only be captured privately (OECD 
2003b, 23ff). The existence of ecosystems and the provision of local ecosystem services are 
often pure public goods, i.e., they are non-rival in consumption and non-excludable, whereas 
individual components of ecosystems are often private goods, e.g., eatable plants. However, 
the category of these private values that can be privatized and sold on the market, generate 
only a small return (Heal 2000, 110). 
Biological resources in forms of wild plants are rival in consumption. If they are harvested in 
greater quantities, as for example wild coffee or wild medical plants, they become scarce and 
if they are not subject to property rights, no one can be excluded from its use. In this case 
they are common goods and even open access resources. 
Non-rival are genetic resources whose information is used, just as a blueprint. If the structure 
of an active chemical compound is known, it can be used in various forms and each 
additional use has no impact on the previous user (OECD 2003a, 11). In the case of 
Excludability
Rivalry
Pure private
good
Pure public 
good
Impure
public good 
(some rivalry)
Impure 
public good 
(some exclusion)
Club good
Joint production
J
oint
 p
rod
u
ctio
n
Common good
J
oint
 p
rod
u
ctio
n
4 The economic framework of the ABS concept 88
biodiversity, it can be distinguished between two levels of excludability. The first level refers 
to the physical access to biodiversity. The one who holds property rights over the resource 
can exclude others from its use. If a state controls the access to its biological resources or 
biodiversity is protected in national parks, which are only accessible through entrance fees, 
biodiversity is exclusive and only available to a certain group of individuals. Domesticated 
and cultivated plants, which are already widely distributed, cannot be made exclusive. The 
second level refers to the genetic information contained in the biological resource. 
Information is excludable if the technology to extract this information is not available (e.g., 
protected by IPRs). In this case, biodiversity can be characterized as a club good. 
Since biodiversity cannot be allocated definitely to one of the four categories (private good, 
public good, common good, club good), the resource is an impure public good. Some of its 
benefits may be captured privately, others may accrue to everyone (Perrings / Gadgil 2003, 
535). According to Cornes and Sandler (1984), public goods that provide private and public 
benefits are the result of joint production and called joint products. They yield two or more 
outputs that vary with the degree of publicness. Jointly produced outputs may be purely 
public, impurely public, or private. Tropical forests are considered as such a joint product. 
Actions to preserve the forest not only yield local public goods (e.g., watershed, ecotourism, 
and local climate stability) but also global public goods (e.g., biodiversity existence and 
carbon sequestration). The provision of joint products depends on the ratio of excludable 
benefits (i.e., the contributor-specific and the club good benefits compared with the total 
benefits). If the share of excludable benefits is high, markets and clubs will evolve to 
efficiently allocate the resource. If the share is low and all jointly produced benefits are non-
excludable, underprovision or overutilization will result and an intervention is needed. 
However, joint products offer the opportunity to reduce the usual problem of underprovision 
of public goods in a decentralized economy. By augmenting private and excludable benefits, 
incentives to potential supporters can be provided (Sandler 2006). ABS is a concept that 
relies on biodiversity as a joint product.  
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Figure 10: Characteristics of biodiversity goods and services 
Source: based on OECD 2003b, 30 
As other goods with public good characteristics, biodiversity and its conservation suffers from 
free riding. Countries and individuals have the incentive to a free ride on the efforts of others, 
since they can enjoy additional benefits without paying for it. As long as no other rules are in 
place, conservation efforts of countries and individuals are determined by the private value 
they can capture by the use or existence of biodiversity. Without international coordinated 
action, both individuals and countries will not undertake conservation measures that go 
beyond their own interests. Free riding appears on the local and global level (Perman et al. 
2003, 131f). 
These discussions show that the property and institutional form under which resources are 
governed can have a decisive impact on the conservation and the sustainable use of the 
resources. Property rights, no matter if they are private, communal, or state, are essential to 
address the problem of non-excludability and for the maintenance of the resource (Coase 
1960; Barzel 1997, 7). The underlying conception is that holders of property rights have a 
long-term view of their asset and therefore use it in a sustainable manner. No property rights 
(i.e., open access) will lead to the depletion of the resource whereas private, communal and 
state property rights can be an adequate basis for negotiations and have the potential to 
institute incentives for conservation measures. The property rights arrangements have 
distinguished characteristics. Open access describes a situation where no controls are 
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placed on how much individuals consume of a resource and no restriction exist on the 
number of individuals that use the resource, i.e., no property rights exist over the resource. 
State rights refer to property rights that are vested in a central governing authority. These 
rights can co-exist with other property rights regimes, as for example open access, if the 
state chooses not to exercise its rights. Community rights are one of the earliest forms of 
property rights over natural resources. Often these rights prohibit persons outside of the 
communities to use the resource and establish rules how the resources should be used and 
exploited. Private rights describe the rights individuals have to the ownership, control and 
enjoyment of the things they own and the right to sell, rent or exchange it or part of it (Devlin / 
Grafton 1999, 73ff). IPRs are a special category of private property rights. Their role 
regarding biodiversity is analyzed in chapter 4.2.2. 
The different property rights arrangements have different allocation and distribution effects. 
Private, state and communal property are promising property rights regimes, but they also 
may have some negative aspects and problems as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10: Allocation and distribution effects of different property rights regimes 
Property rights 
arrangement 
Allocation Distribution 
effects 
Problems Solutions 
Open access Unlimited 
extraction 
Depends on “who 
comes first” 
“Tragedy of the 
unmanaged 
commons” 
Assignment of 
property rights 
Private property Investment in 
appropriate values 
Intergenerational 
unfairness 
Doubtful 
preservation of 
non-appropriable 
values 
Restrictions 
National 
patrimony 
Depends on 
political decisions 
Possible 
problematic in 
regard to local 
people 
Weak 
governments lead 
to open access 
problems 
International, 
political and 
financial support 
Communal 
property 
Depends on 
communal 
decisions 
The ones who 
control the asset 
benefit 
Can lead to open 
access problems 
without regulation 
Set of regulations 
within the common 
property 
Patents Include incentives 
to invest in 
biological 
resources 
Can effect “North-
to-South flows” 
Ethical concerns 
against “patent on 
life” 
Patent law must 
be embedded in 
environmental 
regulation 
Source: Lerch 1998, 292 
4.1.4 Biodiversity loss through policy and institutional failures 
Besides market failure, biodiversity degradation is also a consequence of missing policies 
and institutions. The above described market failure and the undervaluation of diverse 
resources, which lead to the decline of biodiversity, can be addressed through governmental 
actions. The government is often in a position to intervene and correct the market failure. 
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These interventions can be the development of policies and instruments aiming at 
biodiversity conservation and the development of institutions, which assume the 
responsibility to implement such policies and to manage the resource. Examples are the 
creation or the improvements of property rights and the recognition of social benefits (Grafton 
et al. 2004, 447). 
In reality, it can be observed that governmental interventions often do not stop environmental 
degradation. Often the appropriate policies are absent or compete with other policies, which 
have adverse effects on biodiversity. Most of them seek to promote economic development 
and ignore environmental impacts. For example, agricultural subsidies and land grants may 
promote agricultural production and the conversion of land thereby increasing the loss of 
biodiversity. Such a conversion is the consequence of the overvaluation of the converted 
assets, which generates the same result as the undervaluation of biodiversity (Swanson 
1995, 6).  
Part of the difficulties that governments have in establishing effective biodiversity policies is 
reasoned in the lack of a global and a national consensus on the biodiversity preservation 
priorities and the influence of changing societal preferences on policy-making. 
The CBD suggests four different types of policy measures that offer orientation for national 
policy-makers. The first type are positive incentives for conservation like monetary 
inducements paid to landowners to reimburse them for providing biodiversity. The second 
category are disincentives to adjust economic decisions. Disincentives are for example 
realized through the polluter pays principle and the imposing of costs (e.g., through user or 
polluting fees) upon actors who damage biodiversity in order to discourage these activities. If 
the new financial resources are channeled to other actors, e.g., farmers and landowners, to 
incentivise biodiversity conservation, a double dividend can be achieved. The third type of 
policy measures are indirect incentives. These incentives are constituted by a mechanism 
that creates or improves market signals, which encourage conservation and allow receiving 
benefits from values of biodiversity. ABS is such an indirect incentive as well as the 
afforestation programs, which aim to obtain benefits from carbon sequestration. The last 
category is the removal of perverse incentives to accelerate biodiversity conservation. This 
includes the reform of agricultural policies and the reduction of production subsidies (Grafton 
et al. 2004, 448). 
The nature of policy failures may appear differently and vary among countries. In many 
developing countries policy-making and policy-implementing institutions, especially in the 
case of environmental protection, are often weak or not even established. Besides, public 
participation in the policy-making processes is often not very high. Either an environmental 
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regulation is not in place or if developing countries are able to formulate comprehensive 
environmental regulations, they lack institutions, resources, and sometime the political will to 
implement them. Policy failures are also observed in developed countries. However, there 
institutions are stronger, but biodiversity is turned over to other pressures. The consumption 
and the standard of living are much higher and aggravate the pressure on natural resources 
(Bhattarai / Hamming 1998, 12). 
Biodiversity does not only rely on policies. Effective policies and policy instruments require 
efficient and strong institutions that implement them. According to North (1990), institutions 
reduce uncertainty by providing a structure for political, social and economic interactions. 
They affect the performance of the economy by affecting the costs of exchange and 
production, including transaction costs, and determine the profitability and feasibility of 
engaging in economic activity. Hence, institutions provide the incentive structure of an 
economy. Property rights are considered to be such institutions. Effective biodiversity policy 
needs effective institutional structures that provide the needed incentive structures to 
stakeholders. 
4.2 The promise: biodiversity conservation by biodiversity 
commercialization 
The promise of the ABS concept is biodiversity conservation by biodiversity 
commercialization. Besides, it implies that the commercialization will lead to economic 
development. This chapter outlines the essential aspect of the promise and analyzes them. 
ABS is regarded as an instrument that can foster sustainable development. Since ABS 
internalizes the commercial benefits of users of genetic resources, it can also be described 
as a market-based approach. The central elements of the concept are i) the state’s 
sovereignty principle, which is characterized by the allocation of a quasi property right to 
countries over their biological resources and ii) bilateral contracts between providers and 
users of genetic resources on the exchange of these resources and compensations. Even if 
the theory suggests that bilateral contracts are a pareto-optimal solution, practical 
experiences indicate that many factors hinder the optimal outcome. Therefore, the 
subchapter shades light on a multilateral approach. IPRs are special category of property 
rights and eminently important for the ABS concept. The debate on the pros and cons of 
IPRs is sketched at the end of this subchapter. 
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4.2.1 ABS a market-based approach for sustainable development 
ABS and sustainable development are closely linked, but what is sustainable development? 
Only few concepts have made a fast and pervading career in policy discourses as 
sustainable development. It was introduced with the Brundtland report in 1987 and defined 
as "development that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987). During the Rio Summit 
in 1992 sustainable development was the main concept around which the debates 
crystallized. The main Rio documents, the Rio declaration and the Agenda 21, further 
defined the concept and gave it a more policy-orientated content. The balancing of 
economic, social, and environmental issues became the emphasis of concept. The 
overarching policy goal of the international community should be the creation and 
maintenance of a stable economy that produces sufficient welfare for the whole society and 
distributes the benefits in an equitable way. Since the Rio conference in 1992, the concept 
has been embedded in many policy agendas. The main principles of sustainable 
development include policy integration, equity regarding the costs and the benefits of 
production and consumption, intergenerational solidarity, internalization of social costs and 
benefits and participatory policy-making (Bruyninckx 2004, 266ff). 
The CBD is one of the Rio agreements and reflects the concept of sustainable development. 
Firstly, the CBD is a global multilateral agreement that takes the conservation of biodiversity 
into account. It requires global coordinated action due to its global externalities. Secondly, 
the CBD’s main mechanism to conserve biodiversity is a bilateral, market-based instrument, 
which aims to combine conservation and development efforts by conserving biodiversity 
through the commercialization of plant genetic resources. 
Biodiversity-rich countries alone are not able to preserve their resources. In 1995, Norton-
Griffiths and Southey estimated the opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation in Kenya 
from the potential net returns of agriculture and livestock production and compared them with 
the net returns from tourism, forestry, and other conservation activities. They found out that 
at the national level, agricultural and livestock production in the parks, reserves and forests 
of Kenya could generate gross annual revenues of US$ 565 million and net returns of US$ 
203 million, being the opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation to Kenya. In 1995, the 
combined net revenues from wildlife tourism and forestry were US$ 42 million and 
inadequate to cover the opportunity costs to land. The authors come to the conclusion that 
Kenya alone – illustrating many developing countries - is not able to solve this problem and 
that there is a strong need for international co-operation. Developed countries benefit from 
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the conservation efforts of developing countries, and they have to contribute towards these 
costs if they want to maintain these efforts (Norton-Griffiths / Southey 1995). 
But even before such calculations, international policy-makers realized that the biodiversity-
rich countries, being mostly developing countries, were not able to provide sufficient funds for 
nature and especially biodiversity conservation. It was clear that innovative financial 
instruments were needed to tackle the problem. Already between the 1970s and 1980s 
scientists, stakeholders from different developing and industrialized countries, and 
representatives of environmental non-governmental organizations began to develop 
strategies to stop the ongoing loss of resources. Market-based approaches were the focus of 
attention because they offered policy-makers new cost-efficient ways to reach conservation 
objectives, since they use market forces to achieve their objectives. Command and control 
approaches became less popular. The underlying idea of market mechanisms is to capture 
the global, external benefits of biodiversity (Heal 2000, 21ff). These approaches were 
especially driven by the change of exploitation and the change of the property rights status of 
biodiversity and particular genetic resources. 
The market-based approach has been manifested not only in the adoption of the CBD and 
the ITPGRFA, but also through other conventions aiming at conservation and sustainable 
use of resources. Examples are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and GEF, which channels financial resources from industrialized to 
developing countries in order to support conservation activities. The perception of the 
necessity to integrate industrialized countries in conservation strategies in developing 
countries is one important reason that has advanced the concept: biodiversity conservation 
by biodiversity commercialization. 
4.2.1.1 The sovereignty principle 
The recognition of the principle of state sovereignty is the basis of the CBD’s market 
approach. By assigning property rights and responsibility over biodiversity, the exclusivity of 
the biological resource is increased. In the case of crop diversity, the principle of state’s or 
national sovereignty or the assignment of private property rights had existed before it was 
stipulated in the CBD. During the colonial times, ownership was exercised on potentially 
valuable plant species. With advances in breeding in the mid-1950s, the points of economic 
values of biological material shifted from the species to the variety level. There was a 
reallocation from the colonial claims of national sovereignty to the declaration of ”common 
heritage”. Biological materials belonged to humans in general. However, ownership could 
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only accrue only to the creator of a new, distinct, uniform, and stable variety (Petit et al. 
2001, 4).  
Wild genetic resources, which can be accidentally found in forests, on grassland etc., always 
continued to be regarded as “common heritage of mankind”. The “common heritage” status 
of the wild genetic resources remained until its abolishment by the CBD and later reaffirmed 
by the ITPGRFA, recalling the principle of national sovereignty. The principle is regarded as 
a legal regime and as a precondition for the introduction of bilateral market-like contracts 
between holders and users of biodiversity (Boisvert / Caron 2002, 152). 
From an institutional economic point of view, the adoption of the CBD and the ITPGRFA, 
affirming the principal of state’s sovereignty over genetic resources, is the result of the 
improved technologies to use genetic resources. Demsetz (1967) recognized that property 
rights emerge to internalize externalities, caused by open access, if it becomes economic to 
internalize the externalities. Only if the benefits of internalization exceed the costs of 
internalization, property rights will emerge. He describes two effects that can change the 
cost-benefit ratio. Firstly, an increased value of a certain asset increases the benefits or 
gains from ownership and lead to the creation of property rights. For example, new property 
rights can evolve through value enhancement driven by technical progress. Secondly, a 
decline in costs of implementing property rights also positively affects the cost-benefit-
relation of establishing property rights. Demsetz’s theory is based on empirical observation of 
the development of land ownership of Indians in the Quebec region in the 18th century. 
Increased trade and value of fur resulted in the definition of property rights over beaver 
populations and some form of privatization. 
Lerch (1998, 285) applies Demsetz’s theory to the case of genetic resources. The demand 
for genetic resources and their utilization have increased as a result of the technical progress 
in the field of biotechnology. Consequently, the benefits arising out of the use of genetic 
resources have increased, regardless which parts of the genetic resources are used (i.e., the 
tangible or the intangible part). This stands to reason for the creation of property rights of 
genetic resources and the adoption of the sovereignty principle by the CBD and the 
ITPGRFA, or private IPRs. Besides the increase of value, the cost side also influences the 
emergence of property rights. This does not occur on the level of the biological material, but 
on the processed and advanced level where the genetic information comes into effect. The 
transaction costs for the assignment and enforcement of such rights have decreased by the 
establishment of property rights institutions, as for instance, IPR protection systems. The 
existence of such created institutions or regimes facilitate the emergence of IPRs in the area 
of genetic resource utilization (Sedjo 1992, 207f) 
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4.2.1.2 Internalization of commercial externalities 
The innovative framework of biodiversity management under the CBD and the ITPGRFA 
takes up different developments of the last 20 years: the increasing loss of species, new 
insights about biodiversity conservation, but also the technical progress in the area of 
biotechnology and the increasing demand for biological material. This includes access to 
genetic resources and appropriate transfer of relevant technologies.  
To recall the results from the previous subchapter: biodiversity and its components have 
characteristics of public and private goods. While many of the benefits of biological diversity 
accrue to the public as a whole in the form of cultural, social, and economic benefits, a 
number of its components have private values (OECD 2003b, 23ff). It assumed that the 
public value of biodiversity is very large (cf. chapter 4.1.1). Starting from there, every 
endeavor would be made to conserve the planet's life-support system or certain ecosystem 
services. However, the private value of any specific status of biodiversity varies and depends 
on the institutional settings. But it is this private value that determines decisions and 
economic behavior regarding the handling of biodiversity (Simpson 1999). People convert 
biodiversity-rich forests to cultivated land if this allows them to increase their income. The 
conservation of biodiversity through market-based incentives can only be obtained if the 
private benefit of conserving biodiversity exceeds the private benefits of cultivating land or of 
any other biodiversity damaging activity (e.g., commercial logging). 
The utilization of biodiversity as an input in research and development embodies a private 
value. Due to evolution and the selection process, nature provides a number of successful 
strategies that can be used against the dynamic occurrence of existence-threats, for 
instance, pests and predators of the primary food system or non-curable diseases. 
Therefore, diverse wild plant genetic resources are of high interest (Swanson 1996, 3). The 
main user sectors are the pharmaceutical industry, the crop protection sector, the agricultural 
seed business, the horticulture, the botanical medicine, the cosmetic and personal care 
sector, and so-called life science companies, combining pharmaceutical, food, seed and 
chemical divisions. All these sectors have a high interest in obtaining genetic resources for 
research and development. This was already shown in chapter 2.4. The demand function for 
genetic resources is not well known. Already Reid et al. (1993) stressed that the demand for 
biochemical resources for the pharmaceutical industry is likely to be elastic in response to 
price changes, meaning that if the price for access to natural products rises, pharmaceutical 
firms can respond with increased investment in synthetic chemistry and reduced investment 
in natural products research. 
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The contribution of natural products to sales in the world’s top pharmaceutical companies 
ranges from 10 to more than 50 percent. Of the 25 best-selling drugs worldwide in 1997, 42 
percent of sales came from natural products, with a total value of US$ 17.5 billion (ten Kate / 
A Laird 1999, 34). Therefore, the potential of the commercial use of genetic resources is 
obvious. Even if some companies have recently scaled down or closed the section of natural 
product development, all leading companies still run natural product programs within the 
company or through subsidiaries (A Laird / ten Kate 2002, 249). 
The market structure of the sectors using and providing biodiversity is characterized by an 
asymmetric distribution of resources and technology. The sectors having the potential to 
commercialize and demand genetic resources are mainly located in industrial countries, 
whereas most of the provider countries can be identified as developing countries (Myers et 
al. 2000, 855). The ABS concept is a response to this situation by aiming at a participation of 
provider countries in the economic gains stemming from their biological resources. 
ABS internalizes the private commercial value of genetic resources, which is one value within 
a bundle of values determining the social benefits of biodiversity. If biodiversity is conserved 
only based on individuals’ private value (private marginal benefits MBprivate), the maintained 
stock of genetic resources is much smaller (X*private) than it would be optimal from a societal 
point of view (X*social). If the commercial value is internalized by making users of genetic 
resources pay for access and share benefits the conserved stock is much greater (X* 
commercial). However, the conserved amount is still much smaller than the socially optimal 
amount.  
Figure 11: Internalization of the commercial value 
MC
X = stock of 
genetic resources
MC
MB
MBsocial
MBprivate
X*socialX*private
MBcommercial
X*commercial
4 The economic framework of the ABS concept 98
In theory, the concept of ABS seems to be promising. The creation of a market for the 
product “biodiversity” and the trade of biological resources make it possible to protect 
biodiversity by using it in a commercial but sustainable way. This approach is the opposite of 
the classical protection concepts, claiming for not using the resources at all. This concept 
does not only address biodiversity conservation. The commercialization of genetic resources 
is regarded a new source of income and biodiversity comes out as a joint product, which is 
reasoned in its character as an impure public good. It is expected that ABS contracts provide 
sufficient flows of investments and technologies in the area of biotechnology to promote 
economic development and allow countries to establish an industry sector related to the use 
of genetic resources (Reid et al. 1993, 33). New capacity building and economic 
development are closely linked to poverty issues, which has been identified as the major 
underlying reason for converting biodiversity-rich habitats. The commercialization of 
biodiversity promises to serve the dual purpose of alleviating poverty and sustaining natural 
resources at the same time (Simpson 1999).  
4.2.1.3 The bilateral approach 
The CBD has established a bilateral system for the exchange of genetic resources. Within 
this system access to genetic resources and the commercial use are regulated and aligned 
with access and use costs. A country, being rich in biodiversity, is supposed to allow access 
to genetic resources in exchange for monetary or non-monetary benefits as technologies and 
especially biotechnologies (Bonn Guidelines 2001, Appendix II). According to the CBD, the 
competence for regulating ABS is assigned to the national governments, owning the genetic 
material. The exchange depends on negotiations between the provider and the user of 
genetic resources until they agree on a contract about the planned bioprospecting activities 
and the benefit-sharing procedure. This contract provides a framework for determining rights 
and obligations, and, in particular, attributing property rights and regulating the sharing of 
benefits in the case of the discovery of products or processes with new commercial 
applications. Shared benefits are usually payments beforehand for the right to explore, or 
royalty payments deriving from the use of material discovered for a given period, or both. 
Contractors obtain, in exchange, the right to patent, or otherwise exclusively exploit materials 
discovered. Table 11 gives an overview of the potential benefits and costs of users and 
providers. 
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Table 11: Types of costs and benefits arising out of ABS 
Providers’ benefits – Users’ costs Users’ benefits – Providers’ costs 
Non-monetary Direct 
Technology transfer Biodiversity conservation 
Free access to technology and products Access to genetic resources 
Co-ownership of IPR Legal security 
Acknowledgement in publications Non-exclusive or exclusive user rights 
Joint research and increased scientific capacity  
Participation in planning and decision-making 
(including research results) 
Control of samples 
Voucher specimens deposited in national 
institution 
 
Increased conservation capacity  
Monetary Indirect 
Bioprospecting fees New inputs for research and development of 
products and processes 
Per-sample fees Increased profits by new products and 
processes, protected by IPR 
Percentage of research budget Technical progress 
Royalties as percentage of net sales or net profits Increase in information and knowledge 
Development of alternative income generating 
schemes 
Publications 
Commitment to reinvest in source country  
Specific funds  
Source: based on Columbia University 1999; Bonn Guidelines, 2001 
The legal basis of such contracts between a user and a provider, regulating questions of 
ABS, are clear property rights. Most of the countries, harboring high diverse genetic 
resources, are members of the CBD and the state sovereignty principle applies. If the state 
has the quasi-ownership over the genetic resources, it has the mandate to negotiate with 
interested parties and is the beneficiary of present and future profits. The local level only 
participates by giving the PIC. To what extent the local level will benefit depends on national 
regulations. However, one part of the possible profits realized by the commercialization of 
genetic resources, for example in the pharmaceutical and seed industry, should flow back to 
the provider of the resources and give an incentive to continue conserving biodiversity. 
Through such compensations, alternate land uses that destroy biodiversity become less 
economical. 
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In order to create incentives for biodiversity conservation and assure a continuous supply of 
genetic material, the benefits earned through commercialization have to be channeled to the 
landowner or local community in charge of the resource management and bearing the 
conservation costs. Then, these benefits create a new source of income for these agents and 
biodiversity comes out as a joint product. This underlines the important role of the national 
institutions defining property rights and thus distributing income opportunities. 
A central statement of the property rights theory justifies the CBD’s claim for a bilateral 
approach. Bargaining solutions are regarded an internalized strategy for externalities. Coase 
(1960) suggests in the so-called “Coase Theorem” that bilateral bargaining based on well-
defined and assigned property can internalize externalities if a number of assumptions are 
satisfied, including the absence of transaction costs and having fully informed market 
participants. Within that conceptual framework, property rights contribute to achieving 
economic efficiency, which maximizes the overall welfare of society. The distribution of rights 
has no influence on the outcome. If the transaction costs are too high and prevent 
bargaining, the efficient use of the resources will depend on how property rights are 
assigned. Therefore, the Coase Theorem calls for laws that should be structured so as to 
remove the impediments to private agreements or to minimize the obstacles to private 
agreements over resource allocation. It is assumed that the parties are in the best position to 
know how much they value the property right under negotiations. Abstracting from some 
restrictions (which will be discussed later on), bilateral ABS contracts as suggested by the 
CBD can be interpreted as “Coase solutions” (Sedjo 1992, 208f; Lerch 1998, 296ff; Boisvert / 
Caron 2002, 152). 
The Coase Theorem and its assumption initiated the development of transaction costs 
economics that deal with the costs that occur when an economic exchange is undertaken. 
When the exchange involves many agents or agents being separated by time or space, the 
transaction costs might be too high. In that case the outcome would depend on the specific 
nature of the initial allocation of rights (Swanson / Goeschl 2000, 76). 
The Hobbes Theorem formulated by Cooter (1982) considers the case that people are 
seldom rational enough to agree on a division of the cooperative surplus, even when there 
are no serious impediments to bargaining. Therefore, the law has to be designed to minimize 
the harm caused by failures in private agreements by allocating property rights to the party 
who values them most (Janssen 1999, 317). Besides, Coase’s assumptions of distributive 
effects are not always applicable. In the case of biodiversity, the distribution of property rights 
is critical for the outcome of ABS (OECD 2003a, 22). This aspect is examined in chapter 
5.1.2. 
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The bargaining between the provider and the user of genetic resources can end in a pareto-
optimal allocation of protected biodiversity (X*) if the marginal benefits (MB) of the user equal 
the marginal costs (MC) for biodiversity protection of the provider. The outcome of such a 
negotiation is a social surplus (ABC), which can be shared between the participating parties. 
Figure 12: The Coase theorem applied to the trade of genetic resources 
Source: adopted from Janssen 1999, 316 
In theory, bilateral contracts on bioprospecting seem to be a perfect solution because 
externalities are internalized, a social welfare benefit accrues, and - as joint product - 
biodiversity conservation is realized. Therefore, from an incentive point of view a fee-for-
access regime provides an effective system, especially in case of rare and geographically 
isolated wild genetic resources of high interest as input for research and development. 
Nevertheless, Coase already indicated that transaction costs and other factors exist that 
make the bilateral bargaining system ineffective and prevent optimal solutions. Information 
asymmetry and the relevance of transaction costs, imperfect competition, as well as the 
uncertainty about the global and intergenerational value of genetic resources are important 
reasons hindering the achievement of agreements. These problems are closely investigated 
in chapter 5.1. All these issues and reasons are preventing the optimal production of 
“biodiversity conservation” through bilateral benefit-sharing.  
4.2.2 The role of intellectual property rights 
Within bilateral agreements, the exclusiveness of IPRs for products derived from collected 
samples of genetic resources plays a major role. But what is the main idea of IPRs? 
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Today innovations and technologies that promote economic development are becoming 
increasingly intellectual rather than material in nature. Biotechnological inventions, 
computers, and chemicals based on renewable resources are examples for goods with a 
high degree of intellectual content (Bhat 1996, 206). These intellectual goods are based on 
knowledge that can also be characterized by the two criteria of public goods: non-rivalry and 
non-exclusivity. Private investments in knowledge do not pay-off if the new knowledge 
becomes public and has no restriction for its access after it has been developed. The 
consequence is the dilemma of public goods: a non-optimal supply of knowledge and a 
decrease in research and technical progress (Maskus 2000, 29). IPRs have been 
established to address the public good dilemma and provide incentives for research and the 
realization of technical progress. The assignment of IPRs, e.g., patents, grants the recipient 
a temporary supply monopoly, so that she/he can realize a monopoly profit by the selling of 
her/his products. In return, the inventor has to reveal to the public the information necessary 
to build upon and commercialize the invention when the IPR protection has expired. Without 
the incentive it is most likely that the inventor would keep secret the knowledge on the 
invention (OECD 2001a, 13). However, welfare losses are the result of such monopolies 
rights. In comparison to a situation of perfect competition, the price of such a protected 
product is higher and the supplied amount is less in static sense. 
The impact of IPRs depends on the product they protect and on the level of economic 
development of the concerned country (OECD 2001a, 12). The proponents argue that 
protection is especially needed in the case of knowledge-intensive products whose research 
and development take a long time and require large investments, whereas whose duplication 
has very low costs. This holds true for the pharmaceutical sector as well as for the crop 
breeding sector where the development of a new drug/variety can take up to 15 or more 
years and for products that can be easily copied. 
On the one hand, for countries that are technologically advanced, IPR protection is more 
likely to have a positive impact on the economy, since it ensures a return. On the other hand, 
for those economies that are predominantly consumers of protected intellectual property (i.e., 
low-income countries), the impact may, in the short-run, turn out to be negative by lost jobs 
and decreased production of patented products (Bhat 1996, 207). The proponents of IPRs 
argue that in the longer-term the impact on low-income countries is positive because they will 
benefit from enhanced foreign direct investment, increased research activities, technological 
advancement and increases in trade (OECD 2001a, 12). However, IPR protection does not 
increase investment in traditional technologies because developing countries lack the 
fundamental prerequisites as monetary funds, research facilities, and human resources (Bhat 
1996, 207). 
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Another negative effect occurs in the low-income countries from the establishment costs. 
Most developing countries do not have any IPR system in place. These countries have to 
invest huge financial and human resources to establish such an IPR system. Consequently, 
these resources are detracted from other uses that might support economic development 
(Hilpert 1998). 
In the case of agricultural crop protection, Droege and Soete (2001, 161) come to the 
conclusion that developing countries will maximize their welfare if they protect traditional 
cultivation methods (farmers’ rights) and demand royalties but refuse international patent 
protection. If both protection regimes are established industrialized countries have a higher 
pay-off. Industrialized countries also benefit from the protection regime in developing 
countries because only then biodiversity is conserved. Therefore, these countries should 
favor a combination of different regimes. Evenson (1999, 1635) comes to a similar 
conclusion. Even if IPRs are expanded to crops only in developed countries, it will have 
deleterious effects on developing countries. Janssen (1999, 320) concludes that if in provider 
countries biodiversity is an open access resource, IPR protection will aggravate the already 
inefficient global provision of biodiversity, but if efficient property rights regimes are 
established to complement IPRs, the decline of biodiversity will be halted. 
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5 The effectiveness of ABS: critical factors and addressing 
measures 
With the adoption of the CBD, provider countries started to develop ABS regimes to 
implement the Convention. The realization of the ABS concept has mainly depended, so far, 
on the performance of provider countries. Meanwhile, more than 50 countries are in the 
process of developing and implementing laws and policies on the subject (Barber / Johnston 
/ Tobin 2003, 15). The process of infusing the international agreement into national 
legislation is long and difficult. Even if the concept has been implemented, successful cases 
are rare, and in the international community discontent emerges. Complains on both sides, 
providers and users, about the functionality of the approach have arisen. The international 
negotiations indicate that users will have to assume more responsibility in future. However, 
no agreement about a future regime has been concluded.  
This study contributes to the debate by analyzing whether and how the CBD’s approach of 
ABS is an effective concept to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, to 
facilitate access to biodiversity and to ascertain the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising from the commercialization of genetic resources. After having characterized the 
economic framework of ABS in chapter 4 it is possible to progress with the main goal of this 
study. This chapter establishes the analytic framework (cf. Figure 13) to measure the 
effectiveness of the ABS concept, which is defined as the capability of the ABS regime  
i) to set incentives for the sustainable use and the conservation of biodiversity; 
ii) to facilitate access to plant genetic material; and 
iii) to enhance a fair and equitable benefit-sharing (prevent misappropriation).  
This means that an effective ABS regime has the capability to establish an environment in 
which the biodiversity in provider countries is successfully protected, in which biological 
resources in provider countries with a commercial value are sustainably used (i.e., access is 
demanded and granted), and in which the benefits of this utilization are equitably shared 
between providers and users of the material. If an ABS regime, be it national, regional or 
international, has the capability to set incentives, facilitate access and enhance benefit-
sharing, it will be effective.  
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To measure these capabilities their determinants, so-called critical factors, have to be 
defined. These critical factors are derived in chapter 5.1 by an approach, which combines the 
results from the identification of the economic framework of ABS in the previous chapter (cf. 
chapter 4), the application of new institutional economics theory’s major aspects (i.e., 
property rights, bargaining solutions, transaction cost, and information failures), and the 
empirical findings of four ABS country case studies (cf. chapter 1.3). These are based on the 
collection and analysis of empirical qualitative data of national and regional ABS regimes in 
Costa Rica, the Philippines, and Ethiopia. To complement the analytic framework from a user 
perspective, the EU serves as an adequate case study. The structure of this analysis does 
not reflect the chronology of the research. The findings of the case studies, which are 
illustrated in chapter 6, have already contributed to the analysis in this chapter. 
The identified critical factors are property and intellectual property rights, information 
asymmetries, time lags, good governance, administrative complexity, and market structure. 
They impact and shape the outcome of the three objectives of effectiveness. 
Firstly, biodiversity will only be conserved if incentives are established that can stop the 
destructive use of biological resources. Property rights or intellectual property rights must be 
placed at those levels that are most effective at maintaining and investing in the concerned 
asset and compensation payments must occur real-time to make other destructive uses 
(e.g., logging) less profitable. 
Secondly, access has two dimensions. It only takes place if users and providers are 
interested and can agree. One the one hand, access will only be granted if provider countries 
can expect benefits. Therefore, compliance of users must be ensured and informational 
deficiencies between providers and users have to be abolished. Moreover, time lags 
between sampling and commercial success must be accounted for (by, e.g., sampling fees, 
non-monetary benefits). Consecutive behavior due to information deficiencies results in over-
regulation (meant to ensure benefit-sharing) that negatively affects local research.  
On the other hand, access will only be demanded if users cannot use alternative sources. 
Here, ex-situ collections and similar alternative sources pose a problem. Besides, access will 
only be demanded, if (transaction) costs for obtaining access are not prohibitively high. 
Transaction costs arise for various reasons. Uncertainty about ownership and good 
governance leads to difficulties in obtaining PIC, in negotiating and concluding contracts, and 
decreases demand for access. Complex ABS application procedures also increase 
transaction costs.  
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Thirdly, the ABS concept is only effective if the holders of the resource in question receive 
fair and equitable benefits. To fulfill this condition these agents must be defined and 
identifiable. Benefits should address the needs of the local communities and address the 
problems arising from time lags. The received benefits have to compensate the conservation 
costs. The distribution of benefits and thus the CBD objective “fair and equitable benefit-
sharing” is strongly affected by the distribution of bargaining power, which is closely linked to 
market structure. Compliance with contracts must be ensured in user countries.  
These critical factors positively or negatively impact the effectiveness depending on their 
implementation. In this chapter the case studies are not yet analyzed in their country-specific 
context. They all rather provide input to develop a general theoretical framework that can 
serve to analyze a large number of different country-specific cases. The analysis of the 
effectiveness of the ABS concept allows deriving recommendations to improve ABS 
governance. Therefore, this chapter also deals with measures that address the essential 
critical factors affecting the effectiveness.  
Figure 13: Analytical framework to measure ABS effectiveness 
 
Various measures, e.g., the assignment of property rights, compensation schemes, 
contracts, coalitions etc., are identified and assessed, and strategies are proposed how to 
implement such measures. They are separately analyzed from the critical factors in chapter 
5.2. It is assumed that these measures are the most promising to address the critical factors. 
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Following the international debate, it is distinguished between measures that need to be 
initiated by provider countries (i.e., provider measures) and measures that have to be 
implemented in recipient countries (i.e., user measures). So far, the focus of ABS 
implementation has been on provider countries. However, it has been become clear to the 
international community that only both user and provider measures can effectively implement 
ABS. This has been formulated by the call for the development of an international regime. 
After the theoretical examination of the critical factors and potential measures, the 
established analytical framework will be applied to four case studies in the following chapter 
(cf. chapter 6). 
Even if ABS has been looked at from different research fields (mainly law), an adequate 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the effectiveness of the concept is still lacking. So 
far, most of the research has focused on the general economic framework of ABS as 
discussed in chapter 4 or on single problems of ABS. Only the OECD has published a more 
comprehensive approach in 2003. This report compiles economic issues of ABS, which are 
more of a general kind and not based on empirical findings. It also considers asymmetric 
information as major problem of contributing to market failure and the loss of biodiversity in 
addition to non-rivalry and non-excludability. This assessment cannot be agreed with. Non-
rivalry and non-excludability are a general problem contributing to the loss of biodiversity, 
whereas asymmetric information is a problem of ABS. Therefore, in this analysis information 
deficiencies are identified as a critical factor. Other issues, which the report sketchily 
discusses, are property rights, the sharing of benefits, contracting, participation of local 
stakeholders, and capacity building. This study considers the OECD results, but does not 
follow the proposed framework. 
This study considers and integrates existing approaches and publications that analyze these 
single aspects. For example, Swanson and Goeschl (2000) analyze the distribution of 
property rights and its impact on efficiency. Mulholland and Wilman (2003) investigate how 
contracts have to be designed and which payments schemes have to be included to 
guarantee that risk-averse host countries provide high quality genetic material. Gehl 
Sampath (2005) applies transaction costs economics and economies of contracts to 
bioprospecting contracts on traditional knowledge and genetic resources.  
This chapter fills this gap by developing and establishing a new analytical framework based 
on insights of new institutional economic theory, but also based on the findings from the case 
studies. Therefore, the approach applied in this study combines deductive and inductive 
reasoning processes to establish a new analytic framework.  
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5.1 Critical factors of an effective access and benefit-sharing regime 
This chapter derives the critical factors based on the application of new institutional 
economic theory and the insights that could be gained through the case studies. Relevant 
theories are property rights and contracts theory, as well as transaction cost theory and the 
theory on imperfect competition. The applied theories give also a hint, which instruments and 
measures can solve the problems concerning the critical factors. 
5.1.1 The derivation of the critical factors 
Six factors determine the effectiveness of ABS. How have these factors been derived? 
To answer the question, we have to recall the results of chapter 4. Before the CBD was 
adopted and ABS was introduced, there was no market and genetic resources were not 
traded. User unilaterally obtained the needed material without the consent and approval of 
the resource holders. Therefore, these were not compensated for the provision. At the same 
time, the loss of biodiversity went on. The economic analysis of the loss of biodiversity 
comes to the conclusion that mainly two underlying causes explain the decline of the genetic 
resources: market failure and policy failure (Swanson 1995, 1-10). The CBD was adopted 
and ABS was chosen as an instrument to address these problems and establish a market for 
biodiversity. 
The market for biodiversity fails because the provision of the resource has externalities and 
public good characteristics. Biodiversity is not conserved because it produces positive 
externalities that are not considered by private agents. Since the individual’s benefits and the 
private value of producing the good are less than the benefits gained by society (i.e., the 
social value) in a competitive market, an insufficient amount of biodiversity is provided from 
the society’s point of view. The outcome is not socially optimal. Besides, the protection of 
biodiversity is non-exclusive and non-rival and suffers from free-riding. This also contributes 
to the market failure and the amount of biodiversity is not sufficient (see chapter 4.1.3). 
The market for biodiversity also fails due to policy and institutional failures that describe a 
situation where appropriate policies and institutions are lacking. The market for biodiversity 
only functions well if policies and institution provide incentive structures to the agents and 
their transactions (North 1990, 3f). 
By allocating sovereignty rights to provider countries and requiring a fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing, ABS establishes a market for biodiversity (OECD 2003b, 48). The theory 
suggests that ABS is a promising concept to stop the decline of biodiversity. Following the 
Coase Theorem, under certain assumptions the bilateral trade of genetic resources is a 
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bargaining solution that internalizes externalities (Sedjo 1992, 208f; Lerch 1998, 296ff; 
Boisvert / Caron 2002, 152). Theoretically, it can lead to a perfect solution because the 
internalization generates social welfare benefits and biodiversity conservation is realized as a 
joint product. 
However, it seems that the theory is not working in practice. The ABS concept has been 
developed in 1992, and since then its contribution to stop the decline of biodiversity is very 
limited. Many providers and users complain about the approach. Providers criticize that they 
have not received benefits, but that their material is used without approval. Users argue that 
access and use have been impeded. These statements are in contrary to the objectives of 
the CBD. We still observe a market failure. 
Nevertheless, the problems that appear in the bilateral negotiations and hamper the trade of 
genetic resources are not very surprising – even before analyzing the empirical cases. 
Taking a closer look at the theory gives us a hint why certain problems occur and how they 
can be addressed. The theory offers different explaining models. Market failure can be 
caused by externalities, transaction costs and information asymmetries, and imperfect 
competition due to the market form. 
Coase (1960) already formulated certain assumptions under which his model works. He 
already indicated that transaction costs and other factors exist, which make the bilateral 
bargaining system ineffective and prevent optimal solutions. Therefore, he excluded them or 
stressed the need of their existence. He assumes that property rights are well defined and 
the costs of transacting are zero, which implies that all agents in the market are perfectly 
informed. 
These assumptions are not valid for the case of ABS. Even under ABS the market for genetic 
resources is not a perfectly competitive market (Gehl Sampath 2005, 65). Certain 
imperfections can be identified that distort the trading activities or cause a market failure. 
This statement seems quite surprising, since the ABS concept was introduced to remove the 
existing market failure. Some of the problems arise through the ABS concept itself, but some 
are reasoned in the predetermined conditions and the environment, in which the ABS 
concept is applied.  
Property rights theory 
Property rights play an important role because ABS creates a market to trade genetic 
resources for compensation. This exchange also involves a transfer of property rights as 
already described by Coase. The question of the assignment, the distribution and the 
strength of property rights is the most relevant. According to the theory, private property 
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rights contribute to an efficient allocation of resources and increase social welfare (Alchian 
2007; Richter / Furubotn 1996, 81). As long as externalities still exist, because property rights 
are not well defined, the market of genetic resources will fail. 
The OECD report (2003a, 27f) stresses the importance of property rights and the way 
national governments translate the principle of national sovereignty into some other property 
right form. It proposes the forms public property or public interests; the latter form gives room 
for private property rights. Swanson and Goeschl (2000, 77) analyze the case of crop genetic 
resources and come to the conclusion to place property rights for efficiency purposes at 
those levels, being more effective at maintaining and investing in the concerned asset. 
Looking at the value chain it is obvious that at all stages of the production process, potential 
right holders are present. The levels can be providers – private or communal landowners on 
the local level and/or governments – and users in form of companies and 
researchers/research institutions, depending on the processing level of the material. 
Swanson and Goeschl use the UPOV Convention as an example to show that the IPRs 
systems do not have a positive impact on the supply of genetic resources to the plant 
industry. They have created incentives to invest in research and development in the plant-
breeding sector (i.e., at the end of the value chain), but they have not generated investments 
in local farmers conserving local landraces and therefore maintaining crop diversity. The 
reasons are that the local farmers so far have not received benefits from the use of their 
varieties. Hart and Moore (1990) call it a property rights failure when the best investor in an 
asset is not the property right holder. 
The case studies underline that in the ABS concept property rights are not necessarily well 
defined. The CBD allocates property rights to the states, but not to the landowner or resource 
holder. It depends on the state how property rights are distributed within the country and the 
state does not necessarily give the resource holders a share of the benefits. Therefore, the 
adequate response to this critical factor is the assignment of property rights. 
Contract theory and transaction costs 
At the heart of the exchange of genetic resources and benefits are contracts because 
contracts reallocate rights between contracting parties (Barzel 1997, 33). Contracts 
document the exchange of relative property rights between persons. Relative property rights 
are property rights that are directed to a certain person, the contract partner. Absolute 
property rights are rights over property that everybody has to respect (Richter / Furubotn 
1996, 79ff). 
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The incentive structure of contracts is very important for the compliance of the contract. The 
creation of such an incentive structure can be difficult if both transactions do not take place at 
the same time. Such a time lag is very relevant for ABS, since the acquisition of genetic 
resources and the generating of benefits do not coincide. Besides, transaction costs are 
significantly relevant for contracts. The main problems that can arise out of the existence of 
transaction costs and the time lag between the conclusion of the contract and the 
accomplishment are i) asymmetric information and ii) transaction-specific investments related 
to the frequency and the uncertainty of the transactions (Richter / Furubotn 1996, 92).  
Williamson (1985, 52) identifies asset specificity, the frequency, and uncertainty as important 
characteristics of transactions, when he says, „The principal dimensions with respect to 
which transactions differ are asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. The first is the 
most important […] but the other two play significant roles.“. An asset is specific if it is worth 
much more within a certain transaction than outside it. Parties cannot easily switch to 
another partner after some investments have been made. Williamson (1983, 526) 
differentiates four types of specific investments: site specificity (i.e., physical proximity), 
physical specificity (e.g., investments in machines), human asset specificity (e.g., learning by 
doing), and dedicated assets due to expectations of high demand. Frequency has also an 
impact on transaction cost. If the transactions are frequent, the parties will invest in some 
governance structure that decreases transaction costs and makes these transactions 
efficient (Gehl Sampath 2005, 69). However, the trade of genetic resources is not 
characterized by asset specificity. Wild and so far undiscovered genetic resources that are 
collected for screening purposes usually have no specificity. A provider country can offer 
their resources to any company interested in the use and companies can approach any 
provider country. Site specificity can be relevant in cases where a pharmaceutical company 
asks for a specific plant in a specific country or region. Long-term relationships between 
companies and countries (e.g., in the case of Costa Rica) can be characterized by human 
specificity. However, looking at the case studies asset specificity does not prove to be of 
such an importance to justify a closer investigation. Therefore, this factor is not selected as a 
critical factor. 
Transaction costs can be i) search and information costs, ii) bargaining and decision costs, 
and iii) monitoring, renegotiation and enforcement costs. Search and information costs 
comprise the costs that arise when looking for a contractual partner. Contractual partners 
usually face bargaining and decision costs when negotiating. This process takes and 
requires consultations. Monitoring, renegotiation and enforcement costs result from the need 
to monitor the fulfillment of the contract, to renegotiate the conditions and to enforce the 
contract (Richter / Furubotn 1996, 52). 
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In the case of ABS, the three categories of costs appear in the form of uncertainty and 
asymmetric information, which are intensified by opportunistic behavior. Uncertainty arises 
because the contractual partners cannot predict the future. They have to make a decision 
without knowing the consequence of their decision. If contracts can adapt to new or 
unexpected situations, the allocation result will improve. Uncertainty is closely related to 
information. The level of information can be different among the contractual partners. It is 
very likely that one party knows more than the other according to a certain issue relevant for 
the contract. Opportunistic behavior can occur before and after a contract has been 
concluded. Since the parties have an incentive to behave opportunistically after the contracts 
have been concluded, the theory suggests ex ante measures to ensure the efficiency of the 
allocation, as for example, screening or signaling. Through these mechanisms the 
uninformed party can obtain additional information (Richter / Furubotn 1996, 92). Screening 
allows the uninformed party to induce the other party to reveal their information, and 
signaling allows the informed party to signal their willingness to comply. Any measure that 
provides additional information to the uniformed party can address the asymmetrical 
information. 
Provider and users have search costs because before they can conclude a contract they 
have to look for appropriate partners they can trust. During the bargaining process, users 
and providers have asymmetric information. Providers have no information about the benefits 
users expect. Users lack information on the exclusiveness and on the quality of the material. 
Both users and providers have monitoring cost due to asymmetric information. Providers 
cannot observe the use of the material when it has left their territory and users cannot 
observe how the shared benefits are used and whether the provider countries invest it 
biodiversity conservation. 
The transaction costs in ABS are mainly caused by asymmetric information. Therefore, 
asymmetric information is derived as a critical factor. Additionally, some other sources of 
transaction costs have to be mentioned. Search cost can arise due to the difficulties of users 
to identify reliable and suitable providers. In the German user study users state that they 
have difficulties in finding appropriate partners due to lack of support and information. This 
means that their search costs are high. The bargaining and decision costs are also impacted 
by the institutional arrangements in the provider countries. In the German user study it is 
illustrated that some users find the administrative ABS procedures time-consuming, 
bureaucratic, and complex (Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 2005, 46). The case 
studies also provide some insights regarding these issues. The Philippine regulation has 
been very complicated and bureaucratic. Many Philippine stakeholders agree that this is the 
reason why ABS has not taken place so far and have recently improved the ABS regulations. 
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The problem of administrative complexity and the associated transaction costs appears in 
the case studies very relevant. Therefore, it was chosen as an independent critical factor and 
not united under the category “transaction costs” together with asymmetric information. 
Besides, not all three categories of transaction costs are equally relevant. 
The transaction costs are very important, but also the environment, in which transaction 
costs arise, is essential. According to Davis and North (1971), new institutional economics 
are divided into two parts: the institutional environment and the institutions of governance. 
Williamson (1991) argues that the institutional environment is a set of parameters (i.e., 
political, social, and legal) that establishes the basis for economic transactions (i.e., 
production, exchange and distribution). If they are changed, they will lead to shifts in the 
comparative costs of governance. In the case of ABS, good governance is such an 
institutional environment. Good governance comprises for example political stability, control 
of corruption, rule of law, and accountability (Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi 2006, 4). 
Therefore, good governance is chosen as another critical factor. 
Imperfect competition 
It is obvious that the market of genetic resources suffers from imperfect competition due to 
the market structure. A market that operates under conditions of perfect competition is 
characterized by three conditions: i) numerous participants (i.e., many buyers and sellers), 
ii) freedom of exit and entry, iii) perfect information, iv) homogenous products (Baumol / 
Blinder 1994, 222). The second and the fourth conditions are not relevant in the case of ABS. 
Everybody can enter and exit the market and at the stage of collection wild genetic resources 
are homogenous goods, since the quality and potential are unknown. The third condition 
fails, since both users (i.e., buyers) and provider (i.e., sellers) are not perfectly informed. This 
problem was already mentioned in the previous section. The first condition is also not met. If 
sellers and buyers do not equally participate, we can differentiate between four forms of 
market participation: a) monopoly, in which there is only one seller, b) oligopoly, in which 
there is a small number of sellers, c) monopsony, in which there is only one buyer, and d) 
oligopsony, in which there is a small number of buyers. 
In the case of ABS, we observe a small number of relevant buyers that acquire genetic 
resources for commercial purposes while the number of sellers is quite large. Mergers in the 
pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors have created large life science companies that 
dominate the market (Braga 1996, 360). According to the different described categories, the 
market for genetic resources is characterized by an oligopsonistic competition. The users in 
the market have a strong bargaining position and power. Especially for the negotiating 
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process of ABS contracts, the market structure is relevant. Measures that strengthen the 
position of the weak party are an adequate response. Due to its importance, the market 
structure was chosen as a critical factor. 
In the following subchapters, the six critical factors are separately analyzed. The results from 
the case studies are integrated in the analysis; they have deepened and broadened it. 
5.1.2 Property and intellectual property rights 
The strength and the distribution of property rights is the most critical factor of ABS 
effectiveness, since property rights impact all three elements of ABS effectiveness: 
conservation, access, and benefit-sharing. Property rights enable property owners to market 
their resources. Only if the agents, being responsible for conserving biodiversity, have 
adequate property rights over the biological resources they can grant access, and they are in 
the position to receive benefits that in the next step establish incentives for biodiversity 
conservation.  
According to genetic vocabulary, biodiversity can be divided into two parts: the phenotype 
that is the tangible biological material and the genotype that is the genetic and biochemical 
information of the resource. The assignment of property rights over these two forms of 
biological material varies. Tangible resources (e.g., plants) in general are subject to private 
property rights through landowner rights or to communal property rights through state or 
community property rights. Intangible resources such as products of research and 
development can be protected by IPRs, e.g., patents or plant breeder rights (Sedjo 2000, 
111). 
Property rights are transferable. In most cases, companies or research institutions that sign 
ABS contracts with provider countries receive property rights for the purchased, tangible 
material in exchange for access and sample fees and up-front payments. These property 
rights are usually restricted by obligations regarding the utilization. In case of successful 
development, research and commercialization, the inventor can receive IPRs over the 
intangible material. The contribution of provider countries to the invention is rewarded by 
royalties and milestone payments (milestone payments are made if the sample has evolved 
in the research and development process to a more valuable substance), or other non-
monetary transfers, affecting national research and development, local economic 
development, and capacity-building (cf. chapter 4.2.1.3 and Columbia University 1999, 75). A 
necessary condition for the effectiveness of the ABS concept is that the benefits, either 
monetary or non-monetary, can compensate the costs related to the conservation activities 
and set an incentive for conservation. 
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However, the absence of clear property rights on the level of resource managers can hinder 
the realization of profits and consequently, biodiversity protection, because there are no 
incentives for conservation. The CBD does not put weight on property rights on this level. 
Apart from the confirmation of the state’s sovereignty over its biological resources and the 
emphasis on the existence of IPRs, no other property right allocation is demanded by the 
CBD. The definition and assignment is in the responsibility of the national governments. 
Whether they transfer their authority and rights to other stakeholders depends on the national 
legislation. 
Looking at economic theory, Coase opened the discussion for the new discipline “economics 
of transaction costs” and questioned the impact of the initial allocation of property rights. 
Different forms of property rights systems over biological resources exist. The status of these 
rights and changes in these rights may generate changes in the value of the property (OECD 
2003a, 28). In the case of state property, in first place the government manages the country’s 
biodiversity and is responsible for its provision. The state receives the benefits if it can 
enforce its property rights towards users of biodiversity. Sharing benefits with individuals or 
communities who contributed to the existence of biodiversity in the past or even in the 
present may be important in terms of equity and fairness (Bonn Guidelines, 2001). It is not 
important from an incentive point of view though (and therefore the equity dimension is not 
considered in this analysis). However, if the local level is in charge of the resource 
management and the supply, its participation in the benefits arising out of the use of genetic 
resources is indispensable. The CBD demands only the PIC of the local stakeholders. This 
consent is a rather weak form of participation and can be organized without any form of 
benefit-sharing with the local agents. Then without a strong participation in the benefits, the 
agents will estimate the value of wild genetic resources to be very low, even if the private use 
value of genetic resources is high to the companies in the users sectors. If the local level 
participates not only through PIC but also in benefit-sharing the incentives to conserve and 
sustainably use genetic resources are established. 
The relationship between property rights and values of biodiversity depends on the stage of 
process of genetic resources in the production chain and plays an important role for the 
effectiveness of the ABS concept (cf. Figure 14).  
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Figure 14: The distribution of property rights and values among stakeholders 
By comparing property rights of the different stakeholders (i.e., individuals, local 
communities, government, intermediary, companies, and researchers) allocated by 
international regulation, it can be concluded that level by level, the strength of property rights 
of the concerned party increases as well as the economic market value. By granting IPRs 
over developed, marketable products, companies and research institutions receive strong 
property rights for high valued goods. Governments have also strong rights over their 
biological resources that are confirmed by the state’s sovereignty principle of the CBD. This 
principle considers that on a global level provider countries’ governments are in a better 
position to negotiate with users and yield greater benefits in ABS contracts than local 
landowners. However, it is necessary that the state transfers these benefits to the local level 
(Barrett / Lybbert 2000, 296). As already mentioned, the Convention does not allocate rights 
to the local level. If national governments do not regulate the property rights situation in their 
countries at all, the open access status of genetic resources and the on-going degradation 
will remain. Resource holders will have an incentive to conserve nature only if national 
legislation fills this gap left open by the CBD. Thus, strong IPRs as patents and plant breeder 
rights on the user level for the marketable product will not be sufficient for biodiversity 
conservation. Conservation incentives in the form of rights or benefits have to be instituted 
for the economic agents who decide on the use of the biological resources. If these are local 
agents, national legislation has to ensure that they benefit from any ABS contract. 
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5.1.3 Information asymmetries 
Besides property rights, information asymmetries, in form of pre-contractual and post-
contractual problems, are the most important critical factor that impact all three elements of 
effectiveness. Already in the access phase information asymmetries can be identified as a 
major cause of unsuccessful negotiations, resulting in insufficient contracts under which a 
low flow of benefits can be expected or the breakdown of the talks. If access or benefit-
sharing does not take place no incentives for conservation are established by the ABS 
concept. 
The information asymmetries can be identified as pre- and post-contractual principal agent 
problems. Under the presence of two-dimensional asymmetric information each bargaining 
partner has private information on his activities (OECD 2003a, 16). This is the case in 
bilateral ABS contracts between users and providers of genetic resources. If an intermediary 
is involved, the transaction is more complex. In this case, user and provider do not negotiate 
directly. Property rights, genetic resources and information, but also information deficiencies 
are channeled through the intermediaries. The existence of intermediaries even intensifies 
the problem of asymmetric information. 
The problem of asymmetric information is also described by the OECD (2003a, 16) and Gehl 
Sampath (2005, 75f). The OECD observes that users have private information on their 
potential interest, the costs of research and development, and the availability of alternatives. 
Providers have private information on reliability, quality, and diversity. These aspects are 
considered in the following analysis, but they are aggregated and the subsequent analysis is 
much deeper. It is looked at how these asymmetries arise and what the consequences are. 
Gehl Sampath derives three forms of transaction costs that arise of asymmetric information: 
search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and monitoring and 
enforcement costs. She regards the problem of uncertainty about product quality as search 
and information costs in the market for genetic resources that is less important for 
pharmaceutical drugs, but more important for botanical medicines. Bargaining and decision 
cost arise from the uncertainties in the drug research and development process, the legal 
uncertainties and the renegotiations. Monitoring and enforcement costs are due to the two-
sided principal agent relationships between a company and the provider country as well as 
between government and local communities in the provider country (Gehl Sampath 2005, 
76ff). The suggested classification has not been applied in this study because not all the 
criteria are identically applied. For example, legal uncertainty (as one component of good 
governance) is here considered as the transaction costs environment and not as an element 
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of transaction costs, and the lack of knowledge regarding the quality is here not identified as 
search costs, but as costs that arise during the bargaining process. 
5.1.3.1 Pre-contractual information deficiencies 
Pre-contractual problems occur because providers have information deficiencies that affect 
the planned exchange of genetic resources for benefits before a contract has been 
concluded. Providers lack information on the potential benefits of the provided genetic 
resources. Users have an incentive to hide their information regarding the benefits they 
expect to receive by the genetic resources. The benefits of commercialization and not the 
costs of conservation are the important factor in the negotiations. Providers’ costs consist of 
opportunity costs and costs for protection measures. They are important for any conservation 
concept, since resource holders are usually compensated for providing environmental 
services based on the costs. However, the CBD’s ABS concept is not based on the costs 
that arise through the conservation of biodiversity, but on the benefits arising out of the 
commercialization. This is reasoned in the CBD’s goal not only to conserve biodiversity but 
also to reach justice and to equally share the benefits. When the CBD was adopted, the 
expectation on the monetary profits arising from the commercial use of biodiversity was high. 
Genetic resources were even called “green gold”. Therefore, ABS negotiations focus on the 
benefits and how they are shared (Barrett / Lybbert 2000, 294). 
If a potential user supposes or even knows that the commercialization of the genetic 
resources realizes high benefits, she/he will have an incentive to hide the willingness to pay 
in order to pay a smaller compensation to resource providers and reap a profit. On the other 
hand, providers suspect high benefits through the research and development of genetic 
resources. In the end, the expectations regarding the ABS contract diverge in such a way 
that the negotiations fail. In this case, access, conservation and benefit-sharing are 
unsuccessful. 
5.1.3.2 Post-contractual information deficiencies15 
Post-contractual problems arise in form of two-dimensional moral hazards on the provider 
and the user side. Firstly, information deficiencies and missing control mechanisms on part of 
                                               
15
 The problem of information deficiencies on the quality has been analyzed in more detail in Richerzhagen, C. 
(2005): Certificates of origin: economic impacts and implications, UNU-IAS Working paper and Richerzhagen, 
C. (2007): Certificates of origin: economic impacts and implications, in: U. Feit / F. Wolff (eds.), European 
regional meeting on an internationally recognized certificate of origin / source / legal provenance, report of an 
international workshop hosted by the German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation, Isle of Vilm, Germany, 
24-29 October 2006, 46-48. 
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the provider can result in over-regulation in the form of very restricted access. This over-
regulation increases users’ transaction costs and prevents successful negotiations on ABS. If 
resources are not accessed and benefits are not shared, no incentives for conservation are 
established. 
Providers experience moral hazard regarding the use of the collected material. For provider 
countries it is important to ensure that in return for access to biological material, companies 
fulfill their obligations arising out of the bilateral agreements regarding the acquisition of 
material, liability and payments (Reid et al. 1993, 38). The capacity of national regulations to 
monitor the use of the provided material is very limited though. The final utilization of genetic 
resources, the advanced research and development, as well as the marketing of the 
products take place outside of the provider country. The providers are unable to observe the 
research and developments activities of users as soon as they have left the country with the 
collected samples of genetic resources even if though contracts have been concluded. The 
bioprospecting activities defy any control of the country of origin due to the prohibitive 
transaction costs. There exist numerous possibilities to cross borders and to exit a country, 
especially in countries, as for example, the Philippines with more than 7,000 islands. National 
governments are not even able to observe all on-going contractual bioprospecting activities 
within their territories. It becomes even more difficult if the material has been transferred to 
another country. Acquired resources may be passed on to another company without the 
provider’s consent or the user may develop products and processes without declaring it to 
the provider country. In this case potential benefits get lost. Besides, IPRs, as for example, 
patents and plant breeder rights are generally not issued in the provider countries but in 
industrialized countries having the biggest sales markets. These markets cannot be 
observed by providers. 
Bad experiences or worries of the provider countries can lead to a very strict and 
complicated over-regulation, making access almost impossible and prompt foreign interested 
parties to move their investigations to another country with a bioprospecting-friendly climate. 
The unapproved acquisition of genetic resources bioprospecting has build up a bad image of 
users and bioprospecting, resulting in a low acceptance within the provider countries or non-
governmental organizations in industrialized countries. “Biopiracy” is the expression often 
used to describe the illegal obtaining of biological material. In many countries environmental 
and indigenous groups object to the implementation of the ABS concept, because they feel 
that PIC and a fair and equitable benefit-sharing is not ensured by the present legal and 
policy environment (A Laird / ten Kate 2002, 243). It is mainly criticized that the CBD 
promotes IPRs as basic elements of benefit-sharing, while indigenous rights and traditional 
knowledge, often inputs for biotechnological innovations, are not protected. They propose the 
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introduction of an additional property rights system (sui generis rights system), for example, 
intellectual community rights, which will give communities the opportunity to protect their 
resources and knowledge.  
Not only commercial users suffer from biopiracy and associations that come with it. Today, 
the definition of the term biopiracy is very broad and describes almost any commercial 
activity associated with genetic resources. Consequently, researchers and companies 
consider it as a serious impediment of research. They fear to be entitled as biopirates and 
loose image (Wynberg / A Laird 2005, 31). 
A strict legislation, implemented by provider countries, negatively affects the research in the 
own country at local universities and research institutions (Richerzhagen / Virchow 2007, 76). 
Some countries do not differentiate between academic and commercial research and interest 
and apply the same standards for both purposes. This also leads to very restrictive 
regulations, which may cause essential research grind to a halt (Dávalos et al. 2003, 1520). 
Figure 15: Two-dimensional information deficiencies 
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that can concern users is the iii) misallocation of the received benefits. This factor is only 
relevant if users depend on a long-term, continuous provision of material. 
1. Users lack information on the quality of the provided genetic resources. Mullholland and 
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contracts that provide incentives for the host countries to deliver an amount of 
bioprospecting output that maximizes the company’s output. Their proposal is discussed 
in chapter 5.2.1.5. Surprisingly, from the empirical side this case of asymmetric 
information is less relevant so far. In all the interviews and in the conducted user study 
(Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 2005) the argument that companies feel not 
sufficiently informed about the material only slightly appeared. They complained more 
about their lack of knowledge regarding the regulations and the weak institutional 
infrastructure. However, companies obtain material from intermediaries but these 
second-level providers are often not based in the host countries. They are brokers in the 
international markets. Therefore, it seems to be appropriate to take a closer look at the 
problem, whereas Mullholland and Wilman (2003) assume the problem as given and 
concentrate more on the solution (i.e., contract design). At this point the study goes more 
into detail. 
The market for genetic resources suffers from under-consumption due to adverse 
selection. Users can receive a variety of benefits by the use of genetic resources, and the 
composition of benefits is differently evaluated by users. Valuation depends on the 
specific characteristics that determine the quality. Users are only willing to pay for these 
benefits if they can be sure that they exist. Therefore, information on these 
characteristics provided to the user is also a criterion for quality. Passport data on genetic 
resources, as for instance, indication of the origin, the location where it was collected, 
description of specific biological traits, but also the legal guaranty that PIC was obtained, 
can be such criteria for quality. 
As long as consumers cannot differentiate quality levels of genetic resources, they are 
not willing to pay more for “better” genetic resources. Users who obtain genetic material 
through brokers have to trust these intermediaries. A company or a research institute 
cannot control whether PIC has been appropriately obtained and whether an ABS 
agreement has been concluded. Other characteristics as the origin and known traits are 
also concealed. If the material is directly obtained from the country of origin and not 
collected by the users themselves, they have to trust the information given by providers. 
For example, they have to trust that PIC of a local community was obtained and the 
geographical indication is correct. 
A user who cannot identify the quality of the genetic resources puts less value on the 
material. Consequently, the demand of an uninformed user and the purchased quantity is 
less than the demand of an informed user. In Figure 16 the demand curve of the 
uninformed user (Duninformed) is below the demand curve of an informed user (Dinformed) and 
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the traded quantity is lower (Quniformed) because of the existence of information 
deficiencies. 
Figure 16: Informed and uninformed users in the market of genetic resources 
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Source: adapted from Borooah 2003 
In this situation under-consumption occurs and consumer and producer rents decrease. 
Consumer rent measures the difference between the amount users are willing to pay and 
the amount they actually pay. Producer rent measures the difference between the 
amount providers are willing to accept and the amount they receive. Both rents would be 
higher if the user got the additional information on the good. If users knew about the 
quality they could differentiate between the genetic resources of high and low quality. 
Consequently, more resources would be demanded. 
In economic theory, goods can be classified by the level of lack of information of a 
consumer regarding the product’s quality and the level of information needed to identify 
the quality (Nelson 1970). The quality has to be identified through the product. A good 
has search attributes if it is a product with features easily observable before purchase. It 
has low pre-costs of detection and thus allows users, for example, to differentiate the 
specimen (i.e., plant, animal, insect, etc.) by simple inspection. If the price for the 
inspection exceeds the marginal benefit of the additional information users reject the 
specimen. In the case of experience attributes, user can only detect certain product 
qualities after buying and using the product. Goods with experience attributes have high 
pre-costs and low post-cost of detection because the relevant information can only be 
obtained as a by-product of use after buying it (Nelson 1970). However, this information 
is the basis for decisions regarding repeated purchases. Credence attributes are 
5 The effectiveness of ABS: critical factors and addressing measures 123 
attributes that consumers cannot evaluate even after purchasing the product. They have 
high pre-costs and high post-costs of quality detection. The consumer has to rely on 
third-party judgments that are able to detect the product or trust the provider regarding 
the goods’ quality (Darby / Karni 1973). The last category are potemkin attributes that 
describe process-orientated qualities, which are hidden for third parties as well as for 
customers at the end product level. It is impossible to detect them on the product level, 
even with the involvement of a third party (Tietzel / Weber 1991; Spiller 1996). 
Figure 17: Information asymmetry in markets 
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Source: Jahn / Schramm / Spiller 2004 
Genetic resources have mainly experience attributes regarding their quality in terms of 
commercial potential. The material has to undergo some research before the user is 
finally able to evaluate its potential and decide whether the product will be marketed. 
Therefore, material that has already been tested and processed by the provider has more 
value to the user than the material that is obtained without any prior scientific analyses. It 
has been observed that in provider countries, as for example, Costa Rica, which does not 
provide raw material but processed samples, the demand for genetic resources is much 
higher (Richerzhagen / Holm-Mueller 2005, 453ff). However, the provision of additional 
information is aligned with additional costs for a provider. For example, collections in 
provider countries have to be undertaken more systematically. Especially advanced 
scientific knowledge and skills in documentation, cataloguing and databasing are needed 
in order to provide such information. 
But not all quality characteristics can be detected after utilization. In many cases it is not 
possible to identify the origin of the material. In this case, the origin is a potemkin 
attribute. The user can only trust the provider or intermediary that the material was 
obtained as it is indicated. If the detection is possible, it is often aligned with high costs 
and the involvement of a third party. For example, microbial collections are frequently 
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asked to assist users in identifying the origin of the used material. In this case, origin is a 
credence attribute. 
The proof that PIC has been obtained is a potemkin attribute, which can not be revealed 
even with the support of a third party. No analysis of the genetic material can identify 
whether PIC has been obtained. Users have to trust the intermediary or provider if they 
were not involved in the PIC and ABS process. 
2. Users have information deficiencies related to exclusive rights. In general, the user wants 
the legal and secured access to genetic resources but also the exclusiveness of this 
access. By signing an ABS agreement users receive exclusive rights for a special region 
and a certain period of time. The user, however, has only limited information and control 
whether the provider country offers the same samples of genetic resources to other 
competing users. Because of the lack of information or security, users will react with a 
country substitution if other countries offer the same resources (Richerzhagen / Virchow 
2007, 76). 
3. Users lack information on the allocation of the shared benefits. According to the 
underlying idea of the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines (Bonn Guidelines 2001), the 
benefits arising out of bilateral agreements should be allocated for biodiversity 
conservation measures in the provider country. Often national short-term interests in 
biodiversity-rich countries differ from the objective of a long-term conservation and 
sustainable utilization of genetic resources. Due to these short-term interests, the 
benefits (in terms of royalties or up-front payments) derived from the access to and the 
utilization of genetic resources may not be reinvested in the conservation of biodiversity 
but allocated to other national activities. Hence, the long-term security of genetic 
resources may be at risk. In this case, a problem of asymmetric information exists as 
well. It is assumed that benefit-sharing is understood – at least partially – as incentive for 
further conservation and secured utilization of the genetic resources and it is assumed 
that users of genetic resources are interested in the appropriate use of the benefits, 
guaranteeing the conservation and further use of genetic resources. This does not apply 
to all users. Some may only be interested in single samples and not the continuous 
supply of diverse material. These users are not concerned by this problem. However, 
other users, having an interest in the conservation of biodiversity, are unable to control 
the allocation of the benefits at national level in the provider country. It seems that the 
crucial point of any bilateral ABS agreement is the risk that the provider country 
misallocates the received benefits, and threatens hereby the conservation and 
sustainable utilization of genetic resources. The practical conservation efforts or the 
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concrete threat to biodiversity are taking place at local level where the influence and 
sometimes the interest of national decision-makers is restricted or low. Hence, states are 
not always in control of maintaining and providing genetic resources, especially if 
adequate laws and institutions for genetic resources management are not designed and 
implemented. In this case the user will suffer in the specific situation under a moral 
hazard case. 
5.1.4 Time lags 
Time lags strongly impact the effectiveness elements of conservation and benefit-sharing. 
Time lags between the collection and provision of promising samples and the development of 
a marketable product make a fair and equitable benefit-sharing and the setting of incentives 
for conservation very difficult (Barrett / Lybbert 2000, 296f; Dutfield 1999, 2). The variation 
between industry sectors in the cost and the time it takes to develop a marketable product 
from a natural sample as well as the probability for a successful product is enormous. In the 
pharmaceutical sector, 10 to 15 years of research and development are necessary to 
discover and develop a drug. The costs of this process vary but range between US$ 231 
million and US$ 500 million. The probabilities of success vary from one in 5,000 to one in 
10,000. In the botanical medicine sector, the process can be less than two years and the 
cost can be less than US$ 1 million. However, this sector is still regarded as a niche sector. 
In the agricultural sector, it can take from eight to 15 years to develop a new variety and the 
cost amount to US$ 1-2.5 million for a traditional variety and US$ 35 to 75 million for 
transgenic characteristics. A new chemical pesticide can take from eight to 14 years to 
develop and cost US$ 40 to 100 million, whereas a biocontrol agent can be developed within 
two and five years and cost US$ 1 to 5 million (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 10). 
Benefit-sharing is the incentive for conservation and strongly depends on the successful 
development of products and the accumulation of profits. Experiences show that users of 
genetic resources are not willing to pay sufficient compensation as long as no product is 
developed and distributed in the market. However, income substitutions, which change 
economic activities and refrain from biodiversity damaging actions, have to be paid directly to 
be effective and not 15 years later. Otherwise, benefit-sharing will fail in instituting an 
incentive to conserve biodiversity. Therefore, time lags are highly critical for ABS. 
5.1.5 Good governance in provider countries 
Good governance in the provider country plays an important role for the transaction costs 
that arise in the access phase of ABS. This is also a result of the German user survey, which 
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asked potential users about the main problems regarding the acquisition of genetic resources 
(Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 2005, 46).  
Governance in general is a concept that has been developed and applied by two disciplines: 
political and social sciences as well as economics. Whereas political and social sciences 
concentrates on the changed forms of interaction and coordination mechanisms between the 
state and society, economics examines the institutional control of occurrences in the market 
and the social embedding of economic activities (Brunnengraeber et al. 2006, 8). The latter is 
the approach that is chosen in this study. As already mentioned, in economics the debate on 
governance has its roots in the new institutional economics. It is interpreted as the 
institutional environment of transactions and can also be applied to ABS. 
Good governance is a strong factor of the environment of economic ABS transactions. The 
term good governance is a narrower concept than governance in general and found mainly in 
development policy. It refers to specific conditions to which international financial and 
development institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or 
national ministries tie their development co-operation. The World Bank Governance 
Indicators cover 213 countries and territories and measure six dimensions of governance 
since 1996 until end-2005: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.16 
They also form the environment where the negotiations and the bioprospecting take place. 
The detailed analysis of these indicators is beyond the scope of this study. However, the 
World Bank numbers are taken as a reference to indicate where the case study countries 
stand and to analyze their institutional environment. 
The case study in Ethiopia shows that a lack of such good governance and political stability 
has even prevented the development of an ABS regime for a long time. Many provider 
countries are developing countries with instable political systems. The general political 
situation influences the countries’ status as providers. If it is possible, users access the 
countries and their resources that signal reliability and provide political security. Besides, 
                                               
16
 Voice and accountability is the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media; political stability and 
absence of violence are perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence and terrorism; government effectiveness describes 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies; regulatory quality is the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development; rule of law is the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; control of corruption, the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” 
of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi 2006, 4). 
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many countries still have not implemented the CBD and its ABS obligations. They cannot 
provide any legal security to users regarding the utilization of genetic resources. Regulations 
and procedures are not clear or implemented. Focal points that can be approached by users 
are not established and in many cases legal access is associated with high transaction costs. 
Under such conditions users may obtain unapproved material or even stop any collecting 
and research activity in this country. It is also possible that if the company distrusts the legal 
security in a country, it will react with country substitution and move to a country with a 
transparent regulation or without any access legislation (Richerzhagen / Virchow 2007, 76). 
Countries without any ABS legislation, which harbor similar resources as neighboring 
countries that have implemented ABS regulations and charge access, provide interesting 
legal loopholes. It is a legal way for users to circumvent the ABS obligations of the CBD. If 
genetic resources are accessed in these countries, no conservation incentives will be 
established. 
A country with no ABS regulation has negative impacts on the access demand but the 
developing process of regulations can also be difficult for users. Davalos et al. (2003, 1519) 
consider the period during which a country develops a ABS legislation or interpreting 
international agreements as the hardest and most insecure for users that want to obtain 
access. 
Insecurity regarding national property rights might also be a problem. Even if an ABS regime 
is implemented, the absence of or the uncertainty about ownership in a provider country 
creates difficulties in obtaining PIC, in negotiating on ABS and in concluding contracts and 
raises the transaction costs of users. Any ABS regime is embedded in the national political 
and legal system of the respective country. They are main factors that influence the 
implementation and efficiency of ABS regimes and therefore the bioprospecting climate. 
5.1.6 Administrative complexity 
Administrative complexity is another form of governance: the governance that describes the 
reduction of bureaucratic procedures in the administrations and the adjustment of these 
procedures to the needs of the “customers” (Brunnengraeber et al. 2006, 3). Administrative 
capacity is highly linked with institutional capability and transaction costs. 
Institutional capability is a major condition for an effective ABS regime and can be a weak 
point especially in developing countries. The case study in the Philippines shows that 
administrative complexity has a major impact on the access process and the users’ 
transaction costs. Competent, multifunctional institutions are required to design and allocate 
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rights, to manage conservation areas, to coordinate activities, to negotiate ABS contracts, to 
control compliance and sanction misappropriation regarding the use of genetic resources. In 
many developing countries such institutions do not exist. Adequate funding is needed for 
their establishment and maintenance. For many countries the establishment of an ABS 
regime is a challenge and aligned with high costs and transaction costs arising, for instance, 
from the additional need for consultation, work, employing extra staff, and creating of 
institutions (Liebig et al. 2002, 72). The implementation of the CBD, which affects many 
different areas, requires legal and technical capacity. The concern of provider countries of 
not being able to cope with the complex ABS issue and becoming exploited can also result in 
an over-regulation of ABS (Richerzhagen / Virchow 2007, 76). Developing countries develop 
and implement very strict laws whose scope is often beyond the actual needs. Many 
companies regard ABS legislations in some countries as unclear, bureaucratic, time 
consuming and expensive to comply with and intend to relocate their research activities (ten 
Kate / A Laird 1999, 7). On the policy level, this problem has already been addressed. For 
example, the Bonn Guidelines (2001) were adopted by the members of the CBD as an 
instrument to guide both providers and user through the ABS process. They stress the 
importance of National Focal Points to inform applicants about the specific ABS procedures 
(Bonn Guidelines, 2001, IIA/13). 
5.1.7 Market structure 
The market structure also affects the access phase. It affects especially the negotiations, 
since bargaining power is not equally distributed between users and providers. In addition, 
the benefit-sharing is concerned. Benefit-sharing is only fair and equitable if equal partners 
negotiate. 
The bioprospecting market is characterized by a diverse structure. The market is dominated 
by a small number of large buyers and can thus be described as an oligopsonistic 
competition. In the past years, mergers between agro-chemical, agro-seed, and 
pharmaceutical firms have created large, global life science companies and strengthened 
their position in the market (Braga 1996, 360). Some examples are listed in the Table 12. 
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Table 12: Mergers in the pharmaceutical sector 
Rank Company 2002 prescription sales 
(US$ billion) 
Merged entities (sample) 
1 Pfizer 41.2 Warner-Lambert, Pharmacia, 
Parke-Davis, Searle, Upjohn 
2 GlaxoSmithKline 28.9 Burroughs Wellcome, Smith, Kline, 
French, Beckman, Norcliff Thayer, 
Beecham, Sterling 
3 Merck 20.0 Merck Sharp & Dohme 
4 Johnson&Johnson 28.6 Roc, MacNeil, Janssen 
5 Astra Zeneca 8.1 Astar, IC1/Zeneca, Stuart 
6 Norvatis 16.6 Sandoz, Ciba-Geigy 
7 Aventis 14.3 Rhone-Poulenc, Hoechst, 
Connaught Labs, Merieux 
8 Bristol-Myers Squibb 14.3 Mead-Johnson, DuPont 
Pharmaceuticals 
9 Roche 12.5 Hoffman-LaRoche, Nicholas, 
Synex 
10 Wyeth 11.7 American Home Products, Ayerst, 
Lederle 
Source: Oligopoly Watch 2007 
Apart from these companies, a large number of small biotech firms exist in the market, but 
their influence seems to be limited. There is a growing tendency of large, established 
pharmaceutical, agricultural and other life science companies cooperating with smaller, start-
up biotechnology research companies. Through this arrangement, large companies receive 
the innovative research critical to the development of new products. They then use their 
financial and technological capacity to manufacture and market the products. This in turn 
allows biotechnology research companies to receive additional revenues for funding 
expensive research efforts (Hill 1999). Due to this relationship, large life science companies 
still dominate the market for genetic resources, but the flow of genetic resources passes 
through many stations. These developments increase the bargaining position of users and 
point to another category of problems: it is essential though perhaps difficult to keep track of 
the movement of genetic resources between users, otherwise the fair and equitable benefit-
sharing cannot be ensured. 
Due to evolutionary migration in many regions, genetic resources are very similar in 
neighboring countries and geographically widely spread. Companies can always threaten to 
move their research activities to another country. In addition, companies often have better 
negotiations skills and legal assistance supporting them in the ABS negotiations than 
provider countries. This results in an unbalanced bargaining process. 
The position of provider countries is often weakened by the argument that the importance of 
natural product research and development in traditional user sectors as pharmaceutics and 
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biotechnology recently declines. However, in other sectors including horticulture and 
botanical medicine research and development continue to exert significant demand for 
genetic resources (EC 2002, 34). 
The topical study on users of genetic resources in Germany by Holm-Mueller et al. (2005), 
shows that genetic resources are still of great importance today and will be in future as they 
have been in the past. The major part of respondent users does not consider activities in the 
field of genetic resources as the most important area of their company or institution. German 
companies and institutions indicate that it has become more difficult for German users to 
gain access to genetic resources since the CBD entered into force. Especially users based at 
ex-situ collections, universities and other research institutions, and users working in the 
horticultural sector belong to this group. However, the majority of the users report an 
increased or constant use of genetic resources in the last five years and since the CBD 
entered into force. According to the results of the study, genetic resources will continue to 
play an important role in the future. The majority of users answered that they are likely to 
expand their use in the future or will at least continue at a constant level. 
Wynberg and Laird (2005, 9f) come to a similar conclusion. In the 1990s the potential of 
natural products was overshadowed by other chemical approaches (e.g., combinatorial 
chemistry) and the introduction of high-throughput screening using synthetic libraries. 
Besides, advances in molecular biology, cellular biology and genomics as well as the 
declining emphasis among pharmaceutical companies on infectious disease therapy 
supported the turn down of natural product research. Now the trend is reversing due to new 
technologies and the absence of the promised success of the other approaches. 
The existence of ex-situ collections is also an important aspect of benefit-sharing (Mulholland 
/ Wilman 2003, 419). Many users acquire research material from gene banks and other 
collections and not through direct collecting activities in countries of origin. If material has 
been stored for a long time, it can often be very difficult to determine the country of origin and 
the appropriate recipient of shared benefits. Even though some material from ex-situ 
collections is only accessible through Material Transfer Agreements (MTA), which provide a 
basis for tracking the transfer of the material and establish terms for benefit-sharing, the 
majority of material can still be accessed without any commitments to share benefits due to 
the weak implementation of ABS regulations. Genetic material that was acquired before the 
entry into force of the CBD is excluded from ABS regulations. However, national 
governments can strive to introduce regulations that fill the gap. 
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5.2 Measures addressing the critical factors in provider and user 
countries 
After the determination and analysis of the critical factors and the assessment of their 
relation with ABS effectiveness (conservation, access and benefit-sharing), this study 
proceeds with the identification and analysis of measures that address the critical factors and 
that are potential solutions. Provider and user countries can establish measures and make 
use of certain instruments to address the critical factors within their territory or beyond it. 
According to the international discussions on provider and user measures, the analysis of 
measures also differentiates between these two categories. The responsibility for the 
implementation of the measures is in most cases with either the provider countries or the 
user countries. However, some of the measures require efforts by both, providers and users. 
In chapter 5.1 the critical factors have been identified. They are property rights, information 
asymmetries, time lags, good governance, administrative complexity, and the market 
structure. 
5.2.1 Provider countries 
Provider countries can initiate measures to address the problems disclosed by the critical 
factors. The assignment of property rights, the development of compensation schemes, 
which consider the time lags between the discovery of the material and the development of a 
product, capacity and institutional strengthening, screening of users through contracts, trust 
and reputation building, as well as the building of coalitions have the potential to alleviate 
some of the problems. The application of these instruments neither can be considered as 
“one problem/one instrument” solution nor are the discussed instruments exhaustive. 
However, the author considers these measures as the most feasible and effective 
instruments. It has to be taken into account that only a mixture of the instruments can be 
effective and support any ABS regime. The selection as well as the intensity of the measures 
should always depend on the specific shape of the critical factors and adapted to the specific 
situation in the respective country.  
5.2.1.1 Assigning property rights to resource holders 
Property rights have been characterized as the strongest critical factor. The possibility to 
apply for patents creates a strong (intellectual) property right at the end of the production 
chain and an effective instrument to ensure the accumulation of profits. The benefits arising 
out of the use of the genetic material should be shared with the providers to establish 
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incentives. However, in order to implement the ABS concept, resource holders have to be 
legally entitled to receive compensations for their conservation activities and for the stopping 
of destructive activities, e.g., deforestation. The CBD allocates sovereignty rights over 
genetic resources to the countries and leaves it to national governments to set the incentives 
through national property rights system. In order to fulfill the concept’s objective governments 
of provider countries have to assign property rights to land and resource holders that allow 
them to participate in benefit-sharing arrangements. As the theory suggests the respective 
government should participate in or monitor negotiations and the benefit-sharing process to 
ensure that ABS contributes to conservation. In the case the material is obtained on state 
property, the government should be involved in the negotiations and be the one who 
benefits. 
In case the national property rights system does not allocate property rights to the resource 
holders, a national trust fund is an appropriate instrument as suggested by Moran (2000, 
143). Such a trust fund should acknowledge the sovereign rights of the provider countries, 
but it should not undermine the independence of a trust fund. The proposal of a trust fund is 
elaborated in the next subchapter. 
Some countries have not established private ownership concepts regarding, for example, 
land or biological resources. If these countries do not intend to change the property system 
and biological resources remain in the public domain or are vested with the state, the 
national ABS regime has to ensure that incentives are still established. 
5.2.1.2 Compensation schemes and funds 
From an incentive point of view, the timeframe in which benefits are shared and 
compensations are paid is very important. Therefore, the time lags between the collection of 
samples and the development of a marketable product pose another critical factor and 
adequate compensation schemes or funds can address them. Research and development as 
well as product approval and patenting processes are very time-consuming. If benefit-sharing 
takes place 15 years after the collection, no immediate conservation incentives are 
established. Only if compensation is paid at the time when resources are managed and 
conserved, the desired effect will be reached. Adequate compensations mechanisms, in form 
of appropriate compensation schemes and funds, have to be developed and applied in ABS 
contracts because they help to overcome the factual time lags. A biodiversity tax has also 
been suggested as an instrument that can provide additional funds to overcome the financial 
gap. 
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In terms of monetary compensation, different forms of compensation exist. Mulholland and 
Wilman (2003) differentiate between three forms: an advanced payment (up-front payment), 
a price per sample (sample fee), and a royalty rate based on a successful outcome. In their 
paper, they come to the conclusion that royalty payments do not set adequate payoff to risk-
averse host countries in order to set incentives for the optimal provision of biodiversity and 
related information.  
In practice, all three forms are widely used and identified in the provider country case 
studies, but also non-monetary compensation forms play an important role there. Sample 
fees are based on market activities and only cover the supply costs, as for example, field 
collection, documentation, packaging, processing, and shipping. Usually these fees follow 
the fees that are asked for by collections. Up-front payments are an impediment to users 
because they are a risk investment. Users have to make a prior concession although they 
cannot be sure that the received sample will lead them to a marketable product or patent. 
Some up-front payments cover operational costs. Others involve a trade-off in lower royalty 
rates, but provide some up-front benefits for provider countries. They are the least prioritized 
form of payments among users. Milestone payments depend on the stages of the research 
and development process. For example, they will be due if the user identifies an active 
compound or applies for a patent based on the use of the collected material. Royalties are 
closely linked to the outcome. The percentage of royalties (in most cases related to the gross 
profit of the particular product) can be fixed in the initial ABS contract or be subject of 
negotiations, once the research and development process has progressed. The amount of 
royalties can be influenced by various factors, as for example, information provided with the 
samples, novelty or rarity of the species, and the relationship between final product and 
collected material (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 66).  
The diversity of non-monetary benefits is greater, but they require a greater co-operation 
between users and providers, which goes beyond the pure exchange of genetic resources 
and monetary compensation. From a development policy perspective, they are very useful, 
since they have great capacity-building potential. They include joint publications, training and 
joint research, and technology and knowledge transfer. Up-front payments and non-monetary 
benefits that are transferred shortly after the conclusion of an ABS contract can bridge the 
gap, which is caused by the time lags. Non-monetary benefits also provide benefits that can 
sufficiently compensate and establish conservation incentives. Providers have to consider 
their importance during the negotiations. On the other hand, milestone payments and 
royalties come too late in order to set an incentive for conservation. 
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The case studies and the existing literature show that it is difficult to estimate the factual rate 
of benefit-sharing. Most of the details of ABS contracts and partnerships - especially the 
compensation rate - are confidential. Partly published contracts and users’ data indicate that 
monetary benefits include sample fees, up-front payments, milestones and royalties, which 
usually range from one to five percent on net sales.  
However, benefits have only been paid in a few cases where genetic resources have been 
used for commercial purposes. It has been estimated that even if only two percent royalty 
were charged on all genetic resources, being used for research and development in the 
agricultural and medical plants sector, the users of genetic resources would owe more than 
US$ 300 million in unpaid royalties for farmers crop seeds, and more than US$ 5 billion in 
unpaid royalties for medical plants (Anuradha 2001, 32). 
So far, a fund solution has not been seriously discussed in the international CBD 
negotiations. However, a biodiversity trust fund can address the problem of time lags 
because it can accommodate the long-term timeframe of bioprospecting projects and the 
time lag between collection of material and the development of a product. Furthermore, it 
also addresses problems arising from the information deficiencies. Embedded in national and 
international law a trust fund can manage and allocate benefits arising out of the use of 
genetic resources. Transparently governed by stakeholder representatives, including 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, scientists, industry, communities, it can 
be a successful instrument that establishes trust among the partners. An initial payment has 
to be made by a group of users or even all users using genetic resources. The payment can 
be interpreted as a compensation for all the material that has been used for free. Once a 
trust fund is established, users who have concluded ABS agreements with providers can 
transfer monetary benefits at the agreed date: up-font payments in the beginning, milestone 
payments, and royalties later on. The bilateral relationship between provider and user 
remains. A trust fund can even address the property rights problem and offset a missing 
national regulation on the distribution of benefits to the resource holders. So far, the 
distribution of benefits depends on national legislation, the local government, and the 
country’s property rights system. These regulations do not always ensure that incentives are 
set (Barrett / Lybbert 2000, 295). By channeling benefits in a controlled and consistent 
matter, independent from governmental decisions, the trust fund can alleviate the problem 
arising from the users’ information deficiencies. The trust fund can ensure that benefits are 
distributed to the areas from which the material was collected and to those who contributed 
to its conservation and provision. If private or public donors are willing to contribute initial 
payments to create a start-up fund, resource holders can be directly compensated for their 
conservation activities by the fund. Royalties and milestone payments can flow later into the 
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fund and compensate other resource holders. Initial payments would only be necessary for 
the first generation of ABS agreements. Later on, payments that arise out of the 
commercialization of genetic resources can compensate current resource holders and 
providers. The fund can work like an intergenerational contract. Through the trust fund the 
direct relationship between provider and user is suspended. At trust fund can be established 
at regional, national, or international level, but it has to be applied on the same level on which 
the ABS regulation takes effect. In case of regional ABS laws it should be on the regional 
level, in case of national ABS laws on the national level. 
A multilateral fund like the ITPGRFA, which is not linked to bilateral negotiations, would be 
another option. But in this case the direct relationship between provider country and user and 
the direct negotiations, which can result in an outcome close to the optimum, are abandoned.  
A biodiversity tax as suggested by Parry (2004) could be another compensation mechanism. 
It is independent from compensation schemes realized within bilateral ABS agreements. This 
approach abandons the task of trying to trace all the uses of genetic material to identify 
benefits and beneficiary. Instead, users of genetic resources should pay three to five percent 
of the profit ratio to all products, which are sold in the market and based on collected natural 
material. A global, voluntary agreement could provide the legal framework. A smaller tax 
should be paid for products derived from gene and knowledge databases. A global institution 
as the GEF is considered to be an adequate management authority to channel the incoming 
payment to conservation projects. 
5.2.1.3 Creation and improvement of institutional infrastructure 
Both administrative complexity and political and legal insecurity are transaction costs-
relevant critical factors. If transaction costs are too high, users resign from applying for 
access. Therefore, the creation and the strengthening of institutional infrastructure is an 
important instrument to decrease transaction costs and facilitate access. 
Any ABS regime relies on institutional infrastructure and capacity. It is impossible to create or 
maintain a regime if the implementing institutions are missing, if they are too weak or 
overloaded. An institution, which is responsible for ABS-related issues in a country, needs 
sufficient time and capacity to efficiently implement them. Most likely governmental 
departments are already operating at full capacity. Such institutions, which are responsible 
for the negotiations, the collections and provision, the conclusion of the contracts etc., need 
the ability to multitask. According to the Costa Rica case study, it is an advantage if the ABS 
institution in a provider country is detached from governmental bureaucracy and procedure 
and has a self-interest in the ABS activities. A research institution dealing with biodiversity is 
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a good option. Expertise and resources are already established. Such an efficient focal point 
can attract more users and strengthen the country’s bargaining position. 
5.2.1.4 Coalitions 
The unequal bargaining power of providers and users has been identified as a critical factor 
for the demand for and supply of access to genetic resources. For many years, the idea of a 
biodiversity cartel has been proposed in order to outweigh this unbalance (Vogel 2000). 
Cartels are usually a combination of independent (business) organizations formed to regulate 
production, pricing, and marketing of goods by the members as well as to limit competition. 
In general, cartels are economically unstable due to the incentive for members to cheat and 
sell more or at a lower price than agreed. Each member has to agree to produce a certain 
amount to control the price. Once the price has increased, it becomes tempting for each 
member to offer secrets discounts in order to overtake some of the profits of other members. 
Therefore, the members usually control each other and transparency is needed. This cannot 
be ensured if the concerned goods and prices vary and it is almost impossible to compare 
them (Baumol / Blinder 1994, 294). 
How could an oligopoly over natural resources and traditional knowledge related to it look 
like? The idea is that a cartel of all biodiversity-rich states agrees on a price (fixed royalty 
rate) and not the output, as it is in the case of other cartels, as for example, the cartel of 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The received benefits, which 
arise out of ABS contracts, are shared among all countries that are theoretically able to 
provide the same resource. But the question remains if an international cartel can effectively 
contribute to the realization of the CBD’s objectives. 
Looking at the biodiversity market it can be observed that a group of countries already has 
initiated a coalition: the Megadiverse Group. This coalition could be developed to a cartel. In 
2002, 17 countries, rich in biological diversity, and associated traditional knowledge have 
formed a group known as the Like Minded Megadiverse Countries (LMMC). These countries 
are Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and 
Venezuela. The group was formed as a mechanism of consultation and co-operation to 
promote common interests related to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
The LMMC Group holds nearly 60-70 percent of all biodiversity. Therefore, they already have 
a great market share. Besides, it is well recognized as an important negotiating block in the 
CBD and other international fora. Nevertheless, throughout international negotiations it is 
obvious that the group is very diverse and not agreed, especially regarding its objectives and 
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approaches. Until now, it is more a voice of biodiversity-rich countries, making positions and 
raising concerns, than an economically concerted body. 
The enforcement of a cartel can be aligned with high costs, especially if the concerned 
product is not homogenous, the market is not concentrated, prices are invisible and there are 
only few buyers as in the case of genetic resources. Monitoring of the members selling 
activities and cheating is more difficult in the case of heterogeneous products (Baumol / 
Blinder 1994, 294). It is impossible to determine one fixed royalty rate for all genetic 
resources that can be sold as raw plant material, processed samples, or DNA and to monitor 
the trade of these resources by cartel members. Due to the confidential character of many 
ABS contracts, prices are not visible so far. 
Market concentration and organization on the supply side, in form of associations or like-
minded groups, can initially facilitate the negotiations on a cartel agreement and later support 
monitoring and control, but the supply side of genetic resources is not concentrated. 
Resources can be obtained from locations around the world. However, the existence of the 
Megadiverse Group could definitely facilitate the negotiations of an agreement among the 
members. On the other hand, concentration on the demand side hinders the disclosure of 
fraud, but as mentioned before the market of genetic resources can be characterized by as 
oligopsony with few buyers. Nevertheless, the cartel concept is not a promising instrument to 
strengthen provider countries bargaining position due to its characteristics. 
5.2.1.5 Screening through contracts 
Two problems of asymmetric information exist that can be addressed by a certain contract 
design. These information deficiencies hinder the efficient outcome of ABS negotiations and 
agreements. They impact the access, but also conservation and benefit-sharing. Firstly, 
there is the private information of users about the expected benefits. This is a pre-contractual 
problem. In any case, users have an incentive to hide the information on the amount of 
benefits they expect in order negotiate a lower price for the genetic resources. Secondly, 
there is private information of providers (and/or intermediaries) on the quality of the provided 
material.  
Screening of partners through specific contract design is an instrument that can address the 
principal-agent problem. Through screening, the uniformed party (principal) provides 
incentives to which the more informed agent responds and acts, as the principal would like in 
order to maximize profit. In the case of ABS, the incentives are contracts. Screening applies 
before contracts are concluded (i.e., ex ante). Other forms of screening are the obtaining of 
additional information through third parties. However, this is not considered in this study. 
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Two models are analyzed here, which apply this instrument to the two cases: i) users’ private 
information on benefits and ii) providers’ private information on quality. Although this 
subchapter deals with provider countries and the opportunities they have to address certain 
problems, a user measures, dealing with providers’ information. is analyzed here because it 
is very similar to the prior explained provider measure. 
I. Users’ private information on benefits 
The following model, which is based on Illing (1992), is used to illustrate the problem of 
asymmetric information in ABS negotiations and to show how specifically designed contracts 
can alleviate the problem. Illing analyzes the validity of the Coase Theorem in the presence 
of private information about the cost function of a polluter as one kind of transaction costs. It 
is shown that under asymmetric information, the distribution of property rights has a 
predictable impact on efficiency. The allocation is distorted in the direction of the one who is 
in charge of the property rights. Considering this result, Illing draws the conclusion that in a 
bargaining situation under asymmetric information the predictions of the Coase Theorem do 
not apply. In the case of ABS, the presence of private information about the benefit function 
of a commercial user (e.g., pharmaceutical company) has to be considered. Therefore, the 
approach of Illing is applied to the problem of information deficiencies on part of the provider 
regarding the benefits of users. 
The model 
There are two bargaining partners: Y and Z. Y represents a provider country of genetic 
resources, and Z represents a user of genetic resources. The land use activities of Y 
influence the existing amount of areas x (in hectare), rich in biodiversity, in a positive or 
negative way and impose an externality on Z, respectively her/his profit B(x). By omitting 
activities, having a negative influence on these areas or taking preventive actions, Y can 
increase x. But this implicates costs C(x) for Y. It is assumed that C(0) = 0; MC = C’(x) > 0; 
C’’(x) > 0; B’’(x) < 0. Following the state sovereignty principle of the CBD and assuming that 
the provider country considers genetic resources as state property, Y owns all biological 
resources and biodiversity within her/his country. Thus, without any compensation, Y has no 
incentive to take steps against the loss of areas, rich in biodiversity, and the status quo q of 
biodiversity is kept or decreases as a result of continuous degradation. However, 
commitments on international agreements and environmental projects impose a minimum 
conservation, so that q > 0. 
According to economic theory, it is not efficient to conserve the status quo of biodiversity. If 
the conditions of the Coase Theorem (i.e., exclusive property titles are defined and 
transferable, no transaction cost exist and perfect information is ensured) are complied with, 
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a bargaining solution among the different users will result in a pareto optimal allocation of 
biodiversity. In this situation, the provider country (Y) and the user (Z) have an incentive to 
bargain and trade at least temporary property rights because both parties can improve their 
situation by getting a share of the rents arising from a more efficient level of biodiversity. 
Whereas the allocation is independent of the definition of property rights, the distribution of 
income is not. However, in this analysis income effects are so far excluded. The pareto 
optimal allocation is achieved if both parties agree upon the optimal amount of biodiversity 
rich areas x*, following the condition MB (x*) = MC(x*). Here the total surplus [B(x) – C(x)] for 
the contracting partners is maximal. But in the presence of asymmetric information this result 
can change. As soon as one party has private information about her/his benefit or cost 
function, the allocation will be distorted. For the ongoing analysis it will be assumed that the 
benefit function of Z for an increased amount of biodiversity rich areas is BL (low benefits) or 
BH (high benefits) and following the first-order condition, the efficient levels of biodiversity are 
xL*; xH* with xH > xL. Both contracting partners are risk neutral. For all amounts of biodiversity 
x it is valid: BL (x) < BH (x); BL’(x) < BH ‘(x) ∀ x > 0. Z knows his benefit function, whereas Y 
only knows the probabilities high and low benefits are realized pL; pH (pL + pH = 1). 
Asymmetric Information and Screening 
In the following, a bargaining game between the two parties is analyzed. Y owns the property 
rights over biodiversity. The status quo is q > 0. In the first stage, Y makes an offer. Z can 
accept or reject it. Then the game ends. 
Not perfectly informed about the true benefits of Z, Y has to embark another strategy. If Y 
offers only a contract with a compensating payment equal the average expected total 
benefits, only Z with BH will accept the offer. In this case it would be optimal for Y to offer two 
contracts Ri = [
∧
x i; T(
∧
x i)]: one for a low benefit (BL) and one for a high benefit user (BH). In 
dependence of each contract, a specific level of biodiversity rich areas x with corresponding 
compensation payments T(x) is realized. RL = [xL*, T(xL*) = (BL*)] and RH = [xH*, T(xL*) = 
(BH*)] with the efficient outcomes are xL* and xH*. If Y offers these contracts, Z as a high 
benefit user has an incentive to underestimate her/his own benefit and her/his willingness to 
pay in order to keep the price down and reap a profit (BCD): BH (xL*) – BL (xL*). If Y wants to 
avoid this situation, she/he must design the contracts in a certain way, so that a low benefit 
and a high benefit user choose that contract designed for their specific type. 
The optimization problem of Y is to maximize the payments, which can be received less the 
accruing conservation costs. 
(1)   )C(x p - )C(x p - )T(x p  )T(x pmax HHLLHHLL)(, +ii xTx  
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It is assumed that the maximization of provider country’s profits will lead to a higher 
protection level of biodiversity. 
I. Participation constraint 
(2l)   BL (xL) ≥ T (xL) 
(2h)   BH (xH) ≥ T (xH) 
The conditions (2) ensure participation (individual rationality). For both types of companies 
(BH, BL) it must be attractive to accept the contract rather than not to accept it and realize the 
status quo. But a high benefit company can always pretend to be a low benefit company to 
get an extra benefit: BH (xL) > BL (xL) > T (xL). Thus, only condition (2l) is plausible and 
consequently binding: BL (xL) = T (xL). 
II. Incentive compatibility 
(3l)   BL (xL) – T (xL) ≥ BL (xH) – T (xH) 
(3h)   BH (xH) - T(xH) ≥ BH (xL) - T(xL) 
The conditions (3) ensure the incentive compatibility. A low benefit user will never claim to be 
a high benefit user because this would reduce her/his total benefits [after paying T(xi)]. Thus, 
only condition (3h) is plausible and consequently binding BH (xH) - T (xH) = BH (xL) - T(xL). 
Then, the optimization problem with constraints can be transformed to the following 
unconstrained maximization problem. 
(4)   )](xB - )(x[B p - )]C(x - )[B(x p  )]C(x - )[B(x pmax LLLHHHHHLLl
,
+
hl xx
 
Under asymmetric information, the optimization problem of Y has changed. It is not longer 
interested in maximizing the payments, which can be received less the accruing conservation 
costs. Rather Y has to consider the required costs to ensure that a high benefit user (BH) 
does not pretend to be a low benefit user (BL). By renouncing a payment BH (xL) - BL (xL) Y 
gives Z, being a high benefit user, an incentive not to pretend to be a low benefit company. 
These payments have to be made with probability pH. 
The first order conditions are: 
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It is assumed 
∧
x l is the solution of equation (5l). If Z can realize high benefits the efficient 
outcome will be xH = xH* even in the presence of asymmetric information. Y can not acquire 
the first expected surplus because she/he has to consider the payment of the information 
rent BH(xL) - BL(xL) (BCD). Thus, T(
∧
x H) = T(xH*) – BH (xL) - BL (xL). But this is only a 
redistribution in favor of the informed party (Z). 
In the case that Z is a low benefit user, the allocation will be distorted. To simplify matters it is 
assumed that pL = pH= 0.5. Y still can acquire a surplus (ABFG), but the offered amount of 
biodiversity is inefficiently low because Lx
∧
<
*
Lx . According to (5l) and the constraints of the 
benefit function 


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Bp is positive as well as 
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Bp . This can only be the 
case if Lx
∧
 is smaller than the efficient outcome *Lx  and MB > MC. Y will take a loss of 
surplus only if she/he is not worse off. Y deviates from the contract if the expected marginal 
loss of surplus (FG) is equal to the expected marginal savings of payments (EF), it 
renounced before. CDEF represents the savings and CFG the loss of surplus of Y. 
Figure 18: The Coase Theorem under the presence of asymmetric information 
Source: adopted from Illing 1992 
Thus, under the presence of private information the payment of an information rent to a high 
benefit user results in a not pareto optimal contractual offer to a low benefit user. The 
information rent prevents a high benefit user from pretending to be a low benefit user. 
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Providers cannot reduce the information rent by deviating from the presented contract for a 
high benefit user design. Consequently, a pareto optimum is realized, in opposite to the case 
of a low benefit company. 
Results 
The Coase Theorem is only valid if certain information structures are present. If a provider 
country is not completely informed about the expected benefits of a user, the result will not 
be consistent with the predictions of the Coase Theorem. Firstly, in case the partner is a high 
benefit user, the outcome will be pareto optimal, but the distribution of the benefits has 
changed compared to a bargaining situation in the presence of complete information. The 
provider country does not receive the whole surplus and the high benefit user receives an 
incentive payment. Provider countries are not able to solve the problem of asymmetric 
information, but they can alleviate it. They can offer different contracts for the different types 
of companies and, hence, screen users. By considering the participation constraint and the 
incentive compatibility, providers can maximize their revenues. The maximization has a 
positive impact on the conservation of biodiversity. Thus, under the presence of asymmetric 
information a screening of the applicants by a specific contract design can improve the 
situation. Secondly, in case the partner is a low benefit user, the outcome won’t be pareto 
optimal as already shown in the model. Though the provider can get the whole surplus, the 
amount of protected biodiversity is too small and the allocation of the resource is not efficient. 
In both cases, the benefits of the provider are smaller than they would be under the presence 
of complete information because the benefits are distributed in favor of the informed party 
and because the resources are misallocated. 
II. Providers’ private information on quality 
Mullholland and Wilman (2003) analyze information deficiencies on side of the users. In their 
view, providers have private information on their inputs into the companies’ drug discovery 
process because they do not only control access to the resources but also to the information 
on the quality of the material. In this case, they propose that companies need to design 
contracts that provide incentives for the host countries to deliver an amount of bioprospecting 
output that maximizes the company’s output. In their model, it is assumed that provider 
country agents are typically poor developing countries and risk averse and that users are 
risk-neutral principals. Compared to the case that is analyzed in the previous chapter, here 
risk aversion plays an important role. If both principal and agent are risk neutral, the principal 
will design the contract in a way that the agent has to bear the risk. If the agent is risk averse, 
they have to share the risk. 
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Host countries will only sign a contract that provides them with enough expected utility to 
overcome their reservation utility. The expected utility will depend on the payoff they will 
receive and the utility that they will receive as a function of those payoffs. To convince a host 
country to sign a contract, the principal must offer adequate payoffs. For the principal there is 
a trade-off between providing full insurance to the agent and full incentive compatibility 
(Varian 1992, 441ff). 
In the Mulholland and Wilman model the users demand biodiversity resources and access to 
information. The production process is assumed to be random due to the unpredictable 
research and development outcome. They consider time lags between collection and 
outcome and ABS contracts as an instrument that provides insurance. They model the 
contract as a principal-agent relationship. In their model the provider country controls both, 
access to the resources and the related information on the potential. The bioprospecting 
output Q is a function of the stock of biodiversity Z and the stock of information related to the 
pharmaceutical potential G. The biodiversity stock Z depends on the conservation measures 
undertaken by the host country I that thwart destruction or degradation of biodiversity, which 
occurs at the rate δ. 
Z = I - δZ 
The information stock G depends on the agent’s efforts during the collection and processing 
(e.g., screening and identification), which are e. The degradation rate of the information stock 
is ε. 
     G = e – εG 
The function for the bioprospecting revenue is R (G, Z) = πQ (G, Z). π is the competitive 
price17. Since a random variable ω has to be considered that is not influenced by the principal 
or agent but that is a state of nature the bioprospecting revenue is W (ω, G, Z) = ωR (G, Z). 
As already mentioned, the production process of W, which is carried out by the agent, cannot 
be fully observed by the principal. Therefore, the agent has an incentive to provide less e, G, 
I, and Z. 
The pharmaceutical company, as a risk neutral principal, aims to design a contract that 
induces the providers to produce an amount of resources and information that maximizes 
her/his output. Therefore, the contract needs to fulfill the incentive-compatibility to induce the 
provider as an agent to behave in the desired way, but also the participation constraint that 
guarantees that the agent be no worse off than she/he would be if she/he had chosen 
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another option. Sample fees, advanced payments, and royalty rate are considered as 
potential payoffs. The principal can choose the levels of any of these payments. However, 
empirical data show that in the classical case (i.e., provider country negotiates with user) the 
contracts are usually the result of a bargaining process between users and providers and 
that provider countries can influence it. But it has to be considered that today more and more 
intermediaries enter the market. Then, the classical situation occurs less frequent, since host 
countries are not necessarily involved in the negotiations and transfers. In the model the 
royalty rate α is chosen by the principal and paid to the agent out of the profits from any 
products developed. It is based on an observed successful outcome, but the price Pe and 
the advance payment Φ (G, Z)18 depend on variables G, e, Z and I that are not perfectly 
observable. 
They come to the conclusion that if the principal uses royalties in the payment schedule for a 
risk-averse agent the marginal benefits are reduced and lower levels of I, e, G and Z will 
result. With regard to the participation constraint, the agent’s risk aversion reduces the 
payment contribution of the royalty rate. Therefore, it is more costly for the principal to meet 
the participation constraint than through other means. Sample fees and advance payment 
acknowledge the agent’s risk. One suggestion is to earmark advance payments for 
investments in G and Z. That means host countries have to use the compensation payments 
for conservation measures or for training and technology development. These conclusions 
are also very relevant for the compensation schemes that are discussed in chapter 5.2.1.2. 
Empirical insights show that users highly prefer to compensate providers through royalties. 
But only if the agent is risk-neutral royalty payments can provide incentives for the optimal 
level of G, Z, e, and I. These insights have to be considered especially when designing 
model contracts.  
5.2.1.6 Reputation-building 
The transaction costs of the access phase are high due information deficiencies. Providers 
have private information on the allocation of the received benefits and on the handling with 
the provided material, especially on exclusivity of the provided material. The case study in 
Costa Rica indicates that the way provider countries deal with such private information is 
important for their attractiveness. They can signal that they are reliable partners despite their 
informational advantage. 
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Reputation building is a quite strong form of signaling and can alleviate the problems arising 
from uncertainty and information deficiencies on both sides; on part of the providers and 
users. However, in this subchapter only signaling on the provider side is considered. The 
following chapter 5.2.2 on user measures deals with the user perspective.  
According to Spence, “Market signals are activities or attributes of individuals in a market 
which, by design or accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals in 
the market.” (Spence 1974). A signal is a characteristic that is observable and can be 
influenced by the individual through his behavior and action. Provider countries that have 
implemented ABS regulation and regard themselves as reliable partner users should trust, 
can signal this by different ways. They can participate in international meetings, workshops, 
projects etc., and present their ABS regulations and offer their support. Through their long-
term experiences and reliable co-operation, provider countries appear as very attractive 
collection sites. It is more likely that users and providers will conclude or renew contracts with 
known partners than looking for new, unknown providers. Long-term partnerships are a 
specific investment and reduce information gaps and transaction costs. 
5.2.2 Recipient countries 
Since the adoption of the CBD, its implementation has focused more on the establishment of 
ABS regulations in biodiversity-rich provider countries, addressing the agents’ behavior in the 
provider countries. The above-described measures are examples for such provider 
measures. This situation has led to an imbalance regarding the efforts of provider and user 
countries in order to realize the Convention’s objectives. By establishing the ABS concept 
and its requirements for PIC and MAT, the CBD determines the users’ behavior in provider 
countries. However, users have also a responsibility to contribute to its implementation, 
especially when it comes to the third objective, the fair and equitable benefit-sharing. 
On the political level, some steps have been taken to integrate users in the process and 
allocate them more responsibility. The voluntary Bonn Guidelines concretize the idea of an 
international ABS regime and address both provider and user countries by proposing certain 
measures that should be implemented to reach the fundamental objectives of the CBD. 
These measures serve as a basis for the following evaluation. Besides, the action plan of the 
WSSD requests governments to an international regime in which users play a more 
important role. 
In the following subchapters, user measures are analyzed regarding their potential to 
address the critical factors and impact ABS effectiveness. Furthermore, it is investigated 
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whether the proposed instruments are feasible and practicable with a view to 
implementation. 
5.2.2.1 Documentation of the flow of genetic resources19 
The documentation of the flow of genetic resources as a monitoring system can address the 
critical factor asymmetric information and administrative complexity. The critical factor 
analysis indicates that assignment and distribution of property rights have a strong impact on 
access, conservation, and benefit-sharing. Especially, the inappropriate assignment of IPRs 
(i.e., biopiracy) poses a problem. If genetic material is acquired outside of any ABS 
agreement, no benefits will be shared and no conservation incentives will be established. 
Many related cases have been reported. 
To avoid the misappropriation of genetic material the ABS process has to be monitored. It 
can be monitored at different stages: the access phase (i.e., in the field or in ex-situ 
collections), the import of the genetic resources, the research and development phase, the 
application for IPRs, and the final product approval. Apart from the access phase these 
activities usually take place in user countries and depend on user countries’ willingness to 
monitor the behavior of the users. 
A traceability system for genetic resources can monitor the appropriate use of the material. 
Certificates of origin are seen as an instrument of such a traceability system. Irrespective of 
their form they can be used to monitor trade and movement of resources at different 
checkpoints and discourage unapproved and illegal use of genetic resources.  
The concept certificate of origin was originally developed for the use of patent applications 
procedures to ensure the compliance with the CBD and its ABS obligations (Tobin 1994). 
The original idea was that the patent offices should require the disclosure of the origin of 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge as a condition for receiving 
applications for grant of patents. It was suggested that the establishment of a standardized 
certificate of origin, which would act as evidence of PIC, exempt patent officers from the 
need to examine all of the documentation related to an ABS agreement to verify compliance 
with the CBD. It was also suggested that such requirements could extend to product 
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 The main ideas in this subchapter are based on Richerzhagen, C. (2005): Certificates of origin: economic 
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approval procedures, and act as an interim measure to protect the rights of indigenous and 
local communities over their traditional knowledge (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 38f). 
The certificate concept has been considered in the international negotiations. At COP6, 
COP7, and COP8 the parties of the CBD decided to further examine an international 
certificate scheme regarding its feasibility, operational functionality, and cost effectiveness 
(CBD 2002; CBD 2004; CBD 2006). Rosendal (2006, 441) even interprets the discussion on 
certificates as a step forward to a multilateral system. 
Despite several preliminary investigations and discussions at international meetings, there is 
still no clear understanding of how a certificate of origin system could operate in practice, or 
what should be the scope or nature of such system. At COP8, the Parties generally agreed 
on the need to establish a group of technical experts that could examine options for the form 
and intent, practicality, feasibility and costs of an international certificate of origin, source, or 
legal provenance (ENB 2006, 5). This group has met in January 2007 in Lima (ICTSD 2007). 
However, even if the opinions on certificates diverge, the international discussion about a 
certificate scheme seems to agree on a multi-objectives scheme for certificates that is 
consistent with the CBD. It should 
• Support efficient implementation of the CBD’s ABS objectives, 
• Track the flow of resources and being applied as control mechanism to restrict 
unapproved use, and 
• Facilitate access by the consolidation of national permitting procedures and the 
reduction of complexities associated with access to and use of resources. 
A further argument for introducing a certificate system is its potential to facilitate access. 
Existing procedures for access, collection, export of resources are highly regulated and 
involve a plethora of approval processes and permitting procedures: the administrative 
complexity is high. Basic research in particular suffers under these conditions. A majority of 
the genetic and biological resource uses is not for commercial industrial purposes, for 
example, 95 percent of resource use in Mexico is for basic non-commercial research. A 
certificate system should not add to the administrative complexity and raise transaction costs 
but help to rationalize it. If it is the latter, this will require capacity and political will in provider 
countries to streamline processes and overcome existing tensions amongst government 
departments for control over access issues.  
A certificate can play an important role in the entire ABS process. Like a passport, it can 
accompany the genetic resources from the collection phase until the marketing of the product 
and give information about the origin of the material. It can be monitored and verified at 
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different stages of access and use as well as across different jurisdictions beyond that of the 
providing country (Ruiz / Fernandez / Young 2003, 5). In accordance to the existing 
infrastructure, different checkpoints can be considered along the innovation line to decrease 
the costs resulting from the establishment of a certificate system. Some potential checkpoints 
are customs, patent and product approval authorities, the international depository system 
within the Budapest Treaty, research funding organizations, and scientific journals. At these 
checkpoints a certificate can provide information on the origin and in case of certificates of 
legal provenance evidence of the legitimate obtaining of genetic resources. By the 
submission of journal articles, the authors would be required to submit the certificate in 
addition to the information on the used material, which is already required. Research funding 
organization can require this information during the funding period, once the collection start. 
Patent and product approval authorities can make the submission of the certificate as a 
requirement during the application process (cf. chapter 5.2.2.2). A registry on the national or 
international level has to be established to record the transfers of genetic material. A 
certificate system should cover all users and uses of genetic resources. Certificates have to 
be reproducible to account for transformation and splitting of the material for multiple users 
and uses. Flexibility within the scheme is needed to adapt to the changing nature of 
resources as they move through various stages of research, development and 
transformation, thereby modifying the circumstances under which the certificate was 
originally granted. This means a certificate must be applicable to tangible and intangible 
material. However, it has to be as comprehensive as possible to ensure that it provides 
security to the providers (Dross / Wolff 2005, 136). 
A certificate scheme has not necessarily to be mandatory. It stipulates an incentive to 
participate. A mandatory system comprehensively monitors all flows of genetic material, but 
the price would be relatively high. All users would be enforced to implement such the system 
regardless their individual costs and benefits. A voluntary system already institutes adequate 
incentives for participation. If users can decide about their participation, it is ensured that 
benefits of the system outweigh the costs.  
The term ‘certificate of origin’ has been seen by some as problematic, implying as it does 
establish a link with countries of origin of genetic resources as defined under the CBD. 
Attention has been drawn to the complexities of identifying the origin of many resources that 
have been in circulation for decades, if not centuries. Alternatives terms have been 
suggested such as a ‘certificate of source’ (indicating where the material comes from) or a 
‘certificate of legal provenance’ (providing evidence of the legal acquisition of the material) or 
a comprehensive system of certificates involving all three (Tobin / Cunningham / Watanabe 
2004). In the latter case a certificate of origin would most probably be granted by a national 
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authority in the country of origin for primary acquisition. A certificate of legal provenance 
could be issued by a biological collection, or a national authority in a country other than the 
country of origin for secondary acquisition, and a certificate of source would be provided to 
accompany any transfer of resources for basic non-commercial research. 
However, the distinction between “country of origin” and “country providing the resources” is 
significant related to the disclosure obligation, in case the certificate is used as an evidence. 
Correa (2003) suggests with a view to existing disclosure requirement (e.g., in India and the 
EU) and the CBD obligations that the certificate should refer to the source and the providing 
country as understood under the CBD. The Lima expert group recommends implementing a 
certificate of compliance, since this is its main objective (CBD 2007f, p. 7). 
Certificates also provide distinctive advantages from an economic point of view. They can 
alleviate the problem arising out of information asymmetries by serving as labels. The market 
for genetic resources is characterized by under-consumption due information deficiencies 
regarding the quality of the demanded material. The quality of genetic resources being 
potential inputs for commercialization consists of different elements as origin, biological traits, 
but also CBD compliance through PIC. Users cannot differentiate whether the provided 
genetic resources comprise these elements. They estimate a value of which existence they 
can be sure. This value is usually underestimated. 
By indicating the origin, a certificate can supply further information about the provided 
material to users of genetic resources, as for example, biological and geographical 
information. Providing the good with such information converts genetic resources from simple 
commodities into higher-valued differentiated products. By increasing their value, a certificate 
scheme would create incentives for the provision of genetic resources and their 
conservation. 
Certificates of origin, which indicate the origin of the obtained resources and provide a legal 
title to the users who obtains the material, can close the information gap. As labels they can 
inform users about the quality characteristics of the product and enable users to identify the 
appropriate value of the resource. The additional information provided by certificates 
transforms credence and potemkin attributes of genetic resources to search attributes. By 
providing additional passport data of the provided material, the value and the price users are 
willing to pay would be even higher.  
Certificates of origin give providers of high quality material the opportunity to signal the user 
the quality of the good. The demand for low quality genetic resources is reduced as well as 
the output of these resources because adverse selection is prevented. Less material is 
supplied that was not obtained in compliance with the CBD. On the one hand, it seems 
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unnecessary to establish a market mechanism that aims at a goal that should be already 
enforced by law. On the other hand, there is still a lot of material in the market that does not 
fulfill the CBD criteria because many countries have not implemented the CBD’s ABS 
provisions yet, because of the existence of ex-situ collections, which collected material 
before 1992, or because some providers exist who do not follow the international and 
national law and offer illegally obtained material. 
Often provider countries lack human and technology capacities to collect and transfer these 
quality data. Therefore, it is important to enable provider countries through capacity-building 
training, knowledge and technology transfer to collect and transfer data in an appropriate 
format. This would benefit both providers and users. 
A certificate scheme has effects on the trade of genetic resources. If certificates of origin are 
instruments of a mandatory certificate scheme, supply of genetic resources will negatively 
affected due to higher costs. The costs depend on existing frameworks and procedures and 
how they correspond with the introduction of a certificate scheme. However, if a certificate 
scheme helps to streamline ABS procedure in country without rising costs. They might even 
have a positive effect. The demand is positively affected because certificates can reveal 
resources’ real value. Besides, during the exchange of material, they can reduce search and 
information costs. However, research and development costs can immensely increase by 
implementation and enforcement. 
When discussing about certificates of origin one has to keep in mind the heterogeneity of 
users. The public and private sectors benefit by having an appropriate instrument to 
differentiate the quality of provided material and gaining certainty of legal title to genetic 
resources. These benefits are much higher for the private sector, which uses the material for 
commercial purposes, because they can actually recoup the costs caused by the 
implementation and enforcement of a certificate scheme. Public sector users do not make 
profits by using the material, but due to their function, they are involved in many more 
international transfers.  
A survey on German users of genetic resources revealed that German users are critical to 
the introduction of certificates of origin, source, or legal provenance. Although the majority of 
users obtain the genetic material through intermediaries, legal uncertainty is reported as a 
major problem. Therefore, the implementation of this instrument would require specific 
preparations, in particular it would be necessary to inform users and initiate stakeholder 
consultations (Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 2005, 71-73). The same can be 
observed in Japan. A study on Japanese users puts light on the utilization and 
documentation procedures in place and the Japanese users’ attitude towards the different 
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certificate scenarios (i.e., subject matter, type, format, checkpoints and registry) regarding 
practicality, feasibility, and costs. It shows that certificates of origin are critically judged 
among users of both the private and the public sector, which also supports the argument to 
establish a voluntary regime. There, paper and electronic formats are probably the most 
common form of documentation of used material that is already in place. To reduce costs 
they should be the most preferred ones. Certificates of source are considered as least critical 
of all three forms. All proposed checkpoints are positively evaluated and an international 
registry is preferred to the national registry (Richerzhagen 2005, 24ff). More of such studies 
have to be conducted to analyze the structure of the user sectors regarding certificates. 
A future certificate of origin scheme has the potential to address information problems in the 
market of genetic resources. However, when implementing such a system existing 
infrastructure and attitudes have to be taken into account. Only then such a system will be 
effective regarding practicality, feasibility, and costs. 
An important Convention that has to be considered for the creation of a certification system is 
CITES which regulates the transboundary movement of certain specimens, and parts and 
derivatives of protected species of plant and animal since 1975. CITES ensures that 
international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival by 
subjecting international trade in specimens of selected species to certain controls. These 
require that all import, export, re-export, and introduction of species covered by the 
Convention have to be authorized through a licensing system (CITES, 1973). 
Experience in CITES suggests that a computerized, paperless and centrally administered 
system might be preferable. Any system should provide a means for cost recovery for 
certificate administration by provider countries, but these costs should not be so high that 
they will serve as a disincentive for basic research. Capacity-building, awareness arising and 
the consideration of security issues (authorized signatures/seals, special paper or stamps, 
protocols) as being important for the success of a certificate system, but unlike in the case of 
CITES the subject matter of a certificate may change substantially during research and 
development activity (Dedeurwaerdere et al. 2005). 
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5.2.2.2 Monitoring of intellectual property rights applications20 
The monitoring of IPRs application has been identified as a possible checkpoint in a 
traceability system. Therefore, it is an adequate instrument to address the problems arising 
from the information deficiencies providers have regarding the use of their provided genetic 
resources and to address the high transaction costs due to administrative complexity. At the 
same time, it can balance the unequal property rights distribution. By mentioning the origin of 
genetic resources in IPRs application, the providers do not become holders of such rights, 
but at least they are cited in the IPR and therefore have the legal basis for demanding 
benefit-sharing. On the political level these potential functions of a disclosure of the origin 
requirement have also been realized. Even the Bonn guidelines recommend that CBD 
Parties implement disclosure requirements for patents based on the use of genetic resources 
because they can support the monitoring of ABS activities in user countries during the 
application of IPRs or product approval (CBD 2002 VI-24; Gollin 2005). 
Disclosure already plays an important role in patent law. Only if the invention is fully 
disclosed a patent can be granted. According to the TRIPs agreement, applicants for a 
patent have to disclose the invention sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be 
carried out by a person skilled in the art. It may require the applicant to indicate the best 
mode for carrying out the invention known to the inventor at the filing date or, where priority 
is claimed, at the priority date of the application (TRIPs, Art. 29.1). 
A study on patents using biological source material revealed that in cases where plants are 
well known and widespread, as for example, oat or lemon, the origin is not specified in the 
patent application for plant extracts, but if the object of the patent is a rare or exotic, the 
applicant usually provides information on the origin (WIPO 2001). However, usually it is the 
choice of the applicant whether to disclose the origin of the used material. 
A first proposal regarding disclosure of the country of origin emerged in 1994 jointly with the 
proposal for certificates of origin. It tried to link the IPR system and ABS and put forward the 
idea to require the disclosure of origin in patent applications (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 
29). The idea is that an inventor who applies for a patent, which is based on the utilization of 
genetic resources, has to provide additional information on the material’s source or even 
proof of its legal acquisition (Tobin 1997). 
                                               
20
 Many ideas in this paragraph are based on Dedeurwaerdere, Louafi, Richerzhagen and Tobin (2005): 
Roundtable on Practicality, Feasibility and Cost of Certificates of Origin, Workshop Summary, IDDRI-
UNU/IAS-CPDR. 
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What are the arguments supporting such a system? Outside of the patent system, the 
disclosure of origin can help the provider countries to fill the information gap, strengthen their 
position, promote compliance with their access legislation, increase their confidence in users 
and prevent the loss of potential benefits by its functioning as a control mechanism. Through 
the establishment of a disclosure requirement providers would be enabled to keep track, at 
the global level, of all patent applications with regard to genetic resources.  
Within the patent system a disclosure requirement could improve the examination of patent 
applications by facilitating the determination of prior art, and improve the determination of 
inventorship by the patent office or courts. In some cases, as for example, endemic biological 
material, it may even facilitate the execution of the invention (Correa 2003, 3). Considering 
that the verifying of IPR applications places additional burdens on the patent offices, the 
importance of other control systems (e.g., a certificate of origin) becomes evident. 
The debate on disclosure requirements has been intensified during the TRIPs review, which 
is still persistent (cf. chapter 3.2.1). WIPO has been invited by the CBD to prepare a 
technical study on methods within the patent system for requiring disclosure relevant to 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge and therefore collected and analyzed positions 
and proposals from its Member States. Many countries made proposals how to realize such 
a control instrument. A group represented by Brazil and India, including Bolivia, Colombia, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Thailand, and supported by the African group 
and some other developing countries, intends to amend TRIPs. They propose that the patent 
applicants are required to disclose the country of origin of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge used in the inventions, PIC and the benefit-sharing agreements. Switzerland has 
proposed an amendment to the regulations of WIPO’s Patent Cooperation Treaty so that 
domestic laws may ask inventors to disclose the source of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge when they apply for patents. Failure to meet the requirement could hold up a 
patent being granted, or when done with fraudulent intent, could entail a granted patent being 
invalidated. The EU’s position includes a proposal to examine a requirement that all patent 
applicants disclose the source or origin of genetic material, with legal consequences of not 
meeting this requirement lying outside the scope of patent law. The US has argued that the 
CBD’s objectives on ABS could best be achieved through national legislation and contractual 
arrangements based on the existing legislation, which could include commitments on 
disclosing of any commercial application of genetic resources or traditional knowledge (WTO 
2007b). 
Sarnoff and Correa (2006) recommend the establishment of an international system of 
mandatory disclosure of origin requirements, which is linked to TRIPs. According to their 
5 The effectiveness of ABS: critical factors and addressing measures 154 
analysis, an international disclosure system is consistent with international intellectual 
property treaties and can only provide sufficient benefits if it is mandatory because national 
disclosure systems are limited to the national jurisdiction. 
Today, some national or regional IPR, biotechnology, or biodiversity regulations include 
some forms of disclosure requirements or encouragements. The frameworks differ widely 
and range from mandatory requirements for disclosure of origin and legal access to 
disclosure requirements that only encourage to disclose but do not involve any legal 
consequence in cases of non-compliance (Baummueller / Vivas-Eugui 2004, 21). 
Certain problems arise in the preliminary stage of discussion on this instrument and are 
closely related to certificates of origin. The exact characterization of the country of origin is 
difficult due to a possible multiplicity of genetic resources. Some genetic resources can be 
found in more than one country or region or have acquired specific distinctive and genetic 
characteristics not in the same country where it was collected. Often genetic resources are 
not directly provided by the country of origin, but by ex-situ collections (e.g., gene banks, 
microbial collections, or botanical gardens). In these cases provider country and country of 
origin do not correspond. 
The legal nature and the aligned consequences are controversially discussed and differently 
handled. A disclosure requirement can be a formality in the patent procedure or even a 
patentability criterion. However, since many members of the CBD are also members of WTO 
the legal implications of the TRIPs agreement have to be considered. Dedeurwaerdere et al. 
(2005, 5) state that a disclosure of origin requirement is only compatible with the TRIPs 
agreement as it is ruling now in a system where 
• Disclosure of origin is only a formal requirement for patent application (and not a 
substantive criteria for patentability, which determines the eligibility of the 
invention such as novelty), 
• The disclosure obligation only holds if the origin is known (so no requirement that 
the patentee has to do further research on the origin), 
• And where the sanctioning mechanisms lie outside the patent system, for 
example, a system of fines for commercialization on basis of non certified genetic 
resources or financial advantages for the certified ones. 
Sanctions outside the patent system for non-compliance with disclosure requirements 
include criminal and civil sanctions. By placing sanctions outside the patent system, penalties 
can be imposed without paralyzing research and development activities. In some cases 
sanctions might require the transfer of rights over a patent to an aggrieved party, in particular 
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an indigenous or local community whose knowledge had been appropriated. Developing 
countries such as the Andean community have developed more rigorous requirements on 
disclosure with sanctions that fell within the patent system.  
A disclosure requirement for genetic resources needs definitions and standardized 
procedures to be effective. Clear regulations and sanctions in case of non-compliance have 
to be developed to make the system feasible. However, as many uses of genetic resources 
are non-IPR related any system must consider a range of regulatory and non-regulatory 
procedures for monitoring the use of genetic resources in product development and 
commercialization as already indicated by the previous chapter. 
5.2.2.3 Certification schemes for institutions 
Economic theory suggests certification as an instrument to address information asymmetry 
(Fritsch / Wein / Ewers 2003, 297). It is some form of screening because the principal tries to 
get additional information to compensate the deficiency. The critical factors show that 
providers lack information on the users’ behavior, which results in disproportionate and 
complicated regulations. Certification can be a signaling mechanism for users. Companies’ 
compliance with the principles formulated in the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines can be 
ensured through the participation in a certification system. In addition, it can improve the 
user’s reputation and provide the basis for provider countries to feel more confident about 
their potential partners. 
Certification systems voluntarily verify practices of organizations. They might be self-
implemented or implemented by a second party with an interest in the organization’s 
practices. Alternatively, the operations of the concerned private or public organization are 
assessed against a standard set of criteria by an independent third party. The use of the 
certification by an independent third party has become the norm because of the importance 
of credibility of the certifiers (Kanowski / Sinclair / Freeman 1999, 14). Important aspects for 
the implementation of a certification system are the creation of an independent standard-
setting body, an agreed procedure for the certification assessment, the issuance of a written 
certificate that confirms the compliance with the standards, and the establishment of an 
appeal possibility for certification decisions (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 23). Voluntary 
certification schemes are widely and successfully used, for example, under the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). The organization’s work program ranges from 
standards for traditional activities, such as agriculture and construction, to mechanical 
engineering, to medical devices, or even the newest information technology developments. 
Alternative specialized schemes have been implemented for timber products extracted from 
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sustainable managed forests, fisheries, organic food, and other environmental and social 
sectors (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 23). 
5.2.2.4 Corporate and institutional policies and codes of conduct 
Corporate and institutional policies and codes of conduct are another signaling instrument, 
which users can apply in order to signal their will to comply with the CBD. In the past, it was 
observed that some users of genetic resources have developed their own ABS policies, 
either individually or jointly, including whole sectors (ten Kate / A Laird 1999, 309). These 
users operate in the private sector (e.g., companies) or in the public sector as non-profit 
research institutions (e.g., botanical gardens). Corporate and institutional policies and codes 
of conduct developed in the framework of the Bonn Guidelines are measures that can assist 
in the development and implementation of ABS arrangements. 
Corporate and institutional policies and codes of conduct are voluntary measures initiated by 
the users or their representatives (A Laird / Wynberg 2002, 39). The interventions in the 
activities of a research institution or a company caused by such measures are relatively 
small. Once such policies or codes of conduct have been developed and successfully 
applied in an institution or company, they can be disseminated at low transaction costs in the 
entire sector concerned. They can provide sufficient flexibility to respond to the 
circumstances of specific research sectors and users of genetic resources if their design is 
appropriately adjusted. Both users and providers can benefit from their establishment. The 
application of corporate policies and codes of conduct increases user transparency and 
therefore the provider countries’ trust in their partners. The use of codes of conduct can 
facilitate access to genetic resources for the members and reduce the need of other 
compliance procedures (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 22). Control mechanisms, which 
apply to the early stages of research and development, can be established at lower costs 
than those that take effect in later phases. Corporate policies and codes of conduct have the 
potential to alleviate uncertainty and decrease the transaction costs for users and providers, 
which might arise from the asymmetric distribution of information between them. However, 
according to a recent study, only very few companies realize the ABS provisions and 
therefore implement such policies or code of conducts (Busch / Kern 2005, 86). 
5.2.2.5 National Focal Points, Clearing House Mechanisms 
National focal points and the Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) are institutions that, once 
they are established, impact asymmetric information and administrative complexity. The 
Bonn Guidelines give high importance to the provision of information in the ABS process for 
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both providers and users. National focal points and the Clearing House Mechanism are 
important for the collection, provision, and dissemination of information, and they play an 
essential role in raising awareness in user countries. 
According to the Bonn Guidelines, each party of the CBD should designate one National 
Focal Point for ABS. The National Focal Point should provide users with information 
regarding the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines, as well as regarding national ABS laws and 
regulations in provider countries. In this way, applicants for access to genetic resources can 
acquire information on procedures for achieving PIC and MAT (including benefit-sharing) and 
on competent national authorities and relevant stakeholders (Bonn Guidelines IIA/13). 
National Focal Points in user countries can support the exchange of information and 
experiences in ABS issues. More transparency and facilitated access to information in the 
market of genetic resources can alleviate the consequences resulting from asymmetric 
distribution of information, as e.g., complicated and restricted access. The provision of 
information can benefit both users and providers and can decrease their transaction costs. 
Therefore, the negotiations between users and providers can be considerably improved. 
National Focal Points in user countries can establish contacts to focal points and authorities 
in provider countries and facilitate the establishment of contacts among the users. The 
threshold of entrance for first time users is lowered and providers have access to better 
information about potential benefits that can be expected. Important is also the collaboration 
between National Focal Points to decrease costs and facilitate information exchange. 
Through the initial work of the focal points in user countries, the competent authorities in 
provider countries that are often overburdened with the complex ABS issues can be relieved. 
To date, 42 parties of the CBD have nominated ABS National Focal Points (CBD 2007b).  
The CHM provides a possibility for user registration. The register can improve the reputation 
of users, since the registration of a fully-fledged ABS policy in compliance with the CBD 
would be evidence of a good sense of corporate social responsibility (EU Commission 
2003, 4). National focal points in user countries can assume some of the responsibility of the 
focal points in provider countries and relieve them. The problems caused by administrative 
complexity can be addressed. Additionally, the CHM can be used to increase the 
effectiveness of other user measures. Corporate policies and codes of conduct can be 
publicized through the CHM and can be provided for biodiversity-rich countries. 
The CBD has established its own CHM. The first priority of this portal is to ensure universal 
access to the Convention's official records, but also additional information such as case 
studies, national reports etc. It seeks to increase public awareness of Convention programs 
and issues. The internet-based system supports and facilitates greater collaboration among 
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countries through education and training projects, research co-operation, funding 
opportunities, access to and transfer of technology, and dissemination of information. 
Experts are being linked to facilitate joint work programs. The CHM can support scientific and 
technical co-operation through the provision of an information management and exchange 
system and can therefore support technology and knowledge transfer (SCBD 2005, 222ff). 
5.2.2.6 Projects and standardized contracts 
Governments of user countries can support the development and execution of projects by 
aiming at the promotion of co-operation between users and providers and the development 
of standardized material transfer agreements. Supported projects and standardized model 
contracts decrease transaction costs arising from administrative complexity and decrease 
information deficiencies. Furthermore, the bargaining position of provider countries is 
consolidated. Governmental institutions monitor these projects and can ensure that users 
comply with the CBD. Providers will be more confident about their partners if the ABS 
negotiations take place in the framework of such a project. By participating in such projects, 
users can gain reputation and constitute a positive example. The developed contracts can be 
made available for other users. The Bonn Guidelines already identify high transaction costs 
and legal uncertainty as major problems in ABS negotiations and regard the development of 
standardized material transfer agreements and benefit-sharing arrangements for similar 
resources and similar uses as important instruments to address these problems (Bonn 
Guidelines IVD/42, b iv). 
An interesting approach is the initiative International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBG), 
which was launched already in 1992 by three agencies of the US Government (National 
Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, and US Agency for International 
Development). The program supports bioprospecting projects between public and private US 
institutions and provider countries (Boisvert / Vivien 2005, 466). The projects underlie a 
certain design that includes the active participation of host country individuals and 
organizations from the planning stage onward, multi-disciplinary research on diseases of 
both local and international significance, local training and infrastructure development in drug 
discovery and biodiversity management, biodiversity inventory and monitoring, and equitable 
intellectual property and benefit-sharing arrangements (Rosenthal 1996, 1996). 
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5.2.2.7 Technology transfer 
Technology transfer from user countries to provider countries is seen as a major element of 
the benefit-sharing process and necessary to set incentives at the local level to conserve and 
sustainably use biodiversity. Technology transfer is a non-monetary benefit-sharing 
instrument and has the potential to bridge the gap, emerging from the time lags between the 
bioprospecting activities and the development of a marketable product. If provider countries 
are enabled to contribute to the research and development phase of a product, their 
bargaining position and market power is strengthened.  
Technology transfer into different sectors, e.g., agriculture, fishery, or forestry, does not only 
support benefit-sharing but also the other two objectives of the CBD: conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. Only with the relevant technologies, countries are able to 
fulfill these objectives. 
A meeting, organized by UNEP and Norway, on technology transfer within the CBD identified 
problems, which need to be addressed to support the CBD objectives by technology transfer: 
• Insufficiently receptive social and economic conditions to allow successful technology 
transfer and capacity building; 
• Inadequacy of information on available technologies; 
• Uncertainty with respect to terms under which technology transfer could and should 
be undertaken; 
• Lack of appropriate regulatory, financial, and institutional frameworks at the local, 
national, regional and international levels; 
• Achieving improved and better-targeted technology transfer and capacity building will 
require developing concrete targets and improved synergies between biodiversity 
and development policies, with obligations and needs under other conventions, and 
between sectors at the national level. 
Technology transfer depends on the enabling environment. Legal and political security has to 
be ensured, responsible institutions established and property rights defined and assigned 
(UNEP 2003, 9). 
Depending on the countries’ initial situation, different forms of technology transfer are 
required. Simple technologies, for example, improving agriculture and forestry techniques, 
help to alleviate urgent environmental problems and poverty. Transfer of advanced 
technologies, e.g., biotechnology promoting more value added research and development 
activities with genetic resources, enable provider countries to strengthen their position in the 
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market by offering more developed and advanced products instead of raw genetic material. 
Besides, the provision of processed material would make it easier to certify the resources 
being accessed within a certificate scheme. 
5.2.2.8 Implementation of conflict resolution, arbitration and redress mechanisms 
Monitoring deficits are a major problem that leads to asymmetric information and its 
consequences. Adequate conflict resolution, arbitration and redress mechanisms can 
mitigate this problem. For instance, if providers can be sure that they can enforce their rights, 
they will not react with over-regulation. ABS agreements contain contract terms that can be 
violated by both providers and users. Providers are usually the first who meet the contract 
conditions by the provision of genetic material. They usually do not have the capacities to 
control the meeting of the commitments of the users of genetic resources. The difficulties 
even increase, once the genetic resources have left the jurisdiction of the country of origin. 
Being aware of this situation provider countries often react with establishing more restricted 
access regulations.  
Control mechanisms as the monitoring of IPRs applications and the assistance of third 
parties (i.e., access to information, communication of patent applications, additional 
investigation of infringement, provision of visas and legal aid) can help to identify 
infringements on the part of the users and to provide important information to the countries of 
origin whose laws have been violated. User countries’ focal points could play a facilitator role 
by providing information, including the legal system of their country (EU Commission 2003, 
22). With the support of these instruments conflict resolution, arbitration and redress 
mechanisms can be applied. 
In many user countries redress mechanisms for breaches of contracts already exist and 
enable providers to take legal action against misappropriation of genetic resources. The 
applicable law and the competent authority are usually defined in the ABS contract and 
belong to the juridical system of the provider or user states. Despite the regulation, problems 
can arise if one party wants to enforce its claims by legal action (EU Commission 2003, 21). 
If the law of the provider country is the applicable law and the competent authority is also 
settled there, the prosecution of the violation of national ABS law by a foreign company can 
be impossible or difficult in case the company has no assets in the provider country and is 
not available for court procedure. Then, provider countries depend on the enforcement of the 
court decision in user countries. The handling of the enforcement of a foreign court decision 
is possible, but it is different in the user countries. Whether a court decision will be 
enforceable or not, usually depends on various factors (e.g., procedural fairness, reciprocity). 
5 The effectiveness of ABS: critical factors and addressing measures 161 
The decision is made from case to case (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 36). If the 
prosecution is carried out in the user countries, difficulties that arise out of the enforcement of 
foreign court decisions can be avoided. Additionally, the opportunities of higher awards in 
case of tort actions have to be considered (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 37). But this 
approach probably fails due to the lack of financial and human capacity on the part of the 
provider countries to enforce their rights in the user country.  
The procedure of alternative systems, as for example, arbitration or the establishment of an 
independent ombudsman at the CBD Secretariat, can also be considered. They are normally 
faster, less costly, do not necessarily require legal representation, and do not hold the risk of 
high costs if the lawsuit is lost. Probably the most important advantage is that both parties 
have to consent to the process and the arbitration result (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 
36). 
Arbitration in the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States is an alternative instrument that 
could be used to address infringements of the users and solve a dispute between providers 
and users of genetic resources (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 36). 
An ombudsman or a complaints authority associated with the CBD at regional and national 
levels provides an interesting possibility for the development of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. An ombudsman office at the level of CBD may be linked to series of regional 
structures for monitoring compliance with the CBD and Bonn Guidelines in ABS agreements 
(UC 2003). 
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6 Implementation of ABS regulations in provider and user 
countries 
This chapter applies the developed analytical framework to assess ABS effectiveness to four 
case studies and analyzes which of and how successfully the identified measures for 
addressing the critical factors are already implemented. Hereby, it allows analyzing the 
strengths and weaknesses of current ABS regimes in provider countries and user countries. 
It ascertains implemented methods and future options for measures that can be undertaken 
by countries in their capacity as providers and users of genetic resources and therefore, 
explores the perspectives for ABS governance under an international regime. The main 
source of information of these case studies are qualitative interviews with relevant 
stakeholders in the respective countries.  
The study applies a multilevel approach by examining the effectiveness of global ABS 
governance. Whereas the previous chapters focused on the general global framework 
conditions, this chapter centers the attention on the national and regional level where the 
implementation takes place. The findings and results are not only limited to the case studies 
investigated in this study. The analytic framework, consisting of the objectives and the critical 
factors, can be applied to a range of country case studies that are faced with the 
implementation of the ABS concept. Only with such an analytic framework a comparative 
analysis of different case studies is possible. The case studies provide insightful experiences 
for other provider and user countries. Since the underlying questions of this study are 
coherent with the questions international policy-makers are faced with, the results of the 
study support the political discussions and negotiations and propose options for further 
proceedings.  
The four case studies (the Philippines, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, and the EU) together with the 
analytical framework in chapter 5 are the core of the study. They provide the empirical insight 
to the problem of biodiversity loss and the ABS concept and they are the empirical bedding 
and completion for the development of the critical factors, which are based on both economic 
theory and empirical findings.  
The regulations in Costa Rica and the Philippines have been taken as an example to provide 
insights into existing ABS regimes. Both countries implemented the ABS provisions of the 
CBD quite early. Costa Rica established the institutional infrastructure and concluded ABS 
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agreements even before the CBD was signed. A legal framework was only adopted in 1998. 
The Philippines were the first country finalizing and implementing a legal ABS framework, 
which has already been revised in the beginning of 2005. These two countries look back on 
long lasting but different experiences. Costa Rica is internationally regarded as a model 
nation with a view to ABS and environmental measures, whereas the Philippines had major 
difficulties in realizing the CBD objectives. In the following, it is analyzed how the critical 
factors, which have been derived from the theoretical framework, in these countries are 
shaped and how their ABS regulations address them. Ethiopia has only very recently 
adopted an ABS regulation. However, the awareness of the Ethiopian government regarding 
ABS is high. Especially on the international level, Ethiopia is an important actor. The drafts of 
ABS laws have been discussed for a long time but in the beginning of 2006, the Ethiopian 
government finally adopted a regulation. Therefore, Ethiopia represents many of the 
countries being rich in biodiversity and being a party of the CBD but having political and 
institutional difficulties to implement its provisions.  
Since the countries’ geographical location and their approaches to implement ABS differ 
extremely, the selected case studies appear to be very useful. Users are an indispensable 
part of an international ABS regime. However, only little information is available on user 
issues. Therefore, this study considers and integrates them. The EU serves as an example 
of a user country community. This case study is mainly a desktop study, but enriched with 
information gathered in workshops and conferences. Many European member states have a 
strong research and development capacity and distinct and diverse user sectors, including a 
wide range of different sectors, as for example, pharmaceuticals, agribusiness, cosmetics. At 
the same time the EU has been actively involved in the negotiation within the CBD and tried 
to support communication between users and providers. The last subchapter investigates if 
the introduction of certain user or user country measures in the EU can fulfill the 
requirements, which are derived from the identified critical factors. 
6.1 The Philippines 
The Philippines is the first case study that was undertaken. In the following subchapters, the 
analytic framework, comprising the critical factors and the potential measures, is applied. 
First of all, the case study methodology is shortly presented. Then, the introduction to the 
Philippine case is given and the regulatory environment, including the legal and institutional 
setting, is illustrated. The main part of the Philippine analysis is the application of the critical 
factors to the country-specific case. Taking into account the established analytic framework 
regarding the effectiveness (cf. chapter 5), it is looked at how the critical factors are shaped 
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and how they are already addressed in the Philippines. The analysis of the first case study 
finishes with the country-specific conclusions. 
6.1.1 Case study methodology 
The Philippines serve as a country case study because the ABS implementation is 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the country has a long-time experience in ABS 
implementation. On the other hand, the implementation seems to be very ineffective. Since 
1995, only two bioprospecting agreements have been concluded; one for scientific research 
and one for commercial uses. In order to address the implementation problems the 
Philippines have revised their ABS regulation and recently adopted the second generation of 
ABS laws. That experience gives them a considerable lead over other provider countries. 
The case of the Philippines is evaluated by using the critical factors identified above. It is 
analyzed whether the critical factors or their interdependency can explain the obvious low 
effectiveness of the Philippine regime: low access rate, on-going loss of biodiversity and no 
benefit-sharing. The development of the new ABS regulation is considered although it was 
adopted after the interviews took place. The data are based on expert interviews, conducted 
in the Philippines between March and May 2002. Semi-structured interviews were used as 
the method of gathering and analyzing qualitative data (cf. chapter 1.3). Throughout the 
interviewing process, different thematic areas in line with the identified critical factors were 
addressed. 27 experts were interviewed who represent the variety of stakeholders, including 
individuals, communities, government, universities, NGOs, scientific institutions and industry 
involved in the ABS process or having expertise related to the ABS issue (cf. list in the 
appendix). Additionally, secondary literature, including books, journal articles, and reports, is 
used to complement the information gained from the interviews. 
6.1.2 Introduction 
The Philippines belong to the so-called “biodiversity hotspots”. They have regions with high 
biodiversity and a remarkable number of endemic species. Nevertheless, these regions can 
also be described as areas, having a high decline of habitats of these species (Myers et al. 
2000). The extinction rates in the Philippines are unparalleled in Southeast Asia.  
The diversity of ecosystems in the Philippines is extraordinary. About 13,500 plant species 
can be found in Philippine forests. They represent five percent of the world’s flora. The 
flowering plants are estimated to be between 8,000 and 12,000 species in 200 families and 
1,500 genera; 20 percent is unknown while 27 to 75 percent is endemic (PAWB 1998, 2). 
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Beside plant diversity, the diversity of animals (i.e., vertebrates and invertebrates), 
freshwater ecosystems, costal and marine ecosystems, and agricultural plants is very high. 
The spectra of ecological niches or habitat types support high species diversity. The number 
of species is estimated to be more than 53,577. High species endemism is observed among 
flowering plants, algae, lycopsids, ferns, amphibians, birds, and mammals. 
Protected areas amount to 7.8 percent of the total land area in the Philippines (WRI 2003). 
Nevertheless, Philippine forest cover has been reduced from more than 50 percent to less 
than 24 percent between 1948 and 1987 (PAWB 1998, 1-4). Today 19.4 percent of the land 
is covered by forests. According to FAO estimations, the annual deforestation rate is 1.4 
percent (FAO 2003). Only about five percent of the country’s coral reefs remain in excellent 
condition and about 80 percent of its mangrove areas have been lost. It has been estimated 
that about 50 percent of national parks are no longer biologically important (PAWB 1998, 1-
4). 
The major threat for biodiversity in the Philippines is the habitat destruction due to conversion 
of forest and grasslands for agricultural and urban use and due to overexploitation (i.e., over-
logging) (Liebig et al. 2002, 31). Governmental and non-governmental organizations reacted 
in the late 1980s and developed strategies to halt the loss of forests and biodiversity. Various 
environmental policies and biodiversity conservation programs have been formulated. In 
1992 the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Law was adopted and laid 
down the basis for a comprehensive protected area system (Benavidez 2004, 154). In order 
to effectively implement such conservation measures the Philippines depend on external 
support. The same applies to ABS regulations. The development of ABS laws and their 
implementation have been supported by development agencies, e.g., Gesellschaft für 
technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)21. In the Philippines a legal ABS framework was 
developed and adopted shortly after the adoption of the CBD. But it seems that actual 
implementation could not keep up with the legislative input and was not able to effectively 
address the problem of biodiversity loss. 
The establishment of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Regional Centre 
for Biodiversity Conservation (ARCBC) in the Philippines indicates again a strong 
commitment to the increasing willingness to actively address the problem of biodiversity loss. 
The centre serves as an institutional linkage among ASEAN member countries and between 
                                               
21
 The GTZ has supported several projects that aim at advancing the implementation of the CBD, for example, 
“Support in Implementing Presidential Executive Order EO 247 on the Access to Genetic Resources”, 
“Supporting Local Initiatives in Palawan at Implementing National ABS Regulations” and the “Bioprospecting 
Programme”, which has the objective to raise awareness among indigenous and local communities about the 
impacts of bioprospecting (cf. http://www2.gtz.de/biodiv/english/index.html). 
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ASEAN and EU partner organizations to enhance the capacity of ASEAN in promoting 
biodiversity conservation. It aims to support biodiversity conservation through improved co-
operation in the Asian region, by assisting in setting up a network of institutional links among 
ASEAN countries and between ASEAN and EU partner organizations. The centre should 
assist the ASEAN member countries in developing a framework for improving technical and 
institutional approaches through regional co-operation for managing biodiversity conservation 
(ARCBC 2006). 
6.1.3 Regulatory environment: legal and institutional setting 
In 1995 the Philippine government reacted as the first country to the adoption of the CBD’s 
ABS provisions and implemented them by the Presidential Executive Order 247 (EO 247)22, 
which was still a general framework. One year later the Department Administrative Order 96-
20 (DAO 96-20)23 was developed as the EO 247’s implementing rules and regulations. 
Before their implementation, an administrative coordination and permitting system, which 
was executed by the National Museum of the Philippines but which was not in compliance 
with the CBD, regulated the collection of wildlife species (Benavidez 2004, 154). 
EO 247 is based on the constitution’s provision, which vests the state the responsibility to 
preserve the environment and assigns the ownership over wildlife, flora, and fauna to state. It 
covers the prospecting of biological and genetic material in the public domain, including 
natural growths in private lands. Consequently, the state regulates ABS for biological 
resources, existing within the Philippine territory. EO 247 aims to regulate bioprospecting in 
compliance with the CBD. It should benefit the national interest and promote the 
development of local capability in science and technology to achieve technological self-
reliance in selected areas (EO 247, Section 1). Its scope is very comprehensive. It covers the 
prospecting of biological and genetic resources, their by-products and derivatives for 
scientific and commercial purposes. The DAO 96-20 defines bioprospecting as research, 
collection and utilization of biological and genetic resources, for purposes of applying the 
knowledge derived there from for scientific and commercial purposes (DAO 96-20, 2.1 h). 
 
 
                                               
22
 EO 247: Prescribing Guidelines and Establishing a Regulatory Framework for the Prospecting of Biological and 
Genetic Resources, their By-Products and Derivatives, for Scientific and Commercial Purposes, and for Other 
Purposes. 
23
 DAO 96-20: Implementing Rules and Regulations on the Prospecting of Biological and Genetic Resources. 
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The regulation system of the EO 247 contains four basic elements:  
• Scheme of mandatory research agreements between the government and collectors, 
• Setup of an Inter Agency Committee for Biological and Genetic Resources (IACBGR), 
• Regulation on achieving PIC from local communities, and 
• Requirements to conform with environmental protection (La Vina / Caleda / Baylon 
1997).  
To carry out bioprospecting activities, the Philippine government and the applicant have to 
negotiate an agreement based on mutually agreed terms. Such a contract can cover either 
scientific research or commercial research. Contracts about scientific research, called 
Academic Research Agreement (ARA), are usually concluded with national research 
institutions (e.g., universities) and valid for five years, whereas contracts about commercial 
research, called Commercial Research Agreements (CRA), are concluded with national and 
international companies as well as international scientific research institutions for a period of 
three years. In this case, the collection and use of the material is categorized as commercial 
even if a foreign research institution intends to collect the material only for scientific 
purposes. In order to enter an agreement the foreign applicant has to establish and 
financially support a research co-operation with Philippine researchers. ARAs provide more 
flexibility than CRAs. For example, local researchers who are affiliated to an institution 
holding an ARA are allowed to conduct research under the agreement. However, these 
researchers have to comply with the obligations of the ARA, as for example, obtaining of PIC 
(EO 247, Section 3). 
PIC plays an important role in the Philippine bioprospecting regulation and in the application 
process. The submission of a PIC certificate is a precondition for the conclusion of any 
agreement and consequently for the access and collection permission. The applicant has to 
obtain the declaration of consent, depending on the distribution of property rights, from 
indigenous or local communities, private landowners or in the case of nature protection areas 
from the Protected Area Management Board. Therefore, she/he has to inform these 
concerned groups about her/his intentions and the scope of the bioprospecting activities and 
ask them for consent (DAO 96-20, Section 7). 
Under the EO 247 the IACBGR is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the 
ABS regulations. The committee consists of representatives of the affected government 
departments (Environment, Agriculture, Science and Technology, Health and Foreign 
Affairs), the science communities as well as non-governmental and people’s organizations. 
Supported by a technical secretariat, the IACBGR is responsible for the application process. 
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Besides, it advises the affected government departments with reference to the final signing of 
the contract and supervises the compliance. Since 1996, the IACBGR has processed eight 
applications for CRA and 17 for ARA. Only one CRAs and one ARA have been approved so 
far (Benavidez 2004, 157).  
The commercial agreement has been signed between the Marine Science Institute of the 
University of the Philippines and the US Utah University. The project, named “Anti-Cancer 
Agents from Unique Natural Products Sources” aimed at the collection of funicates, sponges, 
and other invertebrate samples for biological assays to screen for potential bioactive 
compounds. The application was submitted in February 1997 and the project was approved 
June 1998. In the other cases, the applications have been withdrawn or are still pending. The 
ARA was approved for the University of the Philippines on “Conservation-related studies as 
part of thesis requirements” in 1998. The commercial agreement has not lead to a 
marketable product so far, and the Philippine government as the contracting partner hasn’t 
received any monetary compensation, apart from a low bioprospecting fee.  
The approach of the EO 247 and its implementation has been widely criticized by national 
and international users of genetic resources. Many local scientists criticized EO 247 for its 
very broad scope (Liebig et al. 2002, 38). The law regulates not only bioprospecting, but also 
collecting and sampling. Any kind of collection, research and utilization of biological 
resources, including research on conservation, is covered by it. As a consequence, access to 
biodiversity is impeded as well as any national and international research related to 
biodiversity. Local scientists who were interviewed stressed that foreign users of biodiversity 
complain about the time-consuming, intransparent, bureaucratic, and costly application 
process. Therefore, they opt to other countries. 
In 2001, the Republic Act No. 9147 Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act 
(hereafter Wildlife Act) was adopted to respond to the problems that were aligned with the 
EO 247. The Wildlife Act is a general wildlife protection law with focus on biodiversity 
conservation. It aims at conserving wildlife and habitats, enhancing biodiversity, regulating 
collections and trade of wildlife, implementing international commitments and supporting 
scientific research in the area of biodiversity. Its implementing rules and regulations were 
developed in 2004 through the Joint DENR-DA-PCSD24 Administrative Order No. 1. 
The Wildlife Act deals only in two section (14: bioprospecting and 15: scientific researches) 
with bioprospecting. However, it enormously changes the existing procedures. It defines 
                                               
24
 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Agriculture (DA), Palawan Council 
for sustainable development (PCSD) 
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bioprospecting as research, collection, and utilization of biological and genetic resources for 
purposes of applying the knowledge derived there from solely for commercial purposes 
(Wildlife Act Section 5a). Any bioprospecting activity requires the negotiations of MAT and 
the obtaining of PIC of the concerned person or community. 
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) has the jurisdiction over all 
terrestrial plant and animal species. The Department of Agriculture (DA) has the jurisdiction 
over all declared aquatic critical habitats, all aquatic resources. In the province of Palawan, 
comprehensive jurisdiction is vested to the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development 
(PCSD). In case bioprospecting takes place, the Chairperson of the PCSD, as authorized by 
the Council, shall be a co-signatory to the bioprospecting agreement (Wildlife Act Section 
19). 
As far as bioprospecting is concerned, the Act addresses most of the concerns or criticisms 
made against EO 247 (Benavidez 2004, 165). It amends the provision on ARAs under the 
EO 247 in a way that a permit system in accordance with the Wildlife Act covers non-
commercial research using biological resources. It explicitly delegates the power to decide 
about the approval of applications to the secretary of DENR or DA who are supported by a 
technical committee of experts. Thus, the IACBGR created under the EO 247 is deemed 
dissolved. PIC and provisions for benefit-sharing as well as the emphasis of the participation 
of local researchers in the bioprospecting, research and development activities remain as 
primary requirements for bioprospecting.  
In the beginning of January 2005, Guidelines for Bioprospecting Activities in the Philippines 
(hereafter Bioprospecting Guidelines) have been approved to harmonize the inconsistency 
between EO 247 and the Wildlife Act. The Guidelines aim to streamline the procedure for 
access and to facilitate compliance thereto by legitimate resource users, to provide 
guidelines for obtaining PIC and for the negotiations, and to establish a cost-effective, 
efficient, transparent and standardized system for monitoring compliance with the ABS 
provisions (Bioprospecting Guidelines, Section 4). 
The Guidelines, jointly signed by DENR, DA, PCSD, NCIP25, set a uniform procedure for 
evaluating and granting access to biological resources as well as avoiding the potential 
problem of inconsistency of bioprospecting regulations for various components of biodiversity 
under the management jurisdiction of different government agencies (i.e., DENR, DA and 
PCSD). Elements of the streamlining process are, for example, the reduction of the 
                                               
25
 National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) was added as co-signatory to the joint Administrative 
Order to ensure that the bioprospecting regulations shall apply to ancestral domains covered by the 
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 1997. 
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bureaucratic process in the review and approval of applications; the reduction of the number 
of days to review (from 30 days to 15 days) and the determination of a definite time line for 
the approval of bioprospecting applications (within 30 days).  
Regarding benefit-sharing, the Bioprospecting Guidelines determine that a bioprospecting 
fee, minimum amount of US$ 3,000 for each bioprospecting undertaking, accrue to the 
national government and should flow to the Wildlife Management Fund or Protected Area 
Fund. Local users that are not supported by foreign collaborators or investors pay only ten 
percent of this amount. Up-front payments shall accrue to the resource providers. An annual 
user’s fee - US$1,000 per collection site - goes to resources providers directly. If a product is 
derived from the collected material, royalties shall be shared between the national 
government and the resource providers; and local governments shall share in the amounts 
received by the national government, consistent with the provisions of the Local Government 
Code26 (Bioprospecting Guidelines, Section 14). The royalties amount to two percent of 
global gross sales of products (minimum); 25 percent goes to national government and 75 
percent to resource providers.  
The bilingual annex of the Bioprospecting Guidelines provides helpful documents, as for 
example, standards terms and conditions, MTA, PIC certificate, checklist of process and 
content indicators, compliance to proper procurement of PIC and certificate of acceptance. 
Instrumental penalties are, e.g., civil liability under contracts law, criminal liability under the 
Wildlife Act, a blacklist published locally and internationally, and a report to the CBD 
secretariat on misappropriation. 
The ASEAN Framework Agreement 
Besides the national framework, the Philippines are also integrated in a regional framework. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 in 
Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Today ten countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) are members. 
The association aims to accelerate the economic growth, social progress, and cultural 
development in the Asian region and to promote regional peace and stability. ASEAN deals 
also with transnational issues concerning the environment, as for instance, nature 
conservation and biodiversity.  
                                               
26
 The Local Government Code from 1991 establishes a system of provincial, city, municipal and barangay 
governments in the Philippines. It is the governing law on local governments.  
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In September 1997 at the 8th meeting of ASEAN, the Senior Officials on the Environment 
(ASOEN) requested the ASEAN Working Group on Nature Conservation (AWGNC) to 
develop a common protocol for member countries on access to genetic resources and IPRs. 
This process took quite some time and is not finalized yet. In June 2000 during the 10th 
Meeting of the AWGNC, the member countries were requested to provide comments on the 
draft of a framework agreement with a view to finalizing the draft by the 11th Meeting of the 
AWGNCB. Finally, at its 14th meeting of ASOEN the draft framework agreement was 
reviewed and recommended for the consideration of the Ministers at their 8th Informal 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (IAMME). In October 2004 some countries 
requested more time to review and to consult at the national level and to complete the 
national process for signature. Therefore, at the 8th IAMME the ministers agreed to expedite 
the signing of the Agreement due to the delay in the national signing processes. 
The key provisions of the agreement are: 
• The agreement’s objectives broaden the CBD’s provisions: the agreement aims to set 
minimum standards for regulating ABS, to strengthen national initiatives, to provide a 
forum for inter-regional co-operation, to strengthen the voice of Parties in related 
international agreements and negotiations; 
• Transboundary existence of genetic resources: it is required that if biological and 
genetic resources are indigenous to two or more Parties, the Parties may collectively 
discuss the terms and conditions of ABS and how to share the benefits; 
• Obligation of the parties to take legislative, administrative or policy measures to 
regulate ABS, to establish procedures for granting PIC (involve resource providers) 
and to disseminate information on access regulation, applications, etc.; 
• Establishment of a regional Clearing House Mechanism: it should provide relevant 
information subject to appropriate confidentiality provisions, and terms and conditions 
that may be imposed by the Party providing the information; it should also provide 
technical and legal support to the competent national authorities, and it should be 
used to establish a database of biological and genetic resources and their associated 
traditional knowledge; 
• Establishment of a common fund for biodiversity conservation, which is administered 
by the Secretariat but which depends on voluntary contributions (ASEAN Framework 
Agreement 2000). 
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6.1.4 Assigning property and intellectual property rights 
In the Philippines all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other 
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and 
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state (Constitution of the Philippines 
1987, Art. XII). The state has the responsibility to preserve and protect the environment 
(Constitution of the Philippines 1987, Art. II). The Wildlife Act assigns the jurisdiction over the 
resources to DENR, DA and PCSD. They represent the resource providers in the 
negotiations. Although the definition and assignment is clear, interviewees mentioned that 
there are competing right holders. One example that was given is the island Palawan that is 
governed by special law according to biodiversity. Palawan has its own Council for 
Sustainable Development being responsible for environmental issues in the region, but the 
local government follows national government, because it is a province of the Philippines. 
Another example is the overlapping of ancestral domain and land rights and provincial 
access regulations. 
In the interviews it became clear that many commercial users have criticized the Philippine 
ABS negotiations because of the unrealistic expectations regarding the potential benefits on 
the provider side. Nevertheless, it became also clear that most of the interviewed NGOs think 
that commercial users can pay more than they offer to do. The views on the expected 
benefits and the amount of compensation diverge. The EO 247 and the DAO 96-20 do not 
provide any indicator regarding the benefits for the negotiations and leave this to the 
negotiators. It is only stated that all discoveries of commercial products and technology 
derived from the resources shall be made available to the Philippine government and that the 
benefits shall be shared equitably among the government, the Integrated Protected Areas 
Fund (IPAF), the local communities or the individual if the resource comes from private 
property (DAO 96-20, Section 8). The new regulations set a framework for these 
negotiations. If a bioprospecting undertaking is concluded, the government (i.e., the 
implementing agency) receives a bioprospecting fee, whereas up-front payments accrue to 
the resource providers. Annual royalties (i.e., a minimum of two percent of total global gross 
sales) are shared between the national government (25 percent) and the resource providers 
(75 percent). Local governments should share the amounts received by the national 
government, consistent with the provisions of the Local Government Code. For monetary 
benefits intended for the local community, it should be ensured that the funds received are 
used solely for biodiversity conservation or environmental protection, including alternative or 
supplemental livelihood opportunities for community members. Non-monetary benefits may 
be agreed upon by the resource user and resource providers as addition to the minimum 
benefits provided.  
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In the Philippines individuals on the local level do not hold property rights over biological 
material, all natural resources are owned by the state. This property rights distribution 
hampers rent capturing by resource providers. Only if the ones, being in charge of using and 
conserving biological resources and bearing the conservation costs, are included in the 
negotiations and participate in the benefits through a clear distribution of property rights, they 
have a real incentive to protect and conserve biodiversity. However, PIC has been a very 
strong instrument in the Philippines and many interviewed stakeholders from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) stress that this principle has to remain as the heart of 
the Philippine ABS regulation. The final decision about access is left entirely to the 
communities and they can negotiate potential benefits. The PIC in the Philippines is 
controversial debated. In the interviews, the local researchers complained about the 
expensive PIC obligations. In the only CRA the Philippine researchers had to obtain eight 
PICs in advance for the first year because they wanted to collect at different sites and many 
communities were concerned. For foreign users it would be impossible to carry out this 
activity because of language problems and the lack of knowledge of the local conditions. 
Identifying the communities that have to give PIC is very difficult. It is obvious that there is a 
trade-off between strengthening the property rights of the local level and increasing the 
transaction costs of users. The new Bioprospecting Guidelines maintain the principle and 
stress the importance of increased resource holder participation. They even specify a 
benefit-sharing distribution system, but it has to be awaited for if the regulations will 
effectively be implemented. 
Looking from the beginning of the value chain to the end, IPRs also play an important role in 
the Philippines. The Philippines are a member of the WTO. The national law implementing 
the minimum standards set by TRIPs is the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines 
(IPC), Republic Act No. 8293. The criteria of product patentability are new, inventive, and 
industrially applicable. This means that the Philippines allow users of genetic resources to 
obtain strong property rights on the products derived from genetic resources. Plant varieties 
and animal breeds are excluded from patentability. To fulfill the TRIPS obligation of a sui 
generis system in 2002, the country adopted the Philippine Plant Variety Protection (PVP) 
law to provide protection over plant varieties. According to the UPOV Convention, the 
protection criteria are new, distinct, uniform and stable (Benavidez 2004, 167). Therefore, 
also in the case of plants the Philippine law gives users the opportunity to protect their 
breeds. Some NGO representatives criticized the patenting of life forms (including 
microorganisms) and the PVP in the interviews. They reject patenting on life forms for ethical 
and moral reasons, but also because they think that the Philippines cannot benefit from such 
a system because it is not sufficiently advanced regarding research and development to 
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make use of it. With the adoption of the IPC and the PVP, the Philippines have complied with 
the WTO obligations. No disclosure of origin requirement is established, whereas the new 
Bioprospecting Guidelines stress it as a major control instrument. However, the Guidelines 
are not based on the existence of an IPR system. For example, joint ownership over IPRs is 
not determined as a benefit-sharing element. 
6.1.5 Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry can be identified as the strongest critical factor in this case. It 
appears on all identified levels. Firstly, it occurs pre-contractually because providers expect 
higher benefits than users are willing to pay. According to the interviews, the users in the 
Philippines complain that NGOs expect unrealistic benefits. However, it appeared that the 
claim for higher benefits has not diffused into the negotiations. The CRA covers only a 
royalty rate (five percent) in case of commercialization but no other monetary benefits, and 
the interviews of the concerned parties document that benefit-sharing was not a considerable 
problem in the negotiations. The expectations on the two sides were not diverged. However, 
it has to be kept in mind that the Philippine Marine Science Institute is an equal partner of the 
Utah University and has self-interest in the negotiations. It was also in their interest to keep 
the monetary benefits for the government and communities low to being able to conduct the 
research. 
Post-contractual information asymmetries are a more substantial problem. Being aware of 
the post-contractual information deficiencies on the provider side, the application procedure 
has been designed in a very risk-averse manner. It is obvious that with the EO 247 the 
Philippines over-regulated ABS and developed a quite inflexible and limiting ABS regime due 
to its bad experiences and the limited capacity to control users’ behavior. One industry 
representative said in the interviews that everybody doing research in the Philippines is 
regarded as a “biopirate”. The system was so restrictive that it discouraged even local 
researchers to collect biological material for scientific purpose. Instead of facilitating access 
to their genetic resources and developing effective strategies to prevent misappropriation, 
the Philippines disrupted any kind of research – commercial and scientific – related to the 
collection of biological resources. 
The new Bioprospecting Guidelines promise to address this problem. Instead of very 
restrictive rules, compliance and monitoring instruments are established. Monitoring is mainly 
carried out by the implementing agencies, but can be supported by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs (DFA) (including embassies and missions) and the Department of Science 
and Technology (DOST), especially regarding the monitoring of inventions and the 
6 Implementation of ABS regulations in provider and user countries 175
commercialization that is undertaken in foreign countries. It is expected that these institutions 
have greater ability to deal with the prevention of biological resources from entering countries 
without a bioprospecting contract, to control the compliance of the disclosure requirement of 
country of origin in patent applications, and to enforce the claims against collectors or 
commercializing entities. It is hoped that DFA and DOST are able to establish and maintain 
contacts with users of biological material of the Philippines and create trust between the 
partners. 
The main monitoring instrument is, however, that the bioprospecting guidelines still require 
the co-operation with a national partner. No bioprospecting activity can be conducted by a 
foreign user, unless a local collaborator has been engaged to participate. From a 
development policy perspective, this requirement is very positive, but it needs competent 
institutions to be successful. Other monitoring instruments are reporting requirements, which 
include the submission of an annual progress report to the implementing agencies by the 
user (e.g., on status of the procurement of PIC, progress of collection of samples, benefit-
sharing negotiations, progress on payment of benefits or other provisions of the contract). 
The Guidelines provide several model certificates, which the resource user should use as 
proof of compliance and submit to DENR, DA or PCSD regional representatives. The 
certificates attest proper procurement of PIC, delivery of benefit-sharing agreements (i.e., the 
acceptance by resource providers of the monetary and/or non-monetary benefits provided in 
the agreement) and collection quota. In order to monitor whether the benefit-sharing 
agreement can be considered fair and equitable, a model of a checklist of process and 
content indicators is provided by the Bioprospecting Guidelines. The contracting parties and 
other stakeholders can use it. Besides, the Philippines seem to rely on the support of the civil 
society, especially NGOs and Peoples Organizations, and encourage them to support the 
monitoring activities within the country but also abroad. 
The information deficiencies on the user side have only slightly been addressed. Until the 
new regulation was adopted, users could not be sure that the shared benefits are invested in 
environmental protection and that they receive exclusive and high-quality material. According 
to the new regulation, benefits should be used for environmental protection, but with a view 
to exclusivity no regulation has been formulated. Regarding the quality they have some idea. 
Since users can carry out self-collection under supervision of Philippine researcher, they 
have an influence on the material they obtain and of which quality it is. 
The on-going loss of biodiversity cannot indicate the willingness of the Philippine government 
to protect biodiversity. No mechanisms are in place to determine how local communities and 
individuals can benefit except through the PIC. Besides, since even local researchers have 
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been accused of being biopirates, foreign users are uncertain how to fulfill the Philippine 
requirements. One researcher in the National Museum who has the mandate to conduct 
basic taxonomic research complained in the interview that he was accused of biopiracy 
because he assisted French scientists from the Paris National and History Museum to 
undertake a biodiversity assessment. They only had obtained PIC for one region (Sulu) 
where they finally did not go because they had changed plans to undertake the assessment 
in Palawan. According to the scientists of the National Museum, the Philippine researcher 
realized too late that the French researchers did not have the appropriate permit and had not 
contacted the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development. 
The interviews with governmental and non-governmental persons reveal that in the 
Philippines no mechanism exists to guarantee exclusiveness to the users. It is possible that 
different users collect in the same areas. From an economic point of view, exclusiveness is 
very important for commercial users. Therefore, users will opt to other countries that provide 
this security. 
6.1.6 Accounting for time lags 
Not many contracts have been negotiated. De facto only one commercial agreement has 
been concluded. This outcome is an essential weak point of the Philippine approach. The low 
number of concluded contracts reduces the chance of realizing these benefits, which 
constitute an incentive for conservation. The only CRA has been negotiated between the 
Department of Agriculture and the University of Utah (principal collector)/ Marine Science 
Institute of the University of the Philippines. Since it was negotiated before the Wildlife Act 
has been adopted it follows the EO 247. 
The agreement stipulates that the Utah University and the Marine Science Institute both will 
share non-monetary and monetary benefits. In the short term non-monetary benefits are 
dominant. The Marine Science Institute has benefited in the short-term through training, 
exchange, and technology transfer. In the long term, the Philippine government and resource 
providers should have access to all product discoveries deriving from the collected material, 
and all used technologies should be made freely available. If a product is developed from the 
collected material, five percent of the net revenue has to be paid to the DA. How local 
communities will participate in these royalties depends on the decision of the government. In 
all documents and publications referring to the collected materials and their improvement, the 
provider has to be acknowledged and the Philippines have to be disclosed as the country of 
origin. If a third party obtains IPRs, commercializes a discovery or technology derived from 
the material, a separate agreement between principal collector/co-collector and the third 
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party has to define the concrete sharing of royalties and other monetary benefits or 
technology (Liebig et al. 2002, 47). No up-front payments were made. The Philippine 
government receives only a small yearly bioprospection fee of Philippine Peso (PhP) 10,000 
(about US$ 200). The local communities benefit through education and training. It is not clear 
how they will benefit from monetary benefits, since it is regulated by the national government. 
So far, no monetary benefits, arising out of this agreement, have been received by the 
Philippines. The co-operation between local and international collector has created some 
non-monetary benefits in scientific education, but neither the resource providers nor the 
environment have benefited. 
Compared to the earlier regulation, the new Guidelines deal much more in detail with the 
issue of fair and equitable benefit-sharing. EO 247 and DAO 96-20 left these terms open for 
the negotiations between the responsible agency and the collector/ co-collector. New 
contracts will have more determined obligations, including annual up-front payments and 
royalties (two percent of total global gross sales of the products). Up-front payments as 
annual using fees can bridge the time lag at least somewhat and set an incentive to conserve 
biodiversity. 
6.1.7 Good governance in provider countries 
The general political situation is not bioprospecting-friendly. Poverty, economic stagnation, 
corruption, governmental incompetence, and conflicts with insurgents destabilize the political 
situation and decrease the Philippines’ attractiveness as a collection and research place. The 
World Bank Governance Indicators show a clear picture. All indicators reflect deterioration 
between 1998 and 2005. For instance, only 17.5 percent of the 213 countries and territories 
rate worth than the Philippines according to political stability. 
Table 13: World Bank Governance Indicators, Philippines (1998, 2005) 
Governance Indicator 1998 2005 
Voice and accountability 58.9 47.8 
Political stability/no violence 39.2 17.5 
Government effectiveness 63.2 55.5 
Regulatory quality 68.5 52.0 
Rule of law 55.3 38.6 
Control of corruption 50.5 37.4 
Source: Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi 2006 
However, compared to many other countries the Philippines do not lack an access 
legislation. It is quite the reverse. Due to its pioneer status, EO 247 and DAO 96-20 have 
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become quite popular on the international level. However, the frameworks have been 
vehemently criticized by national and international users of genetic resources due to its 
restrictive, overregulating and bureaucratic character. In the interviews, almost all 
stakeholders welcome the Philippine approach, but they also agree that it is too ambitious 
and complain about the complex procedures to implement it. The outcomes of the Philippine 
legislation already indicate vulnerability. Out of 14 CRA and 20 ARA applications27, only one 
CRA and one ARA have been approved. Some interested users even withdrew their 
application. 
Recently, the Philippines implemented the second generation of ABS laws and it is hoped 
that this regulation will provide more efficiency but also transparency. The responsibilities 
have been transferred to the ministries (DENR and DA) and the interagency committee has 
been removed. The inability of the committee to process applications is seen as a major 
weak point of the Philippine system. It has to be awaited if the governmental institutions will 
be able to cope with the additional burden. Now, all pending ARA applications will not be 
processed anymore in the EO 247 framework, but enter in a free permit system established 
by Wildlife Act. This indicates that biodiversity research and access to resources is 
facilitated. Pending CRAs will be processed under the new Bioprospecting Guidelines. It is 
foreseen to ensure that the funds are used solely for biodiversity conservation or 
environmental protection, including alternative or supplemental livelihood opportunities for 
community members. 
In order to increase their reputation and finally convince users to bioprospect in the 
Philippines, the country has to increase good governance, stabilize the political situation, and 
keep the promise of the new Bioprospecting Guidelines to streamline and improve the 
application process.  
6.1.8 Administrative complexity 
Administrative complexity was probably the main reason for the failure of EO 247. All 
interview partners confirmed that the application procedure, including the obtaining of the 
PIC put inappropriate burden on researchers and commercial users. The regulations were 
complex and restrictive, and adequate human and financial resources were missing to 
manage the challenge of implementing such a system. Researchers from the Marine Science 
Institute stressed that it took seven month until the CRA was concluded. When they tried to 
renew it, many problems came up: unsolved relationship of Wildlife Act and EO 247, no 
                                               
27
 6 of the CRA and 3 of the ARA applications were exempt from EO 247 coverage. 
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decision by the IACBGR because not all members were present when they discussed the 
application, and the lack of communication between the IACBGR and the applicant. An 
industry representative also states the problem that there is often no quorum because the 
members are not paid and they are all volunteers. Especially for the members that come 
from industry are concerned. In another interview, the researcher from the Marine Science 
Institute mentioned a second application for a CRA that was submitted in 1998. It is still 
pending. These researchers who are actually the only ones that undertake legally approved 
bioprospecting activities state that the procedure is very time-consuming and that not many 
foreign partners can accept this. Only because the Utah University is a long-term partner for 
more than 10 years and the Philippine applicant is a former colleague of the foreign partner, 
the collaboration works out. 
The new regulation dissolves the IACBGR, but the competencies and responsibilities are 
allocated to different agencies depending on the location of the collection or the type of 
resources. There is no main contact point for users that can facilitate communication. Taking 
into account that the concerned ministries are already occupied with many tasks, the 
additional task to process ABS applications can overburden them. An efficient execution 
would not be possible. In the interviews, the IACBGR has been mainly criticized because it 
consists of high-level governmental persons who have many responsibilities regarding other 
issues. The work of the IACBGR is often not their priority and they miss the meetings or do 
not fulfill their task. For example, in the case of the Marine Science Institute, the applicant did 
not receive comments on the draft of the CRA from the IACBGR and the process only 
advanced because the applicant did not give up and contacted several members of the 
IACBGR. The dissolution of the IACBGR alone cannot solve the problem of high 
administrative complexity. It depends now on the different agencies how they implement the 
new ABS provisions and if they provide additional financial and human resources.  
According to the guidelines, if necessary the implementing agencies should recommend 
qualified Philippine scientists as research collaborators to foreign users, but there are doubts 
that the governmental agencies are familiar with the scientific infrastructure in the country. An 
independent research institution would probably better informed and more competent in 
these issues. If this intermediation is inadequate, it can be expected that users will have 
difficulties in fulfilling this initial condition. 
Other factors that increase the administrative complexity are the broad scope and the 
timeframes. IACBGR also regulated all biological resources, including ex-situ collections 
although are they were not covered by EO 247 and DAO 96-20. No adequate regulations 
exist to deal with these resources. However, due to their special nature, they require a 
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specific system. The Wildlife Act has clarified this issue by defining its scope. According to 
the Guidelines, it applies to bioprospecting of any biological resource found in the Philippines 
including wildlife, microorganisms, domesticated or propagated species, exotic species, and 
ex-situ collections of biological resources sourced from the Philippines (Bioprospecting 
Guidelines 2004, Section 2). Nevertheless, the scope is still very broad and the concerned 
resources are still very diverse. 
Furthermore, it took at least five months to go through the process. However, even this 
timeframe was never kept. EO 247 set a 60-day requirement to obtain PIC after the research 
proposal had been submitted to a community. This requirement was removed in the Wildlife 
Act. However, incentives have to be established to accelerate the process since the 
regulation does not set maximum timeframes. The general process has also been 
streamlined, since a decision on the application has to be made fifteen working days after the 
receipt of complete requirements (Bioprospecting Guidelines, Section 8). 
6.1.9 Market structure 
Not only because of the global market structure the Philippines’ position in the market is quite 
weak. Ten years of restricting and not facilitating access have decreased the countries 
reputation as a reliable partner. One interview partner from the industry side stated ironically 
that the EO 247 is good for conferences and that the Philippines are the first in Asia, but that 
there are no results, that there is no conservation and no ABS. 
It is difficult to estimate the country’s position in the market, since only little empirical data 
about ABS research and development is available. The Philippines have only limited 
research and development capacity. The interviewed scientists see the Philippines 
advantage in marine and not plant genetic resources, since many countries in the South 
Asian region might have the same resources. Before users will become more interested in 
starting bioprospecting activities in the Philippines, the country has to prove that it is serious 
about changing the track, and that users’ transaction costs will significantly decrease. 
The Philippines are a member of ASEAN, which integrates the country in a regional context. 
Even if the Philippine legislation is already the most advanced in the region it can be 
expected that the country will also benefit by the adoption of the regional framework 
agreement. Regional co-operation regarding transboundary movements and dissemination of 
information will strengthen the countries position. Besides, the Philippines are a member of 
the group of megadiverse countries. The country can strengthen its position through 
coalitions. 
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6.1.10 Conclusions 
The Philippines serve as an example for a provider country that pioneered regarding the 
development of ABS legislation, but has not managed to establish an effective regime. Only 
two ABS contracts have been concluded and the government, researchers, or the resource 
holders have received no major benefits, monetary or non-monetary. Forests and biodiversity 
in the Philippines are still declining, which shows that there is also a lack of other instruments 
addressing the country’s environmental problems. 
The old regulation EO 247 could hardly address the critical factors. This can explain why the 
regulation could not establish an effective ABS regime. The new regulation handles some of 
the weak points others remain. They promise to streamline and improve the application 
process. Concrete and realistic expectations for benefits are recommended for the 
negotiations. Up-front payments that can partly overcome the time lag are more important 
and play a central role among the benefits in the guidelines. The information deficiencies are 
better addressed. The former system prevented misappropriation by restrictive regulations, 
whereas the new Bioprospecting Guidelines develop non-restrictive instruments to monitor 
and solve the problems arising out of the information deficiencies. The political situation is 
still the same, but the legal security can improve if the new system is effectively enforced.  
Nevertheless, the property rights system is unchanged. The state remains the owner of 
biological material in the Philippines and PIC is still a strong participation right. However, the 
new Bioprospecting Guidelines concretize how the benefits have to be shared with the local 
level. Administrative complexity and high entrance cost of users remain as a main problem. 
However, they are slightly reduced compared to the initial situation because the intersectoral 
committee has been abolished. Different ministries are responsible for processing ABS 
applications, which is confusing for applicants. However, the determined timeframes will 
definitely tighten the application process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Implementation of ABS regulations in provider and user countries 182
Table 14: Overview on the Philippines and the critical factors 
 Philippines 
Property rights State has property rights over biodiversity 
Local communities participate through strong PIC requirements 
Guidelines on benefit-sharing procedure 
Government receives bioprospecting fee, resource holders receive up-front 
payments 
Plant varieties and animal breeds are excluded from patentability, but Plant 
Variety Protection Law as sui generis system 
Asymmetric 
Information 
Pre-contractual: providers expect high benefits, but claim has not diffused into 
the negotiations 
Post-contractual: substantial problem, partly addressed by new regulation (use 
of benefits, less over-regulation due to better monitoring mechanism), but 
exclusivity and quality are not guaranteed  
Time lags Only one commercial contract, but substantial non-monetary benefits for 
Philippine research institute 
In future more weight on up-front payments 
Good 
governance 
General situation is not very positive 
New ABS law has promising improvements 
Administrative 
complexity 
Costs have been very high 
Improved through abolishment of ineffective intersectoral committee and 
introduction of determined timeframes 
Responsibility is still allocated to different agencies (DENR, DA and PCSD) 
Academic research is excluded 
Market structure Ten years of over-regulation have decreased the market position 
ASEAN member/ megadiverse countries 
 
The new Philippine Bioprospecting Guidelines are a big step forward to an effective ABS 
concept, but any legislative and institutional framework of an ABS regime is only as good as 
the process through which it is implemented. The Philippines have to prove their willingness 
to improve the situation, not by only developing this new regulation, but also by implementing 
it. Without facilitating access and concluding any ABS contracts, no benefits will be realized. 
At this point, only a presumption can be made and it has to be waited if the Philippines will be 
able to turn the legislative framework into factual practice. 
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6.2 Costa Rica28 
Costa is the second case study that was carried out. The analysis follows the Philippine 
case. The developed analytic framework, based on the critical factors and the potential 
measures, is exercised in the country-specific case in order to prove and illustrate its 
applicability. First of all, the case study methodology is shortly presented. Then, a short 
introduction to the Costa Rican case is given and the regulatory environment, including the 
legal and institutional setting, is illustrated. The main part of the analysis is the application of 
the critical factors to the country-specific case. Taking into account the established analytic 
framework regarding the effectiveness (cf. chapter 5), it is looked at how the critical factors 
are shaped and how they are already addressed in Costa Rica. The analysis of the second 
case study finishes with a short case study conclusion. 
6.2.1 Case study methodology 
In this study, the case of Costa Rica is evaluated by using the critical factors identified above. 
The underlying question is whether the specifications of these factors in the Costa Rican 
case can explain its apparent success and if this success relates with effectiveness. 
Worldwide Costa Rica’s ABS approach is the most advanced, transparent and experienced 
one, but it is also still changing and improving. The analysis is based on expert interviews, 
conducted in Costa Rica in November and December 2002. Semi-structured interviews were 
used as the method of gathering and analyzing qualitative data. Throughout the interviewing 
process different thematic areas were addressed in line with the identified critical factors. 23 
experts were interviewed who represent the variety of stakeholders, including individuals, 
communities, government, universities, NGOs, scientific institutions and industry involved in 
the ABS process or having expertise related to the ABS issue. Stakeholders are defined here 
as persons who are affected by or who have an influence on ABS regulations in Costa Rica. 
Additionally, secondary literature, as e.g., books, journal articles, and reports is used to 
complement the information gained from the interviews. 
6.2.2 Introduction 
The tropical zones of the American continent contain more species than other tropical 
regions of the world, and many more species than the temperate and cold zones. Costa Rica 
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 The case of Costa Rica has been already analyzed by the author. The results are published in Richerzhagen, 
C. and Holm-Mueller, K. (2005): The effectiveness of access and benefit-sharing in Costa Rica: implications 
for national and international regimes, in: Ecological Economics 53, 4, pp. 445-460. This chapter is based on 
this article. 
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covers 51.100 km2 of the world’s terrestrial surface, representing only 0.03 percent of the 
global territory, but it is considered as one of the most diverse regions and identified as a 
biodiversity hotspot (Myers et al. 2000, 855). According to estimations, four percent of all 
living species are found there. During the 1970s and 1980s, a series of reports predicted that 
based on the actual deforestation rate, Costa Rica’s productive forests would vanish before 
the end of the century. The first undertaking to conserve its rich biological heritage was the 
introduction of protection measures. Since 1970, the country has dedicated 25 percent of the 
national territory to conservation (Castro-Salazar / Arias-Murillo 1998, 5). The second 
response was the creation of the technical, institutional, and financial structure for a system 
of incentives and payments of environmental services. Costa Rica developed a diverse 
strategy to conserve forest areas and biodiversity with international and national support and 
bioprospecting played an important part within this strategy. The country managed to 
address the ongoing declination of forests and biodiversity. Whereas in the 1980s Costa Rica 
had one of the highest deforestation rates in the world, since 1995 the deforestation rate has 
fallen dramatically. Before 1986, there was a net loss in annual forest cover. After 1986, a 
net gain in forest cover of 5.857 hectares per year was recorded during the period 1987-1997 
(afforestation minus deforestation). As consequence in 1997, Costa Rica had the same 
percentage of forest cover as 20 years before (Castro-Salazar / Arias-Murillo 1998, 15). 
6.2.3 Regulatory environment: legal and institutional setting 
The country’s stable socio-political climate has been favorable for those developments. 
Costa Rica is one of the most stable and robust democracies in Latin America, with a long-
standing commitment to economic growth and substantial advancement in social indicators 
(Gámez et al. 1993, 54). 
With the establishment of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy and Mines (MINAE) 
in 1986, Costa Rica’s environmental issues entered daily policy. The ministry developed new 
administrative, financial and institutional procedures. For instance, it took over and 
decentralized the administration of protected land with the new National System of 
Conserved Areas (SINAC) and removed perverse incentives, e.g., the Forest Payment Title, 
a subsidy to promote reforestation. It allowed landowners to make money twice: firstly, by 
cutting and selling primary forest and secondly, by reforesting the open areas (Miranda / 
Dieperink / Glasbergen 2002, 5). Furthermore, it designed the National Conservation 
Strategy for Sustainable Development in Costa Rica, and came up with new innovative 
financing mechanisms for conservation activities (Gámez et al. 1993, 55). 
Even before the adoption of the CBD in 1992, Costa Rica concluded bioprospecting 
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contracts with companies. The country implemented the CBD by the comprehensive Law of 
Biodiversity in 1998, but many years before it established a quasi ABS regime. In Costa 
Rica, the concept of ABS is embedded in a comprehensive environmental governance 
framework, and it seems to work well. The environmental situation has improved due to the 
expansion of protected areas, the removal of perverse incentives against conservation, and 
the implementation of conservation measures. Since the late 1990s, Costa Rica’s 
biodiversity conservation policy focuses even more on the sustainable utilization of 
biodiversity as a way to promote its conservation. In addition to bioprospecting, ecotourism 
and payment programs for environmental services are established as instruments for 
internalizing the cost of providing environmental services and mainly biodiversity. Therefore, 
bioprospecting is part of a strategy and embedded in a bunch of measures striving for 
biodiversity conservation.  
The main institution in Costa Rica dealing with bioprospecting issues is the National Institute 
for Biodiversity (INBio)29. INBio was created as a private, but non-profit institution to 
coordinate the different activities of universities, private organizations and the government 
and to become a national center of expertise in the field of biodiversity. The institute’s 
mission is to raise awareness of the value of biodiversity and thereby promote biodiversity 
conservation and economic development in Costa Rica. INBio’s different programs such as 
the biodiversity inventory, search for sustainable uses, accumulation of information and 
dissemination of knowledge complement one another and help to document the state of 
Costa Rica’s biodiversity and to identify bioprospecting potential. However, it is not only 
INBio. The institute is interlinked with Costa Rican universities. 
Except for some initial funding, INBio is a self-supporting institution allowed to receive grants 
and enjoying tax-free status but being responsible for its own funds and personnel. In 2001 
the bioprospecting budget represented eleven percent of the total institutional budget having 
fluctuated between eleven and 17 percent in previous years (Gámez 2003, 8). A co-
operation agreement concluded between MINAE and INBio provides the legal framework for 
all of the institute’s inventory and bioprospecting activities. Authorized through single 
research permits, INBio collects samples for its own inventory and bioprospecting divisions 
or interested parties. Based on this agreement, INBio bioprospects only within the country’s 
protected wild areas. Monetary benefits are shared with MINAE. The ministry receives as an 
up-front payment ten percent of the research budget and ex post 50 percent of any further 
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 INBio was visited for this study and interviews with a business development person and INBio’s lawyer were 
conducted. INBio is the most important intermediary (others are marginalized) and plays an outstanding role. 
Therefore, the analysis focuses on INBIo. 
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royalties or milestone payments from bioprospecting contracts. The benefits are used to 
finance the management and the protection of conservation areas (MINAE 1994, Clausulas 
12; Sittenfeld / Lovejoy 1999, 95).  
Only in 1998, Costa Rica implemented the CBD by the Law of Biodiversity, No. 7788. Before 
that date, ABS was regulated in the framework of the Law of Wildlife Conservation and 
corresponding regulations. It is obvious that the experiences with INBio, which attracted 
worldwide attention, had a decisive influence on the CBD. Nevertheless, Costa Rica 
introduced with the Biodiversity Law a new ABS approach because it changed INBio’s role. 
Some interview partners who were involved in drafting the Biodiversity Law stated that the 
drafting process was very fast and intensive. INBio should not know about it before it was 
published for the first time because INBio was against the formulation of a new law. 
According to the interviews (including INBio staff) for INBio the situation was better without a 
law like the Biodiversity Law. According to an interview partner, INBio perceives itself as the 
most competent institution to deal with biodiversity issues. Therefore, they also prepared an 
own draft for a law, mainly developed by scientist. 
The Biodiversity Law introduces new procedures and institutions. Regulating the use and 
management of biodiversity, associated knowledge, institutional authorities, the basic 
requirements and procedure for ABS and IPRs, the new law offers the basic framework for 
access permits and bioprospecting contracts. It establishes the National Commission for the 
Management of Biodiversity (CONAGEBIO) as the responsible institution for ABS and 
defines it functions. CONAGEBIO is an intersectoral coordination body. It consists of 
ministers or representatives from the ministry of Environment and Energy, Agriculture, Health 
and Foreign Trade, the Institute for Agricultural and Fishing, the Small Farmers Board, the 
Indigenous People Board, the National Council of Rectors, the Federation for the 
Conservation of the environment and the Union of Chambers of Commerce. The 
implementation process was delayed due to a claim of unconstitutionality concerning the 
extensive competencies of CONAGEBIO. Therefore, CONAGEBIO operates since 2002. It 
has permanent staff and its own budget. The national law and especially the ABS part are 
completed via an ABS by-law (Rules on Access to Biodiversity, Presidential Decree No. 31-
514), which was published in December 2003 and defines CONAGEBIO’s responsibilities. 
On the administrative level CONAGEBIO is supported by a Technical Office, which has 
permanent staff. 
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The ABS procedure in Costa Rica can be divided in four steps: i) registry of the applicants, ii) 
application process, iii) approval process, iv) monitoring (cf. Figure 19). 
Figure 19: ABS procedure in Costa Rica 
Source: Cabrera Medaglia 2004, 106 
Only CONAGEBIO and the Technical Office can grant access. PIC is obtained from other 
entities, e.g., conservation areas, indigenous territories, ex-situ collections, and landowners. 
In case material is collected on private lands, authorization from state entities is also 
necessary (Cabrera Medaglia 2004, 107). The permits can cover commercial and non-
commercial bioprospecting permits. It is also possible to establish general framework 
agreements on collection permits with universities and other centers. Usually they are valid 
for three years and can be renewed. Permits will contain a certificate of origin (Law of 
Biodiversity No. 7788, Art. 71). In general, the establishment of CONAGEBIO is seen as a 
very positive development, since it includes all the relevant stakeholders and moves the 
authority to MINAE. Only one interviewee from the university thinks that CONAGEBIO poses 
the same problems as IACBGR in the Philippine case. 
Until the adoption of the Biodiversity Law, INBio’s activities were based on the Law of Wildlife 
Conservation and the MINAE-INBio agreement that gave the institute much freedom and 
independency. This has changed through the Biodiversity Law. INBio has concluded more 
than 20 investigation contracts with many life science companies, international research 
institutions, and universities in the meantime (cf. Table 16). The agreements have common 
criteria as depicted in Table 15. 
1.  Access Permit (Arts. 6, 7.1, 7.27, 62)
- Basic research (Art. 69)
- Bioprospecting (Art. 69)
STATE
CONAGEBIO
(Art. 14.1 and 14.6)
Technical Office
(Art. 17.1 and  17.3)
FIRST STAGE
Registry of Applicants 
Applicants 
- Individuals/ legal entities 
(Art. 7.27)
- Research centers (Art. 70)
3. Contracts with third 
parties 
Prior authorization required for 
the Technical Office
(Art. 69, 70, 71, 72, 74)
2. Framework 
Agreements
(Art. 74)
SECOND STAGE
APPLICATION (Art. 64) AND TECHNICAL GUIDE:
(Art. 63.2) 
APPROVAL
PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT  (Arts. 7 and  9)
AND MUTUALLY AGREED TERMS (Arts. 63 and  65)
THIRD STAGE
REGIONAL COUNCIL 
OF CONSERVATION 
AREAS
INDIGENOUS 
AUTHORITY
LOCAL COMMUNITY 
AUTHORITY LAND OWNER
EX SITU 
COLLECTIONS 
(Art. 69 and 74)
FOURTH STAGE:   MONITORING
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Table 15: Basic criteria of most of INBio’s bioprospecting contracts 
• Facilitate access to a limited amount of samples from natural resources for a limited period of 
time (exclusivity terms are limited) 
• Significant part of the research is carried out locally and associated research costs are entirely 
covered by the industrial partner (defined as research budget) 
• Up front payments for conservation (a minimum of 10 percent of the research budget is 
transferred to MINAE for conservation purposes) 
• Benefit-sharing mechanisms should be negotiated beforehand and should include among 
others: 
- Milestone payments for the discovery and development phases of a potential product, to be 
shared 50:50 with MINAE 
- A percentage of royalties on net sales of the final product (covering also derivatives from the 
original natural scaffold and/or any technology derived thereof), also to be shared 50:50 with 
MINAE 
- IPR should include participation of INBio’s scientists if applicable (joint patents and 
publications) 
• Technology transfer and capacity building of local scientists should be significant and should 
include state- of-the-art technologies 
• The discovery and development of a product must engage non-destructive uses of natural 
resources and be consistent with the national legislation regarding access of genetic 
resources and development thereof  
Source: Cabrera Medaglia 2002 
At the request of companies, the concrete contractual contents according to royalties are not 
published. This was criticized by some interviewees, since hiding of the rate does not provide 
transparency and raises mistrust.  
One interesting example is the corporation between the National Biodiversity Institute 
(INBio), the British Technology Group (BTG) and Ecos La Pacífica that aims at producing a 
nematicide for tropical crops. The nematicidal activity (DMDP) comes from a tree in the 
Costa Rican dry tropical forest. It is expected that a product will enter the market soon. BTG 
has paid a small amount of money to both INBio and Ecos for the licensing of a patent 
related to the DMDP use (Cabrera Medaglia 2002, 20). 
INBio’s co-operation with international companies supported its scientific and technological 
capacity, which is a prerequisite for the realization of such projects. Through funds from the 
Inter-American Development Bank, small local enterprises, using biological material as 
production inputs are able to initiate low-cost projects for the local market, requiring relatively 
simple technologies and limited time of development. Contrary to the projects carried out with 
large international corporations, these small and simpler projects, while not totally completed 
yet, are already considered to be successful initiatives, likely to make contributions in terms 
of profit, employment and more value-added agro-industrial developments (Gámez 
2003, 10). 
 
6 Implementation of ABS regulations in provider and user countries 189
Table 16: Significant commercial and academic agreements in Costa Rica, 1991-2004 
Industry or academic 
partner 
Application fields Research 
activities in 
Costa Rica 
Cornell University Chemical Prospecting 1990-1992 
Merck & Co Human health and veterinary 1991-1999 
British Technology 
Group 
Agriculture 1992-present 
Ecos/ La Pacifica Agriculture 1993-present 
Cornell University and 
NIH 
Human health 1993-1999 
Bristol Myers & Squibb Human health 1994-1998 
Givaudan Roure Fragrances and essences 1995-1998 
University of 
Massachusetts 
Insecticidal components 1995-1998 
Diversa Enzymes of industrial applications 1998-2007 
Indena Human health 1996-2004 
Phytera Inc. Human health 1998-2000 
Strathclyde University Human health 1997-2000 
Eli Lilly Human health and agriculture 1999-2000 
Akkadix Corporation Nematocidal proteins 1999-2001 
Follajes Ticos Ornamental applications 2000- 
La Gavilana S.A. Ecological control of pathogens of Vanilla 2000- 
Laboratorios Lisan S.A. Production of standardized phytopharmaceuticals 2000- 
Bouganvillea S.A. Production of standardized biopesticide 2000- 
Agrobiot S.A. Ornamental applications 2000- 
Guelph University Agriculture and Conservation purposes 2000- 
Florida Ice & Farm Technical and scientific support 2001- 
ChagasSpaceProgram Chagas disease 2001- 
SACRO Ornamental applications 2002- 
CIFLORPAN, 
Universidad de 
Panama 
Extracts of plants 2003-2005 
Havard University Extracts with potential activity from endophytic fungi 2003-2005 
Source: Cabrera Medaglia 2002; INBio 2004 
Taking the number of contracts with the estimated royalty percentage as an indicator for 
expectable benefits contracts - the more contracts, the more research and the higher the 
possibility of discovering a substance for commercialization - the result turns out relative 
satisfactory. By receiving an eventual royalty payment of one to five percent for one highly 
successful drug Costa Rica could generate as much national net income during the life of the 
patent as a major crop does (Sittenfeld / Gámez 1993, 75). 
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6.2.4 Assigning property and intellectual property rights 
Costa Rica established property rights on all levels of stakeholders, thus allowing rent 
capture from the commercialization of genetic resources and institutes conservation 
incentives. By assigning rights and enabling participation in the Costa Rican case, the critical 
factor of property rights assignment is positively addressed. However, as in the Philippines 
biodiversity is assigned to the state. This has some implications. 
Costa Rica has implemented the sovereignty principle as follows. The Biodiversity Law 
applies to all components of biodiversity found under the state’s sovereignty, as well as to 
the processes and activities carried out under its jurisdiction or control (Law of Biodiversity 
No. 7788, Art. 3). Biochemical and genetic properties of components of biodiversity within the 
Costa Rican territory belong to the public domain, but the state has the responsibility to 
authorize the exploration, research, bioprospecting and use (Law of Biodiversity No. 7788, 
Art. 6). In this way, a second property right regime is created in addition to the private 
property for the tangible biological material, which can be held by the landowner (i.e., 
individuals, communities, state). This second regime for the genetic and biochemical 
information of the resources is held by the public domain and executed by the state or the 
commission (CONAGEBIO). 
But even if the state has the authority over biodiversity according to the Biodiversity Law, an 
important part of the benefits flow back to the National System of Conservation Areas (apart 
from other benefits, at least ten percent of the research budget, 50 percent of later bonuses), 
indigenous communities or to the private owner depending on the land property rights. Thus, 
by establishing a benefit-sharing scheme, which allows those economic agents who decide 
over the use of the biological resources to participate in the benefits, conservation incentives 
are instituted. 
Until now, bioprospecting has only been undertaken in conservation areas on state property 
where property rights are clearly defined and assigned. However, in the interviews 
representatives of indigenous people state that they do not feel that the rights of indigenous 
people are well represented. The majority of protected areas in Costa Rica especially the 
areas where bioprospecting takes place are scarcely inhabited. However, twelve of the 24 
indigenous territories in Costa Rica are protected areas. In these cases, PIC has been 
granted by the state and indigenous people have not been included. 
In the interviews, it became clear that mainly the government and INBio benefited from the 
bioprospecting activities. MINAE channeled the benefits directly to the conservation areas. 
The distribution of the benefits arising out of INBio’s contracts is transparent. Between 1991 
and 2000, the total amount of US$ 512,148 has been received by MINAE due to the ten 
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percent research budget regulation and US$ 790,649 directly by the conservation areas 
(Cabrera Medaglia 2002, 25). According to an interview partner, MINAE invested the money 
in pure conservation activities: the Island Coco, which is absolutely uninhabitated. Compared 
to revenues gained by selected agricultural and forest products and tourism, this contribution 
is small. The foreign exchange generated during the same period (1991-2000) by timber was 
US$ 2,613,000, by bananas US$ 57,051,000, by coffee US$ 32,659,000 and by tourism, one 
of the most important economic activities of the country, US$ 71,986,000 (Gámez 2003, 3). 
Table 17: Contribution to biodiversity conservation in Costa Rica and to universities: 
 
1993* 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
MINAE (10%) 110,040 43,400 66,670 51,092 95,196 24,160 38,793 82,797 512,148 
Conservation 
areas 
86102 203,135 153,555 192,035 126,243 29,579 0 0 790,649 
Costa Rican public 
universities 460,409 126,006 46,962 31,265 34,694 14,186 7,123 4,083 724,728 
Other groups in 
INBio 228,161 92,830 118,292 172,591 129,008 0 0 0 740,882 
Total 884,712 465,371 385,479 446,983 385,141 67,925 45,916 86,880 2,768,407 
Source: Cabrera Medaglia 2004, 111 
Costa Rica is a member of the WTO and therefore, it is obliged to implement IPR protection 
in line with the TRIPs agreement. The Patent, Drawings and Utility Model Law No. 6867 was 
reformed by Law No. 7979 in 2000 to make it compatible with TRIPs. It includes 
microorganism, biological processes, genes, genetic sequences as long as the patentability 
requirements are met. A draft on plant breeders’ rights has been formulated in accordance 
with UPOV 1991 (Cabrera Medaglia 2004, 116). 
By its very wide scope the Biodiversity Law takes up Costa Rica’s TRIPs obligations in the 
area of biodiversity. Apart from the issues directly connected with biodiversity conservation, it 
addresses IPR issues very explicitly, especially the scope of application. Before granting 
some kind of IPR for biodiversity components, the National Seed Office and Registers of 
Intellectual and Industrial Property have to consult the technical office of CONAGEBIO and 
provide a certificate of origin and prior informed consent in order to ensure exceptions of 
patentability (i.e., DNA sequences, plants and animals, not genetic modified microorganisms, 
etc.). The objection of the technical office forecloses the registration of patent or another IPR 
(Law of Biodiversity No. 7788, Art. 80). With the exception of the IPR law of the Andean 
Community (Andean Community Decision 486, Art. 26h) neither international nor other 
national IPR laws require such a certificate. Thus, the control and prevention mechanism 
only takes effect in Costa Rica and not in important locations as the EU or the US. 
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According to the contractual commitments, Costa Rica and INBio as providers usually do not 
participate in a patent because they are not regarded as inventors of the final product. If 
INBio contributes to the invention, a joint patent is possible, but this has not yet been the 
case so far. Only through PIC and benefit-sharing, the contributions of the country and the 
biodiversity institute are considered and acknowledged. 
ABS is more or less accepted in Costa Rica and it is regarded as the implementation of 
international obligations. Nevertheless, there exist environmental, farmer and indigenous 
groups objecting the concept. Representatives of these groups have been interviewed. 
Indigenous and farmer groups are mainly concerned because they do not see the rights of 
indigenous people and farmers well represented. Environmental groups, which reject patents 
of life, consider INBio as a “legal biopirate” or an “international company” selling Costa Rica’s 
biodiversity to international companies. INBio is strongly supported by the government. This 
was underlined by many interviewees. The minister of environment was INBio’s lawyer some 
time ago and therefore, the strong relationship between INBio and the government is 
obvious. Most of the groups do not try to prevent bioprospecting but to increase their 
influence and realize their ideas through the participation in CONAGEBIO or as observers 
and consultants during the negotiations, as for example, the debates on the drafted by-law 
for ABS.  
The new by-law will guarantee the participation of the local level by establishing clear 
regulation on access application and benefit-sharing. Since bioprospecting has only taken 
place in state property, there are no experiences with negotiations and benefit-sharing with 
private landowners. However, it can be expected if this is the case, in future ABS will still 
work out.  
6.2.5 Information asymmetry 
Pre-contractual problems of asymmetric information have not evidently emerged. INBio has 
gained a lot of experience and has approached the negotiations realistically. According to 
INBio, MINAE never participated in the negotiations due to lack of capacity and interests. 
Therefore, INBio independently negotiated the contracts. MINAE only signed the agreement 
later. 
Post-contractual problems on both sides have been recognized and addressed by Costa 
Rica. The country tried to protect itself against the misappropriation. Interested parties do not 
collect bioprospecting material themselves; they receive it directly from INBio or a few other 
intermediaries (e.g., the Organization of Tropical Studies). Since INBio almost process all 
bioprospecting activities, the use of Costa Rica’s resources is easier to control. According to 
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INBio’s staff, the bioprospecting contracts are concluded for a certain amount of samples 
from specified areas. INBio keeps an identical sample in its inventory and delivers coded 
material. If the contractual partners are interested in more of the collected material, they have 
to return to INBio. By this way, INBio keeps important information about the material and 
controls its export. As already indicated the Biodiversity Law also regulates the patenting 
process for bio-products in Costa Rica. The provision of a PIC certificate is an obligation 
within the patent application process. Thus, the legal origin of the biological material that is 
used for the patent is guaranteed. However, this does not hinder patenting with illegal 
material outside Costa Rica though. The only asset Costa Rica has in this respect is the 
interest of companies to continue the co-operation with INBio.  
On the user side, Costa Rica undertook measures to address the problem of asymmetric 
information regarding the use of the benefits and exclusivity. The utilization of the benefits 
has been quite transparent so far. MINAE and INBio have published the amounts of benefits 
they received and disclosed how they used it. This was the procedure under the old system. 
Even if the new approach is much more complex and many other stakeholders are involved, 
it can be expected to be more transparent. INBio guarantees users temporary exclusivity that 
varies between 6 months to 2 years. However, so far INBio does not offer a guarantee 
regarding the quality of the material. Users are not involved in the collection process and 
have to trust INBio that they provide the material they promise. Nevertheless, this lack of 
information has not reduced companies’ interest to collaborate with INBio. By working 
successfully and reliably in this field for more than ten years, INBio gained experiences and 
developed procedures, pioneering and resulting in long-lasting partnerships with industry and 
research institutions. Signaling reliability helped INBio to stand out from the other providers 
and to overcome the problem arising out of the asymmetric distribution of information. 
6.2.6 Accounting for time lags 
Time lags can be addressed by adequate payment schemes. The bioprospecting contracts, 
which INBio has negotiated, include regulations for milestone payments and royalties. 
However, apart from minor up-front payments, Costa Rica or INBio have not received 
payments so far. In the years 1991 to 2000, the total contributions of bioprospecting activities 
to biodiversity conservation and education add up to US$ 2,768,407 (cf. Table 17). For a ten-
year period, the monetary contributions, raised out of direct payments, payments for specific 
samples and the coverage of research budgets, are relative small. Due to the long and 
insecure development, until now, no product has reached the market and no royalties have 
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been paid. However, there are some products under development, especially related to 
herbal areas (cf. Table 18; Cabrera Medaglia 2002, 19).  
Table 18: Outputs generated since 1992 as a result of the ABS agreements with INBio 
Project Initiated Output 
Merck & Co. 1992 27 patents 
BTG/ECOS 1992 DMDP on its way to commercialization 
NCI 1999 Secondary screening for anti- cancer compounds 
Givaudan Roure 1995 - 
INDENA 1996 Two compounds with significant anti-bacterial activity 
Diversa 1998 Two potential products at initial stages / Publication 
underway 
Phytera Inc. 1998 - 
Eli Lilly & Co. 1999 - 
Akkadix 1999 52 bacterial strains with nematocidal activity 
CR-USA 1999 One compound with significant anti-malarial activity 
LISAN 2000 Two phytopharmaceuticals in the process 
Source: Cabrera Medaglia 2002 
Consequently, the substantial part of benefits in form of future royalties and milestone 
payments is still waited for. Around 50 percent of the total revenues of bioprospecting 
activities went directly to the conservation areas; research groups within INBio and national 
public universities have received the rest. Until now, non-monetary benefits dominate the 
ABS process, playing a major role for sustainable development. Costa Rica and INBio 
benefited in different ways. The transfer of important technology has improved the 
infrastructure within INBio and public universities and enables the institute to do research 
and develop own products or at least more processed, value-added samples. The 
biodiversity inventory has been expanded by the collected material and financed by bio-
prospecting partners. Scientists and technicians could build up scientific capacity in relation 
to state-of-the-art technologies, joint research and received acknowledgement in 
publications. INBio and Costa Rica benefit through development of negotiation expertise and 
spill-over effects on other economic activities like ecotourism and the improvement of local 
legislation according to conservation issues (Cabrera Medaglia 2002, 26). 
In monetary terms, time lags remain a problem, even if milestone payments are planned. 
These payments are relatively small. The main benefits accruing to the country and 
especially INBio and the government without any delay are non-monetary benefits, especially 
benefits that positively influence the research capacity. This fact is acceptable for Costa Rica 
as management of biodiversity is placed in the hands of the state, the dominant land-owner 
of collection sites, and INBio was the only institution involved. In future, this picture may 
change since more actors are involved. It shows that even in a relatively successful case 
payments would rarely be able to change the decision of local agents because during the 
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time lag only non-monetary benefits are received. 
6.2.7 Good governance in provider countries 
Good governance is one explaining factor for the high number of bioprospecting contracts 
with Costa Rica. Costa Rica offers a stable democratic and political system. One interviewee 
called it as a comparative advantage that is not related to biodiversity. It is obvious that the 
World Bank Governance Indicators are much better than the Philippines’. For instance, 70.3 
percent of the 213 countries and territories rate worth than Costa Rica according to political 
stability. However, all indicators trend downwards in the 1998-2005 comparison, but it is still 
on a very high level. 
Table 19: World Bank Governance Indicators, Costa Rica (1998, 2005) 
Governance Indicator 1998 2005 
Voice and accountability 87.0 76.3 
Political stability/no violence 84.0 70.3 
Government effectiveness 72.7 64.1 
Regulatory quality 80.8 68.8 
Rule of law 76.0 65.7 
Control of corruption 76.0 66.5 
Source: Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi 2006 
Beside the political stability, not too often found in biodiversity-rich countries, it is the clear 
cut legislation concerning INBio that seems to be highly valued by companies. INBio was 
quite independent and flexible. It was only bound by the agreement with MINAE. This 
situation will change, since MINAE’s position will be stronger. However, the comprehensive 
Biodiversity Law and the developed by-law for ABS will even more ensure the legal 
framework for ABS. Other intermediaries have been also active in Costa Rica, but their 
activities very not regulated. Especially their work is framed by the new regulations. Some 
interview partners underline that companies can find diverse resources in many neighboring 
countries where resources are cheaper and ABS is unregulated. However, they come to 
Costa Rica because it has a system of parks, an adequate documentation system and the 
country provides safety. 
According to INBio, there is a relatively high interest of international companies or research 
institutions to bioprospect in Costa Rica (together with INBio) and the country is attractive for 
bioprospecting. Costa Rica and INBio have concluded many more contracts than other 
countries. Legal security provided in the country and by the biodiversity institute is an 
important reason for companies to choose this research location and partner (Cabrera 
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Medaglia 2002, 37). The legal security guarantees that the Costa Rican partner fulfills 
contractual commitments. The application procedure carried out by INBio is quite 
transparent. INBio is not the only intermediary in Costa Rica who bioprospects and assists 
interested companies and researchers. Private persons as well as other organizations try to 
work in this field, but not on the same scale as INBio does. These intermediaries do not have 
an agreement with MINAE, so their activities take place in a grey area. No significant number 
of contracts has been concluded with those intermediaries, supporting the argument that 
missing legal security deters companies from undertaking bioprospecting activities. 
In future, it has to be waited if CONAGEBIO can offer the same security as INBio did. One 
interviewee from the industry side has doubts and states that CONAGEBIO cannot provide 
the same service and particularly confidentiality. 
6.2.8 Administrative complexity 
INBio was founded with international support and with the objective to support the country’s 
responsibilities in the area of biodiversity inventory, search for sustainable uses and 
accumulation of information and dissemination of knowledge. The biodiversity institute is the 
national center of expertise for bioprospecting. This leads to short timeframes in the 
negotiations of contracts and thus lowers the transaction costs for companies. According to 
INBio’s staff, within one year a bioprospecting contract can be concluded with INBio; in other 
countries this process takes much longer. The experiences seem to prove that a specialized 
probably private (whether non-profit or a profit) organization is in a better position to fulfill this 
function in an efficient manner access than governmental institutions, especially related to 
the process of applying for access. The Biodiversity Institute is not part of the complex 
governmental administration, but operates as a consultant. The condition of not being a profit 
organization prevents INBio from abusing its standing out position related to bioprospecting. 
INBio has even a business development officer who is responsible for the co-operation with 
bioprospecting partners. Therefore, users find a competent contact person at the institute. By 
forming an independent institution with expertise in the decisive fields and embedded in a 
stable political system, Costa Rica succeeds in getting a leading position in bioprospecting. 
The expected changes in processing by the creation of CONAGEBIO as the new 
governmental National Focal Point related to biodiversity policy and management is 
differently evaluated. In the interviews, the demand side appears to be very content with the 
existing regulations. Although, the Biodiversity Law is advertised by some experts as the 
most ambitious and elaborate national law of its kind, bioprospectors and intermediaries 
assume that the new regulation will complicate the application and execution process and 
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that the competitive advantage of Costa Rica in the bioprospecting market will vanish. One 
Costa Rican researcher who is involved in bioprospecting complained that Costa Rica 
follows the Philippines. Under the new by-law, INBio can still work as an intermediary, but 
CONAGEBIO also participates in and supervises the negotiations with the bioprospectors 
and approve the MAT and PIC. The composition of CONAGEBIO representing the major 
concerned stakeholders can lead to longer negotiations and decision-making processes due 
to differences in opinions. Besides, one interviewee mentions that the members are also very 
busy and may not attend meetings, just as in the Philippine case. The transaction costs on 
both the provider and the user side are expected to increase, which will restrict the efficiency 
of ABS. Even if the interview partners support the new system they underlined that it will be a 
more complex process. 
It seems that the construction of one independent agency was one of the assets of Costa 
Rica. The resulting short decision-processes were especially interesting for the demand side. 
The new processes will presumably be more time-consuming, integrating the interests of 
different stakeholders that formerly remained outside the process. However, even if the 
transaction costs will increase due to the increased participation of the stakeholders Costa 
Rica will benefit. The participation will also be a requirement if bioprospecting will not only 
take place on state property but also on private and community property. 
6.2.9 Market structure 
In principle, the bargaining position of Costa Rica is relatively weak due to the oligopsonistic 
competition. Despite the ongoing loss of biodiversity, the total supply of diverse genetic 
material still satisfies the demand. It is still possible to obtain samples even if the total 
number of species decreases. In many countries the access is not regulated and free to 
obtain. Therefore, the degree of competition among buyers is much lower than on the 
supplier side. The diverse biological resources within the mesoamerican biological corridor 
from Mexico to Colombia are similar and an interested company is able to substitute one 
country for another. In fact, INBio and Costa Rica succeeded in attracting many interested 
parties, more than any other country within the mesoamerican biological corridor even 
though there was unregulated access in competing countries. This success can be ascribed 
to the scientific capacity of INBio, the National System of Conserved Areas and other 
institutions (e.g., the Organization of Tropical Studies), which is a result of a long-time 
research by international biodiversity scientists in the country and the transfer of technology, 
knowledge and human capacity. As transaction costs are much lower in Costa Rica than in 
other countries, firms have a great interest in bioprospecting in Costa Rica and INBio’s 
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bargaining position is considerably improved. 
Since 2002, a group of megadiverse countries has been established with Costa Rica as one 
of its members. It can be expected that such a coalition will strengthen the market position of 
supplier countries. However, the bargaining position is still weakened by the existence of ex-
situ collections. Within Costa Rica the Biodiversity Law applies and bioprospecting samples, 
existing in-situ or ex-situ, can only be obtained through an access permit. Nevertheless, the 
access to ex-situ collections in other countries and the access to material stored pre-CBD 
adoption are not regulated and companies still can recourse to these collections. This 
selection is limited though, and the expectations of finding promising genetic material within 
these collections is not as high as from samples, obtained from in-situ sites or ex-situ 
collections, created after the adoption of the CBD. Hence, industry continues to have a high 
interest in bioprospecting contracts (Wynberg / A Laird 2005) 
6.2.10 Conclusions 
Costa Rica is an example for a relatively successful strategy of ABS. The number of 
contracts with companies in the life science industry is high, and there are considerable non-
monetary benefits accruing to Costa Rica. However, up to now there are only scientific, 
academic, industrial benefits and little conservation benefits. The country’s popularity 
accruing from the bioprospecting contracts affects other economic activities including nature-
oriented tourism. INBio developed itself to be an outstanding research institution with high 
scientific and technological capacity in Central America. The national university also benefits 
from the work of the institution. Successful partnerships with local enterprises in the agro-
industrial area developed through Costa Rica’s bioprospecting program, have created jobs 
and have also benefited the local level through the development of new products for the local 
market.  
The ecological data on Costa Rica also shows a favorable development. The monetary 
benefits are small though. This is one important indicator for the fact that the ecological 
progress in Costa Rica is not only and perhaps not even mainly due to the commercialization 
of biodiversity associated with bioprospecting. In Costa Rica ABS is only part of a 
comprehensive strategy. Nevertheless, there are reasons to take Costa Rica as a model 
country for designing ABS procedures. Many of the critical factors analyzed here are handled 
in an outstanding way. With the introduction of one single authority in the bioprospecting 
process Costa Rica lowered transaction costs (in contract preparation and enforcement) for 
demanding companies thus greatly improving its bargaining position. The bioprospecting 
procedure alleviates the country’s informational deficiencies about the use of the biological 
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material and thus its own enforcement costs.  
INBio as the agent being responsible for the management of biodiversity in the country is 
also in charge of the bioprospecting process. In this respect, incentives are set correctly.  
Table 20: Overview on Costa Rica and the critical factors 
 Costa Rica 
Property rights Tangible material is subject of private property right; intangible is subject of state 
property 
Until now, bioprospecting only on state property 
IPR application process requires certificate of origin 
Asymmetric 
Information 
No pre-contractual problems 
Post-contractual problems on both sides have been recognized and addressed: 
users cannot collect, exclusivity and quality guaranteed, benefits flow to 
protection areas 
Time lags Bioprospecting contracts include regulations for milestone payments and 
royalties 
Apart from minor up-front payments, no payments have been received by Costa 
Rica or INBio so far (many patents, product expected soon) 
Good 
governance 
Stable democratic and political system favors bioprospecting 
INBio, ABS framework and experience provide security 
Administrative 
complexity 
INBio is a very efficient, non-governmental institution 
Complexity will increase with the intersectoral committee 
Market structure High reputation and low transaction costs improve market position 
Member of the group of the megadiverse countries  
 
It has to be acknowledged though that this happened in a very favorable environment. Good 
governance and political stability greatly helped INBio to win its good reputation for 
bioprospecting. Costa Rica is a small and not too densely populated country. Property rights 
over the biological resources are defined and assigned. This all helped in designing an 
efficient institutional setting. Nevertheless, there are problems not yet solved. Payments 
come late and they are insecure. The efficient decision process goes together with little 
influence of other stakeholders. Until now, INBio did not manage to gain acceptance among 
the stakeholders, which formally have not participated in the bargaining-process before. 
However, as a non-profit- and non-governmental organization INBio should be in the position 
to integrate all the stakeholders’ views; not only through CONAGEBIO but also in its own 
processes. 
In conclusion, it seems that by the establishment of an intermediate organization as INBio, 
providing technical and scientific capacity and assisting partners in bioprospecting activities, 
countries can greatly enhance their chances to participate in the benefits of bioprospecting. 
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This may help to change the attitude towards the sustainable use of natural resources and 
thus have a positive impact on the ecological situation. It should not be hoped though that 
with future and insecure payments ABS alone can hinder deforestation processes. A 
comprehensive strategy is the minimum requirement to make any progress in this field.  
6.3 Ethiopia30 
Ethiopia was chosen as the third case study. Ethiopia is a very special case, since the 
country appears a very strong actor on the international level, but according to national 
implementation, it falls behind many other countries and can provide only limited empirical 
data. The analysis in this study follows the other two case studies. The developed analytic 
framework, based on the critical factors and the potential measures, is exercised in the 
country-specific case in order to prove and illustrate its applicability. First of all, the case 
study methodology is shortly presented. Then, a short introduction to the Ethiopian case is 
given and the regulatory environment, including the legal and institutional setting, is 
illustrated. The focus of the introduction is wild coffee genetic resources since the author 
participated in a project dealing with the specific case of wild coffee genetic resources in 
Ethiopia. Genetic resources of wild coffee are a very interesting example because wild coffee 
is a crop, but it as similar characteristics as wild plant genetic resources used in 
pharmaceutical research. Therefore, this case study is considered to be very useful for the 
analysis. 
The main part of the analysis is the application of the critical factors to the country-specific 
case. Taking into account the established analytic framework regarding the effectiveness (cf. 
chapter 5) it is looked at how the critical factors are shaped and how they are already 
addressed in Ethiopia. Since Ethiopia has only recently adopted a regulation, the analysis is 
limited because of the lack of data. However, some very interesting results can be 
concluded, which are summarized at the end of this subchapter. 
6.3.1 Case study methodology 
The expert interviews in Ethiopia were carried out in co-operation with the Center for 
Development Research within the project “Conservation and use of wild populations of 
                                               
30
 The main ideas and findings regarding the conservation of montane forests in Ethiopia are based on the paper 
Richerzhagen, C., Virchow, D. (2007): Sustainable Utilization of Crop Genetic Diversity through Property 
Rights Mechanisms? The Case of Coffee Genetic Resources in Ethiopia, in: International Journal of 
Biotechnology 9 (1), 60–86. 
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Coffea arabica in the montane rainforests of Ethiopia”. This explains why the focus of this 
study is the use of coffee genetic resources. Other crop genetic resources are also very 
relevant and threatened in Ethiopia, but this project chooses coffee as an example. It is a 
product of high commercial value. In this case study the regulative framework for all genetic 
resources is investigated but coffee receives special attention. Whereas the emphasis of the 
other two case studies is on wild plant genetic resources, wild coffee is an example for crop 
genetic resources that is not domesticated but that is available in the wild.  
Like Costa Rica and the Philippines, Ethiopia is a country with high biodiversity and suffers 
from a high loss of forests, harboring this diversity. Compared to the other case studies its 
high diversity is especially made up of crop genetic diversity. When the case study was 
conducted (October 2003), Ethiopia had not implemented any ABS regulation, but was 
strongly involved in the international negotiations within the CBD. In February 2006 the 
proclamation “A Proclamation to provide Access to Genetic Resources and Community 
Knowledge and Community Rights“ (Proclamation No. 482/2006) has been adopted and its 
implementation is on the way. Based on the legal document, the relevant provisions and 
implications are included in the analysis. However, until now with a view to genetic resources 
Ethiopia has been an open access country. A considerable amount of biological material, 
which originally is from Ethiopia, has been used in research, development, and 
commercialization abroad, but benefits have not been shared with the country. 
Ethiopia has started to develop a legislative framework to address these problems for a 
considerable time and finally adopted a document, which implements the ABS provisions of 
the CBD. Therefore, the Ethiopian case is excellently suited for a closer look. The case of 
Ethiopia is also evaluated by using the critical factors identified above, and it is analyzed how 
these factors or their interdependency will affect the current situation and the introduction of 
a potential ABS regime in Ethiopia. Even if Ethiopia has only recently implemented the ABS 
regulation and no experiences with the implementation of ABS are available, the analysis of 
the critical factors can be applied. Based on the past situation and the experiences gained 
there, and the analysis of the adopted proclamation that indicates the way Ethiopia has 
chosen to implement the ABS concept, problems can be highlighted and valuable 
conclusions can be drawn. 
The data are based on expert interviews, conducted in Ethiopia in October 2003. Semi-
structured interviews were used as the method of gathering and analyzing qualitative data. 
Throughout the interviewing process, different thematic areas, in line with the identified 
critical factors, were addressed. Since ABS has not played a role in Ethiopia so far, only a 
limited number of experts could be identified. Fifteen experts were interviewed. They 
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represent the variety of stakeholders involved in the ABS process or having expertise related 
to the ABS issue (cf. list in the appendix). Additionally, secondary literature, as e.g., books, 
journal articles, reports is used to complement the information gained from the interviews. 
6.3.2 Introduction 
Ethiopia possesses considerable biodiversity and natural resources, as well as many 
endemic species due to its geographical characteristics as range of altitude, rainfall pattern 
and soil variability. Complex topography and environmental heterogeneity offers suitable 
environments for a wide range of life-forms. Vegetation types in Ethiopia are highly diverse 
ranging from afro-alpine to desert vegetation. It has a large number of plant species: over 
7,000 species from which about twelve percent are probably endemic (IBCR 2007). Only a 
limited number of studies have been conducted to assess Ethiopia’s diversity, which allows 
estimating its value. 
Ethiopia is one of the major Vavilovian centers of origin and crop diversity in the world. 
Famous examples are coffee and teff, the major stable food for Ethiopians. For instance, wild 
coffee varieties derived from the wild populations of Coffea Arabica with large potential future 
value still exist in Ethiopia’s montane forests. These forests are situated in the south and 
south-western parts of the country (Kumilachew 2001, 115-122). These genetic resources 
have not only a potential option value, but they have direct use values. Wherever accessible, 
coffee is harvested directly from these naturally regenerating and unmanaged wild coffee 
trees. This forest coffee system contributes about six percent to the total coffee production in 
Ethiopia (Demel Teketay 1999). Furthermore, there are wild coffee trees in inaccessible 
forest areas, which are not utilized at all. 
Besides this in-situ existence of coffee genetic resources, landraces of coffee exist in the 
other coffee farming systems of Ethiopia, the semi-forest coffee and home garden coffee 
system (Tadesse Woldemariam / Demel Teketay 2001, 131-141). In addition to the in-situ 
and on-farm management, coffee genetic resources have been collected and conserved ex-
situ in field genebanks in Ethiopia as well as in various other countries (FAO 1998). Breeders 
are the users of wild coffee. Coffee breeding is taking place at the national level mainly in 
other countries than Ethiopia (e.g., Columbia, Kenya) and in international research institutes 
(e.g., CIRAD). Interestingly to note that, although the coffee processing and marketing is 
world-wide mainly in the hand of the private sector, the breeding research is done mainly in 
the public sector (Richerzhagen / Virchow 2007, 69). Realizing this unique situation that in a 
country of origin the genetic resources are still existing in in-situ, on-farm as well as in ex-situ 
conservation facilities, it has to be noted that this situation is threatened and – without 
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determined commitment right now – the valuable coffee genetic resources may be lost in-situ 
as well as on-farm in one or two decades.  
The threat of extinction for the plant genetic resources is based on the fact that the remaining 
natural montane rain forests of Ethiopia, the habitat of wild plants, are under constant 
pressure due to land use conflicts in forests and forest fringes. One hundres years ago, the 
natural forest covered more than 40 percent of the country’s highland area. These days it 
has decreased to less than three percent (Gebre Markos Selassie / Deribe Gurmu 2001). 
Ethiopia’s forests are threatened by demand for forest products on the one hand and by the 
conversion of forest areas into agricultural land or settlement on the other hand. The former 
is determined by the demand for fuel wood (95 percent of the whole demand for forest 
products), construction poles (four percent) and industrial wood (one percent). Underlying 
force is the population growth and the increase in energy demand and in construction 
activities. Because the demand is higher than the supply, uncontrolled wood harvesting is 
one of the critical results. The gap between the supply and the demand is increasing 
significantly to the disadvantage of the remaining forest, due to only minor reforestation 
programs (Berhanu Mengesha / Million Bekele 2001, 97–114). It seems that this gap will 
increase, if in future still only little attention is given to the investment in forestry. 
The conversion into agricultural or settlement land is the second major reason for the plight 
of Ethiopia’s rain forests and thereby threatening the extinction of the wild populations of 
plants and their genetic resources. The rapid rates of clearing to open up new agricultural 
and settlement land is driven partly by the need for compensation of land lost through 
degradation, but above all because of the necessity to accommodate the rapidly increasing 
population and their need for new agricultural land. The concentration of population in the 
Ethiopian highlands is threatening the remaining forest areas. Seventy percent of Ethiopia’s 
population is living in the highlands, which occupy only 40 percent of the total area of the 
country (Gebre Markos Selassie / Deribe Gurmu 2001). Besides internal population growth, 
migration to forest areas is generated by various external pressures as for instance, poverty, 
lack of employment opportunities and droughts on the northern highlands leading to 
governmental planned resettlement schemes in the southwest rain forests (Tadesse 
Woldemariam et al. 2001, 237-248; Yonas 2001; Reusing 1998; Alemneh Dejene 1990). The 
resettlement schemes are, however, not a sustainable answer to the famines in the northern 
part of Ethiopia, because it can already be predicted that the migration will carry on, 
continuing to threaten the destruction of the rain forests and the survival of the wild plant 
genetic resources in the montane rain forests of Ethiopia (Yonas 2001). Beside this 
intersectoral aspect of migration, the movement of existing people within the forests 
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determined by unsustainable shifting cultivation or by pressures to move exerted by forestry 
staff or by settlement policies is another reason for the deforestation process. 
In addition, the rain forest areas are attracting the interests of investors due to their high 
ecological potential for growing coffee and tea. Hence, forest areas are in the process of 
being either thinned or cleared for coffee, tea or rubber tree plantations, having a negative 
impact on habitats of the wild genetic resources (Kumilachew 2001, 115 – 122). 
According to Demel Teketay (2002), deforestation of the montane rain forest takes place at a 
pace of up to 200,000 ha p.a. At present, only 2.3 million ha of montane rain forest exist, of 
which 0.7 million ha is slightly disturbed and 1.6 million ha highly disturbed by human 
activities. Based on the deforestation rate of the 1990s, it can be expected that in less than 
15 years the whole montane rain forest of Ethiopia, including all wild plant genetic resources, 
will have disappeared. Today about five percent of Ethiopia’s territory is officially protected, 
but even these areas suffer from poaching and illegal logging. 
The little efforts by the government to allocate necessary financial resources for forestry 
conservation indicate the marginal governmental commitment to forest and wild coffee 
conservation. Between 1992 and 1999, only 0.1 percent of all investment projects in Ethiopia 
were related to forestry and just 0.04 percent of all financial resources were allocated to 
forest conservation and development (Berhanu Mengesha / Million Bekele 2001, 97 – 114).  
With US$ 160 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2005 Ethiopia is one of the poorest 
countries in the world (GNI: Philippines US$ 1,300 and Costa Rica US$ 4,590 in 2005) 
(World Bank 2006b; World Bank 2006c; World Bank 2006a). Ethiopa is ranked 170 out of 
177 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index in 2004. 80.7 percent of the 
population live on less than US$ 2 a day and 42 percent of the population is undernourished 
(UNDP 2004, 142). In the last thirty years, Ethiopia has suffered from wars, food shortages, 
political instability and famines, which decreased the situation extremely. This situation also 
put high pressure on Ethiopia’s environment. 
To sum up, Ethiopia’s montane rain forests are declining at an alarming rate, and with the 
forest, wild genetic resources and especially the endemic wild populations of Coffea arabica 
are in the risk of being extinct. For all genetic resources with commercial potential it still holds 
true what Tewolde called out 16 years ago: “Arabica coffee has the bizarre distinction of 
being commercially one of the most important and, at the same time, in terms of genetic 
conservation, one of the most neglected crops in the world.” (Egziabher Tewolde Berhan 
Gebre 1990, 65-72).  
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6.3.3 Regulatory environment: legal and institutional setting 
The Institute of Biodiversity Conservation (IBC) is the leading agency for biodiversity 
management and ABS issues in Ethiopia. The IBC establishment proclamation authorizes 
IBC to grant permission for the collection of biological resources (Proclamation No. 
120/1998). Until 2005, IBC was called Institute of Biodiversity Conservation and Research 
(IBCR) and its mandate was also to conduct research. This mandate was abolished; anyhow 
conservation based research is still an issue.  
Other organizations that are involved in biodiversity issues are the Environmental Protection 
Authority (EPA) and the Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Organization (EWCO). EPA advises 
both organizations, represents Ethiopia in international conferences and develops the legal 
frameworks for environmental protection. EWCO is responsible for the implementation of 
CITES (Yifru 2003, 108). 
Ethiopia is a member of the CBD, but the country has not developed and implemented a law 
that specifically implements the Convention. In 1998 the country adopted a non-binding 
National Policy on Biodiversity Conservation. For a long time the only existing law that 
broadly addresses access to and use of biological resources has been the Forest 
Conservation, Development and Utilization Proclamation of 1994. This law generally aims to 
ensure the participation of the local communities in forest conservation activities and benefits 
arising out of the utilization of forests (Yifru 2003, 112). On the international level, Ethiopia 
was strongly involved in the development of an African Model Law on ABS. The Ethiopian 
Institute for Sustainable Development (ISD) and EPA prepared the draft for the law that was 
adopted later. Although Ethiopia was strongly involved in the development of the African 
Model law, it has only recently implemented an ABS regulation. 
Since 1998, a national committee, led by the IBC and EPA, have started to develop a draft 
proclamation on access to genetic resources. The draft has been discussed in various 
workshops and between stakeholders. The involvement of local communities has been very 
limited. The draft proclamation “Community Knowledge and Access to Biological Resources 
Proclamation” was finally adopted as proclamation in February 2006. In the interviews EPA’s 
representative, being responsible for the development of the proclamation, reasoned the 
delay with the urgency of other problems and advantage of a defensive position. The civil 
war stopped Ethiopia’s development process and generated problems, which required many 
resources. Developing an ABS regime fell back among the priorities. Another reason is that 
Ethiopia has no patent system that can be applied to life forms. Since patented genetic 
resources that originate from Ethiopia can still be used in Ethiopia, ignoring the foreign 
patents, the problem was not considered as being very urgent. According to EPA, Ethiopia 
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decided to concentrate its resources to fight on the international level, for example, by 
developing the Model Law and by standing up for its position in the international negotiations. 
The Proclamation No. 482/2006 “Access to Genetic Resources and Community Knowledge, 
and Community Rights” has the objective “to ensure that the country and its communities 
obtain fair and equitable share from the benefits arising out of the use of genetic resources 
so as to promote the conservation and sustainable utilization of the country’s biodiversity 
resources” (Article 3). The law follows the ABS sections of the African model law in many 
parts and addresses in- and ex-situ collected genetic resources in Ethiopia. It does not apply 
to the customary use and exchange of genetic resources by and among Ethiopian 
communities as well as to the trade of biological resources used for direct consumption 
(Proclamation No. 482/2006, Article 4). 
According to IBC staff, until the Proclamation was adopted the IBC used MTAs according to 
the FAO Code of Conduct to transfer material for public and postgraduate research. The 
Addis Ababa University has also developed guidelines and Standard MTAs to transfer 
material for research purposes. 
In the interview with a person from the National Herbarium it was mentioned that in the past 
two important ABS agreements have been concluded. The first is on teff. Teff is an 
indigenous crop to Ethiopia and is the major staple food of Ethiopia. A Dutch company 
improves teff varieties, grows them and produces gluten-free flour, which is a suitable 
ingredient in gluten-free diets and sports foods. The company has agreed a memorandum of 
understanding with the Ethiopian Institute for Agricultural Research (EIAR, former Ethiopian 
Agricultural Research Organization EARO) on benefit-sharing, which offers Ethiopia joint 
ownership on teff varieties developed by the company (Feyissa 2006, 9). As compensation € 
10 will be paid to Ethiopia for every hectare of teff sewn outside of Ethiopia. The company 
will also deposit five percent of net profits in a fund, which it will use to support Ethiopian 
farmers, for instance, by promoting a commercial approach to teff cultivation. Until a profit is 
made on teff, the company will deposit € 20,000 annually in that fund. Ethiopia now wants to 
revise these agreements because they were concluded before the Proclamation came into 
force. A committee has been appointed in Ethiopia to study this issue. Negotiations with the 
Ethiopian government on how to share the profits are progressing slowly, but the company 
proceeds with its applications for IPRs for growing the teff crop as well as for the production 
of all products containing teff or teff-flour. The company has been criticized by several NGOs 
regarding these applications. It won the Captain Hook Award for biopiracy in 2004, which is 
an award a NGO gives to companies, individuals or institute that they consider as biopirates 
(Coalition Against Biopiracy 2007). 
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Besides the teff agreement, another ABS agreement has been just signed in 2006. The 
Ethiopian government and Vernique Biotech, a British-based start-up company, have agreed 
on a contract to commercialize vernonia oil. Vernonia is a weed growing in eastern Ethiopia, 
which was almost extinct. Its seeds yield oil, which might be a living source of epoxy 
compounds. These are currently produced entirely from petrochemicals. Until now epoxy 
sales amount to US$ 15 billion per year and provide a great market for its potential 
substitute. In exchange for access, the company agreed to pay a mix of license fees, 
royalties and a share of profits to the Ethiopian government over the next ten years. Since 
vernonia can only grow close to the equator, Verique decided to cultivate it in Ethiopia. 
Cultivation started in 2004 with 200 ha but the company intends to expand the area to 
thousands of hectares. Therefore, many local farmers will be paid to cultivate vernonia in an 
area, which is not well suited to produce crops (Cookson 2006). 
Ethiopia and the African model law 
Many African countries regard the CBD and TRIPs as contradictory agreements related to 
their understanding of property rights. They argue that the CBD recognize sovereignty rights 
of states over their biological resources, whereas TRIPs confers monopoly rights through 
IPRs without recognizing technologies, innovations and practices of local communities and 
their collective ownership of common goods (Ekpere 2000, 1). In their opinion TRIPs cannot 
protect and reward valuable indigenous knowledge. Nevertheless, many African countries 
are members of the WTO and therefore obliged to implement the TRIPs agreement. In order 
to fill the gap and to provide these countries a sui generis system for protecting plant 
varieties, a chapter on breeders’ rights was included in the model law. It was hoped that such 
a model law could reconcile the conflicting approaches arising out of the CBD and TRIPs 
(Zerbe 2003, 13). Furthermore, the African countries intended to widen the scope of the 
model law to agricultural development, indigenous knowledge systems, conservation and 
sustainable use of biological resources, community rights, equitable sharing of the benefits 
and national sovereignty consistent with the provisions of the CBD (Zerbe 2003, 16). 
The African Model Legislation on the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, 
Farmers, Breeders and the Regulation of Access to Biological Resource was approved at the 
conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)31 in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001. A 
draft of the model law had been developed by the Ethiopian EPA, the Third World Network 
and the ISD in Ethiopia. It was discussed and finally adopted as a draft model law in Addis 
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 The OAU is an antecessor organization of the African Union (AU). It was established in 2001 and consists of 
fifty-three African states. 
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Ababa in 1998. In the same year the 68th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the 
OAU recommended that governments of member states should adopt the draft model 
legislation. Until 2001, the law was further developed and redrafted and should from then on 
assist Union members to formulate their national legislation. 
The objectives of the model law reflect its broad scope. It aims at conservation, evaluation, 
and sustainable use of biological resources including agricultural genetic resources, 
knowledge and technology against the background of food security. The model law applies 
not only to in-situ genetic resources, but also to ex-situ collections, derivatives from biological 
resources. It recognizes and aims to protect the rights of local communities over their 
biological resources, knowledge, and technology. The main features are the provision of a 
system of access to resources and knowledge, the promotion of a mechanism of a fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing and the recognition and protection of community, farmers’ and plant 
breeders’ rights as explained in the following: 
• System of access to biological resources. The system is in line with the CBD, 
including PIC, MAT, benefit-sharing. Patents over life forms and biological processes 
are not recognized; 
• Community rights. The model law defines community rights as rights that entitle 
communities sovereign rights over their resources, innovations, practices, knowledge 
and technologies and benefits arising out of their use; 
• Farmers’ rights. The model law recognizes farmers’ contribution to the conservation, 
development and sustainable use of genetic resources and regards the recognition of 
farmers’ rights as a necessary incentive to continue these achievements. In the 
model law farmers’ rights are defined as the rights to participate in benefit-sharing, 
save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed as well as use protected varieties to 
develop farmers’ varieties and save, use, multiply and process these new developed 
varieties; 
• Breeders’ rights. The model law recognizes breeders’ efforts and investments for the 
development of new varieties of plants. Plant breeders’ rights include the exclusive 
rights to sell or license material of a new developed variety if the variety is clearly 
distinguishable, stable and homogenous. Despite the recognition of these rights, the 
model law emphasizes the rights of farmers to save, exchange, and use seed 
material in order to produce seeds for a second sowings. 
Although the ambitions were great, the realization of the initial intends to overcome the 
problems have failed due implementation problems. Until now, the model law has not been 
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widely adopted across Africa. Only few countries have taken steps to establish legal 
frameworks for its implementation due to financial, institutional and political problems (Zerbe 
2003, 22). It seems that the model law can only be implemented if capacities are available 
and certain frameworks are already established. The model law has been criticized by WIPO 
and UPOV mainly regarding its rejection of patents over life forms and biological processes 
and its provisions on farmers’ and breeders’ rights (Egziabher Tewolde Berhan Gebre 2002). 
6.3.4 Assigning property and intellectual property rights 
According to the Ethiopian constitution, land belongs to the state and citizens obtain only use 
rights (Constitution of Ethiopia, Article 40.3). Tenure is insecure. The absence of integrated 
land-use policies and regulations contributes significantly to the loss of the forest resources 
and biodiversity as well as the expansion of agriculture into forests. The government 
regularly redistributes land. Without secure forestland tenure, long-term investment in 
forestry by farmers will be hindered (Melesse Damtie 2001). Without legal instruments, it is 
difficult to prosecute the alleged offenders and impose adequate penalties. In the interviews, 
it became clear that the government of Ethiopia does not intend to legalize private property 
rights in land in near future. Analogical private IPRs on biological resources are not 
accepted. Ethiopia is not a member of the WTO. It has an observer status and is seeking 
membership, but until now the country is not bound by the TRIPs agreement. In the 
interviews at EPA, it was obvious that some people being involved in ABS policy-making 
strongly offend patents on life forms and consider CBD and TRIPs as contradictory. In fact, 
Ethiopia has even played a major role in uniting Africa to come up with a position against 
patenting on life forms (Yifru 2003, 116). So far, Ethiopia has excluded all life forms (i.e., 
plants, animals, and microorganisms) from patentability. However, if Ethiopia becomes a 
member of the WTO the country must change this perception. 
The discussed ABS regulations in Ethiopia consider national characteristics and the African 
model law. According to the Proclamation, the ownership of the genetic resources is vested 
in the state and the peoples of Ethiopia (Proclamation No. 482/2006, Article 5.1). However, 
the state has the authority to decide on the use of Ethiopian genetic resources. PIC has to be 
granted by the national competent authority, which is IBC. In line with the African model law, 
the Ethiopian proclamation recognizes and protects community rights. Local communities 
have the right to use and exchange genetic resources and share from the benefits but their 
PIC is not obtained if their genetic resources are subject to an ABS agreement. The rights 
over the knowledge of communities are stronger protected (Proclamation No. 482/2006, 
Article 6-10). 
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The Proclamation stipulates that the benefits should be shared among the state and the 
communities. Communities should receive 50 percent of the benefits in form of money, which 
should be used to the common advantage of the concerned local communities (Proclamation 
No. 482/2006, Article 9). However, the government is responsible for the distribution. 
Communities will depend on the mechanism the government will develop. Such a 
mechanism is still lacking. Due to the absence of land use policy, not much can be expected. 
In some the interviews doubts were mentioned if Ethiopia’s government would be able to 
realize this aim. 
6.3.5 Information asymmetry 
In Ethiopia pre-contractual problems arising from information deficiencies regarding the 
expected benefits cannot be observed. Much more relevant are post-contractual problems on 
the provider side. They are attempted to be regulated with the new Proclamation. The 
information problems on the user side regarding exclusivity, use of the shared benefits and 
the quality are not addressed at all. Many interview partners stress that Ethiopia has very 
little capacity to monitor the flow of genetic material with Ethiopian origin. Until now, Ethiopia, 
supported by international NGOs, used the strength of public relation to disclose cases of 
inappropriate behavior. Many interviewees underlined that Ethiopia depends on the support 
of user countries, as for example Germany. Nevertheless, as long as Ethiopia had not 
implemented the CBD provision on ABS, none of the activities, even if they are not in line 
with the CBD, is illegal. 
In future, Ethiopia intends to monitor ABS activities in the country through the creation of joint 
research projects and the participation of Ethiopians in collection and research. Besides, the 
Proclamation calls on the local communities and the regional bodies to control the use of 
genetic resources (Proclamation No. 482/2006, Article 28). Especially NGOs’ representatives 
mention that the public awareness is quite low and that it will take time to integrate local 
communities in the process. 
Foreigners’ application for access to genetic resources is only successful if they present a 
supporting document of the competent authority that has been issued with regard to the CBD 
in their home countries (e.g., the Ministry for Environment in Germany) and if they agree to 
be accompanied by the personnel of IBC or of another designated institution. However, users 
of genetic resources can do even more than only comply with these obligations. Establishing 
research or even developments units in the country will certainly facilitate monitoring and 
build trust between Ethiopia and users. Users are urged to deliver regularly progress reports 
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on their work and a sample copy of the material with IBC (Proclamation No. 482/2006, 
Article 17). 
Furthermore, in the interviews it was underlined that export controls to monitor the flow of 
genetic material, leaving Ethiopia, play an important role. The Proclamation also adopted this 
instrument. Customs officers, quarantine control institutions and mail service institutions 
should inspect material that is taken out of Ethiopia and ask for an export permit 
(Proclamation No. 482/2006, Article 30/31/32). One interviewee from the university states 
that some genetic material has left Ethiopia through diplomats that enjoy certain privileges at 
the customs. However, until now it seems that Ethiopia does not have the human capacity to 
control exports. According to the interviewees, the training of the customs officer will be a big 
challenge. 
The penalties that can affect collectors for the unapproved use of genetic resources are 
relatively high. Any person who is engaged in access activities without securing access 
permits from the competent authority can be punished depending on the circumstances and 
the type of genetic material with prison (between three months and twelve years) or with a 
fine (between US$ 600 and US$ 6000) (Proclamation No. 482/2006, Article 35). 
National research has been exempted from the ABS regulations. IBC can grant researchers 
access permits, which are not issued based on the access procedure. Here, Ethiopia has 
addressed an issue that is heavily debated on the national level, and has simplified the 
access for national researcher. 
Ethiopia rejects the patenting of life forms and hopes therefore to prevent the 
misappropriation of genetic material, which originated in Ethiopia. User measures as the 
disclosure of origin in patent application are not applicable in this case. It is expected that 
eventually Ethiopia will become a member of the WTO. In this case, the Ethiopian 
government has to review this rejection due to its non-compliance with the TRIPs agreement. 
6.3.6 Accounting for time lags 
Ethiopia’s experience with ABS on the national level is very limited and time lags have not 
played a major role because until recently, no ABS agreement has been concluded and no 
adequate payment schemes, which can address the time lag, have been developed. In the 
interviews, it was often stressed that Ethiopia has already lost much of its genetic resources 
because it has been an open access country so far. However, this will change in future. The 
first ABS agreement on teff that was concluded before the Proclamation was adopted 
already indicated this change. The company pays a fee of € 10 to Ethiopia for every hectare 
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of teff sewn outside of Ethiopia. Besides, there is a five percent royalty rate, which is at the 
upper end of the supposed “world market rates” (one to five percent) and which flows into a 
fund. Furthermore, an up-front payment in form of deposit of € 20,000 is made. Nevertheless, 
it is not clear how the local will benefits. Even if community rights are recognized and 
monetary benefits will be shared, there are doubts that this mechanism will set incentives for 
conservation on the local level and bridge the time lag. 
However, Ethiopia strongly focuses on non-monetary benefits. Non-monetary benefits are 
independent of the development of a product as up-front payments. In the interviews with 
IBC, it became clear that Ethiopia intends that research on the genetic resources collected in 
Ethiopia should be done in Ethiopia, and in a manner that facilitates the participation of 
relevant agents in the country as local organizations and academic institution, which are 
designated by IBC. Only if it is impossible it is allowed to carry out the research activities 
abroad. Ethiopia’s research infrastructure is quite poor. Unlike Costa Rica, the country 
cannot look back on enormous scientific capacity because of a long-time research by 
international scientists and the transfer of technology, knowledge and human capacity. 
Probably only few companies and researcher will find appropriate initial conditions and 
incentives to invest in research and development in Ethiopia. Unfortunately, IBC puts less 
importance on research (with the exception of conservation-based research) but more on 
policy and conservation activities. 
6.3.7 Good governance in provider countries 
The general political situation in Ethiopia can be described as relatively unstable. In the last 
ten years, Ethiopia has undertaken many efforts to advance democratization and 
decentralization. However, these processes were slowed down due to the border war with 
Eritrea from 1998 to 2000. Just in May 2005, democratic reforms led to heavy participation in 
the elections. However, the results were contested and civil unrest ensued (Lemma Teigist 
2006). The World Bank’s Government Indicators 1996-2005 approve these results.  
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Table 21: World Bank Governance Indicators, Ethiopia (1998, 2005) 
Governance Indicator 1998 2005 
Voice and accountability 28.0 19.3 
Political stability/no violence 18.9 8.0 
Government effectiveness 51.7 15.8 
Regulatory quality 36.0 13.9 
Rule of law 53.8 28.0 
Control of corruption 53.9 25.1 
Source: Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi 2006 
The indicator for political stability amounts to eight percents, i.e., only eight percent of the 
other 213 countries and territories in the world rank worse and 92 percent rank better than 
Ethiopia. 
The unstable political situation is reflected in Ethiopia’s environmental policy. One can state a 
lack of political will to protect and develop the forest. According to Berhanu and Million, there 
is neither a Federal Government policy on forest conservation nor clear forest policy in 
general (Berhanu Mengesha / Million Bekele 2001). It can also be stated that the Ethiopian 
government has shown a gross negligence in the protection and development of forest 
resources (Melesse Damtie 2001). The government of Ethiopia admits that it cannot 
effectively conserve and develop forest resources in the country. On the contrary, the 
communities, the NGOs, the private sector and professional associations are called upon by 
the government to be actively involved in the conservation of Ethiopia’s forest (Mengistu 
Hulluka 2001). Even worse, the government encourages “investors” to open up land for food 
production, tea and coffee plantations and logging without conducting an environmental 
impact assessment beforehand (Yonas 2001).  
Even if Ethiopia was strongly involved in the development of the African model law, the 
country was not able to develop and implement own biodiversity policies and legislations. 
Just recently, the ABS regulation has been implemented. However, the responsibility for 
access but not benefit-sharing had been allocated to the IBC. Benefit-sharing has remained 
as an unclear issue. The legislation, which has been in place until now to determine the 
responsibility and work of IBC, has not sufficiently and efficiently implemented the obligations 
of the CBD. Due to the lack of regulations, the good governance appears to be weak in order 
to attract users of genetic resources. Moreover, the existence of different responsible 
institutions seems to be confusing. In the teff case, EIAR (former EARO) negotiated the 
memorandum of understanding. 
6.3.8 Administrative complexity 
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Due to the lack of empirical data it is difficult to estimate the level of administrative 
complexity. However, in the teff case users regard the negotiations as a unnecessary time-
consuming process. Too many institutions are still involved in the ABS process. By defining 
one competent authority, as for example IBC, to be responsible for all ABS activities in 
Ethiopia, the country can decrease the administrative complexity, which appears as a 
problem in many countries when implementing ABS regulations. The split-up of the 
responsibilities among different institutions has to be avoided. Comparable to INBio, IBC can 
lower the transaction costs for companies if it manages to reduce bureaucracy. The 
accumulation of biodiversity activities, as well as the separation from governmental 
procedure can lead to short timeframes for the negotiations of contracts, and help Ethiopia to 
become an interesting source of genetic resources for users. In the interviews, it became 
clear that most interview partners think that it is impossible to establish an intersectoral 
committee as in Costa Rica. However, many issues are not regulated in the Proclamation. 
For example, the application procedure is still unclear as well as the obtaining of PIC. 
6.3.9 Market structure 
Ethiopia’s initial bargaining position has been very weak due to market structure and the 
general political and institutional environment, but also due to the lack of a clear-cut 
legislation that can increase users’ interest. Until now, only few agreements have been 
concluded with the private sector for commercial purposes. Much more scientific research 
agreements have been concluded. However, Ethiopia and IBC have the potential to improve 
the situation. Once other critical factors are addressed, Ethiopia can strengthen its position in 
the market. Nevertheless, the initial condition is to effectively implement the newly formulated 
ABS legislation. In many interviews, especially with staff from IBC, it was mentioned that 
Ethiopia is a weak country regarding the negotiations, but also regarding the monitoring. 
Besides, Ethiopia has no private sector (e.g., breeding institutions and seed enterprises) 
using genetic resources. This also weakens the country’s position (Feyissa 2006, 13). 
The advancement of the implementation of the African model law in many African countries 
and the stronger co-operation of these countries can increase the bargaining position of 
Ethiopia. Besides, in the international negotiation process Ethiopia represents the African 
countries and strongly stands up for the implementation of an international regime, but on the 
national level things look different. After establishing a clear-cut legislation, Ethiopia can use 
its strength on the international level to improve its position. 
Like in the other case studies the access to ex-situ collections in other countries and the 
access to material stored pre-CBD adoption are not regulated, and companies still can 
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recourse to these collections. A lot of material with Ethiopian origin has already left the 
country before a legislation will finally come into place. This was underlined by many 
interviews. In this case Ethiopia depends on regulations on the international level that can 
address the problem. 
6.3.10 Conclusions 
It is obvious that the Ethiopian forest and genetic resources should be preserved. Therefore, 
strategies have to be implemented aiming at this goal. The final implementation of the ABS 
regulations could work and contribute to their conservation if the critical factors can be 
addressed and specific institutional arrangements exist that ensure the performance of the 
necessary tasks. Even if the proclamation has been adopted, detailed rules are not existent, 
as e.g., how the benefit-sharing is going to be implemented. The absence of implementing 
measures is problematic and can be the main reason why it might be difficult to enforce 
provisions of the legislation. Nevertheless, the guidelines pave the way for a better approach 
compared to the one that was carried out until now. They include many important issues and 
integrate experience that was already made in other countries, as for example, the 
regulations regarding national research. Based on these guidelines, IBC has the potential to 
evolve to an adequate ABS institution if it receives support for capacity development. With 
such an institution, chances are given to establish ABS as a conservation concept in 
Ethiopia. This will require time and sufficient financial resources and capacity development. 
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Table 22: Overview on Ethiopia and the critical factors 
 Ethiopia 
Property rights No private property rights system, but communities are strengthened 
Benefits are to be shared between government and communities (50:50), but no 
distribution mechanisms 
No IPRs on biological resources 
Asymmetric 
Information 
No pre-contractual, but post-contractual problems 
ABS regulation only addresses post-contractual problems on the provider side 
(e.g., export control, joint research, document from competent authority in user 
countries) 
Time lags Country strongly focuses on non-monetary benefits 
Participation in research and development 
Good 
governance 
General unstable situation 
Just recently, the country has adopted an ABS regulation despite the country’s 
efforts regarding the African Model Law 
Administrative 
complexity 
IBC is an excellent institution and is suitable to be the institution responsible for 
ABS 
Too many institutions involved 
Market structure No experiences: weak market position 
African Model provides opportunities to strengthen African countries as a 
coalition 
 
The most critical factor in the Ethiopian system are the property rights. Due to the lack of 
adequate property rights and appropriate land-use policies, it is unlikely that an ABS regime 
can address the problem and effectively contribute to the conservation of biodiversity in 
Ethiopia. The other critical factors are also hardly affected. Even if Ethiopia considers them in 
the new Proclamation, the country lacks the capacity to effectively implement the provisions. 
Ethiopia needs support from other African countries, but also from industrialized countries to 
set up an efficient system. To ensure legal security the responsibilities have to be clearly 
defined and the number of interfering institutions has to be reduced. The new proclamation 
and concentration of responsibility to IBC is a step in the right direction. IBC has the potential 
to work as a reliable partner for interested companies. The institute is the center of 
biodiversity activities in Ethiopia, and has experiences and capacities to increase users’ 
interest in bioprospecting in Ethiopia. With the proclamation on ABS, Ethiopia has gained a 
good instrument that can strengthen the role of IBC, but it needs more to advance Ethiopia 
with regard to ABS and biodiversity conservation. The institute needs political and financial 
support to fulfill its task and to fully implement the Proclamation. 
ABS needs to be integrated in a broader conservation program, which is politically 
supported. Policy and institutional deficiencies hold back these developments. The national 
government of Ethiopia is embarking on a decentralization of political power. The 
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responsibilities to establish, manage, and utilize forests and most of the protected areas 
have been passed on to regional governments who struggle with low technical and 
management capacity to execute the new responsibilities (Leykun Abunie 2000). The 
decentralization process was carried out so quickly that the regions were not at all prepared 
for the new tasks, mainly without adequate financial and human resources. 
6.4 EU and Germany 
The EU, with a special focus on Germany, serves as an example for a group of user 
countries. The analysis of the EU and Germany complements the study. Whereas the other 
three case studies represent provider countries, the analysis of the EU focuses on the user 
side that has been neglected so far. However, in an international regime the user dimension 
is the second pillar beside the provider dimension. The analysis follows up the previous 
investigations of the three case studies. The developed analytic framework, based on the 
critical factors and the potential measures, is exercised in the EU context with a special focus 
on Germany in order to prove and illustrate its applicability. First of all, the case study 
methodology is presented. Then, a short introduction to the role of the EU and Germany is 
given. The main part of the analysis is the application of the critical factors to the EU case. 
Taking into account the established analytic framework regarding the effectiveness (cf. 
chapter 5) it is looked at how the critical factors are shaped and how they are already 
addressed in the EU and through its regulatory framework. The analysis of the EU case 
study finishes with a short case study conclusion. 
6.4.1 Case study methodology 
When discussing ABS issues and using the terms of user and provider countries, the main 
criteria of distinction are the amount of biodiversity in the country and the occurrence and 
development of biotechnological, pharmaceutical and agricultural industry. Due to the 
unequal distribution of resources and research and development capacities in the world, 
biodiversity-rich developing countries are classified as provider countries and most of the 
industrialized countries as user countries. However, the distinction and the generalization 
cannot be held in all cases. For example, Australia is an important provider genetic 
resources, whereas Brasilia has a highly developed biotechnology and agri-industry sector 
(Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 18). User countries are characterized as countries that have 
a high demand for genetic resources and capacity to use them in research, development and 
commercialization disregarding if they also provide biodiversity. Users are those agents that 
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import or use genetic resources for commercial or scientific purpose. User countries reflect 
the competent legal and political authorities under which jurisdiction the users of genetic 
resources act and operate (Barber / Johnston / Tobin 2003, 18). User measures are 
understood as a package of legal, administrative and policy measures designed to promote 
compliance by users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge with obligations 
regarding prior informed consent, mutually agreed terms, and benefit-sharing. These 
measures can be applied by either the private or public sector and may be mandatory or 
voluntary (CBD 2002, 17). 
In the following chapters, different user or user country measures, with regard to the analysis 
in chapter 5.2.2 and their implementation in the EU, are investigated based on literature and 
activity review. It is analyzed if the introduction of these measures can fulfill the 
requirements, which are derived from the identified critical factors. As already indicated, 
there is a wide range of user measures that promise to support the objectives of the CBD 
and that can be applied in the private and in the public sector. The introduction of such 
measures requires different degrees of intervention in the existing situation on part of the 
governments of user and provider countries as well as on part of the providers and users 
themselves. In the following, selected user measures are evaluated with regard to their 
feasibility, efficiency, interrelationships and their potential to address the critical factors. 
On the one hand, the considered measures are corporate and institutional policies and codes 
of conduct, the initiation of voluntary certification schemes (mostly applied in the private 
sector), as well as the establishment of a Clearing House Mechanism. On the other hand, the 
measures are National Focal Points, the monitoring of IPRs applications, certificates of 
origin, and the implementation of conflict resolution, arbitration and redress mechanisms, 
which are exclusively applied in the public sector. The list of user measures considered here 
is not exhaustive, but it contains user measures which are intensely discussed in the 
international arena and which in the author’s view promise the most success concerning 
implementation and targeting. 
6.4.2 Introduction 
The EU is an important community of user countries of genetic resources in research and 
product development and possesses substantial commercial research and development 
capacity. European life sciences industry constitutes an important sector of the European 
economy (EU Commission 2003, 6). In 1993 the Community joined the CBD as a member 
and is committed to the implementation of its provisions, including ABS. Responding to 
developing countries' requests, the EU supported in the fourth COP to the CBD (in 
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Bratislava, 1998) the launching of a negotiation process on the question of ABS to explore 
options for access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing on mutually agreed terms. This 
process led to the adoption of the Bonn Guidelines on ABS, a set of detailed, voluntary 
provisions, which should help to implement the ABS provisions of the CBD (EU Commission 
2003, 7). Some member states, as for example Norway and Germany, have been active in 
addressing provider countries concerns and request by financing ABS governance research 
projects and establishing and supporting the introduction of user measures. 
The German user survey revealed that German users generally support user measures, 
which are currently being discussed at the international level, as e.g., the governmental 
support of ABS projects, certification systems, certificates of origin, disclosure of country of 
origin, codes of conduct, international standardized ABS contracts, and central information 
offices (focal points). German users consider instruments in form of services, which have 
less impact on their activities, as more useful than measures regulating their handling of 
genetic resources. A central information point in Germany, which actively informs about 
access possibilities and conditions in provider countries and assists in approaching the latter, 
is considered the most useful instrument (Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 2005, 50-
53). 
6.4.3 Property rights and intellectual property rights 
Disclosure of origin has been identified as a strong instrument to balance the property rights 
distribution between user and provider country. In some countries, both user and provider 
countries, the concept has already been implemented as a stand-alone disclosure 
requirement. This means that non-compliance does not affect the patentability or 
enforceability of a patent. Besides, the consequences of non-compliance lie outside the 
ambit of patent law. Denmark and Norway have followed the approach. The non-compliance 
of the disclosure requirements does not affect the handling of a patent or the validity of a 
patent. Belgium has recently introduced a formal requirement for disclosure of geographical 
origin. Theoretically, failure to comply with this requirement could result in the patent 
application not being processed. However, the Belgian patent office does not check 
compliance, as it is not a searching authority, and so this would be an unlikely occurrence. 
For patents that have been granted, wrongful disclosure would not affect their validity, but 
could result in a fine. Switzerland has proposed similar legislation. Under their draft 
legislation, non-disclosure would lead to rejection of a patent application and wrongful 
disclosure would be an offence to be prosecuted ex officio, the applicant being liable to a 
fine. The provider countries have stronger regulations. In the Andean Community, Brazil, 
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Costa Rica, and India the failure to disclose geographical origin and/or PIC will result in 
rejection of the patent application or its subsequent nullification (Chatham House 2006, 2-3). 
The European Community (EC) Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions specifically considers ABS. The Directive encourages patent 
applications to include information on the geographical origin of biological material, but it is 
non-binding of voluntary nature (Directive 98/44/EC, Recital 27). This provision supports 
compliance with national legislation in the source country of biological material and with 
contractual arrangements governing the acquisition and use of that material. It is without 
prejudice to the processing of patent applications or the validity of rights arising from granted 
patents (Straus 2001, 161). 
Furthermore, in the European patent law a regulation already exists that is not aiming at the 
disclosure of origin of genetic resources as an instrument to monitor compliance with the 
CBD, but rather as an instrument to enable the reproduction of the invention. The EC 
Directive 98/44/EC states that where an invention involves the use of or concerns biological 
material, which is not available to the public and which cannot be described in a patent 
application in such a manner as to enable the invention to be reproduced by a person skilled 
in the art, the description shall be considered inadequate for the purpose of patent law, 
unless the application as filed contains such relevant information as is available to the 
applicant on the characteristics of the biological material deposited (Directive 98/44/EC, 
Article 13(1)b). In this case the disclosure of origin serves the only purpose to enable 
persons to reproduce the invention and would only be applied in few cases (EU Commission 
2003, 17). 
6.4.4 Information asymmetries 
Post-contractual information asymmetries on the provider side (due to the lack of monitoring 
capacity) can be addressed by certain user measures, which the EU has already partly 
implemented and developed. They are corporate and institutional policies and codes of 
conduct, voluntary certification schemes, National Focal Points and the CHM, and the 
promotion of co-operation and standardized contracts. 
I. Corporate and institutional policies and codes of conduct 
In the EU some stakeholders’ initiatives exist in order to develop and implement policies and 
codes of conduct, which comply with the CBD and national ABS legislation in provider 
countries. Scientific research institutions and networks of ex-situ collections in the EU have 
developed institutional policies and codes of conduct on ABS to facilitate the acquisition and 
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exchange of genetic resources in accordance with applicable national and international law. 
Important initiatives have been taken by European botanic gardens, microbial culture 
collections and germplasm collections (EU Commission 2003, 10). 
The "Principles on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing for participating 
institutions" developed under the auspices of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew and involving 
28 botanic gardens from 21 countries is an important example, as well as the International 
Plant Exchange Network (IPEN). IPEN is an exchange system for botanic gardens according 
to the CBD and has been developed by the Verband Botanischer Garten (an association of 
botanic gardens in German speaking countries) on behalf of the Federal Ministry of 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. Botanic gardens that wish to join the 
network must sign and abide by a Code of Conduct that sets out gardens’ responsibilities for 
acquisition, maintenance and supply of living plant material and associated benefit-sharing. 
The botanical gardens themselves impose the control of admission, conservation, and 
dissemination of genetic resources. The objective of this initiative is to promote the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, to comprehensibly document living plant 
material in order to secure the rights of the countries of origin in accordance with the CBD, 
and to strengthen the mutual trust with the countries of origin so that the access to genetic 
resources and its use are guaranteed for the future (Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 
2005, 24). 
The project “Micro-organisms Sustainable Use and Access Regulation International Code of 
Conduct (MOSAICC)”, which is financed by the EU and has been developed by the Belgian 
Co-ordinated Collections of Micro-organisms (BCCM) conjointly with 16 international 
organizations, is another example. MOSAICC is a code of conduct developed to facilitate 
access to microbial resources and to help partners in developing practical agreements when 
transferring microbial resources. MOSAICC provides a system based on the identification of 
the in-situ origin of microbial resources via PIC and the monitored transfer of the resources 
and material transfer agreements defined by provider and user. It is already frequently used 
by institutions using microbial resources (BCCM 2007). 
Some European pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have developed corporate 
policies on ABS. Other smaller sectors, including horticulture and botanical medicines, do not 
seem to have developed comprehensive corporate or sector-based policies on ABS (EC 
2002, 34). 
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II. Voluntary certification schemes 
The gaining of reputation of bioprospecting companies would be the simplest measure to 
establish confidence between partners and overcome the problem of asymmetric 
information. On the user side, some large pharmaceutical companies (e.g., Merck) have 
already improved their image by concluding ABS agreements in compliance with the CBD. 
But even if the market for genetic resources is dominated by a few companies, a large 
number of small biotech firms still exist in there and there is a growing tendency of large, 
established pharmaceutical, agricultural and other life science companies cooperating with 
these smaller, start-up biotechnology research companies (Hill 1999). These small start-up 
research companies are new in the market and lack the time to gain reputation. The 
participation in a certification system can improve the user’s reputation and provide the basis 
for provider countries to feel more confident about their potential partners. However, in reality 
they are not sufficiently applied. 
The EC Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) offers an interesting example that 
should be considered for the development of voluntary certification schemes for 
organizations complying with the CBD, Bonn Guidelines and national ABS regulations. 
Nevertheless, so far it does not receive much attention. EMAS is a voluntary scheme for 
organizations and was established for the evaluation and improvement of the environmental 
performance of organizations, and the provision of relevant information to the public and 
other interested parties. It is open to any organization in the public and in the private sector in 
the EU (Regulation (EC) No 761/2001, Art. 1/3,1). The participation in EMAS requires the 
conduction of an environmental review considering all environmental aspects of the 
organization’s activities, products and services, the establishment of an effective 
environmental management system, the carrying out of an environmental audit, and the 
provision of an environmental statement (Regulation (EC) No 761/2001, Art. 3, 2). The direct 
and indirect environmental aspects that have to be considered include, e.g., emissions to air, 
the use of natural resources and raw materials, and effects on biodiversity (Regulation (EC) 
No 761/2001, Annex VI). 
The European Commission has developed guidance on the identification of the 
environmental impacts and on the assessment of their significance that can be used by 
companies and research institution to identify significant direct and indirect impacts of their 
activities on the conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources (EU Commission 
2001a).  
The application of EMAS in the ABS process seems to be appropriate. The principles 
formulated in the CBD and in the Bonn Guidelines could be incorporated in organizations’ 
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environmental policies and environmental management systems established under EMAS 
and could then be reflected in their environmental statement. The independent environmental 
verifiers accredited under EMAS would control the reliability, credibility and correctness of 
the data and information in the environmental statement. EMAS is based on the international 
standard ISO 14001 as its basic management system and goes even beyond in relation to 
public transparency, credibility and environmental performance (EU Commission 2003, 23). 
The application of EMAS could support the setting up of an international certification system 
for genetic resources, as it is discussed in the CBD, with useful information and experiences. 
A modified EMAS could be implemented in other user countries. 
III. National Focal Points and the Clearing House Mechanism 
National Focal Points in user countries as well as CHMs increase transparency and trust 
especially when information deficiencies may compromise the relationships between provider 
and users. 
The EC-CHM is an important portal and database regarding biodiversity issues. However, it 
is rarely known and not frequently used by users. In September 2005, the EC has launched 
the EC ABS Portal (EC 2007). It provides information on European policy and legislative 
measures related to ABS as well as links to web pages of international organizations that are 
active in this field. The Bonn Guidelines can be found in different European languages. As a 
network platform it shares details of contact points in all the Member States of the European 
Union and links to information on ABS in the Member States. This portal is a significant 
improvement of the European information policy. However, the utilization of such a portal 
requires the readiness of stakeholders to provide informational documents as well as 
publicity among those. Until now, this portal is also rarely used. 
Most member states of the EU have designated national CBD and/or ABS focal points. The 
EC-CHM provides access to some but incomplete information on policies, legislation, funding 
opportunities, databases, sources of expertise, etc. held by European Community 
institutions. It publicizes links to other European institutions and organizations (i.e., 
governmental, private and NGOs) keeping useful information. It also links to web sites of 
global organizations such as the CBD Secretariat’s web site and CHMs of EU member states 
(e.g., Belgium, France, Germany). National CHMs play a very important role to inform users 
on biodiversity-related issues and ABS in their own language. Recently, Germany has 
launched a new ABS portal in addition to its CHM (BfN 2007). The portal provides essential 
information on ABS for German citizens and especially users. 
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IV. Promotion of co-operation and standardized contracts 
Governments of user countries can support the development and execution of projects 
aiming at the promotion of co-operation between users and providers and the development 
of standardized material transfer agreements. Governmental institutions monitor these 
projects and can ensure that users comply with the CBD. Providers will be more confident 
about their partners if the ABS negotiations take place in the framework of such a project and 
facilitate access. By participating in such projects users can gain reputation and constitute a 
positive example (Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 2005, 25). 
The Federal German Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) finances the project 
Process-oriented development of a model for equitable benefit-sharing for the use of 
biological resources in the Amazon Lowlands of Ecuador (ProBenefit). The main participants 
in the project are German institutions (Institute of Biodiversity, University of Göttingen), the 
Association of German Engineers, and a German company, one of the leading 
manufacturers of phytomedicines worldwide. The objectives of ProBenefit are to develop a 
model agreement on equitable benefit-sharing in Ecuador's Amazon region, to explore the 
potential for using medicinal plants and develop possibilities for sustainable use of these 
plants. ProBenefit started in June 2003 and has a planned term of about 5 years. Until now, 
only an agreement with the indigenous organization Federación de Organizaciones de la 
Nacionalidad Kichwa del Napo (FONAKIN) has been reached. This organization supports the 
negotiation process with concerned indigenous communities. No ABS agreement has been 
signed so far (ProBenefit 2007). 
6.4.5 Accounting for time lags 
Technology transfer is the most relevant non-monetary benefit. It can address the time lags 
between the bioprospecting activities and the development of a marketable product. 
The EU has the potential and the possibilities to transfer technology to provider countries. 
However, no data are available to draw conclusions about the actual implementation. In the 
EU no policy measure exists addressing especially technology transfer and ABS. Technology 
transfer is supported through general rules of competition, partnership agreements, and 
framework programs for research and development. In the EU technology transfer is very 
diverse and carried out on member state level. In Germany several hundred institutions in 
different sectors (government-based international co-operation sector, science sector, 
governmental sector, private sector, and non-governmental sector) are actively dealing with 
aspects of biodiversity technology transfer (Paulsch et al. 2004, 4). In the EU no legislative 
and policy measure exists that specifically addresses research and technology transfer under 
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the CBD. The EU Declaration ratifying the Biodiversity Convention highlights technology 
transfer and access to biotechnology in accordance with CBD Article 16 and in compliance 
with IPRs (EC 2002, 8). 
The Decision No 1513/2002/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 June 2002 
concerning the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Community for research, 
technological development and demonstration activities sets up rules with regard to 
international scientific co-operation, technology and knowledge transfer and human 
resources. It stresses the importance of the consideration of developing countries’ interests 
(EU Parliament and Council 2002). These proposed rules do not, however, incorporate 
provisions on ABS in the context of the CBD (EC 2002, 14). 
The Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) States and the European Community and its Member States (Cotonou Agreement) 
could also enable technology transfer under ABS partnerships between EU institutions and 
countries that provide genetic resources. A Compendium on Co-operation Strategies is part 
of the agreement and provides strategies and guidelines for scientific, technical and research 
co-operation. Especially the section Scientific, Technological and Research Co-operation of 
the Compendium stresses the importance of the strategies with regard to the implementation 
of research and development projects and programs established by the ACP States, the 
establishment and promotion of activities aimed at the consolidation of appropriate 
indigenous technology, and the acquisition and adaptation of relevant foreign technology 
promotion of scientific and technological co-operation between ACP States themselves, 
between ACP States and other developing countries, and between ACP States and the 
European Community and its Member States (EU Commission 2001b, 35-36). Additionally, 
the Compendium states that ACP/EC collaboration shall continue to stimulate partnerships 
between all sectors of society, both users and generators of knowledge. It stresses that co-
operation should support the efforts of the ACP states to create and develop technology and 
research (EU Commission 2001b, 36). 
6.4.6 Good governance in provider countries 
So far, good governance has only been discussed in the providing countries. Through 
development and foreign policies user countries can support measures aiming at stabilizing 
general political security, but also support the development and implementation of 
biodiversity and ABS laws. Nevertheless, it is difficult or even impossible for the EU to ensure 
that the regulations are actually enforced. Therefore, the influence of the EU and its 
possibilities to positively contribute to this critical factor are very limited. 
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6.4.7 Administrative Complexity 
The EU cannot directly influence problems related to administrative complexity, except 
through the support within development co-operation. However, National Focal Points and 
CHMs have a positive effect on the administrative complexity in provider countries. By 
implementing certain user measures, the EU can assume some responsibility in the process 
and lessen the burden of the provider countries. For example, the National Focal Points of an 
EU member state could inform potential users about the ABS regulation in provider 
countries. Besides, they issue some kind of document to the user, which they can use as a 
proof of registration as required in the Ethiopian Proclamation. Besides, National Focal 
Points and CHMs in user countries can support the exchange of information and experiences 
in ABS issues. They also can establish contacts to National Focal Points and authorities in 
provider countries and therefore facilitate the establishment of contacts among the users. By 
informing users, which are often insufficiently informed regarding ABS, about their obligations 
the National Focal Points relieve the provider countries.  
The German user survey revealed that German users of genetic resources are poorly 
informed about the international legal framework of access to and use of genetic resources, 
and not familiar with CBD terms. Many users, regardless of the size of their company or 
institution, do not know the Convention and the meaning of the terms “Access and benefit-
sharing”, “National Focal Point/National Competent Authority”, “Clearing House Mechanism”. 
However, users are aware of this situation. More than half of the users who know of the CBD 
consider themselves not sufficiently informed. The lack of knowledge and information is 
differently distributed among the sectors. Public institutions (i.e., ex-situ collections, 
universities, and other research institutions) are more familiar with the terms and feel better 
informed than private institutions and companies. The main channels through which users 
obtain information are secondary sources: the internet, associations and scientific journals. 
National authorities in Germany or in the countries of origin are of minor significance as 
source of information (Holm-Mueller / Richerzhagen / Taeuber 2005, 59). 
Through the initial work of the focal points through CHM or other media in user countries, the 
competent authorities in provider countries that are often overburdened with the complex 
ABS issues can be relieved. 
6.4.8 Market Structure 
The transfer of technology from the EU to provider countries, which has been explained in 
chapter 6.4.5, will certainly increase their position in the market both among other providers 
but also towards users. Through technological improvement, provider countries are enabled 
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to use the country’s biodiversity for research and development or even for commercialization. 
If it is possible to establish and technically equip research facilities in provider countries, they 
are able to offer more processed and higher valued genetic material in the market instead of 
raw genetic material. Positive effects on economic development can be expected. 
Furthermore, technology transfer related to biodiversity conservation and environmental 
protection has a positive influence on the environmental situation in the provider country. 
6.4.9 Conclusions 
The EU is taken as an example for an important community of user countries of genetic 
resources in research and product development. The life sciences industry constitutes an 
important sector of the European economy and has a considerable demand for genetic 
resources.  
User measures can take effect where providers’ influence and capacities are very limited. 
They can benefit users and providers and have the potential to advance the international 
governance of ABS. On the policy level, some European user measures are already 
implemented or being intensely discussed and designed. They can serve as an example for 
the introduction of user measures in other user countries even if they are still in the 
development stage. The EU’s user measures address the factors, which have been defined 
as critical for an effective international ABS regime that aims at conservation, access, and 
benefit-sharing. Scientific research institutions and networks of ex-situ collections in the EU 
have developed institutional policies and codes of conduct on ABS to facilitate the acquisition 
and exchange of genetic resources. They increase user transparency and facilitate users’ 
acquisition activities. There is probably less need of other compliance procedures. By 
transferring important technologies, the EU member states can bridge the time lags between 
provision and compensation and strengthen the bargaining position of provider countries. 
Voluntary certification schemes like EMAS and the monitoring of the use of genetic 
resources in research and development and IPRs applications help to verify the transparency 
of the ABS process and the compliance with the CBD obligations. Furthermore, they remove 
information deficiencies on the part of providers and users. The creation of a National Focal 
Point is important as an official contact for applicants and for information dissemination. The 
same applies to the CHM. Moreover, the Clearing House Mechanism supports scientific and 
technical co-operation through the provision of an information management and exchange 
system. Conflict solution and redress can be reached through the traditional, already existing 
systems. 
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Table 23: Overview on the EU (Germany) and the critical factors 
 EU - Germany 
Property rights Encouragement: disclosure of origin in order to comply with the CBD, but also to 
enable reproduction of the invention 
Asymmetric 
Information 
Few examples of corporate and institutional policies and codes of conduct (e.g., 
botanical gardens, microbial collections) 
Application of voluntary certification schemes not sufficient 
National Focal Points and the European CHM 
Promotion of co-operation and standardized contracts (e.g., ProBenefit) 
Time lags Technology transfer is carried out, but not sufficient to solve problem 
Good 
governance 
Only support through development co-operation 
Administrative 
complexity 
National Focal Points can release provider countries by informing and preparing 
users 
Market structure Technology transfer can enable provider countries to offer value-added products 
(increased market position) 
 
The EU’s activities regarding the disclosure of origin can be seen as very limited, since they 
rely on a unilateral and voluntary system. Here, a multilateral system with a self-standing 
disclosure requirement in patent application is preferable. Within such a system, providers of 
genetic resources who have granted access to their resources would have the opportunity to 
observe the utilization and commercialization of the provided genetic material outside of their 
territory. The establishment of such a multilateral system, attached to the TRIPs Agreement, 
the PCT or the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) seems to be impossible because of the difficult 
negotiations in the WTO or WIPO. Therefore, policy-makers should support the development 
of a binding disclosure requirement in patent applications in the EU - probably as a formal 
condition for patentability. It can improve the situation and pave the way for a multilateral 
solution. 
When looking at the EU as an example, it has to be considered that in the international 
negotiations about ABS the EU has always appeared as an ABS supportive party of the CBD 
responding to developing countries requests. Therefore, the EU’s activities regarding the 
establishment of user measures are not surprising. However, the EU case allows drawing 
important conclusions, which can be applied to other user countries. The analysis of the user 
measures shows that many actual and potential measures do not require the development of 
new national or international laws and regulations or the development of new and complex 
institutions. This plays an important role for their feasibility. Rather it can be concluded that 
user measures can be implemented by the adjustment and modification of existing systems 
in the area of voluntary certification, monitoring of IPRs, and certificates of origin. The 
implementation of user measures in user countries should provide effective and feasible 
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measures regarding the ABS objectives of the CBD and not hindering the utilization and the 
trade of genetic resources. Therefore, these measures have to be designed in such a way to 
avoid the creation of time-consuming and bureaucratic regimes aligned with high transaction 
costs. 
Even if user countries outside of the EU do not have the same institutional and legislative 
environment as EU member states, they should consider the European measures 
experiences when designing and implementing user measures within their territory. User 
measures play a significant role in an international ABS regime to support the compliance 
with the obligations and responsibilities arising out of the ratification of the CBD. Only then a 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing can be realized. 
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7 Conclusions 
Since 1992, ABS has been promoted as a promising concept to halt the on-going loss of 
biodiversity. However, the success has failed to appear so far. Biodiversity is still declining, 
ABS has only been implemented in about 20 countries, and only a few successful cases 
have been reported. Researchers and industry relying on wild genetic resources complain 
that access has been restricted and provider countries complain that no shared benefits have 
been channeled to the resource countries and holders and that their genetic material is still 
used without approval. Therefore, it is legitimate to raise the question how has the ABS 
regime to be designed to reach effectiveness. 
To answer this question the study establishes an analytic framework to measure the 
effectiveness of the ABS concept on the national and regional level. The effectiveness is the 
capability of the ABS regime i) to set incentives for the sustainable use and the conservation 
of biodiversity, ii) to facilitate access to plant genetic material and iii) to enhance a fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing, which also implies the prevention of the misappropriation and 
unapproved use of genetic resources. Six critical factors determine the level of effectiveness 
and the realization of these objectives. They are property rights, asymmetric information, 
time lags, good governance, administrative complexity, and market structure.  
User and provider countries have different options to develop and implement measures that 
have the potential to address the critical factors and thereby to improve ABS governance and 
form an international regime. The measures can be differentiated by the party that is mainly 
responsible for its implementation. User measures are implemented by users and provider 
measures by providers, but most measures depend on the commitment of both sides or are 
interlinked. The respective provider measures are the assigment of property rights, 
compensation schemes, institutional strengthening, coalitions, screening, and signaling. The 
respective user measures are monitoring of IPR applications, documentation of gene flow, 
certification schemes, corporate and institutional policies, National Focal Points and Clearing 
House Mechanisms, projects and model contracts, technology transfer, and conflict 
resolution. In the following, the main results of the study regarding the relationship between 
the critical factors and the provider and user measures are illustrated. 
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7.1 ABS and the critical factors 
The ABS concept is still suffering from the high expectations providers and environmentalists 
had when it was developed and integrated into the CBD. In the beginning of the 1990s, 
genetic resources were considered as green gold that has high economic value due to its 
genetic potential. It was hoped that if the share of the benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources flows back to provider countries, it will facilitate access to genetic 
resources and set incentives for conservation and make destructive activities less 
economical. However, it can be observed even without the deeper insights of the case 
studies that these anticipations have not turned into reality. Not many contracts have been 
concluded during the last fourteen years and the concluded contracts have not generated 
sufficient incentives to stop the on-going loss of biodiversity. This is the point of departure of 
this study. The question arises whether the ABS is a silver bullet that can effectively 
contribute to the reaching of its promises that are i) facilitated access to the genetic 
resources, ii) conservation of biodiversity and iii) the fair and equitable benefit-sharing. The 
latter implies the prevention of the misappropriation and unapproved use of genetic 
resources. Only if the three elements are positively affected by the critical factors the 
approach is effective. 
In general, it can be concluded that despite its overall disappointing experiences ABS is a 
useful concept that can contribute to the three goals. The CBD and ABS have improved the 
situation. Before, biodiversity was considered as common heritage and treated as an open 
access resource. The tangible resource as well as its intangible components have suffered 
from exploitation. The ABS concept in the CBD can accomplish two important things. Firstly, 
it allocates the responsibility for acting to the provider countries. Through the principle of self-
sovereignty, provider countries are not only responsible, they also receive the autonomy of 
decision. Secondly, it internalizes a part of the total economic value of biodiversity: the 
commercial value of genetic resources and its contribution to research and development. 
Other values are not considered. Users of genetic resources have to share the benefits they 
gain from the use. Therefore, it is clear that ABS alone is never sufficient to provide an 
incentive for biodiversity conservation. It has to be embedded in a comprehensive strategy 
that internalizes other values beside the commercial value. Moreover, ABS does not only 
take effect in one dimension. Besides its impact on access, conservation and benefit-sharing, 
ABS can have large-scale impacts on provider countries’ economic and social situation. It 
has the potential to alleviate poverty and support economic development. For example, if 
ABS attracts foreign direct investment, drives the establishment of new industries and 
supports the improvement of the research potential it can assist countries in their 
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development goals. Therefore, ABS needs to be seen in a much broader sense of 
sustainable development and cannot be reduced to only environmental objectives. For 
example, Costa Rica is the case that shows that ABS has supported the country’s will and 
capability to establish and advance a research institution. 
The CBD and the ABS concept raised awareness about biodiversity and provided 
environmentalists and policy-makers with economic arguments to conserve the biological 
diversity. As the Stern report, which caused a stir, showed economic arguments are much 
better perceived than any other by the decision-makers and the population. 
Having the limitations of internalization in mind, the theory suggests that the approach is still 
very promising within this defined scope. However, the reality shows different results but the 
reasons for this divergence have not been analyzed in the relevant literature. This study 
provides a new analytical framework to measure the effectiveness by six determinants, 
(property rights, asymmetric information, time lags, political and legal security, administrative 
complexity, and market structure). The ABS concept itself is very sophisticated and it is a 
long way from theory to practice. The analysis shows that due to the interlinkages of the 
determinants and the possible instruments and measures providers and users have to 
address the shape of the critical factors. The ABS concept is very complex. There is no 
“perfect” or “optimal” specification of the critical factors. However, some rules of performance 
can be formulated that the critical factors should follow. It always depends on how specific 
critical factors and undertaken measures can jointly take effect. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider both sides. Even if a critical factor indicates a poor performance of a country when 
the right provider or user measures are in place, the result can be satisfying. However, based 
on the analysis some striking statements can be made regarding the specification of the 
critical factors. 
Property rights including intellectual property rights, and especially their strength and how 
they are distributed among the stakeholders (providers and users), are the most relevant 
critical factor in the ABS concept. Property rights impact all three elements of ABS 
effectiveness: conservation, access and benefit-sharing. If property rights are not allocated, 
resource holders cannot grant access and benefit-sharing does not take place. Property 
rights enable property owners to market the resources. Only if the agents responsible for 
conserving biodiversity have adequate property rights over the biological resources, they can 
grant access, and they are in the position to receive benefits that in the next step establish 
incentives for biodiversity conservation. If the property rights situation in a country is not 
sufficient, a national trust fund can guarantee a fair and equitable benefit-sharing. 
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Intellectual property rights take effect on the other end and provide users with strong rights 
after a product has been developed. The balanced distribution of property and intellectual 
property rights is essential. Property rights or intellectual property rights must be placed at 
those levels that are most effective at maintaining and investing in the concerned asset, and 
adequate compensation payments must occur real-time to make other destructive uses less 
profitable. The approval of intellectual property rights has to ensure that such rights are only 
granted if material has been obtained legally. The disclosure of the origin when users of 
genetic resources apply for a patent is an appropriate instrument. Certificates of origin issued 
by provider countries can be used as the relevant document to prove that the material was 
legally obtained. 
Asymmetric information is the second important critical factor. In the form of pre-
contractual and post-contractual problems, it impacts all three elements of effectiveness. 
Information deficiencies are reciprocal. They occur on both sides, on the user and provider 
side. Providers have information deficiencies regarding the expected benefits genetic 
resources will deliver and the factual utilization of the material once users have them. 
Providers cannot estimate the value of the expected benefits and ask for unrealistic benefits. 
As a consequence, no contracts are concluded. To address the problem more economic 
studies on the commercial value of genetic resources have to be undertaken and more 
contracts have to be published. Model contracts and projects and economic assessments 
can put the negotiations on a solid basis.  
Providers cannot observe the use of the provided material. Worried about the unapproved 
use, provider countries over-regulate and stop trading genetic resources. To confirm their 
eligibility users can signal their willingness to comply. Besides, providers can screen users 
with specifically designed contracts.  
Users lack information regarding exclusivity, quality and the utilization of the received 
benefits and react with a country substitution if the deficiencies are too obvious. Users can 
also screen providers to ensure the provision of better quality. This is especially relevant 
when the role of intermediaries grows. All scenarios can lead to a situation in which access, 
conservation and benefit-sharing does not take place. Adequate conflict resolution 
mechanism enable trust building among users and providers, since providers can rely on 
support if their rights are compromised. 
Time lags strongly impact the effectiveness elements of conservation and benefit-sharing. If 
the timeframes between the collection and the flow of benefits is too large, no incentives for 
conservation are stipulated. Adequate compensation schemes or fund solutions can address 
the problems. Up-front payments need to be included. However, many companies, especially 
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small ones, are not able to make payments in advance. Therefore, a fund solution would be 
adequate. Users of genetic resources have to make some advance payments into this fund 
and from then on all the payments can be channeled through the biodiversity trust fund 
managed by representatives of all stakeholders. This group can even decide on the 
distribution among the provider. In this case, the payments are uncoupled from the national 
property right distribution. 
The next two critical factors are highly relevant from a transaction cost perspective as 
asymmetric information. Good governance plays an important role for the transaction costs 
that arise in the access phase of ABS. The general transaction environment is important, 
especially if users collect the material themselves. Costa Rica is a good example for a 
developing country that offers high legal and political security. Furthermore, it is also 
important whether the provider country has already implemented a clear ABS regulation. 
Otherwise, users react with country substitution. The strengthening of institutions and 
political systems as well as the support of the formulation of laws facilitate the development 
of good governance. 
Administrative complexity is another aspect of governance and mainly impacts the access 
phase. It can heavily increase users’ transaction costs. Competent, multifunctional 
institutions in provider countries are required to design and allocate rights, manage 
conservation areas, coordinate activities, negotiate ABS contracts, control compliance and 
sanction misappropriation regarding the use of genetic resources. Many developing countries 
lack such institutions. Institutional strengthening in provider countries and streamlining of 
ABS policies and procedures is therefore very important. The introduction of documentation 
systems, as e.g., certificates of origin, can support such processes. 
Finally, the market structure also impacts the access objective of ABS. To reach a fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing, the negotiations on ABS have also to be fair and undertaken by 
equal partners. Due to the market conditions provider countries are in a weaker position. 
However, although the industry argues that genetic resources have become less important 
recent data indicate that, for example, in Germany users expect to constantly use genetic 
resources or even expand the use. However, the existence of ex-situ collections, providing 
material that was collected before the CBD was adopted, is an alternative for users and 
weakens the bargaining position of providers. Coalitions, as e.g., the group of megadiverse 
countries, are an option to strengthen the position of providers in the market. The same 
applies to the use of model contracts and model projects on ABS (e.g., ProBenefit). 
It is obvious that the analyzed provider measures can address the critical factors. Most of 
them are very target-oriented and address only one critical factor. Four out of the six 
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measures (assigning property rights, coalitions, screening and signaling) have only a one-
dimensional impact, and one other measure (compensation schemes) has a strong impact 
on one critical factor, which is time lags, but weaker effects on property rights and 
asymmetric information. Therefore, a variety of provider measures is necessary if different 
critical factors cause problems for the ABS effectiveness. 
Table 24: Critical factors and provider measures 
 Assigning 
property rights 
Compensation 
schemes 
Institutional 
strengthening 
Coalitions Screening/ 
Signaling 
Property 
rights  
     
Asymmetric 
information 
     
Time lags 
     
Good 
governance 
     
Admin. 
complexity 
     
Market 
structure 
     
 strong effect  weak effect  no effect 
Users have a comprehensive set of measures that have the potential to address all critical 
factors. However, as in the case of the provider measures the instruments can only tackle 
one or two critical factors. Only the measure “projects and model contracts” promise to be 
broader instruments since it impacts up to four critical factors. 
Table 25: Critical factors and user measures 
 Monitoring 
IPR 
applications 
Documentation 
gene flow 
Certification 
schemes/ 
institutional 
policies/ 
Focal 
points/
CHM 
Projects/
model 
contracts 
Technology 
transfer 
Conflict 
resolution 
Property 
rights 
       
Asymmetric 
information 
       
Time lags 
       
Good 
governance 
       
Admin. 
complexity 
       
Market 
structure 
       
 strong effect  weak effect  no effect 
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The user measures have been not only analyzed with a view to their potential to address the 
critical factors. Other criteria that have to be regarded are if they are feasible and practicable. 
In the international discussions, the feasibility of user measures is persistently questioned by 
users. The analysis shows that all measures are feasible. Some are already implemented 
and applied, as for example, the coalition of group of megadiverse countries on the provider 
side or the different CHMs on the user side. Some measures are still under discussion or in 
the development as it is in the case of certificates of origin. However, the analysis makes 
clear that most of the instruments are not fully effective yet. They need adjustment or have to 
be applied and used in a better and broader way. Measures that are based on voluntary 
initiatives and agreements, e.g., institutional policies, projects and model contracts, 
certification system, can be implemented easier and faster. Measures that require changes in 
the legal system (e.g., disclosure of origin) are subject to long and taxing political and 
legislative processes. 
7.2 Case studies 
The three provider country case studies have proved to be excellent examples of how 
developing countries deal with the challenge to implement an international concept that aims 
to protect a formerly open access resource. From many points of view, the case studies differ 
much and can show the range of aspects that have to be regarded when analyzing the 
effectiveness of ABS. Costa Rica and the Philippines are pioneers regarding the 
implementation of the ABS concept. However, they walked on different paths. The 
Philippines already developed a regulation in 1995, but since then only one commercial 
agreement has been concluded, whereas Costa Rica has negotiated and concluded 
contracts on bioprospecting even before the CBD has been in place. The comprehensive 
legislative frameworks were only adopted in 1998 and in the end of 2003. However, this has 
not impeded the country to establish a research institute, namely INBio, which successfully 
conducted more than twenty research projects on bioprospecting. Ethiopia is a late-comer 
regarding the development and implementation of ABS laws as well as the conclusion of 
contracts. Only in 2006, an ABS Proclamation has been adopted. However, few 
bioprospecting contracts have been concluded and Ethiopia is on the way to apply the ABS 
concept. In environmental terms, Costa Rica was able to improve the situation and slow 
down deforestation. In the Philippines and Ethiopia the situation is worse. Nevertheless, this 
positive development cannot only be traced back to the implementation of ABS. The 
inclusion of ABS in a comprehensive environmental and forest protection strategy and the 
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diversification of applied instruments to protect the forests and internalize environmental 
costs can rather explain the success.  
Based on the case studies this study analyses the strengths and weaknesses of current ABS 
regimes in provider countries and user countries with a view to the critical factors. On the one 
hand, in the three provider countries the shape of the critical factors is analyzed in a country-
specific context and it is investigated whether they are already addressed and/or gaps are 
still existent. On the other hand, in the group of user countries potential user measures are 
identified and analyzed with regard to their feasibility, efficiency, and their potential to 
address the critical factors. 
The property rights systems in the three provider countries differ. Especially Ethiopia’s 
approach is very different from Costa Rica’s and the Philippines’. In the latter two, the state 
has the property rights and authority over biodiversity as allocated by the CBD. In the 
Philippines these rights apply to all forms of biodiversity, whereas in Costa Rica only the 
intangible material is subject of state property and the tangible material is subject of private 
property rights. However, in the Philippines the role of the private level is acknowledged and 
local communities participate through strong PIC requirements, which are already exercised, 
since the government recognizes the right of private land property. It is regulated that the 
government receives the bioprospecting fee, and that resource holders receive the up-front 
payments. In Costa Rica, private landowner and communities can also participate through 
PIC. However, so far bioprospecting has only taken place on state property and only the 
government and INBio as an intermediary have received benefits. Therefore, in Costa Rica 
the experiences are fractional and only partial useful. In Ethiopia biodiversity but also land is 
under state property. Communities have the right to control access and participate through 
PIC and benefit-sharing. However, until now this has only rarely been implemented. 
Intellectual property rights are a strong counterpart of property rights over wild genetic 
resources and they are treated differently in the countries. Ethiopia is not a member of the 
WTO and does not have to comply with TRIPs. All biological resources are exempted from 
patentability. Both countries the Philippines and Costa Rica are members of the WTO and 
comply with TRIPs. In the Philippines plant varieties and animal breeds are also excluded 
from patentability, but the country has adopted a Plant Variety Protection Law as sui generis, 
which strengthen users of genetic resources. In Costar Rica providers are strengthened, 
since IPR application processes require the submission of a certificate of origin.  
User countries have only limited possibilities to impact the critical factor of property rights, 
since national property rights systems are fully under the control of the national states. User 
countries can only positively contribute through user measures that address intellectual 
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property rights. Most of the intellectual property rights are granted in user countries, since the 
majority of products are sold there. On example is the EC Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions, which specifically encourages patent applications to include 
information on the geographical origin of biological material. However, it is non-binding and 
has voluntary nature. 
In the Philippines both pre-contractual and post-contractual problems are relevant due to 
asymmetric information. Pre-contractual problems are due to the benefits providers expect. 
Philippine providers expect high benefits. These unreasonable expectations paralyze the 
negotiations. Post-contractual problems arise on the user side regarding the use of the 
benefits, exclusivity, and quality. The problem is partly addressed by the new regulation. The 
use of benefits is defined and less over-regulation occurs due to better monitoring 
mechanisms. However, exclusivity and quality regarding the provided material are not 
guaranteed for the users. In Costa Rica pre-contractual problems do not occur, but post-
contractual problems on both sides have been recognized and addressed. Users cannot 
collect themselves, but exclusivity and quality are guaranteed. The received benefits flow to 
protection areas. In Ethiopia all mentioned post-contractual problems appear and the ABS 
regulation only addresses post-contractual problems on the provider side through, e.g., 
increased export control, joint research, and the requirement of a document from competent 
authority in user countries.  
In order to address asymmetric information user countries can signal that they are willing to 
comply and screen providers, especially intermediaries. In the EU only few examples of 
corporate and institutional policies and codes of conduct are known. Mainly botanical 
gardens and microbial collections introduce such policies. Most EU member states have 
established National Focal Points and CHMs to increase transparency and inform providers 
and users on existing procedures and activities. The promotion of co-operation and 
standardized contracts, as e.g., the ProBenefit project are useful examples how user 
countries can contribute to the mitigation of information deficiencies in the market. 
All three provider countries have difficulties with the time lags between collection of genetic 
resources and marketing of a product, and focus more on non-monetary benefits and 
diversified compensation schemes to address this problem. In the Philippines only one 
commercial contract has been concluded. However, this contract provided substantial non-
monetary benefits for a Philippine research institute. In future, the country will put more 
weight on up-front payments. In Costa Rica all bioprospecting contracts include regulations 
for milestone payments and royalties. However, apart from minor up-front payments, Costa 
Rica and INBio have received no payments so far. Even though, many patents have come 
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out from the INBio-Merck agreement. Ethiopia strongly focuses on non-monetary benefits, 
e.g., the participation in research and development. Monetary benefits are subordinate. Here 
it becomes clear that in Ethiopia ABS is considered more as an instrument that strengthens 
the local research capacities than setting incentives for conservation. User countries in the 
EU can address the problem by providing monetary contributions for a fund that allows 
payments that are independent of the commercialization of a product. Another option to 
bridge the gap and enable providers to offer value-added genetic resources is increased 
technology transfer. 
In Ethiopia and the Philippines good governance is much weaker than in Costa Rica, since 
the general situation not very positive, especially regarding political stability. However, in the 
Philippines it is hoped that the situation slightly improves due to the revised ABS regulation. 
In Ethiopia only recently an ABS regulation has been adopted despite the countries efforts 
regarding the African Model Law. In Costa Rica the picture is different. The country has a 
stable democratic and political system that favors bioprospecting. Besides, INBio, the ABS 
framework and the country’s experience indicate security and attract users. User countries 
have only limited influence on the governance of provider countries. Through development 
co-operation they can support the strengthening of institutions, actors and political 
processes. 
Administrative complexity plays a significant role in the Philippines and is less important in 
Costa Rica and Ethiopia. There, the access and negotiation cost have been very high for the 
users and hindered the conclusion of ABS contracts. Especially the existence of the 
ineffective intersectoral committee, representing the relevant stakeholders, and the long and 
costly application process has been a problem. The situation will improve through the 
abolishment of the ineffective intersectoral committee, determined timeframes, and the 
exclusion of academic research. The committee is substituted by governmental agencies. 
However, the responsibility is still allocated to different agencies, which makes coordination 
difficult. In Costa Rica INBio has been the leading agency for bioprospecting, including the 
application process. INBio, being a non-governmental institution, has worked very efficiently. 
Due to the regulative changes, administrative complexity will increase with the new 
intersectoral committee, which is very similar to the one that was dissolved in the Philippines. 
Ethiopia has mandated the governmental research institute IBC to overview and manage 
bioprospecting. Before, many institutions were involved in bioprospecting. Since its work 
concentrates on biodiversity just like INBio, it appears to be very appropriate to handle 
bioprospecting. It is, just like INBio, excluded from political processes. Therefore, it is 
expected that the institute will work efficiently. 
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User countries as the EU can mitigate the burden of the provider countries by informing, e.g., 
German users on the conditions and regulations in provider countries. National Focal Points 
can inform and prepare users and release provider countries. 
In general, provider countries have a weak position due to the market structure. This 
applies also to the three provider countries case studies. Additionally, ten years of over-
regulation have even more decreased the market position of the Philippines. The country is 
an ASEAN member. Being a member of such a regional coalition can strengthen its position. 
Beside, the country is also a member of the group of the megadiverse countries. Just as well 
as Costa Rica. In contrast to the Philippines, Costa Rica was able to improve its market 
position. The country and INBio have gained a high reputation because they have been 
reliable partners for bioprospecting and caused low transaction costs to users. Ethiopia’s 
weak position has only slightly, since the ABS regulation has been implemented. Due to the 
small number of co-operation projects, Ethiopia did not have a chance to increase its 
reputation and attractiveness by proving reliability and service. The African Model provides 
Ethiopia and other African countries opportunities to strengthen African countries as a 
coalition. The EU can support provider countries through technology transfer. This can 
enable provider countries to offer value-added products and increase their market position. 
7.3 Recommendations 
What can we learn from this analysis? What are feasible steps that should be taken by the 
international community and policy-makers to improve the concept and make it work? The 
analysis of the effectiveness and the perspectives of the ABS concept allow deriving 
recommendations to improve the ABS concept. 
Policy-makers need to initiate studies and analyze the critical factors in their countries and 
derive particular measures that address them in an adequate way. The analytic framework of 
this study can support these investigations and can be applied to other countries faced with 
the implementation of the ABS concept. All these countries, both user and provider countries, 
need to investigate their own regulative and institutional frameworks and assess the shape of 
the critical factors: property rights, asymmetric information, time lags, good governance, 
administrative complexity, and market structure. This information is needed to feed the 
international negotiations and advance them, but also to streamline the concept domestically. 
Only having in mind the critical factors an effective implementation is possible. 
However, although it has to be tested in deep research, it is obvious that the findings and 
results derived here are not only limited to the investigated case studies. They have a 
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general and global dimension across the different countries. ABS can only work in an 
international context. Too much time has passed already in which users and providers are 
more and more estranged instead of cooperating and creating an effective ABS framework. 
Only both providers and users can implement the concept and address the critical factors. 
Therefore, it is necessary to have a comprehensive international regime. The negotiations on 
an international regime need to be strengthened and successfully put to an end. However, it 
has to be shaped in a way that it addresses the critical factors.  
Not all of the analyzed measures in this study that can be introduced to address the critical 
factors are negotiatable on the international level, since providers or users do not agree. The 
measures under discussion are certain user measures, but there is no reason for not 
including also provider measures so that the international regime is more balanced and users 
have a higher incentive to agree to some users measures. Furthermore, the interplay of user 
and provider measures is important. Only an international regime can lay the foundation of 
an effective interplay. The international regime has to provide the framework and different 
options. Since the users and providers and the ABS activities are very heterogeneous, an 
international regime needs to be flexible. It can be expected that only very few mandatory 
measures will be included in the regime because users will try to prevent the adoption of 
many commitments. To be effective the regime has not to build on mandatory measures. The 
analysis shows that a range of measures is necessary to address the critical factors. 
Therefore, these certain measures need to be implemented jointly with the international 
regime on a voluntary basis. These provide the flexibility needed. 
Some possible approaches have been introduced and explicitly analyzed by this study. They 
show the point of departure. Some of them are already in place but do not function well. For 
provider countries it is important to assign property rights. Property rights are the heart of the 
whole concept. Institutions have to be strengthened and good governance has to be 
maintained or developed to create a good ABS environment and signal this to the users. 
Capacity development is very important. Jointly with the national governments, the 
international community should support capacity development activities. If providers can 
build up research capacity and increase vertical integration their position in the market will be 
stronger and as well as their participation in economic benefits. Through the provision of 
valued added products based on genetic resources, ABS can deliver some of its promises. 
Provider countries need to strengthen their position in the market and make coalitions work. 
So far, it seems that the group of the megadiverse countries is too heterogeneous and 
indecisive. When ABS contracts are concluded, providers have to make sure to accomplish 
adequate payments schemes, which lead to an apparent fair and equitable benefit-sharing. 
To remove this burden from the providers and overcome the time lag a biodiversity trust fund 
7 Conclusions 242
is an appropriate instrument. The analysis of this study strongly supports the establishment 
of such a fund, which allows providers to benefit directly of the use of their genetic resources 
and sets a strong incentive for conservation. 
On the user side, it can be expected that certificates and probably disclosure will be the only 
mandatory measure in an international regime. It is the only measure that is seriously 
discussed on the international level. The results of this study fully support this political 
development. However, it has to be kept in mind that these measures alone cannot solve the 
problems related to ABS. Other voluntary user measures are very important and need to be 
implemented and improved. Many measures exist to address the asymmetric information 
and build up trust among the parties. One possibility is a certification scheme to certify “good” 
users. However, if the establishment of such a complex system is too expensive, corporate 
and institutional policies need to be implemented by the user institutions and the user 
countries need to establish the National Focal Points and CHMs. They play a very important 
role. Some of them are already in place, but they are too passive and do not assume the 
responsibility they should. Besides, single and sectoral examples as projects and model 
contracts are not sufficiently used. They need to be broadly applied. Often the public sector 
is more active than the private sector. The initiative from the microbial collections should be 
applied by the pharmaceutical sector for instance. 
Often in the international debate the question is raised whether the bilateral ABS concept is 
adequate to reach the goals conservation, access and benefit-sharing and some voices 
propose a multilateral system as the ITPGRFA. Compared to the bilateral system a 
multilateral system causes much lower transaction costs in form of search and information 
costs, bargaining costs and enforcement and monitoring costs. However, the shared benefits 
will be lower and not directly linked to the genetic resources of a certain country. 
Even if this argument has been put forward, no serious study has been undertaken to 
analyze the options of a multilateral regime under the CBD. In the negotiations there are 
doubts that the states (both provider and user countries) will agree to move from the bilateral 
benefit-sharing to a multilateral one. Provider countries fear to loose their sovereignty and 
user countries worry about even more complicated access. Definitely, more research is 
needed to analyze this question.  
ABS provides an instrument that can monetarize the commercial value of genetic resources, 
but due to the complexity of the problem and the involvement of actors the effective 
implementation of the concept is difficult. ABS alone cannot stop the on-going loss of 
biodiversity. Therefore, the international community has to agree and advance other 
approaches to protect biodiversity. 
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Table A1: Interview partner, Philippines 
Date Name Institution 
02/04/2002 Elpidio Peria Searice, NGO 
05/04/2002 Patrick T. “Sonny” Batungbacal Tambuyog, Research Officer 
05/04/2002 Fabian Dayrit Ateneo University 
05/04/2002 Jose Padilla WWF 
08/04/2002 Dr. Lourdes Cruz Marine Science Center (MSI) 
09/04/2002 Althea O. “Teng” Lota Protected Area Wildlife Bureau (PAWB) 
09/04/2002 Noel Saguil MSI 
10/04/2002 Dr. Amelia Guevarra Vice Chancellor UP Diliman 
10/04/2002 Dr. Elisio Ponce Bureau of Agricultural Research, Director 
11/04/2002 Paz “Babs” Benavidez II Private Lawyer 
12/04/2002 Rodolfo Caberoy Philippine National Museum (PNM) 
12/04/2002 Dr. Domingo A. Madulid Philippine National Museum (PNM) 
12/04/2002 Rina Rosales REECS, Consultant 
13/04/2002 Jose Maria “Joey” Ochave UNILAB 
13/04/2002 Rene Salazar Consultant, SEARICE 
15/04/2002 Porfirio “Perry” Aliño MSI 
15/04/2002 Francis Gomez Altermed/Pascual Lab. 
16/04/2002 Dr. Giselle P. Concepion Marine Science Institute, UP Diliman 
16/04/2002 Analiza Albano Vitug Bureau for Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (BFAR) 
17/04/2002 Ms. Teresita (TS) Borromeo UP Los Banos, Department of Agronomy 
24/04/2002 Dr. med. Eliseo T. Balaynal Deputy Director General of PITAHC 
24/04/2002 Rene / Alesna, Edwyn B. Ledesma Bureau for Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (BFAR) 
25/04/2002 Gemiliano A. Aliqui Philippine Council for Health Research 
and Development (PCHRD), Executive 
Director 
25/04/2002 Dr. Julie Barcelona Philippine National Museum (PNM), 
Researcher and curator of ferns, Botany 
Division 
25/04/2002 Marivene Manuel Philippine National Museum (PNM), 
Zoology Division 
25/04/2002 Virgilio S. Palpal-Latoc Philippine National Museum (PNM) 
29/04/2002 Dr. Saturnina C. Halos Bureau of Agricultural Research, Senior 
Project Development Adviser 
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Table A2: Interview partner Costa Rica 
Date Name Institution 
14/11/2002 Edgar Fürst UNA 
15/11/2002 Grethel Aguilar Rojas IUCN 
15/11/2002 Isaak Rojas Friends of the Earth 
21/11/2002 Marta Liliana Jimenez MINAE 
25/11/2002 Miriam Miranda CINPE 
27/11/2002 Jaime Echevarria Consultant 
29/11/2002 Carlos Hernández Mesa Nacional Campesina 
02/12/2002 Patricia Madrigal Cordero SoLiDar, Coopperativa Autogestionaria 
de Servicios Profesionales para 
Solidaridad Social R.L. 
02/12/2002 Vivienne Solis Rivera SoLiDar, Coopperativa Autogestionaria 
de Servicios Profesionales para 
Solidaridad Social R.L. 
03/12/2002 Jorge Polimeni MINAE 
04/12/2002 Jorge A. Cabrera Medaglia INBio Attorney. Co-president of the 
Panel of Experts on Access and Benefit-
Sharing of the CBD, Professor of 
Environmental Law, University of Costa 
Rica 
04/12/2002 Luisa Eugenia Castillo Instituto Regional des Estudios en 
Sustancias Toxicas (IRET), UNA, 
Ciencias del Medio Ambiente 
05/12/2002 Eugenia Wo Ching Cedarena (Centro de Derecho Ambiental 
y de los Recursos Naturales) 
05/12/2002 Marco V. Zamora Castro FES 
09/12/2002 Silvia Rodriguez Cervantes UNA 
10/12/2002 Isabell Macdonald FECON 
12/12/2002 Ester Cama IXAUACAA 
13/12/2002 Ana Sylvia Huertas Business Development Officer, INBio 
16/12/2002 Donald Rojas Mesa Idigenas 
17/12/2002 Francisco E. Campos Rivers Organización para Estudios Tropicales 
(OET/OTS Organization for Tropical 
Studies) 
17/12/2002 Javier Guevarra Sequeira Oficina Atencíon al Usario, SINAC, 
MINAE, Ventania Unica 
19/12/2002 Carlos Manuel Rodriguez MINAE 
19/12/2002 Ana Sittelfeld UCR, former head of the department for 
bioprospecting at INBio 
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Table A3: Interview partner Ethiopia 
Date Name Institution 
7/10/2003 Demel Teketay Ethiopian Agricultural Research 
Organization 
8/10/2003 Mesfin Bayou Institute of Biodiversity Conservation 
(IBC) 
9/10/2003 Haileselassie Yibrah Institute of Biodiversity Conservation 
(IBC) 
10/10/2003 Sue Edwards National Herbarium, Addis Ababa 
University / Institute for Sustainable 
Development (ISD) 
13/10/2003 Martin Neumann GTZ 
14/10/2003 Imiru Tamirat Consultant 
14/10/2003 Dessalegn Mesfin Environmental Protection Authority 
(EPA) 
16/10/2003 Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher Director General, Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) 
16/10/2003 Regassa Feyissa Ethio Organic Seed Action 
17/10/2003 Yonas Yohannes Institute for Sustainable Development 
20/10/2003 Getachew Mengistie Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office 
(EIPO) 
22/10/2003 Girma Balch Institute of Biodiversity (IBC) 
20/10/2003 Zemedie Asfaw Biology Department Addis Ababa 
University 
23/10/2003 Mehdin Zewdu Conservation and Sustainable Use of 
Medical Plants Project (CSMPP) 
24/10/2003 Taye Bekele Institute of Biodiversity (IBC) 
 
9 Appendix 266
A. Guiding Questions Philippines 
1. The bilateral and multilateral access and benefit sharing approach have a positive 
effect on the conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources 
a. Is ABS a successful strategy for the conservation and sustainable use of plant 
genetic resources? 
b. Is the multilateral or the bilateral approach more promising? 
2. Assigned property rights are prerequisite for a successful ABS regime. 
a. Who owns the property rights for genetic resources in the Philippines? 
b. Who owns the property rights for genetic resources when they have left the country? 
c. Who gets intellectual property rights if a product or process is derived from the 
collected genetic resources? Is this correct? 
d. Suggestions for improvement according to the assignment of property rights for 
genetic resources? 
3. Bilateral contracts result in a win-win situation 
4. Monetary and non-monetary benefits can arise out of ABS agreements 
a. Which kind of benefits are perceived and received in the Philippines? 
b. - up-front payments or royalties? 
c. Who gets the benefits? 
d. Which benefits are of more importance (non-monetary, monetary)? 
e. Do these benefits have an positive effect on the conservation of biodiversity? 
f. Are there other benefits not being concerned with biodiversity? 
g. What benefits receive the user of genetic resources from a Philippine stakeholder’s 
view? 
h. What are the costs of the bilateral contracts for the provider and the user? 
5. Application process is bureaucratic, time-consuming, causes high transaction 
costs and is one of the main reasons for missing interested firms 
a. Which stakeholders are involved in the application process? 
b. What are stakeholders’ experiences with ABS application process? 
c. How do stakeholders evaluate the application process (time)? 
d. Suggestions for improvement for the Philippine and the international ABS regulation? 
6. Diverging views and interests of the stakeholders result in inefficient ABS 
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a. Who are the stakeholders being involved in ABS? 
b. What are the views and interests of the different stakeholders? 
7. Over-regulation is a consequence of asymmetric information 
a. What are the concerns of the resource provider in the ABS process? 
b. How do providers try to obviate these concerns? 
8. Legal and institutional insecurity result in a “country-substitution” 
a. How do the Philippine stakeholders assess the international acceptance (resource 
users’ acceptance) of the national ABS regulations? 
 - Will the benefits really be used for biodiversity measures? 
b. How do they evaluate the ABS regulations in other countries (better, worse 
examples)? 
9. International control and sanction mechanisms are necessary for efficient ABS 
regulations 
a. Which are the control and sanction mechanisms for ABS? 
b. Are the control and sanction mechanisms efficient? 
Detailed questions about the bilateral approach (CBD) 
EO 247, IACBGR, PIC, BS, CRA, ARA 
Wildlife Act 
Detailed questions about the multilateral approach (ITPGRFA) 
ITPGRFA, Trust Fund, Annex list (crops not in the list?), Farmer’s rights 
PVP bill 
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B. Guiding Questions Costa Rica 
1. The bilateral benefit sharing approach has a positive effect on the conservation 
and sustainable use of genetic resources 
a. Is bilateral ABS a successful strategy for the conservation and sustainable use of 
genetic resources/biodiversity? 
b. How important is this strategy compared to other strategies? Which other strategies 
does Costa Rica have to promote the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity? 
c. What are the major threats of biodiversity in Costa Rica? Do they differ from those in 
other countries? 
2. Assigned property rights are prerequisite for a successful ABS regime. 
a. Who owns the property rights for biodiversity (genetic resources) in Costa Rica? 
- Bioprospecting on private land (negotiations, royalties)? Has a private landowner 
the same status as for example INBio? 
- PIC: how is the course of the procedure, who controls? 
b. Who owns the property rights for genetic resources when they have left the country? 
c. Who gets intellectual property rights if a product or process is derived from the 
collected genetic resources? Is this correct? 
d. Suggestions for improvement according to the assignment of property rights for 
genetic resources? 
3. Bilateral contracts result in a win-win situation 
a. Do you think that bilateral contracts result in a win-win situation? 
4. Monetary and non-monetary benefits can arise out of ABS agreements 
a. Which kind of benefits are perceived and received in Costa Rica? 
- Up-front payments or royalties? 
- Before bioprospecting: 10% of INBio’s research budget, salary, technology; after 
bioprospecting: ?% to INBio => 50% to MINAE 
- Which royalties can be justified (1-5% of net profit)? 
- Are 50% for MINAE enough? 
b. Who gets the benefits? 
c. Which benefits are of more importance (non-monetary, monetary)? 
d. Do these benefits have a positive effect on the conservation of biodiversity? 
e. Are there other benefits not being concerned with biodiversity (national economy)? 
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f. What benefits receive the user of genetic resources from a Costa Rica stakeholder’s 
view? 
5. According to Biodiversity Law the state is responsible for the ABS, but it 
transferred the responsibility to an independent institute (INBio) 
a. What is the role of the National Commission for the Management of Biodiversity? 
Focus point for applicants? Is it efficient, are the representatives paid (Philippine 
experiences)? 
b. Is INBio only responsible for National Parks? Is bioprospecting possible without 
INBio? 
c. Who is responsible for other areas outside of protected areas? 
d. Has in such areas any bioprospecting taken place? Before and after the adoption of 
the Biodiversity Law? 
e. Suggestions for improvement for the Philippine and the international ABS regulation? 
6. The privatization of the application process is a major advantage of the Costa 
Rican ABS system 
a. Can a private organization/institute better fulfil the function of negotiating, leading 
through the application process (instead of state or private landowner)? Why? 
7. The composition of INBio (inventory, information management/distribution) is a 
decisive factor for a successful institution 
a. How import is the concentration of biodiversity management within INBio? 
b. Is INBio self supporting? 
8. Legal and institutional security attracts bioprospectors (multinational companies) 
and hinder a “country-substitution” 
a. How long did the negotiations last? Who was included? 
b. What are the costs of the bilateral contracts for the provider and the user? 
c. How many contracts have been concluded [academic (other regulation?), 
commercial/national, international]? 
d. How do you judge the new Biodiversity Law? 
e. How do the Costa Rican stakeholders assess the international acceptance (resource 
users’ acceptance) of the national ABS regulations? 
f. Will the benefits really used for biodiversity measures? Are they a contribution to 
biodiversity conservation? 
g. How do they evaluate the ABS regulations in other countries (better, worse 
examples)? 
9. Asymmetric Information about benefits, costs, quality, exclusivity can hinder the 
signing of contracts 
a. How is the problem of asymmetric information tackled? 
- Provider’s knowledge: foregone costs/conserving costs, quality of areas, 
exclusivity, use of benefits? 
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- User’s knowledge: expected benefits, development? 
b. How are the royalties determined (costs/benefits/different)? 
10. International control and sanction mechanisms are necessary for efficient ABS 
regulations 
a. Which are the control and sanction mechanisms for ABS (national/international)? 
b. Are the control and sanction mechanisms efficient? 
Detailed questions  
Contact persons? 
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C. Guiding Questions Ethiopia 
1. The bilateral benefit sharing approach has a positive effect on the conservation 
and sustainable use of genetic resources 
a. Is bilateral ABS a successful strategy for the conservation and sustainable use of 
genetic resources/biodiversity? 
b. How important is this strategy compared to other strategies? Which other strategies 
does Ethiopia have to promote the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity? 
g. What are the major threats of biodiversity in Ethiopia? Do they differ from those in 
other countries? 
2. Assigned property rights are prerequisite for a successful ABS regime. 
a. Who owns the property rights for biodiversity (genetic resources) in Ethiopia? Do you 
think property rights system will change/should change? 
- Bioprospecting on land used by farmers (negotiations, royalties)? 
- PIC: how is the course of the procedure, who controls? 
b. Who owns the property rights for genetic resources when they have left the country? 
c. Who gets intellectual property rights if a product or process is derived from the 
collected genetic resources? Is this correct? 
d. Suggestions for improvement according to the assignment of property rights for 
genetic resources? 
3. Bilateral contracts result in a win-win situation 
a. Do you think that bilateral contracts result in a win-win situation? 
4. Monetary and non-monetary benefits can arise out of ABS agreements 
a. Which kind of benefits can be perceived and received in Ethiopia? 
- Up-front payments or royalties?  
- Which royalties can be justified (1-5% of net profit)? 
b. Who gets the benefits? 
c. Which benefits are of more importance (non-monetary, monetary)? 
d. Do these benefits have a positive effect on the conservation of biodiversity? 
e. Are there other benefits not being concerned with biodiversity (national economy)? 
5. IBRC is responsible for bioprospecting in Ethiopia 
a. What is the role of the IBCR? 
b. Is only IBCR responsible? Is bioprospecting possible without IBCR? 
c. Has bioprospecting taken place? 
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d. Suggestions for improvement for the international ABS regulation? Other countries? 
6. IBCR is in a similar position has INBio in Costa Rica 
a. Can an external organization/institute better fulfil the function of negotiating, leading 
through the application process than a ministerial department (instead of the state)? 
Why? 
7. The composition of IBCR (biodiversity science) is a decisive factor for a 
successful institution 
a. How import is the concentration of biodiversity management within IBCR? 
8. Legal and institutional security attracts bioprospectors (multinational companies) 
and hinder a “country-substitution” 
a. How long did the negotiations last? Who was included? 
b. What are the costs of the bilateral contracts for the provider and the user? 
c. How many contracts have been concluded [academic (other regulation?), 
commercial/national, international]? 
d. How do you judge the Proclamation draft? 
e. How do the Ethiopian stakeholders assess the international acceptance (resource 
users’ acceptance) of the national ABS regulations? 
f. Will the benefits really used for biodiversity measures? Are they a contribution to 
biodiversity conservation? 
g. How do they evaluate the ABS regulations in other countries (better, worse 
examples)? 
9. Asymmetric Information about benefits, costs, quality, exclusivity can hinder the 
signing of contracts 
a. How is the problem of asymmetric information tackled? 
- Provider’s knowledge: foregone costs/conserving costs, quality of areas, 
exclusivity, use of benefits? 
- User’s knowledge: expected benefits, development? 
b. How are the royalties determined (costs/benefits/different)? 
10. International control and sanction mechanisms are necessary for efficient ABS 
regulations 
a. Which are the control and sanction mechanisms for ABS (national/international)? 
b. Are the control and sanction mechanisms efficient? 
Detailed questions  
Contact persons? 
 
